




NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: POL 422

COURSE TITLE: REVOLUTION AND SOCIETY



POL 422

REVOLUTION AND SOCIETY

**Course Developer(s)/Writers: Professor Nduka Nwabueze
Okechukwu Augustine Agugua (Ph.D)**

Department of Sociology
Faculty of Social Sciences
University of Lagos,

Akoka, Nigeria.

Course Editor:

Professor Fatima Ibrahim Bayero

Department of Political Science

Faculty of Social Sciences

Bayero University

Kano, Nigeria.

Course Coordinator:

Ifeyinwa M. Ogbonna-Nwaogu

Department of Political Science

Faculty of Social Sciences

National Open University of Nigeria
Abuja.

Programme Leader:

Aminu Umar (Ph.D)

Department of Political Science

Faculty of Social Sciences

National Open University of Nigeria
Abuja.



NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

University Village, Plot 91, Cadastral Zone,

NnamdiAzikiwe Express Way,

Jabi- Abuja.

TABLE OF CONTENTS	Pages
Introduction	1
Course Aims.....	2
Course Objectives.....	3
Working Through This Course.....	4
Course Materials.....	5
Study Units.....	6
Self-Assessment Exercises (SAE)	6
Tutors Marked Assignments (TMA)	7
Final Examination and Grading.....	8
Course Marking Scheme.....	9
How to get the most from this course.....	10
Tutors and Tutorials.....	11
Summary.....	11

1.1 Introduction

Welcome to POL 422: REVOLUTION AND SOCIETY

This course is a three (3) unit course for undergraduate students in Political Science. The course guide gives you an overview of what Society and Revolutions is all about. It equally provides you with the necessary information on the organization and requirements of the course. Indeed, the overall objective of this course is to expose you to the concept of revolutions and its relevance in the political affairs of every society. This is important because the critical issues of underdevelopment in African societies today are not unconnected with our rulers' misconception of power and its misuse. The reasons why there are variants in the use of power and authority, and different perceptions of issues of social contract, legitimation, and crisis of legitimation among the rulers and the ruled, will be fully addressed in this course.

1.2 Course Aims & Objectives

The course will enable you to:

- (1) Have background information and knowledge in Societal Relations, Social Contract; its fulfillment or negation, Legitimation crisis, and Political Revolutions;
- (2) Be up to date with the theoretical perspectives as well as methodological issues which the course has to grapple with;
- (3) Understand the interconnectedness of many patterns of political governance and misuse of power which appear distinct;

(4) Explore the theoretical anchors in studies of cultural background, environmental settings, social identity, values, attitudes, and emotions encompassed in personality and cognitive processes, and institutions affecting the 'Political Subject' in a particular political environment.

(5) know whether political behavior patterns is universal or is restricted to people who live in one particular culture or in one type of political system.

(6) Learn whether citizens, who exercise their political rights in a democracy, by visiting the voting booth on election-day, could, under certain circumstances, support an authoritarian dictatorship that forbids political competition and tortures its opposition.

(7) Discover which theoretical perspective, perceptions, personality, and group dynamics affect the policy-making arena.

(8) Comprehend the commonly held assumptions that self-interest drives behaviour and to explain how societal factors affect our behaviour as well as others in ways we rarely recognize at the time the behaviours takes place.

(9) Recognize some of the explosive and restive moments in human history, and in recent times afflicting our society (such as Boko Haram, MEND, MASSOB, IPOB etc.); and on the other hand, explain the socio – cultural dynamics (i.e. the social, historical and causal path analysis) of group agitations, communal conflicts, nationalism, political extremism, global politics, etc.

(10) Show how to prevent abuse of power, as well as conflict resolution mechanisms, and how to recover from it.

(11) Know the enormous complexity of human behaviour and illuminate the importance of understanding political revolution's significant role in improving the state and nature of governance.

1.3 Working through this Course

The course is written in study units within Modules. You are also provided with related reading materials for each topic examined. At the end of each unit, you will be required to attempt Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs) for assessment purposes. And at the end of the course, you will write a final examination.

1.4 Study Units

There are twenty units in this course spanning five modules. These are as follows:

MODULE 1 SOCIETY, ITS DYNAMICS, AND MEANING OF REVOLUTION

- Unit 1 The idea of society; basic features of society
- Unit 2 Types of society
- Unit 3 The basis of order and stability; civil society as public space
- Unit 4 Meaning of revolution; revolution, rebellion, insurgency and terrorism:
Differences and similarities

MODULE 2 REVOLUTIONS IN WORLD HISTORY

- Unit 1 The British revolution of the seventeenth century; the Mexican revolution
- Unit 2 The American Revolution; the Russian revolution
- Unit 3 the Longest Revolution: China (1911-1949)
- Unit 4 French Revolution

MODULE 3 REVOLUTIONS IN THE ARAB WORLD

Unit 1 Introduction; Tunisia

Unit 2 Egypt; Libya

Unit 3 Yemen

Unit 4 Syria

MODULE 4 PROTEST AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Unit 1 Introduction to protest and social movement

Unit 2 Four stages of social movement

Unit 3 Four stages of social movements (cont'd)

Unit 4 Types of social movement organizations

MODULE 5 CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Unit 1 Mass society theory

Unit 2 Relative deprivation theory

Unit 3 Resource mobilization theory

Unit 4 Structural strain theory

1.5 TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

Every unit contains a list of references and further readings. Try to get as many as possible of those textbooks and materials listed. The textbooks and materials are meant to deepen your knowledge of the course. For this course, it is highly recommended that you consult widely in your further choice of reading materials.

1.6 ASSIGNMENT FILE

An assessment file and a marking scheme will be made available to you. In the assessment file, you will find details of the works you must submit to your tutor for marking. There are two aspects of the assessment of this course; the tutor marked and the written examination. The marks you obtain in these two areas will make up your final marks. The assignment must be

submitted to your tutor for formal assessment in accordance with the deadline stated in the presentation schedule and the assignment file. The work you submit to your tutor for assessment will account for 30% of your total score.

1.7 TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAS)

You will have to submit a specified number of the (TMAs). Every unit in this course has a Tutor-Marked Assignment. You will be assessed on three performances from the (TMAs) which will be used for computing your 30%. When you have completed each assignment, send it together with a Tutor marked Assignment form to your Tutor. Make sure each assignment reaches your tutor on or before the deadline for submissions. If for any reason, you cannot complete your work on time, contact your tutor for a discussion on the possibility of an extension. Extensions will not be granted after the due date unless under exceptional circumstances.

1.8 FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination will be a test of three hours. All areas of the course will be examined. Find time to read the unit all over before your examination. The final examination will attract 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of questions, which reflect the kind of self-assessment exercise, and tutor marked assignment you have previously encountered. You should use the time between completing the last unit, and taking the examination to revise the entire course.

1.9 COURSE MARKING SCHEME

The following table lays out how the actual course mark allocation is broken down.

Assessment	Marks
Assignments of three TMAs	= 30%
Final Examination	= 70%
Total	= 100%

PRESENTATION SCHEDULE

The dates for submission of all assignment will be communicated to you. You will also be told the date of completing the study units and dates for examinations.

Course Overview

Unit	Title of Work	Week(s) Activity	Assessment
	Course Guide		
Module 1	<i>Society, Its Dynamics, and Meaning of Revolution</i>		
1	The idea of society; basic features of society	Week1	Assignment1
2	Types of society	Week2	Assignment2
3	The basis of order and stability; civil society as public space	Week3	Assignment3
4	Meaning of revolution; revolution, rebellion, insurgence and terrorism:differences and similarities	Week4	Assignment4
Module 2	<i>Revolutions in World History</i>		
1	The British revolution of the seventeenth century; the Mexican revolution	Week1	Assignment1
2	The American revolution; the Russian revolution	Week2	Assignment2
3	The longest revolution: China (1911-1949)	Week3	Assignment3
4	French revolution	Week4	Assignment4
5	Trait & Motive Theories	Week5	Assignment5
Module 3	<i>Revolutions in the Arab World</i>		
1	Introduction; Tunisia	Week1	Assignment1
2	Egypt; Libya	Week2	Assignment2
3	Yemen	Week3	Assignment3
4	Syria.	Week4	Assignment4
Module 4	<i>Protest and Social Movements</i>		

1	Introduction to protest and social movement	Week1	Assignment1
2	Four stages of social movement	Week2	Assignment2
3	Unit iii. Four stages of social movement (cont'd)	Week3	Assignment3
4	Types of social movement organizations	Week4	Assignment4
Module 5	<i>Contemporary Theories of Social Movements</i>		
1	Mass society theory		
2	Relative deprivation theory	Week5	Assignment5
3	Resource mobilization theory		
4	Structural strain theory		

GETTING THE MOST FROM THIS COURSE

You will be required to study the units on your own. However, you may arrange to meet with your tutor for tutorials on an optional basis at a Study Centre. Also, you can organize interactive sessions with your course mates.

In distance learning, the study units replace the University lecture. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning, you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your pace, and at a time and place that suits you best. Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same way a lecturer might give you some reading to do, the study units tells you when to read, and which are your text materials or set books. You are provided exercises to do at appropriate points, just as a lecturer might give you an in-class exercise. Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit, and how a particular unit is integrated with the other units as a whole. Next to this is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do by the time you have completed the unit. These learning objectives are meant to guide your study. The moment a unit is finished, you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If this is made a habit, then you will significantly improve your chances of passing the course. The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your set books or from the reading section.

The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, telephone your tutor. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need assistance, do not hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.

1. Read this course guide thoroughly; it is your first assignment.
2. Organize a study schedule. Design a 'Course Overview' to guide you through the Course. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units. Important information, e.g. details of your tutorials, and the date of the first day of the semester is available from the Study Centre. You need to gather all the information into one place, such as your diary or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates and schedule of work for each unit.
3. Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything to stay faithful to it. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind with their course work. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please, let your tutor know before it is too late for help.
4. Turn to Unit 1, and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.
5. Assemble the study materials. You will need your text books and the unit you are studying at any point in time.
6. Work through the unit. As you work through the unit, you will know what sources to consult for further information.
7. Keep in touch with your Study Centre. Up-to-date information on your course subjects will be continuously available there.
8. Well before the relevant due date (about 4 weeks before due dates), keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignment carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the examination. Submit all assignments not later than the due date.
9. Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study materials or consult your tutor.
10. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to pace your study so that you keep yourself on schedule.

11. When you have submitted an assignment to your tutor for marking, do not wait for its return before starting on the next unit. Keep to your schedule. When the assignment is returned, pay particular attention to your tutor's comments, both on the tutor marked assignment form and also the written comments on the ordinary assignments.

12. After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in the Course Guide).

TUTORS AND TUTORIALS

Information relating to the tutorials will be provided at the appropriate time. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, keep a close watch on your progress and on any difficulties you might encounter and provide assistance to you during the course. You must take your tutor-marked assignments to the study centre well before the due date (at least two working days are required). They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible. Do not hesitate to contact your tutor if you need help. Contact your tutor if you experience any of the following:

*Not understanding any part of the study units or the assigned readings;

*Having difficulty with the exercises;

*You have a question or problem with an assignment or with your tutor's comments on an assignment or with the grading of an assignment.

Moreover, you should try your best to attend the tutorials. This is the only chance to have face-to-face contact with your tutor and ask questions which are answered instantly. You can raise any problem encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefit from course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will learn a lot from participating in discussions actively.

SUMMARY

The course guide gives you an overview of what to expect in the course-Society and Revolutions such as: how society, political culture, governance environment, personality, and group dynamics affect political governance patterns and subsequently policy-making and

implementation outcomes; either by way of conformity or deviance in revolutions. We wish you success in the course and hope that you will find it both interesting and useful.

MODULE 1: SOCIETY, ITS DYNAMICS AND MEANING OF REVOLUTION

Module 1, which is the introductory module, aims to expose you to the dynamics of society and some conceptual issues in the field of revolution and terrorism. If you read and listen to news often, you tend to see the frequent occurrence of the word *society*. If you are a deep thinker, you might have wondered why the society exists in the first place, you might have also wondered the rationale for which the society exists. Some thinkers have put up arguments and thought on the issue of whether the individual or the society is primary; with this in mind, you may ask yourself two simple questions:

(1) Can we have society without the individuals?

(2) On which space will individuals exist without the society?

It is the answers to these questions that made some people conclude that the co-existence of the entities is what keeps the world going. So if individuals exist in the society, it is definite that there would be differential orientations and opinions on the same phenomenon. In fact, there would be different categories of people, different origins, religions, values, traditions and so on. In situations where one group is unable to accommodate or live peacefully with others, tension will set in. Unresolved tensions will eventually lead to acrimony which eventually blows into revolution. Failure of the eighteenth century French rulers to quickly blend the oppressed into the system and carry them along eventually resulted in French Revolution.

The reason for the above explanation is to expose you to the basis in which society exists, and how co-existence of non-accommodating dynamic groups-as we have in the world today- causes revolution. Supposedly, this should open our eyes to the nexus of society and revolution which is our main discussion of this project.

This module is divided into four units that are logically interrelated such that an understanding of one unit aids the swift grasp of others. There are self-assessment exercises in every unit, and there are tutor-marked exercises and answers at the end of this module.

Unit 1: THE IDEA OF SOCIETY; BASIC FEATURES OF SOCIETY

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 The idea of society

3.2 Basic features of society

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This is the first unit of module 1. This unit will introduce you to the concept of society and the issue of whether the individual in the society is primary. Importantly, the view of society as opined by different writers will be known to you in this unit; as a point of reference, historical conception of the society as evident in the work of Karl Marx will be clear to you here. In addition, the basic characteristics of the society will be taught to you in this unit. You will learn in this unit that no matter how large and complex a society is, there are commonalities among its entities and components.

2.0 Objectives

After the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- ✓ Have a broad understanding of the concepts of society
- ✓ Be exposed to the argument of the primacy of individual or society
- ✓ Understand the characteristics of and commonalities of societal entities

3.0 Main Content

3.1 The Idea of Society

Society is a central component in the study of revolution and its causes because revolution does not occur outside the society but within the confines of the society. A society consists of people who interact and share a common culture. Indeed, Society is indispensable to the individual because it possesses, at a given moment, an accumulation of values, of plans and materials which the individual could never accumulate alone. But the individual is also indispensable to society because by his activity and ingenuity he creates all the material values, and the whole needs of civilization. Some definitions of society (particularly, older ones) specify that interaction occurs within some shared boundaries. Increasing globalization and the rapid expansion of communication, information, and transportation technologies all make culture sharing and convergence possible across the globe. Dropping this geographic aspect of the definition of society allows a more accurate and complex understanding of all

that a society is. For example, Palestinian society defies any strictly defined territorial boundaries (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 2000).

Macionis (2008) draws his understanding of society from the points of view of Gerhard Lenski (1924-2015), Karl Marx (1818-1883), Max Weber (1864-1920) and Emile Durkheim (1858-1917). Macionis (2008) noted that society refers to people who interact in a defined territory and share a culture, and further stated that Lenski describes how societies have changed over the past 10,000 years. According to him, Lenski points to the importance of technology in shaping any society. In the views of Macionis (2008), Karl Marx, like Lenski, took a long historical view of societies. But Marx's story of society is all about social conflict that arises as people work within an economic system to produce material goods. Max Weber tells a different tale, showing that the power of ideas shapes society. Weber contrasted the traditional thinking of simple societies with the rational thought that dominates complex societies today. Finally, Emile Durkheim helps us see the different ways that traditional and modern societies cling together.

According to Stolley (2005), society includes our social institutions, the major social organizations formed to meet our human needs. The family, medical system, military, religious system, political system, economy, and educational system are all examples of social institutions. Many introductory sociology textbooks have chapters that discuss these institutions separately, explaining how sociologists apply their theoretical perspectives and research skills to each of these aspects of society. All of these social institutions are interrelated. Together, they comprise a society's social structure, the way a society is organized around the regulated ways people interrelate and organize social life. What happens in the economy, for example, impacts all other institutions to some extent. If the economy takes a downturn, large numbers of people might have trouble supporting their families and paying for medical care or college.

The term society is derived from a Latin word *socius*, which means association, togetherness, gregariousness, or simply group life. The concept of society refers to a relatively large grouping or collectivity of people who share more or less common and distinct culture, occupying a certain geographical locality, with the feeling of identity or belongingness, having all the necessary social arrangements or insinuations to sustain itself. We may add a more revealing definition of society: “A society is an autonomous grouping of people who inhabit a common territory, have a common culture (shared set of values, beliefs, customs and so forth) and are linked to one another through routinized social interactions and interdependent statuses and roles” (Stolley, 2005). Society also may mean a certain population, group, a community.

The common tendency in sociology has been to conceptualize society as a system, focusing on the bounded and integrated nature of society. Great founders of sociology had also focused on the dynamic aspect of society. Such early sociologists as Comte, Marx and Spencer grasped the concept of society as a dynamic system evolving historically and inevitably towards complex industrial structures. But in recent years such an approach has been criticized. Contemporary sociologists now frequently use the network conception of society. This approach views society as overlapping, dynamic and fluid network of economic, political, cultural and other relations at various levels. Such a conception is analytically more powerful and reflects the reality especially in the context of modern, globalizing world.

3.2 BASIC FEATURES OF SOCIETY

First, a society is usually a relatively large grouping of people in terms of size. In a very important sense, thus, society may be regarded as the largest and the most complex social group that sociologists study. Second, as the above definition shows, the most important thing about a society is that its members share common and distinct culture. This sets it apart from the other population groups. Third, a society also has a definite, limited space or territory. The populations that make up a given society are thus

locatable in a definite geographical area. The people consider that area as their own. Fourth, the people who make up a society have the feeling of identity and belongingness. There is also the feeling of oneness. Such identity feeling emanates from the routinized pattern of social interaction that exists among the people and the various groups that make up the society (Henslin and Nelson,1995; Giddens, 1996).

Fifth, members of a society are considered to have a common origin and common historical experience. They feel that they have also common destiny. Sixth, members of a society may also speak a common mother tongue or a major language that may serve as a national heritage. Seventh, a society is autonomous and independent in the sense that it has all the necessary social institutions and organizational arrangements to sustain the system. However, a society is not an island, in the sense that societies are interdependent. There has always been inter– societal relations. People interact socially, economically and politically. It is important to note that the above features of a society are by no means exhaustive and they may not apply to all societies. The level of a society’s economic and technological development, the type of economic or livelihood system a society is engaged in may create some variations among societies in terms of these basic features.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES (SAEs)

- 1.** If you must give primacy to one, would you choose the individual or the society? Give logical reasons for your choice of answer.
- 2.** Highlight and discuss the various features of society.

Unit : TYPES OF SOCIETY

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Pre-industrial societies

3.2 Industrial societies

3.3 Post-industrial societies

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This is the second unit of module 1. Here, historical development of society from the early phase to the stage it is presently will be clear to you. Importantly, the role of Industrial Revolution in the transition of society from one stage to another will be clarified in this unit. Importantly, you will see the core features of each stage in the societal development ladder.

2.0 Objectives

After the end of this unit, you will be able to:

- ✓ Understand the historical development of society
- ✓ Identify different types of society with the features of each
- ✓ See factors that brought about the emergence of one type of society from the previous one

3.0 Main Content: Types of Society

William Little in his 2015 book “Introduction to Sociology” discussed types of societies He classified them into pre-industrial, industrial and post-industrial societies.

3.1 Pre-Industrial Societies

Before the Industrial Revolution and the widespread use of machines, societies were small, rural, and dependent largely on local resources. Economic production was limited to the amount of labour a human being could provide, and there were few specialized occupations. The very first occupation was that of hunter-gatherer.

Hunter-gatherer societies demonstrate the strongest dependence on the environment of the various types of preindustrial societies. As the basic structure of human society until about 10,000–12,000 years ago, these groups were based around kinship or tribes. Hunter-gatherers relied on their surroundings

for survival—they hunted wild animals and foraged for uncultivated plants for food. When resources became scarce, the group moved to a new area to find sustenance, meaning they were nomadic. These societies were common until several hundred years ago, but today only a few hundred remain in existence, such as indigenous Australian tribes sometimes referred to as “Aborigines,” or the Bambuti, a group of pygmy hunter-gatherers residing in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Hunter-gatherer groups are quickly disappearing as the world’s population explodes (Little, 2015).

Pastoral Societies: changing conditions and adaptations led some societies to rely on the domestication of animals where circumstances permitted. Roughly 7,500 years ago, human societies began to recognize their ability to tame and breed animals and to grow and cultivate their own plants. Pastoral societies rely on the domestication of animals as a resource for survival. Unlike earlier hunter-gatherers who depended entirely on existing resources to stay alive, pastoral groups were able to breed livestock for food, clothing, and transportation, creating a surplus of goods. Herding, or pastoral, societies remained nomadic because they were forced to follow their animals to fresh feeding grounds. Around the time that pastoral societies emerged, specialized occupations began to develop, and societies commenced trading with local groups (Little, 2015).

Horticultural Societies: around the same time that pastoral societies were on the rise, another type of society developed, based on the newly developed capacity for people to grow and cultivate plants. Previously, the depletion of a region’s crops or water supply forced pastoral societies to relocate in search of food sources for their livestock. Horticultural societies formed in areas where rainfall and other conditions allowed them to grow stable crops. They were similar to hunter-gatherers in that they largely depended on the environment for survival, but since they didn’t have to abandon their location to follow resources, they were able to start permanent settlements. This created more stability and more material goods and became the basis for the first revolution in human survival (Little, 2015).

Agricultural Societies: while pastoral and horticultural societies used small, temporary tools such as digging sticks or hoes, agricultural societies relied on permanent tools for survival. Around 3000 B.C.E., an explosion of new technology known as the Agricultural Revolution made farming possible—and profitable. Farmers learned to rotate the types of crops grown on their fields and to reuse waste products such as fertilizer, leading to better harvests and bigger surpluses of food. New tools for digging and harvesting were made of metal, making them more effective and longer lasting. Human settlements grew into towns and cities, and particularly bountiful regions became centres of trade and commerce. This is also the age in which people had the time and comfort to engage in more contemplative and thoughtful activities, such as music, poetry, and philosophy. This period was referred to as the “dawn of civilization” because of the development of leisure and humanities. Crafts people were able to support themselves through the production of creative, decorative, or thought-provoking aesthetic objects and writings. As resources became more plentiful, social classes became more divisive. Those who had more resources could afford better living and developed into a class of nobility. Difference in social standing between men and women increased. As cities expanded, ownership and preservation of resources became a pressing concern (Little, 2015).

Feudal Societies: The Ninth century gave rise to feudal societies. These societies contained a strict hierarchical system of power based around land ownership and protection. The nobility, known as lords, placed vassals in charge of pieces of land. In return for the resources that the land provided, vassals promised to fight for their lords. These individual pieces of land, known as fiefdoms, were cultivated by the lower class. In return for maintaining the land, peasants were guaranteed a place to live and protection from outside enemies. Power was handed down through family lines, with peasant families serving lords for generations and generations. Ultimately, the social and economic system of feudalism would fail, replaced by capitalism and the technological advances of the industrial era (Little, 2015).

3.2 Industrial Societies

In the 18th century, Europe experienced a dramatic rise in technological invention, ushering in an era known as the Industrial Revolution. What made this period remarkable was the number of new inventions that influenced people's daily lives. Within a generation, tasks that had until this point required months of labour became achievable in a matter of days. Before the Industrial Revolution, work was largely person-or animal-based, relying on human workers or horses to power mills and drive pumps. In 1782, James Watt and Matthew Boulton created a steam engine that could do the work of 12horses by itself. Steam power began appearing everywhere. Instead of paying artisans to painstakingly spin wool and weave it into cloth, people turned to textile mills that produced fabric quickly at a better price, and often with better quality. Rather than planting and harvesting fields by hand, farmers were able to purchase mechanical seeders and threshing machines that caused agricultural productivity to soar. Products such as paper and glass became available to the average person, and the quality and accessibility of education and health care soared. Gas lights allowed increased visibility in the dark, and towns and cities developed a night life.

One of the results of increased productivity and technology was the rise of urban centres. Workers flocked to factories for jobs, and the population of cities became increasingly diverse. The new generation became less preoccupied with maintaining family land and traditions, and more focused on acquiring wealth and achieving upward mobility for themselves and their family. People wanted their children and their children's children to continue to rise to the top, and as capitalism increased, so did social mobility.

It was during the 18th and 19th centuries of the Industrial Revolution that sociology was born. Life was changing quickly and the long-established traditions of the agricultural eras did not apply to life in the larger cities. Masses of people were moving to new environments and often found themselves faced with horrendous conditions of filth, overcrowding, and poverty. Social scientists emerged to study the relationship between the individual members of society and society as a whole, (Little, 2015; Poloma, 1979).

It was during this time that power moved from the hands of the aristocracy and “old money” to business-savvy newcomers who amassed fortunes in their lifetimes. Families such as the Rockefellers and the Vanderbilts in the United States became the new power players, using their influence in business to control aspects of government as well. Eventually, concerns over the exploitation of workers led to the formation of labour unions and laws that set mandatory conditions for employees. Although the introduction of new technology at the end of the 19th century ended the industrial age, much of our social structure and social ideas—like family, childhood, and time standardization—have a basis in industrial society (Poloma, 1979).

3.3 Post-Industrial Society

Post-industrial society is also known as the information societies. Unlike industrial societies that are rooted in the production of material goods, information societies are based on the production of information and services. Digital technology is the steam engine of information societies. Since the economy of information societies is driven by knowledge and not material goods, power lies with those in charge of storing and distributing information. Members of a post-industrial society are likely to be employed as sellers of services—software programmers or business consultants, for example—instead of producers of goods. Social classes are divided by access to education, since without technical skills, people in an information society lack the means for success (Little, 2015; Poloma, 1979).

SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES (SAEs)

1. In your understanding of the characteristics of each type of society, which one would you say the Nigerian society belongs? Give reasons for your answer.
2. Identify and explain the types of society known to you.

UNIT III: THE BASIS OF ORDER AND STABILITY; CIVIL SOCIETY AS PUBLIC SPACE

CONTENTS

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 The basis of order and society

3.2 Civil society as public space

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

Introduction

This module will expose you to the works of some core figure in structural functionalism. When it comes to the issues of peace, order, stability, harmony, consensus, and so on, the functional school is usually credited due to its focus and relevance in those areas. In fact, some writers have concluded that structural functionalism is the traditional paradigm in Sociology, and that those other schools in sociology rest on one or two tenets of structural functionalism. In this unit, you will be exposed to the bases for which the core concepts-such as order, stability, harmony and consensus among others- in functionalism exist. Importantly, the issues of society and space as we mentioned briefly in the introductory part of this module will be clearer to you in this unit.

Objectives

After the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- ✓ Grasp the germaneness of order and stability despite the apparent tensions and disorder in the society
- ✓ Understand the relevance of space in the understanding of societal existence

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 THE BASIS OF ORDER AND STABILITY

The problem of order is one of the most important in all of the social sciences. Given that human beings have the tendency to behave in a selfish and egoistic ways, how is society possible? How can human beings cooperate with each other to produce social order?

According to Hechter and Horne (2001), social order is a core theoretical issue in the social sciences. For social order to arise and be maintained, two separate problems must be overcome. People must be able to coordinate their actions and they must cooperate to attain common goals. Coordination requires that people develop stable expectations about others' behaviour. We can have stable expectations and still not much social order, however, if people are to live together, they must not only be able to co-ordinate their activities but also to interact productively—to do things that help rather than hurt others. Thus highly ordered societies have a remarkable capacity to sustain cooperation.

Lawrence Frank (1944) raised questions about the then taken for granted nature of social order. He noted that social order has long been conceived as an organization or mechanism which exists as a part of the cosmos and operates through large-scale forces acting at a distance. Social theory has taught man

that he must learn to submit to these assumed forces and accept this cosmic organization as necessary to social order, while social research has attempted to measure these assumed forces. Recent studies of culture and personality indicate that social order is not given but historically developed ideas, beliefs, and patterns of conduct and of feelings which each culture has evolved as the guides to human conduct and the management of group activities.

For instance, Marshall (1998) opined that explanations of social order, of how and why societies cohere, are the central concern of sociology. The 'Hobbesian problem of order', for example, preoccupied those classical sociologists faced directly with the apparent consequences of industrialization and urbanization: the demise of community, disruption of primary social relationships, loss of authority on the part of traditional agencies of social control, and general instability associated with rapid social change in the nineteenth century.

For Durkheim (1858-1917), emphasis on social order arose out of his critique of utilitarian social thought, popular among social and political theorists such as Herbert Spencer in Britain, who focused on mutual self-interest and contractual agreements as the basis of social order in increasingly complex industrial societies. For Durkheim, by comparison, questions of morality were central to the explanation of social integration. In his view, the 'mechanical solidarity' of pre-industrial societies rested on shared beliefs and values, located primarily in the conscience collective. However, the advent of industrial society sees the emergence of a new form of 'organic solidarity', based on interdependence arising out of socialization and differentiation. Moral restraints on egoism arise out of association and form the basis of social cohesion.

While Durkheim did not deny the existence of conflict and the use of force, especially in periods of rapid social change, Parsons (1902-1979) underlined the importance of a prior moral consensus as a necessary

pre-condition for social order. He saw organic solidarity as a modified form of the conscience collective and argued that the acceptance of values by the internalization of norms is the basis of integration and social order in modern societies. Because of the importance which he attached to a shared body of norms and values, Parsons was persistently criticized for over-emphasizing consensus, and for neglecting conflict and change in his sociological analyses.

The second explanation of social order derives from the Marxist tradition within the discipline and offers a materialist rather than a cultural account of cohesion. Marx emphasized inequalities in material wealth and political power in capitalist societies. The distribution of material and political resources is the source of conflict between different collectivities—social classes—who want a greater share of those resources than they may already enjoy. Conflict implies there is no moral consensus and social order is always precariously maintained. It is the product of the balance of power between competing groups, whereby the powerful constrain weaker groups, and cohesion is sustained through economic compulsion, political and legal coercion, and bureaucratic routine. While many Marxists have increasingly embraced cultural accounts of social order, for example by explaining working-class incorporation through a dominant ideology, others have noted that economic and political coercion has proved a remarkably effective source of stability, especially where power is legitimated as authority. Nevertheless, persistent conflict implies tension and change, rather than enduring stability.

David Lockwood, cited by Kaldor (2003), has demonstrated that neither Marxian nor Durkheimian theory satisfactorily resolves the issues, since each approach is forced to employ residual categories which turn out to be the central analytic elements of the other. In Durkheim's work, the concept of moral classification is the key to social structure, whereas for Marx it is production relations. That is, one theory emphasizes the socially integrative structure of status, the other the socially divisive structure of class. However, Durkheim cannot explain how anomic declassification (disorder) occurs or is structured

(schismatic) without introducing concepts of power and material interests into his schema, whereas Marx cannot explain the persistence of capitalist societies without recourse to a generalized category of ideology which introduces the (unanalysed) conceptual problem of the nature and variability of consensus.

Explanations of social order tend to be macro-theories in orientation which focus on society as the unit of analysis, although studies of family obligations, crime, and leisure (to cite but a few examples) raise issues of social order at the micro level. Quite different accounts of how social order is reproduced during face-to-face interaction will be found in the writings of symbolic interaction in dramaturgy, ethnomethodology, and exchange theory.

3.2 Civil Society as Public Space

A healthy civil society is considered an integral part of any democratic system of governance. Along with free and fair elections as well as accountable institutions, it ensures that the voices of citizens are included in policy-making. Different democratic traditions can lead to different pathways for ensuring this inclusion, but a democratic system must enable expression by those affected by policy decisions.

Civil society is defined here as a public space for citizens to engage in collective debate and self-expression, and where public opinions that influence public policy are formed. This space lies between the family and the state, is independent from the state and is legally protected. Fundamentally, civil society is a medium in which the social contracts between citizens, political and economic centres of power are negotiated and reproduced (Kaldor, 2003). Civil society implies the existence of independent organizations, with active communication between organizations, citizens and the state, leading ultimately to a certain degree of influence on policy-making. These citizens' groups, which consolidate various interests, can take numerous forms such as membership organizations, charities, think-tanks, neighbourhood associations, informal movements and faith-based groups. Their key characteristic is

independence from the government. All these types are equally important for a vibrant civil society as they provide more avenues for citizen engagement, which can be expressed in formal membership, signing of petitions, participation in demonstrations, volunteering and donations.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES (SAEs)

1. What is your understanding of civil society as public space?
2. A democratic system must enable expression by those affected by policy decisions.
Discuss

UNIT IV: MEANING OF REVOLUTION; REVOLUTION, REBELLION, INSURGENCE AND TERRORISM: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Revolution: A conceptual clarification

3.2 Revolution, rebellion, insurgency, and terrorism: differences and similarities

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

In this unit, which is the last unit of the module, we will discuss some conceptual issues relating to revolution. You often hear the frequent use of such words as revolution, insurgency and terrorism in the mass media; sometimes, you may get confused and even think that the words mean the same thing. In this unit, you will learn the differences among those concepts.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

1. Understand the idea of revolution and its emergence
2. Differentiate between revolution, rebellion, insurgence and terrorism

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 REVOLUTION: A CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

It appears that writers on the phenomenon of revolution derive their understanding of the concept from the two great events; French Revolution in France and Industrial Revolution which started late 17th and early 18th century in Britain- that led to the development of Sociology. According to Arendt Hannah (1965), the concept of revolution, inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold, was unknown prior to the two great revolutions at the end of the eighteenth century. Before they were engaged in what then turned out to be a revolution, none of the actors had the slightest premonition of what the plot of the new drama was going to be. However, once the revolutions had begun to run their course, and long before those who were involved in them could know whether their enterprise would end in victory or disaster, the novelty of the story and the inner most meaning of its plot became manifest to actors and spectators alike.

The study of revolution is marked by fundamental theoretical and political controversy, beginning with the definition of the term itself. An influential definition of what he calls the “great revolutions” was offered by political scientist Samuel Huntington (1968):

Revolution is the rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and governmental

activity and policies. Revolutions are thus to be distinguished from insurrections, rebellions, revolts, coups and wars of independence (Huntington, 1968).

This, points to the numerous dimensions of social transformation that revolutions can unleash, but substitutes violence for the seizure of state power and/or mass participation. A better definition of social revolution has been provided by sociologist, Theda Skocpol (1979), who takes up some of Huntington's criteria while moving fruitfully beyond them:

Social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below..... What is unique to social revolution is that basic changes in social structure and in political structure occur together in a mutually reinforcing fashion. And these changes occur through intense socio-political conflicts in which class struggles play a key role (Skocpol, 1979).

3.2 Revolution, Rebellion, Insurgence, and Terrorism: Differences and Similarities

This part of the write-up will look at definitions and characteristics of revolution, the difference between revolution and rebellion, causes of mass unrest, rebellion, and revolution, and counter-insurgency.

Definitions of "revolution" differ from one theorist to another and are widely debated. The modern concept of revolution originated during the French revolution of the eighteenth century, giving an example to the world that "a nation's people, by concentrated political struggle, could fundamentally transform the political order that governs their lives and, with it, the social and economic structure of society" (Gurr and Goldstone, 1991).

To Katz (2001), "true revolutions" represent "the downfall of a dominant social class" after large uprisings, giving examples of the French, Chinese, and Russian revolutions. It may also represent "any sudden replacement of one type of regime by another type" is a revolution (Katz, 2001). Robertson (quoted in Calvert 1990) defines revolution as a "violent and total change in a political system, which not

only vastly alters the distribution of power in the society, but results in major changes in the whole social structure.” Katz (2001) argues that revolutions involve “downfall of an old regime through violent means and replacement by a new regime that attempts to establish a new political and socio-economic order.” Welch and Taintor (1972) wrote that revolutions involve “tearing down of existing political institutions and building them anew on different foundations”.

Four characteristics common to all types of revolution are:

(1) Revolutions are sudden,

(2) Violent

(3) Require political replacement of one ruling group by another, and

(4) There must be some major political and/or socio-economic changes to the system. Revolutions can only be determined after they happen and the revolutionary movements seize power and make substantial political and/or socio-economic changes in their societies (Calvert, 1990). Revolutionary movements are groups that “seek to bring about a revolution [overthrow the ruling regime and take power] but have not yet done so” (Katz, 2001). Revolutionary warfare is defined as a campaign of violence by a political movement representing an alternative to a current regime. Movements fighting revolutionary warfare “mobilize a sufficient segment of the masses” to threaten the regime in power (Sederberg, 1994). Schutz and Slater (1990) argue that revolutionary movements “tend to be motivated by a common perception of regime illegitimacy.” Johnson (quoted in Sederberg, 1994) believes that participants in revolutionary movements decide to use violence “in order to cause the system to change when all else has failed”.

According to the 1998 *Oxford Dictionary of Sociology*, it is hard to distinguish between a political revolution and a rebellion. Some argue that the term “revolution” should be used only in cases when

victorious revolutionary movements make fundamental changes in the social structure of the society. Rebellions are seen as “more limited political upheavals involving only the replacement of one ruling group by another. On this criterion, rebellions clearly shade into revolutions, depending upon one’s judgment as to the scope and intensity of the social changes that follow the seizure of power.” Russell (1974) defines rebellion as a violent struggle that threatens to seize power through violence and fighting. According to Weede and Muller (1998), a rebellion can become a revolution if the rebels succeed in overthrowing the ruling regime and substantially changing the system.

When a government fails to fulfill the essential requirements to its citizens, the doors are open for a mass upheaval and rebellion by the excluded part of the society (Calvert, 1990). Gurr and Goldstone (1991) noted that, a widely shared sense of grievance among people is a necessary condition in a mass mobilization and rebellion. Welch and Taintor (1972) offered four preconditions that may lead to a mass unrest, rebellion, or revolution:

1. A widespread sense of disappointment with the conditions of life (relative deprivation)
2. Focusing the feelings of disappointment upon political institutions
3. Vacillation, incompetence, and incoherence of political leadership through resistance to reform or through injudicious use of force;
4. Combination of economic and political feelings of deprivation with the acceptance of a myth or ideology of change.

Every insurgency, rebellion, or revolution provokes a response from the governments that the revolutionary or rebel movements are trying to overthrow. Walt (2001) argues that successful revolutions occur rarely due to the fact that “even weak states usually control far greater resources than their internal opponents.” On the other hand, violence and severe coercion used in counter-insurgency actions often lead to decline in political support for the regime, especially in the areas where fighting is

occurring (Sederberg, 1994). This often helps revolutionary and rebel movements to attract more support from victimized communities. Halliday (1999) adds that counter-insurgencies that last long often “alienate significant constituencies within the society,” and influence other countries to oppose them.

Counter-insurgency can take a number of forms. Some governments use regular army to topple the insurgents. Other states prefer counter-insurgency by “indirect means” – through providing arms, equipment, financial support, training, and other assistance to paramilitary groups fighting the insurgents (Katz, 2001). Some governments try to destabilize the revolutionary/rebel movements and their leadership. Gurr and Goldstone (1991) wrote that many revolutions failed due to factionalism and leadership struggle within the movements.

Success of revolutionary and rebel movements depends on factors such as the emergence of a broad coalition of forces that challenge the ruling regime, balance of military power, internal solidarity, support from the masses, financing, and international support (Gurr and Goldstone, 1991; Weede and Muller, 1998). Gurr and Goldstone (1991) emphasized the fact that the international community’s pressures and involvement are crucial in “shaping the revolutionary process and its outcomes”.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES(SAEs)

1. Discuss the similarities and differences between a revolution and a rebellion.
2. With reasons and examples, classify Boko Haram under one of these concepts: revolution, rebellion, insurgence, and terrorism.

5.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS(TMAs)

1. How veracious is the claim that Sociologists study society?
2. Write an essay on the forces that led to the movement from pre-industrial society to post-industrial society
3. With reference to Merton's social structure and anomie, do you agree that the society itself creates revolution?
4. Write short notes on the following:
 - i. Order
 - ii. Stability
 - iii. Change
 - iv. Equilibrium
 - v. Consensus
5. To what extent can it be argued that the Boko-Haram sect is an example of a revolutionary group?
6. Write an essay on the nexus between a failed state and revolution in Africa.

REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Abercrombie, N., Hill, S. and Turner, B.S.(2000). *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology. 4th ed.* London: Penguin Books.

Arendt, H. (1965). *On Revolution.* United States: Penguin Books.

Calvert, P. (1990). *Revolution and Counter-Revolution.* Buckingham. Open University Press.

Frank, L.K., (1944). What is Social Order, *American Journal of Sociology*, 49(5), pp. 470–77.

Giddens, A. (1996). *Sociology. 6th Edition.*London: Macmillan.

Gurr, T.R. and Goldstone, J.A. (1991).Comparisons and Policy Implications. In Gurr, T.R.,Goldstone, J.A., and Moshiri, F. (Ed.). *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century.* Boulder.Westview Press, Inc. Pp. 324-352.

Gurr, T.R. and Goldstone, J.A. (1991).Comparisons and Policy Implications. In Gurr, T.R.,Goldstone, J.A., and Moshiri, F. (Ed.). *Revolutions of the Late Twentieth Century.* Boulder.Westview Press, Inc. Pp. 324-352.

Halliday, F. (1999).*Revolutions and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power.*New York. Palgrave.

Hechter, M. and Horne, C., (2001).*Theories of Social Order, SecondEdition,* Stanford University Press, available at <http://www.sup.org/socialorder/Excerpts/Part%20I.pdf>, accessed 08 May 2015

Henslin, J. M. and Nelson, A. (1995).*Sociology: A Down-to-Earth Approach.* Canadian Edition.Scarborough, Ontario: Allyn and Bacon.

Huntington, S.P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. United States: Yale University Press.

Kaldor, M. (2003). *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War*. Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2003.

Little, W. (2015). *Introduction to Sociology*. Open Stax College, Rice University.

Katz, M. (2001). *Revolution: International Dimensions*. Washington, DC. CQ Press.

Macionis, J. J. (2001) *Sociology* (8th ed). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

Macionis, J.J. (2008). *Sociology, 12th Edition*. New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc. Upper Saddle River.

Marshall, G., (1998). *Social Order in A Dictionary of Sociology*, available at <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1O88-socialorder.html>, accessed 08 May 2015.

Russell, D. (1974). *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force*. New York. Academic Press, Inc.

Schutz, B. and Slater, R. (1990). *Revolution and Political Change in the Third World*. Boulder. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.

Sederberg, P. (1994). *Fires Within: Political Violence and Revolutionary Change*. New York. HarperCollins College Publishers.

Skocpol, T. (1979). *States and Social Revolution*. United States: Cambridge University Press.

Stolley, K.S. (2005). *The Basics of Sociology*. London: Greenwood Press.

Weede, E. and Muller, E. (1998). Rebellion, Violence and Revolution: A Rational Choice Perspective. *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. 35, No. 1. Pp. 43-59.

Welch, C. and Taintor, M. (1972). *Revolution and Political Change*. Belmont. Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc. Pp. 1-19.

Welch, C. and Taintor, M. (1972). *Revolution and Political Change*. Belmont. Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc. Pp. 1-19.

MODULE 2 REVOLUTIONS IN WORLD HISTORY

This module goes deep into archives to bring out history of events of revolutions across the world. You should bear in mind that this module does not cover all the revolutionary events in the world; however, the significant ones are presented in this module. You may have heard about revolution in different countries and continents of the world but without being told about their origin and correlates, so in this module the origins and factors responsible for the spring of revolutions in different countries will be clear to you. It will be left to you to identify commonalities in the causes of these revolutions so that if you are asked to proffer suggestions on how to curb revolution, you would have something to say. It is unreasonable to attempt to solve a problem without knowing the causes of such problem, so your abilities to decipher commonalities in the origins and causes of revolution across space would be of great help when it comes to proffering solutions. Because of its historical nature, this module is lengthy and detailed.

There is a saying that *Rome was not built in a day*, different nations of the world that are now developed were not developed in the first day, they strived towards development and they attain it. This sends a signal to hopeless Africans who think that there is no way out of the mess we are in, Britain, France, China and even America have witnessed political and economic recession that are worse than what we are experiencing in Africa today. The then rulers of those countries put their minds together and decide to make their territory great, and they achieve their objectives. Likewise, if African rulers change their minds towards development, and strive pragmatically toward development goals, we will get there.

In this module, revolution in six parts of the world will be discussed, these six will be spread across four units; while two revolutions will be discussed in some units, and one will be discussed in others.

UNIT I: THE BRITISH REVOLUTION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY; THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1: The British revolution of the seventeenth century

3.2: The civil war

3.3: The British revolution of 1649

3.4: The Mexican Revolution

3.5: The revolutionary decade (1910-1920)

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

Introduction

This is the first unit of module 2, out of the six revolutions to be discussed in this module, two of them will be presented here. The first is the British revolution or the English civil war as it is popularly referred to in political science literature. You will see how socio-cultural determinants-as common as they may seem- go a long way to predict revolution. The second is the Mexican revolution- a twentieth century revolution, you will see the influence of class in the emergence of the revolution, and the roles played by members of international community to bring the revolution to an end.

2.0 Objectives

By the end of this unit, you should have:

- ✓ Learn the origin and causes of the English civil war
- ✓ Identify the forces that led to the emergence of the world
- ✓ Understand Mexican revolution and its causes

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 THE BRITISH REVOLUTION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

According to Michael Richards (2004), what many historians now call the British Revolution—the events of the 1640s and 1650s in the British Isles—others still refer to as the English Revolution or the English Civil War. Some would see it as a mere rebellion, others as a political crisis that got out of hand. It was all these and more. The argument put forth in this chapter is that the events of this period, especially when considered with the Revolution of 1688, constitute a revolution, probably the first true revolution in world history. Rather than scrap the existing political system for something altogether new, as happened in so many subsequent revolutions, the English attempted to preserve time-honoured customs and rights. Nonetheless, they succeeded over time in creating something new.

Religion played a major role in the British Revolution. In part, the opposition to the Crown began to form because of royal support for religious policies that established a relatively intolerant Anglican Church that too closely resembled the Catholic Church. For those who considered themselves Puritans, the religious issue was paramount. For others, it might simply be an example of the king interfering in

matters over which he had no jurisdiction. For many supporters of Charles, of course, religious policies and institutions were also important factors. And for a small number, religious beliefs led to radical political, social, and economic ideas. Let us quickly turn to the origins of the revolution (Richards, 2004).

While the politics of the 1620s and 1630s did not lead inexorably to rebellion and revolution in the 1640s, certain events did help create a situation that could easily become revolutionary. The policies pursued by Charles I and his advisors in the 1620s, particularly in the arena of foreign affairs, produced some tension and opposition. The Petition of Rights (1628), based on various statutes and charters sought to gain recognition for a few basic principles. Perhaps most important of these was the idea that taxes could not be levied without the consent of Parliament. Others included a reaffirmation of the right of habeas corpus (no one could be imprisoned without showing cause) and an insistence that soldiers could not be quartered in civilian homes or martial law declared in a time of peace. In return for his acceptance of the petition, Charles was granted subsidies. The next year, however, he dissolved Parliament and ruled in the 1630s without calling it back into session (Richards, 2004).

In the 1630s, royal policies connected with both religious affairs and fiscal matters continued to be unpopular. The ship money tax (a tax previously levied only on coastal areas to help pay for defense) in 1638 proved to be especially unpopular. The Anglican Church seemed headed toward "popery". Puritans wanted to abolish the office of bishop and end the use of the Book of Common Prayer. Presbyterians and other groups had their own ideas about how to organize the church. Religious policy spilled over easily into political questions. The idea that the Anglican Church was headed back toward Catholicism readily fed fears of papal plots to overthrow the English system of government (Richards, 2004).

It is not possible to sort the growing opposition to the Crown into neat categories. The old idea of an increasing gap between court and country is somewhat helpful, but supporters of the Crown could be

found throughout England and in all levels of society. Important social, economic, and cultural changes were taking place. In particular, the growth of a commercial economy brought with it an increase in prices. Neither the rise to prominence of new social groups nor the decline of older groups, however, provides a key to the unfolding of events. At this time, no one was thinking in terms of revolution or even rebellion. There was mainly a growing dissatisfaction with royal policies, for which Charles unfortunately took responsibility. The Scottish Rebellion in 1639 brought matters to a head. Primarily a rebellion against royal enforcement of Anglican religious practices, in particular the attempt to impose the Book of Common Prayer on the Presbyterians of Scotland, it created a political and fiscal crisis that required Charles to call a meeting of Parliament in 1640 (Richards, 2004).

The "Short Parliament," which met for only three weeks, failed to vote funds for the war with Scotland, Charles then called what became the "Long Parliament". The immediate goal of the parliamentarians was the end of measures associated with eleven years of non-parliamentary rule and the removal from office of those responsible for these measures. A Triennial Act called for no more than three years to elapse between sessions of Parliament. Another act forbade the dissolution of Parliament without its consent. The ship money tax was declared illegal. Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, one of Charles's most important officials, was impeached for high treason and later executed. Archbishop William Laud, chief architect of Anglican religious policies, was imprisoned in the Tower of London. This short period of reform might well have been the end of the political and fiscal crisis. One prominent view of the British Revolution holds that it was largely a matter of political mismanagement. In this view, more astute royal policies or a somewhat different royal personality might have appealed at this point to the large number of members of the House of Commons who had little interest in pressing issues to the point of civil war. Charles had to contend with issues raised by governing multiple kingdoms and those associated with religious division, problems his counterparts on the continent also contended with. However, revisionist scholars stress the importance of "the breakdown of a financial and political system

in the face of inflation and the rising costs of war.” This approach discounts the possibility of either social change or differences of political principles as important factor in the coming of civil war (Richards, 2004).

It does appear, nevertheless, that both social change and the construction of ideological positions helped to determine the outcome of the events from 1640 to 1642. While elites continued to take the lead in the events leading up to the civil war, there was a noticeable broadening of the political nation. Whether this broader political nation participated on the local or on the national scene, it redefined the parameters of political events. Religious policy was particularly important in this period and, as noted above, views on it easily spilled over into views about politics more generally. There were ideas about monarchical power based on notions of contract, law, and consent. If the “opposition” to the Crown largely preferred to find common ground with the monarchy, it nonetheless held a position it would not compromise. New groups entered politics in 1641 and 1642. They included merchants and artisans, people who were not members of the traditional elites. London became a revolutionary city. In May 1641 thousands of people in the streets of London pressured the House of Lords to convict the Earl of Strafford, the chief minister of Charles; they also played a role in Charles’s decision to sacrifice him. In December that year, popular pressure was again used to remove the bishops from the House of Lords. While these demonstrations were not completely spontaneous, they reflected support for Parliament, distrust of Charles’s advisors, and fear of popish conspiracy (Richards, 2004).

The opposition did not trust Charles and saw in his actions attempts to regain control. They worried about his control of the military. Parliament was seen as the best defense against an arbitrary exercise of power. The situation was compounded by an Irish rebellion against English rule. Again, the rebellion in Ireland fanned fears of a popish conspiracy against the English people. The failed attempt by Charles early in 1642 to arrest five leaders of the opposition in the House of Commons probably made civil war

inevitable. For its part, Parliament presented a statement of nineteen demands in June 1642 that included not only reform of church and government along lines that it set but also parliamentary control of the military and of appointments of royal ministers. Such proposals had the effect of vesting sovereignty in Parliament; a position that Charles could not possibly support. On the eve of civil war, a broad-based political nation stood divided on religious and political questions. Distrustful of the Crown, it was not necessarily committed to abolishing the monarchy. The civil war that began in the summer of 1642 created fertile ground for a polarization of opinions and for increasingly radical positions (Richards, 2004).

3.1: THE CIVIL WAR

By August 1642 opposing sides had formed, each claiming the same cause: they were the defenders of the true English political system and the Protestant religion. The two factions were also somewhat similar in social composition; and aristocratic elites furnished the leadership of each as well. While the king drew his strongest support from the House of Lords, a sizeable minority from the Commons also joined his cause. Anglicans and Catholics also tended to support the Crown. Geographically, the Crown's strength lay in the north and west. The parliamentary group naturally drew much of its strength from members of the Commons. It also drew on the merchant and artisan classes in London, Norwich, Hull, Plymouth, and Gloucester. Geographically, its support came from the south eastern counties. In religious terms, it appealed to those who considered themselves Puritans and those from the more radical sects. The early part of the civil war was indecisive, although one important development was the rapid rise to prominence of Oliver Cromwell, a member of the Long Parliament, as a military leader. The parliamentarians accepted the Solemn League and Covenant with the Presbyterian Scots in which they agreed not to establish a centralized national church. The influence of the Independents and the

sectaries increased in the army, creating a widening gap between the army and Parliament (Richards, 2004).

In 1644 and 1645 the royal cause met defeat first at Marston Moor (1644), and then at Naseby (1645). Between these major battles, the parliamentary army was reorganized as the New Model Army with Cromwell as the main figure, although not the Commander in Chief. The first part of the civil war ended in 1646. The Scots delivered Charles to Parliament the following year. In the meantime, differences of opinion between Parliament and the army developed. The army resisted attempts by Parliament to disband it. Soldiers worried not only about pay but also about the religious and political settlement proposed by Parliament. The Putney debates in 1647 showed the influence of the Levellers, a radical group interested in popular sovereignty and social equality. This represented a move away from doctrines that looked largely to the past and toward revolutionary change and universal ideas. Other groups, the Diggers, for example, with their ideas about collective ownership of property, were even more radical than the Levellers. Charles, who had been captured by the army from the parliamentary party, refused to agree to the army council's peace terms (the Heads of the Proposals). He succeeded in escaping in November 1647 and, after negotiations with both Parliament and the Scots, allied with the Scots and began the second part of the civil war in 1648. The royalist cause was quickly crushed. In December 1648, the army removed its opponents in Parliament (Pride's Purge), reducing the Long Parliament to the Rump Parliament. This remnant erected a high court of justice, which tried the king for treason. Sentenced to death, Charles was beheaded on 30 January 1649 (Richards, 2004).

3.2 : The British revolution of 1649

The execution of the king opened a decade of experimentation. What should be put in place of a failed monarchy? Beyond abolishing the monarchy, had the English succeeded in carrying out a true

revolution? Part of the answer may lie in the relationship between war and revolution. The French Revolution led to war and civil war. The problems experienced in preserving the revolution and simultaneously fighting a war and a civil war increasingly pervaded the vision of desperate revolutionary leaders as well as corresponding radical measures. The French in the 1790s and also under Napoleon exported the revolutionary ideology and institutions throughout much of Europe. Civil war in England pushed the political process past several points at which moderates might have liked to stop, but not to the point of a coherent revolution in politics. England experienced war in the 1650s, but in the British Isles it was mainly a war of conquest in which Cromwell's army re-conquered Scotland and subdued Ireland. The brutality of subjection of Ireland, "the curse of Cromwell," left a legacy of bitterness that has yet to be overcome. Abroad, the British engaged in a naval war with the Dutch between 1652 and 1654. War and increases in property taxes and customs duties led to a crisis in 1653. Parliament considered disbanding the army, but Cromwell acted first, ending the Rump Parliament and declaring himself Lord Protector (Richards, 2004).

Essentially, Cromwell created a dictatorship in the 1650s, an ad hoc and personal solution that provided only a limited revolution and blocked, temporarily as it turned out, any chance of restoration. Seeing himself as the agent of God, Cromwell banned newspapers and used spies to keep track of possible dissent. While he allowed religious freedom in general terms, Catholics were not allowed to worship in public, nor could Anglicans use the Book of Common Prayer. His firm leadership kept this arrangement in place in the 1650s, although it could not completely stop the subversive activities of songwriters and pamphleteers. England in the 1650s did not undergo anything similar to the Terror in France in 1793–1794 (although it may be argued that the situation in Ireland was far worse). Cromwell's death in 1658 undid the arrangement, leading to political chaos and fear of renewed civil war. The Parliament elected in 1660 moved quickly to invite Charles II, son of the executed king, to return to the throne in 1660 (Richards, 2004).

The abolition of the monarchy and the House of Lords was indeed enough to constitute a political revolution. For a few years, the parliamentary representatives of the people theoretically governed England. Radicals were dissatisfied with Parliament. The army itself was critical. In 1653 Cromwell assumed personal power. Nonetheless, the ideas and positions of the 1640s and even earlier could not be ignored, even if they could be temporarily set aside. Perhaps even more fundamental, politics came to be seen in a different light than had been the case earlier in England than was the case at the time across the Channel. Both Hobbes and Locke emphasized the human element in politics. It was not something based on divine laws but rather created by men agreeing to a contract. In religious matters, too, much had changed. A revived and powerful Anglican Church appeared with the restoration of the monarchy, but it was not able to suppress the Presbyterians and the more radical dissenters. Significant Protestant minorities continued to exist. They eventually won religious toleration, but continued to endure civil and political disabilities. The split between church and chapel played a significant role in English culture, education, and politics for more than two centuries after the British Revolution (Richards, 2004).

There was little that could be termed a social revolution. The Diggers, for example, were a tiny group of radicals. Some royalists lost property, but many avoided significant penalties. It was clearly not a bourgeois revolution. No class conscious capitalist class emerged victorious over the feudal nobility. There was greater interest in commercial agriculture and in commerce more generally. Government began to be seen as having a positive role in such areas as colonial expansion rather than as a source of interference in economic matters. Perhaps paradoxically, the events of the revolution led to a stronger state but also one that existed within the context of a more individualized and commercialized society. In terms of geography, the revolution established the centrality of England in British affairs and laid the basis for the creation of Great Britain. It emphasized as well the importance of London. Finally, the

conquest of Ireland in the 1650s led to a social and economic transformation in that country with significant, long lasting political implications.

The British Revolution was, to a very large extent, based on the defense of the historic political rights of the country. These appeals to the past nonetheless led to new departures. The idealized past became the basis for a fundamentally different system of government, although one certainly akin to the system that prevailed when Charles I ruled. The question might be raised, however, whether the events of the 1640s would be seen as revolutionary on their own and without the events of 1688 and 1689, forty years later. The short answer is most likely not.

The Revolution of 1688 might easily have had a different outcome. That it continued and in a sense confirmed the British Revolution of the mid-century was not foreordained. Without the Revolution of 1688, the mid-century revolution would clearly have been seen as a failure, an interruption of political continuity.

3.3 The Mexican Revolution

The Mexican Revolution was the first great political and social revolution of the twentieth century. It was also one of a cluster of revolutions occurring at about the same time in Russia, China, the Ottoman Empire, and Iran (then called Persia). These revolutions, particularly those in Russia and China, had an enormous impact on the history of the twentieth century. The Mexican Revolution in its revolutionary decade, 1910–1920, features bloodshed, betrayal, and cruelty, as well as class struggle, intervention by the United States, and a colourful assembly of larger-than-life revolutionaries. Of primary importance, the revolution was a product of Mexican history, one way of responding to the political situation created by the regime of Porfirio Díaz. And, it shaped the way politics were done for the remainder of the twentieth century (Richards, 2004).

In the twenty years that followed the chaos and dislocation of the revolutionary decade, those Mexicans who had gained power in the revolution used that power, sometimes with great thoughtfulness, at other times more with simple cunning, to rebuild and reshape their country. It was a contentious process, often punctuated by violence, especially in the 1920s. Both idealism and opportunism flourished. Idealism seemingly triumphed in the 1930s, when revolutionary momentum on various levels found a leadership, personified in Lázaro Cárdenas, sympathetic to its goals.

3.4: THE REVOLUTIONARY DECADE (1910-1920)

The revolutionary decade began with the problems experienced by the regime of Porfirio Díaz. Long-lived (1876–1910) and successful for most of its existence, the Díaz regime emphasized economic growth and a strong central government. It grew, however, increasingly dependent on foreign investment and the global market. While economic problems and the development of a Mexican nationalism lessened the popularity of the regime in the first decade of the twentieth century, it floundered initially on the issue of *continuismo*, i.e. the modification of constitutional arrangements to allow Díaz to continue in office. Liberals in Mexico spent the first decade of the twentieth century calling for free elections and a constitution that worked. Organized in the Partido Liberal Mexicano (PLM) in 1906, they worked in Mexico and in exile in the United States to end the Díaz regime. Francisco Madero, a member of the Coahuila provincial elite, landowner, industrialist, and banker, who was often called “The Apostle of Democracy,” challenged *continuismo* with a book entitled *The Presidential Succession* of 1910 (1908). He later campaigned against Díaz in 1910. To the extent that ideology helped

to bring about the revolution, the ideology that initially influenced the Mexican Revolution was an older liberal one that called for constitutions, representative bodies, and free elections (Richards, 2004).

Although the constitutional challenge was important, there were other factors behind the challenge to the regime. The regime had long been concerned with economic growth and with its role in the emerging world economy. The very success of the regime's policies also created two problems. The first was the expansion of foreign investment. Foreigners held approximately one-third of the land in Mexico at the turn of the century. They dominated industry and held important stakes in mining and timber. American holdings in both agriculture and industry were particularly large. Secondly, in the last few years of the Díaz regime, developments in the world economy damaged important sectors of the Mexican economy, especially agriculture, mining, timber, and textiles. Unemployment was high in industry and mining. Small businessmen also suffered from the economic downturn. Bad harvests in 1908 and 1909 led to famine and food riots.

Economic contraction, in turn, influenced two other aspects of the revolution. One was nationalism, in particular, the belief that foreigners had undue influence on Mexican politics. The second was the vulnerability of regional elites (Coahuila and Sonora in particular), who found their economic interests jeopardized by the policies of a regime on which they had little or no influence. In the spring of 1910 the Anti-Re-electionist Party nominated Madero as a candidate for president. Arrested by Díaz, he spent Election Day in prison in San Luis Potosi. Diaz was, not surprisingly, re-elected. In September, Díaz celebrated his eightieth birthday and the centennial of Mexican independence. The following month, Madero, released on bail, escaped to San Antonio, Texas. There he issued the first of the many plans in the revolution, the Plan of San Luis Potosi. Primarily a political document, it promised democracy and federalism but also mentioned the right of workers to bargain collectively and agrarian reform.

The combination of a regime experiencing heavy criticism and open challenge and the disintegration of the social consensus of the elites opened the flood gates to a torrent of ideas, aspirations, and schemes. Centres of revolution developed in Chihuahua under Pascual Orozco, Jr. and in Morelos under Emiliano Zapata. Other ideologies, in particular anarcho-syndicalism, a radical movement emphasizing the power and influence of trade unions, and a kind of agrarian populism among the peasants, gained prominence.

Over the next few years, the revolution existed essentially on two levels. The first level involved the elites. They emphasized politics, nationalism, and the revival of a stagnant economy. They gathered support from the middle and lower middle classes, including businessmen, merchants, the intelligentsia, bureaucrats, and local officials. Aware of the needs of the working class and the peasantry, they were, however, not willing to venture far in the direction of social reform. Early on, the most prominent representative of this group was Madero. The second level included mostly workers and peasants, those most directly affected by the economic problems associated with the Díaz regime. While clearly interested in what political arrangements the revolution might produce, they emphasized social and economic issues. In part, they stressed the defense of the traditional. This could be seen especially in the followers of Zapata. They wished to regain their communal lands from those, Mexicans and foreigners alike, who had used the legal system to gain ownership, and to re-establish largely autonomous municipalities. They did not, however, simply wish to turn the clock back. They recognized, for example, the importance of collective bargaining rights for the working class.

Luis Cervantes, the representative of the *intelligentsia* in Mariano Azuela's novel *'The Underdogs (Los de abajo)*, waxes eloquent on the motives of the revolutionaries:

It is not true you [Demetrio Macias, the protagonist of The Underdogs] took up arms simply because of Señor Monico. You are under arms to protest against the evils of all the caciques [political bosses] who are overrunning the whole nation. We are the elements of a social movement which will not rest until it has enlarged the destinies of our motherland. We are the

tools Destiny makes use of to reclaim the sacred rights of the people. We are not fighting to dethrone a miserable murderer; we are fighting against tyranny itself.

The reality, of course, is that motives were mixed. Some saw the revolution as a grand struggle for justice in the face of tyranny. Many, perhaps most, had more concrete aims. Madero gained broad support in 1911 and defeated Díaz. In the fall he took office as president. Although aware of the need for land reform, his initial measures seemed designed more for speculators than for *campesinos*. In less than a month after Madero took office, he faced the opposition of Zapata. Zapata was a trainer of horses and a stable master. Elected to local office in 1909 in the village of Anenecuilco, Morelos, he was deeply sympathetic to the problems of the peasants. In his own plan, the Plan of Ayala (November 1911), Zapata advanced a radical agenda for land reform. He called for land redistribution in the form of communes and cooperatives and also for the return of municipal autonomy. He also advocated democracy and collective bargaining rights for the working class. Pascual Orozco, who had combined cowboys, miners, lumberjacks, Indians, and farmers in Chihuahua into a force that was originally Maderista, emerged as the major opponent of Madero. He, too, issued a radical plan of social reform, the Plan Orozquista (March 1912). Zapata and Orozco, although unable to coordinate their individual efforts effectively, nonetheless were a formidable opposition to Madero by 1913. In the meantime, Madero failed to win support from the industrial workers who formed the Casa del Obrero Mundial, a workers' council in Mexico City in 1912 (Richards, 2004).

The greatest danger to Madero, however, came from reactionaries, opportunists, and foreigners. Felix Díaz, a nephew of the former dictator, had already rebelled once against Madero and had been defeated and arrested. Gaining release from prison, he rebelled again in February 1913. This rebellion also failed and Felix Díaz found himself besieged in an old fortress in Mexico City. The commander of the

federal troops, Victoriano Huerta, came to an agreement with Díaz. He also concluded the Pacto de la Embajada with the American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson. The main idea of the agreement with the American ambassador was to remove Madero from power in favour of Felix Díaz. Huerta, however, managed to make himself president. In the process he had President Madero and José María Pino Suarez, his vice-president, murdered (Richards, 2004).

Huerta's cynical opportunism led to a civil war that engulfed large portions of Mexico from 1913 to 1917. Huerta gained the backing of Orozco, but he was opposed by many of the elites. The most important of these, Governor Venustiano Carranza of Coahuila, detested Huerta's regime and issued his own plan in response to it, the Plan of Guadalupe (1913), a document almost exclusively concerned with politics. Zapata, of course, still looking for support for land reform, opposed Huerta even more strongly than he had Madero. Pancho Villa, who had fought in 1910–1911 under Orozco, emerged as an important new opponent in

Chihuahua, where he gathered cowboys, sharecroppers, miners, and lumber jacks into a first-class fighting unit, the Division del Norte, the most powerful rebel force in the revolution. Where Zapata was the leader of a community, Villa seemed more the man on horseback (he was a superb horseman). Brave, charismatic, dedicated to his men, and an excellent organizer and manager, he was not all bravado, however. He believed in the redistribution of income from the rich to the poor and noted the importance of education. Most of all, he seemed interested in a return to the autonomy enjoyed by what had been frontier communities in Chihuahua. In this respect, both he and Zapata wanted to return to a world that governed itself with minimal interference from Mexico City. Like Zapata, too, he was a regionalist, uncomfortable on the national stage (Richards, 2004).

In the chaos of warring factions, American intervention once again forced the revolution in a particular direction. In April 1914 the US Navy launched an attack on the Mexican port of Veracruz. After a naval bombardment, the US Army secured and occupied the city. In November 1914 the American government decided to back Carranza's Constitutionalist army as the faction most likely to respect American interests in Mexico. It used its position in Veracruz to equip Carranza's army. The army received some 12,000 rifles and carbines, over three million rounds of ammunition, machine guns, barbed wire, cars, trucks, and artillery. These supplies were crucial in the eventual constitutionalist defeat of Villa's forces. Between the American occupation of Veracruz and the resupply of Carranza's troops, Villa had repeatedly defeated Huerta's forces, forcing Huerta to give up the presidency and flee the country. In the summer of 1914, even though Huerta had left the revolutionary stage, Carranza was still no match for Villa and his ally Zapata, neither in terms of military strength nor political following (Richards, 2004).

Alvaro Obregón Salido, who had not participated in the Maderista revolt of 1910–1911, was on the fringes of the elites socially. He soon, however, became the indispensable man for Carranza and the Constitutionlists. Obregón not only wanted to liberalize politics, he also presented an extensive social agenda that included agrarian and industrial reform. He could step outside the elite view of the world and understand the needs of other social groups in Mexico. He eventually became the most important figure in the first, most violent phase of the revolution. Obregón made two significant contributions to the Constitutionalist position in 1914. First, he courted the working class, organized in the Casa del Obrero Mundial, and the urban intellectuals. The workers provided important support for the army. When Carranza's stance on land reform, which stressed the importance of observing property rights,

was widely denounced by Villista and Zapatistaleaders, Obregón arranged a meeting between the two sides at Aguascalientes in October. The convention at Aguascalientes brought the followers of Villa and Zapata closer together and made clear their differences with Carranza. It also made plain the radical nature of their ideas, effectively pitting them against Carranza and Obregón. Stunned American observers made the fateful decision to support Carranza and Obregón.

At the end of the year, Villa and Zapata met for the first time at Xochimilco. As an American agent (quoted in John Womack's fine biography of Zapata)described the scene, Villa was "tall, robust, weighing about 180 pounds... wearing an English [pith] helmet, a heavy brown sweater, khaki trousers, leggings and heavy riding shoes". Zapata was much shorter than Villa, "weighing probably 130 pounds, and wearing a short black coat, a large light blue silk necker chief, pronounced lavender shirt, and a pair of black, tight-fitting Mexican trousers with silver buttons down the outside seam of each leg". The two chiefs, at first at a loss for words, eventually found common ground in their dislike of Carranza. They were unable, however, to effectively coordinate their armies. While the nation saw them as a united force, they continued to fight largely separate campaigns, which weakened each of their positions greatly.

In 1915 Obregón's reorganized and well-equipped armies defeated Villa's forces in a series of battles from April to June. Obregón applied the lessons the Great War was teaching the world and used barbed wire and carefully placed machine guns to good effect. He also had the use of modern artillery provided by the Americans. While Obregón defeated Villa, Zapata continued to hold the south and the centre of Mexico. At the same time, working-class radicalism, centred on the Casa del Obrero Mundial, formed a

growing threat to the Constitutionalist movement. A strike in May 1916 resulted in victory for the Casa. When few of the promises made in May were kept, a renewed strike in July found the government better

prepared. It used the army to break the power of the anarcho-syndicalist unions. Villa, despite defeat by Obregón, continued to be troublesome. His raid on Columbus, New Mexico, early in 1916, resulted in the "Punitive Expedition" led by General John J. Pershing. Villa became an almost legendary figure, but could not translate this into effective political power. While the fighting continued, the Constitutionalists staged a meeting in 1916 at Queretaro. This was a very different affair from the meeting two years prior at Aguascalientes. Fewer military leaders were present. Instead there were more people with university educations and professional backgrounds. Out of the meeting came the Constitution of 1917, the most important document in twentieth century Mexican history.

The Constitution of 1917 created a series of reforms that laid the foundation for a new Mexican government. It called for separation of church and state, the right to education through public schools, the regulation of working conditions, and the right of workers to form unions and to strike. It also empowered the government to redistribute land. This meant not simply restoring land illegally seized from the peasantry. It also made possible the expropriation of land that was not serving a useful purpose. Finally, it also asserted that the nation owned the subsoil resources. Nearly every group in the Mexican Revolution found something in the Constitution it had been fighting for. The Constitution, a clear repudiation of laissez-faire liberalism, owed much to the plans, especially the Plan Orozquista and the Plan de Ayala. It was, however, a document of reform, not of revolution. The costs of the revolution were enormous. In a nation with a population of roughly 15 million, between 1.5 and 2 million died. Many of the leaders of the revolution were assassinated. The first was Emiliano Zapata in April 1919, he

became a martyr. Carranza was held responsible for Zapata's death and lost a great deal of popularity. The following year Carranza attempted to handpick his successor. To many, workers, peasants, and even the Americans, this could only

mean the continuation of a regime that seemed unable to address the basic problems of the country. His former lieutenant, Obregón, who had resigned after the assassination of Zapata, led a march on Mexico City that deposed the isolated Carranza. Carranza was assassinated later that year.

The Mexican Revolution, while occurring at the same time as the Great War and revolutions all around the world, had followed and continued to follow its own path. It had broadened the practice of politics and given voice not only to provincial and local elites but also to the urban middle classes and the workers. It had done the least for the majority of the population, the peasants. But even for them it had made promises and created a constitutional basis for action on those promises. The Constitution of 1917 had set an agenda that was basically democratic and progressive. The revolutionaries had seized and reconstituted power. It now remained to be seen how effectively they would use it.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES(SAES)

1. What will you say the British revolution and Mexican revolution have in common?
2. Highlight the major issues that surrounded the Mexican revolution.

UNIT II: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION; THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

- 3.1 The American Revolution**
- 3.2 Growing hostilities and the war**
- 3.3 The influence of the enlightenment**
- 3.4 Success for the colonists**
- 3.5 The Russian revolution**
- 3.6 Comparison of the Russian and Mexican revolutions**
- 3.7 The crisis year of 1914**
- 3.8 The 1917 revolution**

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

In this module, we will discuss revolution in two powerful countries that are capable of shaking the world today. The first is in the American Revolution. Remember that America is considered to be the most powerful nation in the world today in terms of political and economic strength. America is so powerful that whatever happens there affects other parts of the world, for instance, a drop in US dollar will shake almost every country in the world. The second is in Russia, remember that Russia is the largest country in the world in terms of land size; moreover, Russia has a strong military power that is capable of determining the fate of the whole world. It should be noted that the lessons of the section will be largely

replicated/drawn from the writings of Richards, 2004; Foran, 1997, 2005) due to their extensive review on the subject matter of the module.

2.0 Objectives

The objectives of this unit are to:

- ✓ Introduce you to the history of American revolution
- ✓ Expose you to the influence of enlightenment philosophy on the occurrence of American revolution
- ✓ Make you grasp the dynamics of the Russian revolution

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

Throughout the 1600s and 1700s, British colonists had formed a large and thriving settlement along the eastern shore of North America. When George III became king of Great Britain in 1760, his North American colonies were growing by leaps and bounds. Their combined population soared from about 250,000 in 1700 to 2,150,000 in 1770, a nearly nine fold increase. Economically, the colonies thrived on trade with the nations of Europe. Along with increasing population and prosperity, a new sense of identity was growing in the colonists' minds. By the mid-1700s, colonists had been living in America for nearly 150 years. Each of the 13 colonies had its own government, and people were used to a great degree of independence. Colonists saw themselves less as British and more as Virginians or Pennsylvanians. However, they were still British subjects and were expected to obey the British law.

In 1651, the British Parliament passed a trade law called the Navigation Act. This and subsequent trade laws prevented colonists from selling their most valuable products to any country except Britain. In

addition, colonists had to pay high taxes on imported French and Dutch goods. Nonetheless, Britain's policies benefited both the colonies and the motherland. Britain bought American raw materials for low prices and sold manufactured goods to the colonists. And despite various British trade restrictions, colonial merchants also thrived. Such a spirit of relative harmony, however, soon would change.

In 1754, war erupted on the North American continent between the English and the French. As you recall, the French had also colonized parts of North America throughout the 1600s and 1700s. The conflict was known as the French and Indian War. (The name stems from the fact that the French enlisted numerous Native American tribes to fight on their side.) The fighting lasted until 1763, when Britain and her colonists emerged victorious—and seized nearly all French land in North America. The victory, however, only led to growing tensions between Britain and its colonists. In order to fight the war, Great Britain had run up a huge debt. Because American colonists benefited from Britain's victory, Britain expected the colonists to help pay the costs of the war. In 1765, Parliament passed the Stamp Act. According to this law, colonists had to pay a tax to have an official stamp put on wills, deeds, newspapers, and other printed material.

American colonists were outraged. They had never paid taxes directly to the British government before. Colonial lawyers argued that the stamp tax violated colonists' natural rights, and they accused the government of "taxation without representation." In Britain, citizens consented to taxes through their representatives in Parliament. The colonists, however, had no representation in Parliament. Thus, they argued they could not be taxed.

3.1 Growing Hostilities and the War

Over the next decade, hostilities between the two sides increased. Some colonial leaders favoured independence from Britain. In 1773, to protest an import tax on tea, a group of colonists dumped a large load of British tea into Boston Harbour. George III, infuriated by the “Boston Tea Party,” as it was called, ordered the British navy to close the port of Boston. Such harsh tactics by the British made enemies of many moderate colonists. In September 1774, representatives from every colony except Georgia gathered in Philadelphia to form the First Continental Congress. This group protested the treatment of Boston. When the king paid little attention to their complaints, the colonies decided to form the Second Continental Congress to debate their next move. On April 19, 1775, British soldiers and American militia men exchanged gunfire on the village green in Lexington, Massachusetts. The fighting spread to nearby Concord. The Second Continental Congress voted to raise an army and organize for battle under the command of a Virginian named George Washington. The American Revolution had begun.

3.2: THE INFLUENCE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Colonial leaders used Enlightenment ideas to justify independence. The colonists had asked for the same political rights as people in Britain, they said, but the king had stubbornly refused. Therefore, the colonists were justified in rebelling against a tyrant who had broken the social contract. In July 1776, the Second Continental Congress issued the Declaration of Independence. This document, written by political leader Thomas Jefferson, was firmly based on the ideas of John Locke and the Enlightenment. The Declaration reflected these ideas in its eloquent argument for natural rights. “We hold these truths to be self-evident,” states the beginning of the Declaration, “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”. Since Locke had asserted that people had the right to rebel against an unjust ruler, the Declaration of Independence included a long list of George III’s abuses. The document ended

by declaring the colonies' separation from Britain. The colonies, the Declaration said, "are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown".

3.2: SUCCESS FOR THE COLONISTS

The British were not about to let their colonies leave without a fight. Shortly after the publication of the Declaration of Independence, the two sides went to war. At first glance, the colonists seemed destined to go down in quick defeat. Washington's ragtag, poorly trained army faced the well-trained forces of the most powerful country in the world. In the end, however, the Americans won their war for independence.

Several reasons explain the colonists' success. First, the Americans' motivation for fighting was much stronger than that of the British, since their army was defending their homeland. Second, the overconfident British generals made several mistakes. Third, time itself was on the side of the Americans. The British could win battle after battle, as they did, and still lose the war. Fighting an overseas war, 3,000 miles from London, was terribly expensive. After a few years, tax-weary British citizens called for peace. Finally, the Americans did not fight alone. Louis XVI of France had little sympathy for the ideals of the American Revolution. However, he was eager to weaken France's rival, Britain. French entry into the war in 1778 was decisive. In 1781, combined forces of about 9,500 Americans and 7,800 French trapped a British army commanded by Lord Cornwallis near Yorktown, Virginia. Unable to escape, Cornwallis eventually surrendered. The Americans had shocked the world and won their independence.

3.3: THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The Russian Revolution is one of the seminal events of the twentieth century. Like the French Revolution, it continued to reverberate long after it had ceased its active phase. Even now, more than a decade after the collapse of its chief product, the Soviet Union, its influence still lingers. It was, together with the Mexican Revolution and similar events in the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and China, part of a cluster of revolutions with somewhat comparable causes and aims. The impact of the Russian Revolution, however, was far greater than the other revolutions in the cluster. In many ways, it set the standard for revolution in the twentieth century, just as the French Revolution had done for the nineteenth century. Vladimir Lenin, with his ideas about a party of professional revolutionaries and the possibilities of an alliance between proletariat and peasantry, seemingly charted the path one took in order to seize power. Josef Stalin, Lenin's disciple and successor, showed how power might be used to construct an industrialized, urbanized society capable of defending and extending the revolution.

There are at least two general issues that should be addressed before considering the Russian Revolution in detail. One is the question of inevitability, a kind of Russian version of *Sonderweg*, the idea often broached in German historiography of a special historical path taken by that nation. The short answer to the question of inevitability is that the Russian Empire had many options open to it other than revolution, certainly down to and even during World War I. Political figures made strenuous efforts to modify or reform it in the twenty-five years before the outbreak of war. Even as late as the fall of 1917, there were a number of options available.

Secondly, any definition of the Russian Revolution should go beyond merely the events of the extraordinary year 1917. Instead we should view it as involving four different periods, each of which is a part of a much larger whole. First, the Russian Revolution of 1905 brought about a series of events that might have led in other circumstances to a Russian empire modified as a true constitutional monarchy. Had the changes produced by the Revolution of 1905 taken hold, the Russian Empire might have survived the trauma of World War I and possibly achieved roughly the same degree of industrialization and urbanization by the 1930s that the Soviet Union did, and at a much lower cost in human lives. Next is the crisis year of 1914. Third is 1917 and the Civil War that followed that remarkable year. Finally, there are the efforts to use power, first in the 1920s and then, a far darker picture, in the Stalin Revolution of the 1930s.

3.5: PERSPECTIVES ON RUSSIAN AND MEXICAN REVOLUTION

There are intriguing similarities between the Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Mexican Revolution. Both countries were experiencing rapid but uneven economic growth based on an influx of foreign capital, circumstances that created severe problems for the working class and for the peasantry. The central government became increasingly powerful. Additionally, elites either saw their interests threatened or wanted the state to pay more attention to their particular needs and interests. The

differences, however, are also important if we want to understand more fully what led to revolution in each country. In Mexico the unresolved constitutional questions created an opening for discussion and organization. National pride and patriotism were also major factors. Ideologies played a larger role in Russia. Too many Russians, it appeared that only a violent and revolutionary approach could challenge the oppressive power of the Tsar. Nationalism became a factor only when the Russian Empire became involved in conflict with Japan and suffered a series of embarrassing defeats.

At the turn of the century, the Russian Empire had gambled and lost. It had gambled that the economic policies of Count Sergei Witte, the finance minister, would prove successful before the burden of taxation created an opposition to those policies. Witte had attempted to industrialize the Russian economy by attracting foreign investment, just as Mexico had done, and also by constructing the necessary infrastructure for industry and commerce. The Trans-Siberian railroad was only the most visible instance of the latter effort. The Russian economy grew rapidly in the 1890s, but, then, at the very end of the century fell into recession. Over the next few years strikes and unemployment among the working class combined with peasant land hunger in the countryside to create a volatile mix of social disorder. On top of this, a range of ideologies challenged the tsarist system politically. Liberal professionals wanted a political system more responsive to their particular kind of expertise, one in which they as educated men and women could participate. Marxists worked to organize the working class and to spread the ideas of Marx and Engels within the Russian Empire. They looked to the fall of the empire, expecting to help bring about a bourgeois democracy within which they could continue to work toward the ultimate goal of a proletarian revolution and then a classless society. The Socialist Revolutionaries worked among the peasantry and looked to an alternate path that would eliminate any need to imitate the West. They were largely responsible for the campaigns of assassination that contributed to an atmosphere of lawlessness and disorder in the Russian Empire by 1904.

It is likely the Russian Empire would have weathered this particularly rough period except for the Russo-Japanese War that began in 1904. Defeats suffered during the war called into question the effectiveness of the tsarist government. Commitment of troops and material to the war effort also made it difficult for the regime to respond effectively to the outbreak of revolution in 1905 (Nunn, 2009). The catalyst for the revolution was an event in January 1905 later known as “Bloody Sunday”. Father Georgi Gapon led a group of workers, their wives, and children to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to present a petition to the tsar, and the authorities responded by firing on the crowd. The massacre of peaceful demonstrators set off a spontaneous revolutionary movement that the government could not deal with effectively. In the major cities, radical students, liberal professionals, and workers met together to discuss events. In St. Petersburg, a Soviet or council—a broadly representative body—was formed. Its main goal was the creation of a Duma, a national parliamentary body.

In August the government called for a Duma with which it would consult on policy issues. The Duma would, however, have no legislative powers. In September railroad workers began what quickly turned into a paralyzing general strike. Count Witte presented the tsar with two options: use force to repress the revolution or issue a manifesto promising a Duma. When Tsar Nicholas II realized that no one was willing to repress the movement through the use of force, he agreed to the October Manifesto, a document that granted a Duma and basic civil rights, together with the promise to issue other laws later. The October Manifesto split the revolutionary opposition into those who believed they had gained what they wanted—a constitution, representative government, and elections—and those who wanted to continue the revolution to the point of overthrowing the tsarist regime. The brief period in which the liberal upper and middle classes allied with the lower classes ended. In its place were possibilities for the tsarist government to work with liberals in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy that would

not only fulfill political desires but also pay attention to the many social and economic issues that existed in the empire.

3.6: THE CRISIS YEAR OF 1914

If Witte had been the key figure in the period before 1905, Piotr Stolypin was his equivalent after 1905. Debate continues to this day as to whether Stolypin's policies had any chance of changing Russia sufficiently so that it could have moved toward political freedom and an industrialized economy. It seems unlikely that his policies alone would have accomplished those ends, but it is also true that his policies did not receive anything like an adequate test. For various reasons, among them lack of consistent support from Nicholas and failure on Stolypin's part to find ways to work with the Duma, the efforts to change and reform Russia after 1905 were cut short. Stolypin worked in three complementary directions. First, he worked in 1906 and 1907 to stamp out the last remaining fires of the revolution. By the use of field courts martial and the "Stolypin necktie" (the hangman's noose), he was able to restore order. The second policy involved taming the Duma. While Stolypin was largely successful in this aim, revising the suffrage arrangements drastically in 1907 to favour the aristocracy, he did not succeed in establishing a working relationship with the more docile Duma.

Stolypin's third policy involved another wager, this time that a peasant freed from the tyranny of the mire or village commune, farming his own land as a consolidated holding, and, ideally, living on that land, would become a conservative force, and a source of support for the government. If enough peasants could be turned into conservative small farmers, then a major element of revolutionary discontent in the countryside would be effectively eliminated.

Legislation made it possible for peasants to petition to dissolve the mire and to consolidate their holdings. Even when this was done, however, it was not usually the case that peasants lived

independently on their holdings. Since most peasants continued to live in the village, they usually remained under the influence of village traditions and customs. The self-reliant, independent farmer that Stolypin hoped to create was the exception rather than the rule.

Even before Stolypin was assassinated in 1911, he had lost the backing of the tsar. Neither Nicholas nor his advisors understood the necessity of modifying the tsarist system and the importance of strong, competent leaders. Nicholas was determined to pass on to his son what his father had passed on to him: the tsarist autocracy. With this kind of blind stubbornness leading the way, it is difficult to imagine how the Russian Empire might have found an alternate path. Still, in 1914, while a serious crisis existed on three different levels, it would have been premature to see that the empire was doomed to revolution. The first level was cultural. Among many writers, artists, and other cultural figures there existed a sense of impending catastrophe. A vague, intuitive feeling that the Russian Empire would simply explode in the near future pervaded. Art and culture would be lost in the destruction and chaos that this would bring.

The second level was more tangible. Its focus was the intense strike movement that had begun in 1913 and assumed gigantic proportions in the first part of 1914. The government worried the movement might paralyze the economy. The Bolsheviks (the Leninist faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party: RSDLP) hoped to use the strike movement to launch a revolution. Compared with 1905, however, one key element was missing. The countryside was relatively quiet. Without a restive peasantry, it was unlikely the strike movement by itself could have led to revolution. Finally, the third level featured a split between the *obshchestvo*, that portion of society involved in politics, and the tsarist regime. The government had long ago used up any political good will created by the October Manifesto and the hopes for a constitutional order after 1905. At the same time, the *obshchestvo* feared the masses: the workers on strike certainly, and also the peasantry.

3.7: THE 1917 REVOLUTION

The February Revolution ended the Romanov dynasty. It was actually more a collapse of the empire under the pressures of war than a revolution. Battered by defeats, the regime was also close to economic disintegration early in 1917. Nicholas and his ministers had not taken advantage of the desire of members of the Duma, industrialists, and professionals to aid in the war effort. Nothing like the British- and German-controlled economies existed in Russia. Instead factories lacked raw materials, city dwellers went hungry and cold, and the army lacked necessary supplies, weapons, and ammunition. Beginning on the 23rd of February (8 March), crowds of people, a large percentage of them women, thronged the streets of Petrograd (the wartime name of St. Petersburg). Over the next several days, the crowds grew larger and more radical. The soldiers sent to control the crowds made common cause with them. Unable to maintain order in the capital, the regime disintegrated (Faulkner, 2017).

A Provisional Government derived from the Duma stepped into the political space that opened up. The Provisional Government issued a number of popular decrees such as one calling for the eight-hour workday. The government looked to an eventual constituent assembly to work out the details of the new system of government. Initially, however, the main task was to continue the war effort. Other pressing questions, such as land for the peasantry, were to be postponed indefinitely. Perhaps the most important mistake made by the Provisional Government was to overestimate the patience and goodwill of the masses. Another institution, the Petrograd Soviet, appeared at the same time the Provisional Government formed. It represented the workers, soldiers, and sailors of the Petrograd area. With a constantly shifting membership, it reflected public opinion in the most direct way. While it did not try to

exercise governmental power, it had considerable leverage over the Provisional Government. Observers spoke of “dual power”: the idea that the Provisional Government had to consider opinion in the Petrograd Soviet in everything it did.

Initially, the leading figures in the Provisional Government were Pavel Miliukov, the foreign minister and a Constitutional Democrat (Kadet), and Aleksandr Guchkov, minister of war and an Octobrist. When Miliukov indicated that the government would adhere to its agreements with its allies in the war, including provisions for territorial change after the war, the ensuing uproar led to a reorganization of the government. In the new Provisional Government there were two important developments. First, Aleksandr Kerensky, the new minister of war, emerged as the leading figure. Kerensky, a moderate socialist, seemed more at home in the revolutionary chaos of 1917 than the other members of the government. The second development involved the entry of representatives’ from the socialist parties into the government. Both the Mensheviks, Lenin’s rivals in the RSDLP, and the Socialist Revolutionaries took part in the new Provisional Government. They now shared responsibility for governmental policy and actions. Lenin, leader of the Bolsheviks, returned to Russia in April 1917. In his “April Thesis” he established a position that set his party apart from all others in Russia. He called boldly for peace without annexations or indemnities, land to the peasants, and all power to the Soviets. This was a crucial contribution to the eventual seizure of power carried out by the Bolsheviks. At the time, however, many Bolsheviks had difficulty accepting this new direction. Not for the last time, Lenin had to convince many in his party of the correctness of his views.

By the end of the summer of 1917, it appeared that Kerensky, who had become prime minister during the summer, was firmly in control of the government. Despite the failure of the offensive he had organized, the Provisional Government had come through the chaotic July Days in good shape. During that time armed demonstrators had called for the socialist parties to take charge of the government and

the Bolsheviks had considered the idea of leading an attempt to seize power. The socialist parties declined to take responsibility for the government and the Bolsheviks decided to head off an armed insurrection rather than take the chance of it failing. In August an attempted coup from the Right by General Kornilov failed. The Bolshevik Party was weakened by rumours that Lenin was a German agent. Lenin fled to Finland in disguise to avoid arrest and several Bolsheviks were taken into custody.

In the fall neither Kerensky nor Lenin saw the Russian situation very clearly. Circumstances worked out in favour of Lenin, however. Kerensky continued to delay the election of the Constituent Assembly by convening groups that were meant to represent public opinion and prepare for the elections. Lenin, for his part, had convinced himself that Russia was ripe for revolution. He set about the business of convincing others this was the case. The Central Committee (CC) of the Bolshevik Party was reluctant to take action, but agreed finally to put the idea of revolution on the agenda.

Two factors helped the Bolsheviks gain power in the October Revolution. The first was the chaotic conditions in the country. Russia was in a state of near anarchy with peasants seizing land, workers occupying factories, soldiers deserting their units, and national minorities working toward autonomy or even independence. Towns and regions responded to local situations without much reference to Petrograd. At the same time, they looked to Petrograd for what national leadership was available. The second factor was the work of Leon Trotsky, now a major figure in the Bolshevik Party and an influential member of the Petrograd Soviet.

Trotsky used his position in the Soviet to make preparations to protect the revolution. He established connections with Red Guard units, workers' militias, and the soldiers and sailors in the area, undermining the authority of the Provisional Government over the military units as he did so.

The Bolsheviks presented the Provisional Government's actions against Pravda, the Bolshevik newspaper, as the beginning of a counter-revolution. Very quickly, they established control in Petrograd and overthrew the Provisional Government. The Bolshevik Party was still a minority party, even in Petrograd, but they could claim their goals were broadly representative of the goals of the masses in the country. Most workers and peasants were not Bolsheviks, but they agreed with the Bolshevik program, particularly with the idea of defending the revolution. The Bolshevik takeover was presented to the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets who were just beginning to meet in Petrograd in an effort to preserve the revolution. Not all the delegates were willing to sanction what the Bolsheviks had done and many walked out of the Congress. The rump, however, approved a Bolshevik-Left Socialist Revolutionary government. The seizure of power had been accomplished with relatively little bloodshed. The Civil War that followed was bloody and cruel. It has been argued that the Civil War period was that point at which the revolution began to go in the wrong direction. Steps taken and methods adopted then made it difficult in later years to avoid the harsh regime that Stalin installed in the 1930s.

Initially, several difficult choices had to be made. The first concerned the Constituent Assembly, which met for the first and last time in January 1918. About a quarter of the delegates was Bolshevik. Others came from the Left SRs, but most of the delegates were moderate SRs and Mensheviks. The Bolsheviks unceremoniously dissolved the Constituent Assembly once they had a sense of how difficult it would be to work with it. Another difficult choice concerned the question of whether to sign a peace treaty with Germany. Although Trotsky tried some clever manoeuvres ("no peace, nowar"), the Germans imposed harsh terms in the Treaty of BrestLitovsk and Lenin insisted on the necessity of accepting the treaty (Richard, 2004).

“War Communism,” the set of economic policies that prevailed from 1918 to 1921, was in large part a response to the conditions of the Civil War, the necessity of controlling food supplies, industrial production, and the distribution of goods. It is also true; however, that War Communism was an effort to construct a single economic plan and to create the institutional basis for Communism. Although it failed as a method of organizing and managing the economy, Bolshevik experience with decision-making and use of force helped to convince them of the necessity of coercion in shaping the new society. The activities of the White Armies and the several instances of foreign intervention also helped shape a siege mentality that continued to characterize the party even after the end of the Civil War. The creation of the Red Army under Trotsky and the Cheka, the secret police, under Feliks Dzerzhinskii, also contributed to an atmosphere in which brutal methods seemed necessary. Lenin had always prided himself on being “hard” rather than “soft.” The times seemed to require that the Bolsheviks exhibit toughness and show a willingness to use whatever means were available and likely to gain results.

Some European socialists criticized the Bolsheviks for holding on to power at all costs. Rosa Luxemburg, for example, a founder of the German Communist Party, wondered if it would not be better to relinquish power rather than use such drastic methods to preserve it. The Civil War was in any case a formative experience for millions of Russians, whether party members or not. In addition to toughening many who gained positions of power in the 1920s, it also created a revolutionary myth that found a response in the idealism and willingness to sacrifice for the goals of the revolution that characterized many young Russians at the end of the 1920s. Stalin tapped into that energy and enthusiasm during the Five-Year Plans.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES(SAEs)

1. Discuss the roles of enlightenment philosophy and ideology in the occurrence of American and Mexican revolutions.
2. Of what relevance is the Russian Revolution to world history?

UNIT III: THE LONGEST REVOLUTION: CHINA (1911-1949)

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 The longest Revolution: China (1911-1949)

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

In this unit, we will present occurrence of revolution in another giant country-China. We should not forget that China is among the best three largest economies in the world. The revolution in China ended less than 100 years ago, but now, they are recording progress. As an African, you should attempt to make connections from African crises and hope for development with lessons from China.

2.0 Objectives

After the end of this unit, you should:

- ✓ Learn the history of revolution in China and its causes and attendant consequences
- ✓ Develop the spirit of hope that Africa can be developed within a short time.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 THE LONGEST REVOLUTION: CHINA (1911-1949)

With the Chinese revolution of 1949 we come to a typical example of a socialist revolution in the Third World. John Dunn (1972) considers it “probably harder to characterize than any other historical revolution: vast in scope, be musingly protracted in time, enduringly diffuse in focus, politically still very much unresolved, and formidably occluded and opaque throughout (Dunn, 1972)”. The case of China was investigated by Theda Skocpol according to the same structural principles as were the French and Russian revolutions: a semi-bureaucratic absolutist monarchy was toppled in 1911, after which a mostly agrarian economy near the limits of its growth combined with Japanese invasion in the 1930s to cause a crisis for the nationalist state of Chiang Kai-shek. This state fell to a communist revolution led by Mao, who provided the missing organizational capacity to the mass peasant base of the revolution. Eric Wolf has challenged this view of a stagnant agrarian economy, noting significant commercialization of agriculture in key regions as the basis of peasant grievances.

Rod Aya and Ekkart Zimmermann have joined Skocpol in arguing against a major role for ideas in the events: “the ideological currents did not palpably exist as political reference points when the old regimes [in Mexico and China] were toppled in 1911.” But Skocpol’s teacher, Barrington Moore, Jr., provided an early version of what we might term Wolf’s “social” interpretation, while also underlining the salience of peasant ideals in the revolutions he studied, in the shape of “a crude notion of equality, stressing justice and necessity of a minimum of land for the performance of essential social tasks.” More recently, Alvin So and Stephen Chi in Halliday (1999), have offered a most promising synthetic theory of the revolution:

The Chinese Revolution is such a complex event that it has to be explained by a combination of the following factors: (a) The degeneration of the GMD's [referring to the Guomindang nationalist movement led by Chiang Kai-shek] Nanjing government laid the foundation for the Communist movement; (b) peasant pauperization and changing agrarian class relations in the 1930s provided the social supports for this movement; (c) Maoism, the Red Army, and peasant mobilization provided the revolutionary ideology, organization, and strategy; and (d) the second Sino-Japanese War provided the timing and the powerful catalyst for revolution.

From 1644 until the 1911 political revolution, China was ruled by the Manchu, or Ching dynasty – Skocpol's centralized, semi-bureaucratic absolutist monarchy. Its 40,000 officials needed the help of local elites –the landlords and scholars once known as the gentry – to rule the vast countryside. Sharecropping and wage labour were common in a system that was – if not yet capitalist – then certainly not feudal. Eighty percent of the population were peasants with small holdings who either owned their own land (about 50 percent), or rented land (30 percent), or both owned and rented to make ends meet (20 percent). There were very few large estates or common lands to manage, and peasants had to compete with each other for scarce access to land. Nor did peasants possess many independent solidarity organizations of their own; instead, they tended to be politically controlled by local elites, and organized together with them in clans or groups of families. Revolts did sometimes occur in the countryside, but rebellion was dangerous and not likely to succeed.

This state and economy were relatively prosperous for several centuries, relatively stable politically and expanding economically. Population grew from 65–80 million in 1400 to 430 million by the middle of the nineteenth century, when it began to strain the limits of existing agricultural productivity (it would burgeon further to 600 million by 1950). In the nineteenth century from Britain, France, Russia, and Japan, at the same time as it was reaching internal limits to development. Wolf comments that the foreigners sought a Chinese government “weak enough to accept orders and controls from abroad, but strong enough to give orders and exercise control domestically” – which indicates the depth of the contradiction faced by the monarchy, because as Skocpol (1979) judges, “China's sheer existence as a

sovereign country was profoundly threatened.” In 1911 the system broke down, a republic was declared, and the Manchus fell, ending the centuries-old system of monarchy in China century, moreover, China came under severe outside pressure from Britain, France, Russia, and Japan, at the same time as it was reaching internal limits to development.

Let us take up the story at this point. There would be no strong central government after 1911, right up to the revolution in 1949. Power lay in the hands of the provincial armies, each controlled by a local figure known as a warlord. Warlords taxed their populations heavily, and competed with each other in a system Skocpol characterizes as a “balance of weakness.” The Confucian-educated elite declined after 1911, but local landlords were left alone, and if anything increased their demands on the peasantry. In the 1920s two new organizations came onto this unstable scene. The Chinese Communist Party (the CCP) was organized in 1921; in Chinese, its name tellingly translated as the “Share Property” Party.⁷⁸ One of its founders was a young student leader named Mao Zedong, the son of a wealthy peasant. At about the same time, a nationalist organization, the Guomindang or GMD, became a mass party. It had been founded in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen, on “the Three People’s Principles of Chinese nationalism, constitutional democracy (to be realized after a period of tutelage), and ‘people’s livelihood’ (an ill-defined form of socialism in the cities and ‘land to the tiller’ in the countryside.” Sun was replaced after his death in 1925 by a young military leader named Chiang Kai-shek. The two parties united temporarily between 1923 and 1927 at the suggestion of the Soviet Union, the main source of the weapons they used for battles against the warlords.

Interestingly, the Soviet Union forced the Chinese communists to subordinate their work to that of the GMD, which they did by working within the labour movement while Chiang’s armies scored military victories (Mao, for example, served as deputy director of propaganda for the GMD). Matters came to a head in the spring of 1927 when Nanking was taken by the GMD and made its capital, and Shanghai, an

important coastal city, was the scene of a left-wing workers' government (it was Zhou Enlai who organized the workers' uprising that allowed Chiang to take Shanghai without a battle). At this point, differences in degree of radicalism arose between nationalists and communists. As Skocpol puts it, "How much social revolution and how much anti-imperialism?" became the questions. Though Chiang could be antagonistic to the capitalist class, especially when seeking funds, the right wing of the GMD grew closer to conservative social forces such as landlords, local elites, factory owners, and army officers. In April 1927 Chiang turned his troops against the communist-backed strikers at Shanghai, and killed hundreds of members of the Communist Party. Soviet aid was rejected and the GMD turned to Chinese business interests instead. By 1931, the GMD had fought, bought, and manoeuvred its way to nominal control of most of the country, largely defeating the warlords in the 1928–30 Northern Expedition and confining the communists to one rural region in the south.

But the GMD failed to set up a stable, effective central government. In part, this was due to the underlying economy and social structure of the country. Turn of the century China was perhaps a dubious case of dependent development, but by the 1930s and 1940s, under the spur of the nationalist government and then the Japanese occupation, the still largely agrarian country had begun a process of industrialization that better qualifies for the term. Though there was no heavy industrial base, the working class grew in numbers from 1.5 million in 1919, concentrated in transport and textiles, to some three million unionized workers by 1927. In addition, there were four million students beyond the secondary level in 1915, and 200,000 teachers, with 100,000 Chinese educated abroad between 1872 and 1949, a fertile ground for both GMD and communist nationalism. Industrial growth was significant from 1912 to 1920, spurred by the limits World War 1 imposed on European competition in China, and continued to expand at 6 percent or more annually from 1926 to 1936, accounting for 3.4 percent of net domestic product in 1933. The index of industrial production rose from 100.0 in 1926 to 134.1 in

1931 and 186.1 in 1936 for all of China, and from 100.0 to 378.0 over the same period for Manchuria. Starting with consumer goods, the process deepened into metallurgy, electricity, and other capital and strategic goods (Foran, 2005).

The GMD made infrastructural improvements to air and water transport, as well as communications. Foreign capital, dominated by Great Britain and Japan, controlled 42 percent of China's industrial assets before World War 2: more than 60 percent of coal, 86 percent of iron ore, 88 percent of steel, 76 percent of electricity, 44 to 54 percent of key textile activities, 73 percent of shipping tonnage. Debt payments took a third of government expenditures from 1911 to 1937 (Foran, 2005). The 1929 world crisis revealed the downside of this incipient dependent development: "Silk exports dropped from 136,000 piculs in 1931 to 54,000 in 1934, and 160 of 180 silk factories in central China had to close". Meanwhile, life was difficult for workers, as unemployment reached five million people in 1935; hours were long, pay low, and women were particularly exploited and harassed. Nor was the GMD popular in the vast countryside, where it left regional landlords in control, and below them, the rural gentry. The situation of the peasantry – up to 85 percent of the population – continued to worsen in the 1930s. In explaining the rise of the communists Wolf emphasized the impact of commercial agriculture in a famous thesis: "The introduction of commercial crops and the commercialization of land affected land prices, tenure conditions, and rent charges. Prices for land doubled and tripled in some areas, and secure tenure was replaced by short-term contracts" (Wolf, 1999). Wolf's views fed into a major debate on the conditions of the peasantry. In the early 1930s R. H. Tawney had estimated that 40 to 50 percent of peasant families lacked enough land to provide their food. Contra Tawney and Han-seng Chen, Ramon Myers, and Thomas Rawski argued that the rural sector did well, even registering rising per capita consumption. R. B. Wong notes that this debate is inconclusive, given the difficulties posed by the lack of evidence. So and Chiu agreed with Albert Feuerwerker that "there is no doubt that the Chinese

peasants experienced a sharp fall in income as a result of the contraction of export markets during the 1930s world depression”.

Peasant debt grew, they lost titles to land, land inequality rose, and the number of impoverished peasants grew. Jonathan Spence adds arguments that peasant conditions worsened by the 1930s, whether due to foreign imperialism and landlord exactions, or to population growth, antiquated farming techniques, and soil exhaustion. He accepts the thesis of deterioration in their conditions, noting further the 1931 floods that created fourteen million refugees, the dislocations of migrant labour after the Japanese seized Manchuria and attacked Shanghai, the effect of the world-wide depression on cash crop exports, and high GMD-imposed taxes. Spence concludes that “many, perhaps tens of millions – lived in terrible and humiliating poverty, and were too preoccupied with the daily struggle for survival to look far ahead or brood about the national scene.”

The GMD state of the period emerged as repressive, exclusionary, and primordial. It was run by a clique around Chiang Kai-shek, who was referred to as the “Generalissimo.” Former warlords staffed it, bribery and favouritism ran rampant. The ideological underpinning of Chiang’s Rule was the “New Life Movement,” based on elements of fascism, including contempt for democracy and strong proscriptions on independent personal and social behaviour. Chiang stated approvingly in 1933: “The most important point of fascism is absolute trust in a sagely, able leader. Aside from complete trust in one person, there is no other leader or schism. The leader has final decision in all matters (Chiang quoted by Eastman, 1972). The shallow roots of this hegemonic project were revealed by the May 21, 1936 replies from all over China to novelist Mao Dun’s call for people’s thoughts on that day.

The GMD ruled through coercion, execution, assassination, arrest, threat, and censorship. Lloyd Eastman concludes that the hold on power by the GMD “depended almost wholly on the army. It was, in fact, apolitical and military structure without a social base, inherently one of the least stable of all political systems.” Foreign pressure, in the form of Japanese encroachments on Chinese territory, became severe in the 1930s. When Japan finally invaded in 1937, the GMD did little to mobilize the masses to resist, retreating instead from the rich coastal cities to the far poorer interior, where it was much less suited to thrive. Obsessed with the communist threat, Chiang devoted most of his forces to the struggle against them, rather than the Japanese. In western China, the GMD’s revenues fell 63 percent; meanwhile, 41 percent of the budget went to the military between 1928 and 1937. In John Fairbank’s telling words, “Instead of learning to live off the countryside as the CCP was doing, the KMT lived off the printing press [referring to the inflation touched off by printing money]”. A huge campaign was launched against the communists’ southern stronghold, forcing Mao to set out with 80,000 supporters in October 1934 on what would be immortalized as the Long March. In one year they walked 6,000 miles across China from the south and east toward the north and west; at the end they numbered only 8–9,000 people (Foran, 2005).

In the process Mao had emerged as the undisputed communist leader and the party had deepened its relationship with the peasants of China and fashioned a strong political culture of opposition out of elements of nationalism and anti-imperialism, popular participation (or at least mass mobilization) in politics, and social and economic justice. Skocpol maintains this successful match of revolutionary leadership and the peasantry had “little to do with revolutionary ideology and everything to do with the ‘peculiarities’ (as seen from a European perspective) of the Chinese agrarian socio-political structure.” By this she means that peasants, lacking land and other resources, had no alternative but to respond to the communist overture. Such a view accords little agency to either party and gives no credit to the skill

of the Red Army and CCP in articulating a message of hope that was readily understood and embraced by a considerable part of the rural population. Let us pause then and look at the political cultures of opposition that helped make the revolution a possibility. Political cultures of opposition were just starting to develop by 1911 (and were largely confined to middle-class urban circles), and communist thought did not exist, but by 1949, Mao's army and party had won the battle for ideological hegemony with Chiang's GMD, especially in the countryside, having wrested from them the mantle of nationalist defenders of the country during the world war. In at least two senses, the CCP quite literally created its own political culture of opposition, more so than in most revolutions: that is, the Long March itself and the subsequent experience in Yanan (termed the "Yenan Way" by Mark Selden)

formed the content of a founding legend, and Mao articulated an ideology— Mao Zedong Thought, or more loosely, Maoism — that represented an astute Sinification of classical orthodox Marxism (Foran, 2005).

In both respects, this ideology built on existing idioms, Chinese and Western. An important intellectual precursor was the May 4 Movement, referring to the date in 1919 when 3,000 students protested against the concessions to Japan made by the victors of World War 1 at the Paris Peace Conference. May 4 gave voice to a new generation's strand of nationalism, and the slogan "down with the old, up with the new" became a weapon of criticism of existing political and social arrangements inside China. This critique was sharpened in the 1920s by the brilliant essays and short stories of Lu Xun (1881–1936), whose loose alliance with the CCP was expressed through the founding of the League of Left-Wing Writers:

[Lu] believed in the power of literature to change ideas and was appalled by the callous insensitivity in Chinese social treatment of the poor and handicapped. Throughout his life he was in rebellion against the treatment of individuals by his fellow Chinese. His famous and influential writings got their power from a bitter and sardonic cynicism that expressed his sense of injustice(Quoted by Fairbank, 1987).

The keys to this political cultural project were to blend nationalism and communism, and to prioritize the role of the peasantry. Revolutionary nationalism grew in the deep roots of resistance to the Japanese occupation after 1932 and especially during World War 2, to the degree that Chalmers Johnson saw it as the political culture of the revolution: “the Communist rise to power should be understood as a species of nationalist movement.” Certainly it attracted students, workers, and intellectuals to the cause. It built on “the overriding sentiment of Chinese nationalism based on cultural and historical pride, which meant China could not be the tail of someone else’s dog”. Its bottom-line, irreducible meaning was “China for the Chinese,” a slogan reminiscent of El Hijo del Ahuizote’s “Mexico for the Mexicans.”

But Mao promised more than this, grafting onto the nationalist current an equally powerful and long-standing message of social justice which appealed to the peasant base of his army and the party. According to Mark Selden, the core of Maoism was based on the values of “equality, mass participation, and self-reliance.” Initially rent reduction, and later, during the civil war, substantive land reform, concretized the first of these. This tapped deeply felt experiences of injustice and aroused strong anti-landlord emotions. During World War 2, the Communist Party toned down its land reform message but tried to make life better for the poor through tax and rent policies. Judith Stacey notes that the word for “Soviet” – soo-wei-ai, sounded similar to shih-wo-yai, meaning “This is mine,” a happy coincidence in the countryside. She also detects a gender dimension to this, finding that due to the economic deterioration of the peasantry, the family was in crisis prior to the revolution. The communists in the 1930s tried to improve living conditions in the country side, thereby restoring the peasant family as the mainstay of the rural economy and resulting in the creation of a more numerous, well-to-do peasant middle class, with families as the basis of the working unit – father, wife, brothers, children all working together (Foran, 2005).

The second element, mass participation, was enshrined as the “mass line approach”. As Fairbank notes, “This from-the-masses-to-the-masses concept was indeed a sort of democracy suited to the Chinese tradition.” The inevitably military organization of the movement and the fact that the subsequent communist government made increasingly cynical use of the rhetoric of participation should not obscure its initial appeal in the period under question. The third leg of the stool – self-reliance – was embodied in the actual practice of the community Mao established at Yanan after the Long March, a social project that included a training centre with its own university, Kangda, the Anti-Japanese Military and Political University, which trained some 100,000 “graduates” who provided a core network for the propagation of the movement’s political culture (Foran, 2005).

Taken as a whole, this skillfully crafted political culture attracted a diverse social base to the side of the revolution, comprising poor, middle, and “rich” peasants in the countryside, and students, intellectuals, workers, and soldiers in the cities, including significant numbers of urban and rural women in one capacity or another.

The world system also intervened decisively in the civil war, with three successive moments constituting a powerful world-systemic opening for the Chinese revolution. First, Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, claiming it as a puppet state, Manchukuo, in 1932. Between 1937 and 1939, Japan occupied the key ports, industrial centres, capital, and most populous and well-to-do parts of the country. The “long” world war then decisively weakened the GMD and ultimately strengthened the CCP. The Japanese overran the GMD strongholds in the cities of east China by 1938, taking the country’s industrial areas and the best farmland, and cutting China off from the outside world. Chiang’s army “incurred large and irreplaceable losses during the first year of fighting, and thereafter its quality was abysmally low”. The

GMD and the communists cooperated briefly against the Japanese from 1938 to 1941, but soon fell into their old conflict; Chiang was unable to fight the Japanese head on, saving his best forces for the coming struggle with the communists. The 1944 Ichigo offensive by Japan destroyed some of the GMD's best remaining armies. Using less costly guerrilla tactics, the communists meanwhile were more effective against the Japanese, attracting further support from nationalist students, professionals, and hard-pressed workers and peasants. Their army was up to ten times smaller than Chiang's in 1945, but their morale was higher and their popular support greater (Foran, 2005).

The second movement in the world-systemic opening came in the form of Soviet actions at the end of World War 2. Following the terms of the Yalta Agreement of February 1945, Stalin declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945, two days after Hiroshima. The Soviet army quickly gained control of Manchuria. The Soviet occupation literally took away much of the industrial base that the GMD could have used to rebuild, for the economic weight of Manchuria was vast (Foran, 2005).

The final act in the world-systemic opening was the attenuation of US support for Chiang and the GMD. After 1941 the GMD received substantial aid from the Allies and the United States. During the war, US aid to the GMD government included a \$75 million loan in 1940, a \$500 million loan in 1942, \$25 million annually in aid from 1943 on, and the sale of \$900 million in lend-lease military equipments for \$175million at the war's end. Retired American airman, Claire Chennault, had built the Chinese air force, General Joseph Stilwell led a key military mission against the Japanese, and right after the victory US planes transported half a million GMD troops to occupy key cities. Paradoxically this only made the communists more self-reliant and better guerrilla fighters, whereas a popular tea-house poem ran: "Chiang Kai-shek has a stubborn heart, America is his father and mother". American support for Chiang weakened, however, as World War II drew to a close and Truman's envoy, General George Marshall,

told Chiang that political reform was essential to continued US aid. By early 1947 Marshall admitted failure in his efforts to mediate the conflict (*Ibid*).

Thereafter, US policy was confused and divided. Fairbank sees this in terms of a split between the earlier generation of Americans in China – often missionaries – who saw the GMD as the answer, and the late-comers (fewer in number, but including General Joseph Stilwell) who had a sense of the CCP's appeal and power. Since the former dominated policy-making, the policy was flawed by serious anachronism and resulted in mixed counsels in the formation of American policy. The US followed a contradictory policy of demanding coalition and reform at Nanking and Yen-an and yet at the same time, supplying the Nationalists. Marshall's mediatory role was thereby given the lie. Stressing US ignorance of the situation at all levels, and almost complete ignorance about the CCP's potential and strength, Fairbank concludes: "Seldom has a national posture been more ineffective and unproductive". The China Aid Act of 1948 provided Chiang with another \$400 million, but the seemingly endless flow ended later that year, when Madame Chiang Kai-shek went to Washington asking for \$3 billion; not only was this refused, all aids were suspended. In the end, the United States was unwilling and unable to intervene in the civil war, effectively leaving the outcome to the play of internal forces.

These factors combined with an economic downturn caused by the aftermath of war and the ongoing revolutionary conflict to make a difference in the civil war between the nationalists and the Communists from 1945 to 1948. Incredible inflation weakened the GMD's efforts in its urban strongholds – prices in Shanghai rose 39 times between September 1945 and February 1947, another 58.6 times by July 1948, and a further 400 times by February 1949, or almost a million times between 1945 and 1949. This was due to GMD corruption, printing of worthless money, scarcity, speculation, and hoarding of goods. The economy was reduced to a barter system by late 1948. Unemployment rose as high as 20 percent in

Canton and 30 percent in Nanjing after the war. Confidence in the GMD was shattered and urban intellectuals, students, workers, and professionals flocked to the communist side.

Of the struggle that followed, Fairbank notes: “for Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalists to lose the civil war was a remarkable achievement”. The GMD made both political and military errors, alienating key social forces with its policies and fruitlessly trying to hold the cities with its armies, seriously overextending its supply lines. The CCP, on the other hand, built on a solid peasant base in north China and on what remained of the industrial foundation in Manchuria, emphasizing a more radical land reform after 1946. They fought a smart guerrilla war, and refused to panic even when their rural bases were overrun in 1946–47 (which only meant the return of hated landlords). In the northeast the population responded well to their appeals after the Japanese occupation and the GMD’s ineffectiveness. Chiang left some of his best troops in a hopeless position in the major cities, and so their arms and many of their men went over to the CCP.

By May 1948 the GMD armies were being cut off from supplies by the communists’ guerrilla tactics, and nationalist troops were deserting in large numbers. In September, Lin Biao took Manchuria once again, a major blow. In November 1948–January 1949, fifty-one GMD divisions and 600,000 men were lost (mostly captured, it seems) in the Huai-hai River campaign. The Red Army, now numbering a million well-armed men, took Beijing without a struggle on January 31, 1949, its troops “riding in [captured] American trucks led by American-made tanks”. Chiang resigned as president ten days later, but continued to head the GMD, which ultimately fled the mainland and installed itself in power on the island of Taiwan, where it would rule for half a century. Meanwhile, in China, on October 1, 1949 Mao announced the founding of the People’s Republic of China. The first fully-fledged Third World revolution of the twentieth century – and the first socialist experiment in Third World history – had come to power.

4.0:SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES(SAES)

1. List and discuss five factors that brought about the emergence of the Chinese revolution.
2. In your assessment of world revolutions, what made the Chinese revolution spectacular?

UNIT IV: THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1The French revolution

3.2: The Old order

3.3: Forces of change

3.4: Dawn of the revolution

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This unit, which is the last of this module, is important and critical to our understanding of revolution in the twentieth century. In fact, if the French Revolution had not occurred, we may not be talking about Sociology today, that is, the emergence of Sociology as a discipline is not unconnected with the

occurrence of French revolution. The French revolution sparked unrest in the whole of Europe. Surprisingly at the moment, Europe is at the top of development ladder; this is a lesson for Africa.

2.0 Objectives

This unit aims to:

- ✓ Introduce you to one of the most remembered revolution in world history
- ✓ Show you how enlightenment philosophy served as a force of determination

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

According to McPhee (2002), the French Revolution is one of the great turning-points in history. Never before had the people of a large and populous country sought to remake their society on the basis of the principle of popular sovereignty. The drama, success, and tragedy of their project, and of the attempts to arrest or reverse it, has attracted students to it for more than two centuries. Although right-wing journalists at the time of the bicentenary of 1989 rushed to proclaim that 'the French Revolution is finished', its importance and fascination for us are undiminished. There are several somewhat contradictory accounts of the revolution, a brief step by step approach would be taken to avoid confusion:

SETTING THE STAGE

In the 1700s, France was considered the most advanced country of Europe. It had a large population and a prosperous foreign trade. It was the centre of the Enlightenment, and France's culture was widely praised and imitated by the rest of the world. However, the appearance of success was deceiving. There was great unrest in France, caused by bad harvests, high prices, high taxes, and disturbing questions raised by the Enlightenment ideas of Locke, Rousseau, and Voltaire.

3.1 THE OLD ORDER

In the 1770s, the social and political system of France—the Old Regime—remained in place. Under this system, the people of France were divided into three large social classes, or estates.

THE PRIVILEGED ESTATES

Two of the estates had privileges, including access to high offices and exemptions from paying taxes, which were not granted to the members of the third. The Roman Catholic Church, whose clergy formed the First Estate, owned 10 percent of the land in France. It provided education and relief services to the poor and contributed about 2 percent of its income to the government. The Second Estate was made up of rich nobles. Although they accounted for just 2 percent of the population, the nobles owned 20 percent of the land and paid almost no taxes. The majority of the clergy and the nobility scorned Enlightenment ideas as radical notions that threatened their status and power as privileged persons.

The Third Estate: About 97 percent of the people belonged to the Third Estate. The three groups that made up this estate differed greatly in their economic conditions. The first group—the bourgeoisie, or middle class—were bankers, factory owners, merchants, professionals, and skilled artisans. Often, they were well educated and believed strongly in the Enlightenment ideals of liberty and equality. Although some of the bourgeoisie were as rich as nobles, they paid high taxes and, like the rest of the Third Estate, lacked privileges. Many felt that their wealth entitled them to a greater degree of social status and political power. The workers of France's cities formed the second, and poorest, group within the Third Estate. These urban workers included trades people, apprentices, labourers, and domestic servants. Paid low wages and frequently out of work, they often went hungry. If the cost of bread rose, mobs of these workers might attack grain carts and bread shops to steal what they needed.

Peasants formed the largest group within the Third Estate, more than 80 percent of France's 26 million people. Peasants paid about half their income in dues to nobles, tithes to the Church, and taxes to the king's agents. They even paid taxes on such basic staples as salt. Peasants and the urban poor resented the clergy and the nobles for their privileges and special treatment. The heavily taxed and discontented Third Estate was eager for change.

3.2 FORCES OF CHANGE

In addition to the growing resentment among the lower classes, other factors contributed to the revolutionary mood in France. New ideas about government, serious economic problems, and weak and indecisive leadership all helped to generate a desire for change.

Enlightenment Ideas: New views about power and authority in government were spreading among the Third Estate. Members of the Third Estate were inspired by the success of the American Revolution. They began questioning long-standing notions about the structure of society. Quoting Rousseau and Voltaire, they began to demand equality, liberty, and democracy. The Comte D'Antraigues, a friend of Rousseau, best summed up their ideas on what government should be: *The Third Estate is the People and the People is the foundation of the State; it is in fact the State itself; the . . . People is everything. Everything should be subordinated to it. . . . It is in the People that all national power resides and for the People that all states exist.*

Economic Troubles: By the 1780s, France's once prosperous economy was in decline. This caused alarm, particularly among the merchants, factory owners, and bankers of the Third Estate. On the surface, the economy appeared to be sound, because both production and trade were expanding rapidly. However, the heavy burden of taxes made it almost impossible to conduct business profitably within France. Further, the cost of living was rising sharply. In addition, bad weather in the 1780s caused widespread

crop failures, resulting in a severe shortage of grain. The price of bread doubled in 1789, and many people faced starvation. During the 1770s and 1780s, France's government sank deeply into debt. Part of the problem was the extravagant spending of Louis XVI and his queen, Marie Antoinette. Louis also inherited a considerable debt from previous kings. And he borrowed heavily in order to help the American revolutionaries in their war against Great Britain, France's chief rival. This nearly doubled the government's debt. In 1786, when bankers refused to lend the government any more money, Louis faced serious problems.

A Weak Leader: Strong leadership might have solved these and other problems. Louis XVI, however, was indecisive and allowed matters to drift. He paid little attention to his government advisers, and had little patience for the details of governing. The queen only added to Louis's problems. She often interfered in the government, and frequently offered Louis poor advice. Further, since she was a member of the royal family of Austria, France's long-time enemy, Marie Antoinette had been unpopular from the moment she set foot in France. Her behaviour only made the situation worse. As queen, she spent so much money on gowns, jewels, gambling, and gifts that she became known as "Madame Deficit." Rather than cutting expenses, Louis put off dealing with the emergency until he practically had no money left. His solution was to impose taxes on the nobility. However, the Second Estate forced him to call a meeting of the Estates-General—an assembly of representatives from all three estates—to approve this new tax. The meeting, the first in 175 years, was held on May 5, 1789, at Versailles.

3.3 Dawn of the Revolution

The clergy and the nobles had dominated the Estates-General throughout the Middle Ages and expected to do so in the 1789 meeting. Under the assembly's medieval rules, each estate's delegates met in a separate hall to vote, and each estate had one vote. The two privileged estates could always outvote the

Third Estate. The National Assembly, The Third Estate delegates, mostly members of the bourgeoisie whose views had been shaped by the Enlightenment, were eager to make changes in the government. They insisted that all three estates meet together and that each delegate have a vote. This would give the advantage to the Third Estate, which had as many delegates as the other two estates combined.

Siding with the nobles, the king ordered the Estates-General to follow the medieval rules. The delegates of the Third Estate, however, became more and more determined to wield power. A leading spokesperson for their viewpoint was a clergyman sympathetic to their cause, Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès. In a dramatic speech, Sieyès suggested that the Third Estate delegates name themselves the National Assembly and pass laws and reforms in the name of the French people. After a long night of excited debate, the delegates of the Third Estate agreed to Sieyès's idea by an overwhelming majority. On June 17, 1789, they voted to establish the National Assembly, in effect proclaiming the end of absolute monarchy and the beginning of representative government. This vote was the first deliberate act of revolution.

Three days later, the Third Estate delegates found themselves locked out of their meeting room. They broke down a door to an indoor tennis court, pledging to stay until they had drawn up a new constitution. This pledge became known as the Tennis Court Oath. Soon after, nobles and members of the clergy who favoured reform joined the Third Estate delegates. In response to these events, Louis stationed his mercenary army of Swiss guards around Versailles.

Storming the Bastille: In Paris, rumours flew. Some people suggested that Louis was intent on using military force to dismiss the National Assembly. Others charged that the foreign troops were coming to Paris to massacre French citizens. People began to gather weapons in order to defend the city against attack. On July 14, a mob searching for gunpowder and arms stormed the Bastille, a Paris prison. The mob overwhelmed the guard and seized control of the building. The angry attackers hacked the prison

commander and several guards to death, and then paraded around the streets with the dead men's heads on pikes. The fall of the Bastille became a great symbolic act of revolution to the French people. Ever since, July 14—BastilleDay—has been a French national holiday, similar to the Fourth of July in the United States.

4.0:SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES (SAEs)

1. Why do you think the people of France staged a protest and killed the monarch during the revolution?
2. What major factors influenced the French revolution?
3. What characteristics are associated with the trait and motive theories?

5.0: TUTOR MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (TMAs)

1. What were some of the major changes that the British revolution created in Great Britain?
2. What were some factors that led to, and sparked off the American Revolution?
3. Enumerate the similarities and the differences of the Russian and Mexican revolution.
4. Highlight some major events that sparked off the French revolution.
5. Discuss in brief some of the reasons why the American colony was successful in their war against Britain.

6.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READING

Dunn, J. (1972). *Modern Revolutions*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fitzpatrick, S. (1994). *The Russian Revolution, second edition*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Eastman, L.E. (1972). Fascism in Kuomintang China: The Blue Shirts. *The China Quarterly*, 49 (1-33).

Fairbank, J.K. (1987). *Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985*. Australia: HarperCollins.

Foran, J. (1997). *Theorizing Revolutions*. London and New York: Routledge.

Foran, J. (2005). *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Faulkner, N.(2017) *A People's History of the Russian Revolution*. Pluto Press

Goldstone, J. A. (1991). *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Gonzales, M. J. (2002). *The Mexican Revolution, 1910–1940*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.

Hall, L. B. (1981). *Alvaro Obregon: Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911 to 1920*. College Station: Texas A & M Press.

Halliday, F. (1999). *Revolutions and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power*. New York: Palgrave.

Hughes, A. (1998). *The Causes of the English Civil War*, second edition. New York: St. Martin's.

Keddie, N. (1995). *Debating Revolutions*. New York: New York University Press.

Kimmel, M. (1990). *Revolution: A Sociological Interpretation*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Lyell, I. (2017) HTAV's Russian Revolution Study and Exam Guide. Georgina Argus Retrieved from <https://www.htav.asn.au/documents/item/2820>

McPhee, P. (2002). *The French Revolution: 1789–1799*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nunn, W. W. (2009) *Image Is Everything: The Centrality of Prestige in Russian and Austro-Hungarian Foreign Policy, 1904-1914*. Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations - The Graduate School. Florida State University Libraries

Poloma, M. M., (1979). *Contemporary Sociological Theory*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.

Richards, M.D. (2004). *Revolutions in World History*. New York: Routledge.

Russell, C. (1990). *Unrevolutionary England 1603–1642*. London: Hambledon Press.

Speck, W.A. (1988). *Reluctant Revolutionaries: Englishmen and the Revolution of 1688*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Wolf, E.R. (1999). *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. United States: University of Oklahoma Press.

MODULE 3 REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD

We have discussed occurrences of revolution in some parts of the world, so this module is a continuation of the previous one. Here, we will focus strictly on revolution in the Arab countries. You may have noted that in the last module, we did not discuss revolution in any African country; justice will be done to that effect in this module. You may have heard about Arab Spring revolution, you will learn more about it in this module. you should know that there are still traces of revolution in some Arab countries that we will discuss in this module, for example, traces of revolution, if not revolution itself, can still be found in Syria, Egypt and Libya among others.

Unlike the Western world, most countries in Arab world appear not to believe in some ideologies and philosophies like equal right for men and women, women participation in politics, democracy, liberty and so on. It is often said that they are conservative, so this conservativeness becomes an issue with simultaneous existence of globalization. When Arabs have contact with the West on political and social grounds, issues may arise due to ideological and philosophical contradictions. The existence of Islamic State is not unconnected with such ideological and philosophical contrasts.

In this module, we will focus on five Arab countries: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria.

UNITI: TUNISIA

1.0Introduction

2.0Objectives

3.0Main content

3.1Tunisia

3.2Voting for change

4.0Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

Here, we will present introductory statements on revolution in the Arab World, and the occurrence of revolution in Tunisia. It will be recalled that external forces such as Israel among others are not innocent in the occurrence of revolutions in some Arab countries. You will learn here, as we argued earlier, that revolution does not suddenly begin, unresolved protests, agitations and differences finally explodes to become revolution (as we will see before the end of this unit).

2.0 Objectives

The objectives of this unit are to:

- ✓ Introduce you to the Arab political philosophy
- ✓ Expose you to the occurrence of Tunisian revolution

3.0 Main content

Introduction

The Arab revolutions of 2011 have already overturned the false edifice of stability that had masked the furious changes sweeping across the region. It is far too soon to know whether they will produce real transitions to democracy, renewed authoritarian rule, or an era of instability and unending street politics. Nor is it yet clear how this new popular energy will affect the great issues of power politics in the region, from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the nuclear standoff with Iran. But the dizzying changes that have toppled two of the world's most entrenched leaders in the space of weeks have already fundamentally challenged assumptions about the region, not to mention reshape politics for decades to come.

It is commonly said that nobody saw these revolutions coming. But this is not exactly right. For years, Middle East experts have been warning of the corrosive effects of entrenched authoritarianism and the rising frustrations of a disenfranchised youth bubble. With each gerrymandered and fraudulent election, each arrest of dissident bloggers and journalists, each report of youth unemployment and crisis of human development, each crack down on legitimate protests, they sounded warnings. But these constant warnings of impending crisis fell on deaf ears precisely because the predictions never seemed to come to pass. Authoritarian Arab regimes seemed all too capable of holding on to their power and protesters unable to break through to spark off mass revolt.

If the problems were clear, it is true that few saw these particular waves of protest coming. At first, the unrest in Tunisia that began on December 17 appeared more of the same. When the demonstrations began to pose a real challenge to Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, few thought that they could spread to other Arab countries. When upheaval began to break out across the region, from Egypt to Yemen and Jordan, most thought that Arab regimes would be well-prepared to avoid suffering the Tunisian president's fate. A decade of watching protests across the region failed to dislodge autocratic regimes left observers wary and skeptical. The power and success of the protests sparked by Tunisia took everyone by surprise—not least the protesters themselves.

It is far too soon to offer confident conclusions about why these protests succeeded where so many others had failed. But some things seem clear even now. Youth movements drew on the experience of a decade of protest and managed to bring mass publics into the streets in the face of very real repression and fears. The demonstration effect from Tunisia was far more powerful than most political scientists expected. Al Jazeera (2012) almost certainly played a decisive role in bringing the Tunisian and then Egyptian stories to the broader Arab public, casting them as a dramatic new chapter in the ongoing struggle for changes that had always been central to the network's agenda. Social media, from Facebook and YouTube to SMS networks, gave powerful weapons to those organizing protests and helped them shape international views of their struggle. The United States played an important role in Egypt, particularly, by restraining the military from massive repression and urging the regime to begin a real, immediate transition.

Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and other countries in North Africa and the Middle East exploded in revolution in 2011. Rage against autocrats, many of them elderly, yet holding tenaciously to power, spread quickly, ultimately involving—to one extent or another—all 22 Arab countries and hundreds of millions of people. The impact on non-Arab Muslim countries, like Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, and parts of

Africa, has also been considerable. Waves of democracy had engulfed other regions of the world in previous decades, including Eastern Europe, Latin America, Eastern Asia, and parts of Africa. Revolutionary fervor had hit almost every region in the world except the regions inhabited by Arabs, a Semitic people who speak Arabic, a Semitic language. Ajami quoted by Mahan and Griset (2012) noted this about Arab lands:

Tyrants had closed up the political world, become owners of their countries in all but name. It was a bleak landscape: terrible rulers, sullen populations, a terrorist fringe that hurled itself in frustration at an order bereft of any legitimacy. Arabs had started to feel they were cursed, doomed to despotism. The region's exceptionalism was becoming not just a human disaster but a moral embarrassment.

The epic convulsion that swept the region with amazing speed, accompanied by cries for basic human rights and democratic reforms, are far from over. In many of the countries in the region, for example Syria and Bahrain, protests are still ongoing as at 2018, as do violent government crackdowns on the protesters. In other countries, like Saudi Arabia, the rumblings of the populace have been quelled with money, at least temporarily. Rulers in Morocco, Jordan, and other countries have made reforms aimed at pacifying the calls for change. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, where the strongmen were deposed or killed, new governments are struggling to form viable societies.

3.1 TUNISIA

Located in Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Algiers and Libya, Tunisia is relatively small, with just over 10 million people, and its land area is about the size of the U.S. State of Georgia. Tunisia won its independence from its colonial overlord, France, in 1956. Tunisia, like Morocco, Algeria, and Libya, occupies an area in North Africa called the Maghreb. A major al-Qaeda franchise, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), based in Algeria, operates in several areas in North Africa. As the revolutionary spirit has increased throughout adjacent countries that comprise an area known as the

Sahel (Chad, Mali, and Niger), AQIM has found opportunities for radicalizing their dissatisfied neighbours.

There is little dissent about the facts that ignited the so-called Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia (Jasmine is the country's national flower). On December 17, 2010, a 26-year-old fruit peddler named Mohamed Bouazizi refused to pay the customary bribe to a City Inspector. The City Inspector retaliated by confiscating his fruit. Bouazizi later pushed his fruit cart to the centre of Sidi Bouzid, the capital of one of Tunisia's rural provinces. After failing in his efforts to appeal to the government, Bouazizi, using paint thinner, set himself on fire. With burns over 90% of his body, he died a few weeks later.

The news of Bouazizi's self-immolation spread quickly, fuelled by the Internet. Wright as quoted by Mahan and Griset (2012) noted the following:

Cell phones are common, and the Internet is popular. Over one-third of Tunisians are Internet users. Some 20 percent use Facebook. Bouazizi's cousin posted a video of the family protest on YouTube. Al Jazeera picked it up and aired it within hours, as eventually did other independent satellite stations circumventing state-controlled television. A local lawyer who witnessed Bouazizi's self-immolation used Facebook, one of the few online video sites not censored, to mobilize the public for broader protests. Word spread quickly on Twitter. Within twenty-four hours, the world's first "virtual" revolution rumbled across Tunisia.

The dictator in question, U.S. ally president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, had ruled Tunisia with an iron fist since engineering a coup of the former leader, Habib Bourguiba, in 1987. Corruption was apparently widespread within the leader's extended family, and a Wiki Leaks cable in 2010 called the Ben Ali's clan a "quasi-mafia".

In response to the street protests that followed Bouazizi's self-immolation, Ben Ali imposed a state of emergency and instructed the army to fire on the crowd. But the military turned against Ben Ali, refusing his orders to shoot the protestors. On January 14, Ben Ali fled into exile in Saudi Arabia, thus quickly ending his 23-year rule. Ben Ali subsequently claimed that he had been tricked into staying in

Saudi Arabia. A statement released by Ben Ali said that he had been warned of an assassination plot, so he flew his family to safety in Saudi Arabia. He said he planned to return to Tunisia on the same flight, but the plane's pilot disobeyed orders and took off without him (Jensen, 2011) cited in Mahan and Griset (2012). A transitional government was formed, in large part composed of former officials in the Ben Ali government and military. An interim Prime Minister was appointed. A general and seemingly fair election followed.

3.2. Voting for Change

In October 2011, millions of Tunisians cast votes for an assembly to draft a constitution and form a new government. The first election of the Arab uprisings signaled a turn to a more religious society. Rejecting secular government, the voters overwhelmingly endorsed Islamic political parties, which had been excluded during the reign of Ben Ali. The switch to a more religious government concerned many, including many liberal Tunisians (Sayare, 2011). The Ennahda Party, seen as one of the most pragmatic of the region's Islamist movements, won a plurality (41%) in the election. Ennahda's task was to form a coalition government and name the Prime Minister. A new interim President, Moncef Marzouki, a member of the Congress for Republic party supports a coalition with the Ennahda party. He argued that Tunisia has not become an Islamic state as many in the West fear (Middle East Online, 2012).

Not surprisingly, the optimism fuelled by the revolution collided with the hard reality that the day-to-day life of most people in Tunisia. Many are poverty-stricken, unemployed, and marginalized. Youth unemployment in Tunisia is said to be at least 30% (Fahim, 2011). The new rulers tried to impose order on the bedlam left by the regime's collapse. In April 2012, the new government fired tear gas into a crowd protesting the new ban on demonstrations (Aljazeera, 2012) Tunisia was the first, and perhaps the easiest, of the revolutions. It has a young, educated population with high youth unemployment. The willingness of the Tunisia military to disobey their orders to fire on civilians was pivotal (Kirkpatrick,

2011). It is thus sadly ironic that the new government used force against its people after the election. Egypt, where we turn next, experienced a similar, yet different, trajectory.

4.0:Self-Assessment Exercises(SAEs)

1. Identify and discuss major features of the Tunisian Revolution.
2. Give a succinct account of the correlates associated with the Tunisian revolution.

UNIT II EGYPT; LIBYA

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Egypt

3.2 Voting

3.3 Libya

3.4 The revolution

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

In this unit, you will learn about revolution in two Arab countries in Africa: Egypt and Libya. Remember that Egypt is the 30th largest country in the world, and that early civilization is not unconnected with Egypt. Also, you will learn about Libya and the great Muammar Gaddafi who maintained strong opposition with the United States. Here, you will see how lesser enemies put hands together to cooperate and fight perceived bigger enemies.

2.0 Objectives

In this unit, your objectives are to:

- ✓ Show you how revolution, if not curtailed, in one country may spread to others within a region
- ✓ Expose you to the occurrence of revolution in Egypt
- ✓ Teach you the dynamics of Libyan revolution, and ruler Muammar Gaddafi.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 EGYPT

After Tunisia, another major U.S. ally was soon to fall. Tunisia's revolutionary fervor next hit Egypt, two countries to the east. It skipped, for the time being, Libya, which lies in between Tunisia and Egypt. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt is a big country—the 30th largest country in the world, covering over 386,000,000 square miles (Central Intelligence Agency [CIA], 2012). Egypt has an estimated population of over 82 million. The long and often-studied history of Egypt will not be recounted here, other than to note that in 1952 Egypt obtained full independence from its colonial master: Great Britain. Within less than 2 weeks from Ben Ali's flight from Tunisia, the Egyptian "Day of Rage" was organized, again with the help of the Internet. Wright reported (2011, p. 21) that more than 500,000 people used Facebook to support the planned protest. The numbers of protesters in the newly named Liberation Square (formerly Tahrir Square) swelled.

During the revolution, Egyptians came together as one—the age-old differences between the religious and the secular approach faded. Egypt is 90% Muslims—mostly Sunni. Coptic Christians and a few other groups make up 10% of the population.

By 2011, Egypt's strongman, Hosni Mubarak "had ruled longer than all but three Pharaohs and Pashas in Egypt's six-thousand-year history" (Wright, 2011). Mubarak did not give up at first. He unleashed his forces on the protestors. Mubarak's police were widely feared and hated by the people because of their brutal methods. During the less than 3-week uprising, more than 800 people were killed. The police were often forced to retreat. Ultimately, 18 police generals and 9 other senior police officers were forced into early retirement as punishment for their treatment of the nonviolent protestors (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

The protestors ultimately won when the army would not obey Mubarak's orders to fire on them, and like Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak was forced to step down, which he did on February 18, 2011, going into exile at his coastal home in Egypt's Sharm El Sheikh on the Red Sea, on the southern tip of the Sinai

Peninsula. He and his sons subsequently went on trial in Cairo for conspiracy to kill unarmed protestors: he was apparently very ill. Mubarak was found guilty of complicity in the murders of the protestors. He was sentenced to life in prison but is being held in a military hospital. Tahrir Square again erupted in anger when many former regime officials were acquitted (Aljazerra, 2012).

After Mubarak left office, a state of emergency was declared and a military council, called Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), made up of former Mubarak loyalists, ran the country. SCAF announced that, despite the promise of upcoming elections, it would promulgate a declaration of basic principles for the new constitution. Amid heavy protests, SCAF ultimately revised some of their more hated edicts.

The new spirit of cooperation did not last long. On May 7, 2011, Muslims launched a brutal attack on the Coptic Christian Church located in a Cairo slum; churches were burned, as were Coptic businesses, 15 people were killed, and almost 200 injured (El Rashidi, 2011). The dream of a secular and tolerant society appeared in tatters. In May 2011, Tahrir Square was again in the headlines, as protestors called for an end to emergency law and the removal from power of several of Mubarak's former officials. Clashes between the police and protestors left more than a thousand injured (Gibaly & Amer, 2011). In July 2011, tens of thousands of Islamists gathered in Tahrir Square, where secular forces had started the revolution. The Islamists demanded a state run by strict religious laws (Shadid, 2011). Instead, Egypt's military flexed its muscles and expanded its power. Many feared that Egypt's military would intervene in the election results, particularly the generals who seized power from Mubarak and had been running the country ever since (Kirkpatrick, 2012). Thus, between the time Mubarak fled and the elections for parliament were held, Egypt suffered from many of the old problems, as well as some new problems, including a crime wave that could not have happened when Mubarak ruled (Kirkpatrick, 2011).

3.2 VOTING

Egypt held parliamentary elections in January 2012, and almost 28 million people voted. The final results were a clear victory for the Islamists: the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party won 47% of the vote; second, with about 25% of the vote, was the Al-Nour Party, representing hard-line Salafists. Thus, the non-secular Islamists won more than 70% of the vote. Further, less than 2% of the new Parliament is female (Garcia-Navarro, 2012). A presidential runoff was held in June 2012, pitting the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi, against Ahmed Shafiq, the last prime minister to serve under Mubarak. Morsi won, but the day before the elections, SCAF disbanded parliament, thus undermining the president's power. Morsi called the parliament back in, but the session was brief, and questions remain about who is making the key decisions in Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood is not a terrorist organization, although members have been convicted of terrorist attacks on two prior presidents, and the group was banned for decades in Egypt, as well as several other parts of the Arab world. Brotherhood members tried unsuccessfully to assassinate Gamal Abdel Nasser, who ruled from 1956 to 1970. Nasser was seen as one of the most important leaders in the Arab world, and he retaliated against the Muslim Brotherhood by jailing many of their leaders (Trager, 2011). Four members of the Brotherhood were blamed for the successful assassination of Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, in 1981. Not surprisingly, the secretive Brotherhood continued to be banned as a political party under Sadat's successor, Mubarak. Currently, the Muslim Brotherhood can best be characterized as the fountain head of Islamic ideology. It permeates life in many areas of the region. Its transformation into a legitimate political party leaves many questions. Violent clashes between the military and protestors continue, and the Muslim Brotherhood has demanded that the military cede power at once. Whether they will is an open question. The final reprint for this book discusses the recruiting and organizational history of the Brotherhood. Although it is not labelled a terrorist organization, the Brotherhood will be very important in determining the direction of Egypt's popular revolts.

The Salafists were also big winners in Egypt's election. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, they had been banned under Mubarak from participating in elections. The Salafists, described as "bearded and dressed as though they had just stepped out of the seventh century, their women shrouded in black except for their eyes..." (Heard, 2011), have now joined the political process. Ultra conservative and anti-Western, Salafists want an Islamic state based on Sharia law. They are particularly popular in rural areas, where almost half of Egypt's population lives.

The United States, while long a supporter of Mubarak, has recognized that the election results require it to engage in dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood (Duss, 2012). Can Egypt, a net importer of oil, afford to turn its back on its former trading partners? Unlike Saudi Arabia or Iran, Egypt cannot draw on oil wealth to appease the populace. Part of Egypt's role as a U.S. ally was to sign a peace treaty with Israel. What will happen if the peace is renounced? Does the Egyptian revolution undermine terrorism? An Egyptian, Ayman al-Zawahiri, became the leader of al-Qaeda following bin Laden's death. Continuing to espouse extremist ideology and violence, Zawahiri and al-Qaeda seem somewhat diminished by the events in Egypt. Zawahiri and the Egyptian protestors had the same goal: to oust the tyrant Mubarak. But the peaceful nature of the protests—and their ultimate success—underscored how attitudes may be changing in the Arab world.

3.3LIBYA

Libya is in Northern Africa, bordering the Mediterranean Sea, between Egypt and Tunisia. It also borders Algeria, Chad, Niger, and Sudan. Ninety-seven percent of Libyans are Muslims, mostly Sunni. The country is primarily made up of Arabs and Berbers, who speak an Afro-Asiatic language. Berbers are believed to have originally come from Spain and Portugal, where they were known as Iberians. Libya was part of the Ottoman Empire until Italy overthrew the Turks in 1911. It became independent from its

Italian colonial rulers in 1951. In 1969, Col. Muammar Qaddafi took over control of the country after a military coup. Until his death in 2011, he had been an on and off ally with the United States.

Qaddafi endorsed what he called the Third Universal Theory, which combined socialism, Islam, and tribal practices. He saw himself as a ruler of a new Pan-African society. When Qaddafi came to power, Libya was divided among loose confederacies and insular tribes. Qaddafi forged them into a single country; some say it was a country built around Qaddafi's personality cult (Kirkpatrick, 2011). The United Nations imposed sanctions on Libya after the explosion on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Sanctions were finally lifted after Libya accepted fiscal responsibility for the bombing. Libya was removed from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism subsequently.

3.4 The Revolution

Libya's revolution began on February 15, 2011, in Benghazi, in eastern Libya, only 4 days after Egypt's Mubarak resigned. Wright (2011) wrote that the revolt's "flashpoint was the arrest of human rights lawyer Fathi Terbil, who was representing families of 12,000 men killed by security forces in a 1996 prison massacre" (Wright, 2011: 249). In March, a Transitional National Council (TNC) was formed in Benghazi with the goal of overthrowing Qaddafi and turning the country into a democracy.

Libya's dictator was 42 years into his rule and long considered erratic and perhaps insane. He was also defiant and responded to the protests with ruthless force. His troops fired on unarmed protestors. He sent troops to surround Benghazi, prompting the UN Security Council to pass a resolution to stop the "loss of civilian life by targeting Qaddafi's war-making machine" and establish a no-fly zone over Libya (Fahim & Mazzetti, 2011). Shortly thereafter, the United States, France, Britain, other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, and two Arab countries commenced bombing of Libyan military

bases, airplanes, and air defence. Nevertheless, many Libyan cities, including the port city of Misurata to the west of Benghazi, continued to be bombarded by forces loyal to Qaddafi (Chivers, 2011).

NATO stepped up the bombing of Libyan military facilities. The United States, while facilitating the air strikes, was unwilling to put “boots on the ground,” as Britain and France did (Tisdall, 2011). It is widely believed, however that the U.S. CIA was assisting the TNC. After more than a month of NATO airstrikes, the U.S. military warned that the fighting in Libya could become a dangerous stalemate. As the fighting dragged on, the TNC was recognized as the legitimate Interim Government by the UN General Assembly. Many countries sent emissaries to Benghazi, which remained under rebel control, and several billion dollars in support was pledged by the nations intervening in Libya. By July 2011, the United States formally recognized the TNC as the country’s legitimate government and pledged to release Libya’s frozen assets. After several months of victories and retreats, the anti-Qaddafi forces, with the assistance of NATO airstrikes, captured the capital, Tripoli, in August of 2011.

By this time, several of Qaddafi’s top officials had gone into exile, and several of his family members had been killed or fled. Concerns mounted that even if Qaddafi was captured the various tribal factions that comprise Libya would seek revenge on those who had been associated with the regime, as well as on other tribal factions (Kirkpatrick & Chivers, 2011). Of further concern to the West was the growth of the Islamist movement in Libya, which would unlikely favour a democracy and acceptance of tribal pluralism. As in Tunisia and Egypt, the Islamists had been banned under Qaddafi. Unlike Tunisia or Egypt, where the dictators fell quickly, the protracted war in Libya was not going to end without the capture (or killing) of Qaddafi, which finally happened on October 20, 2011, in Sirte, his home city. Initial video footage showed him alive when he was pulled from a drainage ditch after his convoy was hit by NATO planes. Soon after, it was announced he was dead, and a video showed him with a bullet hole in his head. The TNC announced the revolution was over and promised that the new government would be

based on Islamic beliefs. A free election was also promised (Nossiter & Fahim, 2011). A parliamentary election was held in July 2012, and to many observers' surprise, the candidate from the Muslim Brotherhood lost to the candidate from the Centralist National Forces Alliance. The parliament is responsible for writing a new constitution and selecting a prime minister.

Yet things have not gone smoothly for the new government. Rebels have been reluctant to hand back arms and various factions continue to battle. The new government has little legitimacy, and the militias are fostering chaos in Libya. Many observers fear that the militias have made the country chaotic and susceptible to the rise of another strongman. The repercussions from Libya's downfall are beginning to spread to other areas of Africa as mercenary fighters hired by Qaddafi bring home Libyan arms. For example, in February 2012, Tuareg rebels, who had fought for Qaddafi and taken his weapons, stormed Mali's northern desert, demanding independence for the Tuareg people (Nossiter & Fahim, 2011).

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises(SAEs)

1. With respect to facilitating variables, distinguish between Egyptian revolution and Libyan revolution.
2. How will you characterize the Libyan revolution as an efflux of the "Arab Spring"?

UNIT III: YEMEN

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Yemen

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

Unlike the previous unit, we will present occurrence of revolution in only one country here-Yemen. Also, this unit deviates from the last one on the basis of space, while the two countries discussed in the last are in Africa, Yemen is in the Middle East. You should have seen in some of the countries discussed above that the urgent need for democracy is a critical issue in the occurrence of revolution in Arab countries. While the rulers are comfortable with monarchy and ruling till death, young educated folks want a modern system of government, this contradiction is an issue that causes revolution in Yemen.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you should understand:

- ✓ The nexus of dissatisfaction with the state and uprising
- ✓ Yemenis revolution and its consequences for Arab world

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 YEMEN

With an area about twice the size of Wyoming, Yemen is located in the Middle East, between Oman and Saudi Arabia. Over 20 million people live in Yemen, and almost half of the population is 14 years old or younger. The northern part of the country was ruled by the Ottoman Empire until 1918. The north

stayed independent, but southern Yemen was ruled by the British until 1967 and then became independent. Political strife in the south resulted in the migration of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis to the north. In 1990, the two countries were united into the Republic of Yemen (CIA, 2012).

Wright (2011) noted that Yemen “represented the perfect storm, the potentially catastrophic confluence of crises”. Yemen is the poorest nation in the Arab world. The majority of people live below the poverty line, and at least one third of the adult population is unemployed. Further complications include tribal divisions—an almost even split between Sunni and Shite Muslims, southern secessionists, and northern rebels. Yemen has an active al-Qaeda franchise, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Wright, 2011). Or, as Ajami (2012) said, Yemen is the “quintessential failed state”. President Ali Abdullah Saleh had ruled since 1978; he was the leader of the north before the unification of Yemen. Saleh was unable to quell the political revolt that began in January 2011, despite cracking down brutally on the peaceful protestors camped in what became known as Change Square. President Saleh quickly suspended the constitution, declared martial law, and outlawed protests.

The revolt was protracted, unlike in Tunisia or Egypt. First, the president said he would leave office, but thereafter he balked at doing so. He pledged to resign if certain conditions were met, including full immunity from prosecution for him and his family. Each time Saleh reversed course, concerns were raised that the stalemate was leading to civil war. Saleh, like many of the long-ruling despots in the region, had been an important ally of the United States in its “war” on terrorism. Again, the impact of the Arab uprisings on U.S. foreign policy are evolving and unknown, but the question of the U.S. policy of embracing dictators is clearly worth debate at the highest levels of government. The six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council, in consultation with the United States and the European Union, proposed a plan for Saleh to leave with full immunity, but then the president announced that he would not leave until

the street protests stopped. Gun fights broke out in the capital, Sana, between pro-Saleh forces and members and associates of his main political rivals, the Ahmar family.

Yemen was on the brink of economic collapse. Its domestic oil and electricity networks were shut down by anti-Saleh forces. Lines for gas in some areas extended for miles, and electricity was available only a few hours a day. Food prices soared, water was scarce, banks refused to lend money, and many businesses stopped paying taxes (Worth, 2011). Life for the average Yemeni remains dangerous and sparse. The impasse was broken, at least in part, when, on June 3, 2011, anti-Saleh forces attacked the Presidential Palace, seriously injuring Saleh and other top officials who were praying in the mosque inside the palace. At first, the government reported that the president had sustained minor injuries, but this was proved false the next day when Saleh flew to Saudi Arabia for urgent medical treatment. Yet he refused to resign as president and pledged to return to Yemen following treatment.

The United States responded to the crisis in Yemen by increasing its strikes of unmanned drones. The United States' heavy use of drones is changing the way that modern war is being conducted. On September 30, 2011, U.S. armed drones operated by the CIA killed American-born Anwar al-Awlaki, a fiery preacher and AQAP's most ardent propagandist. The United States considered al-Awlaki an extremely important figure in AQAP; the drone strike also killed Samir Khan, another American citizen, who was believed to be the editor of al-Qaeda's online English magazine, Inspire. Al-Awlaki delivered many Internet lectures and sermons, apparently inspiring many jihadists, including Major Nidal Malik Hasan, with whom he had several e-mail exchanges before Hasan's deadly rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, in 2009. Faisal Shahzad, whose failed attempt to set off a car bomb in New York City's Time Square in 2010, called al-Awlaki an inspiration. The drone strike raised many questions about the legality and morality of putting American citizens on a list of militants slated for assassination. An internal memo

from the Obama administration provided justification for the killing of an American citizen despite an executive order banning assassinations (Savage, 2011).

The crisis in Yemen provides fertile ground for the growth of AQAP, which also goes by the name Ansar al-Sharia. This and other jihad groups have exploited the turmoil to entrench their position in the country. In the south, the port city of Aden was surrounded by AQAP fighters. Several cities, including Zinjibar, a provincial capital near the port of Aden, were under the control of AQAP. Further, a massive assault on a southern prison holding al-Qaeda militants resulted in the escape of 57 prisoners (Al-Haj, 2011). In October 2011, the UN Security Council unanimously called for Saleh to immediately transfer power to a deputy. Finally, in November 2011, Saleh signed the agreement. The plan was to have elections within a short period and to form a national unity government that included both members of the opposition and ruling party.

After receiving full immunity from prosecution, Saleh went to the United States for further medical treatment in early 2012. There is speculation that his family still controls the military and other important institutions in Yemen, so the degree of power that Saleh continues to hold is unclear. The new president, Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi, is faced with enormous problems, not the least of which is the AQAP control of the south, where daytime shoot-outs between the police and the terrorists are a daily occurrence. For example, a suicide bombing—which is blamed on AQAP—in the capital in May 2012 left hundreds dead or injured. The crisis in Yemen is far from over.

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises(SAEs)

1. What role did agitation for democracy play in the Yemenis revolution?
2. What are the circumstances linking Saudi Arabia to the Yemen uprising?

UNIT IV: SYRIA

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Syria

3.2 Background

3.3 The Protests and the Vicious Response

3.4 The world's reaction

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This is an interesting unit as the revolution we will discuss here is in a well talked about country in the media. As we speak, the revolution in Syria is not yet over as there are always reports of crisis, shootings and airstrikes in Syria. The major point to note here is that revolution in Syria began as an internal crisis before external forces intervened.

2.0 Objectives

Here, you will learn about:

- ✓ How the roles of different (and somewhat contradictory) religious doctrines fuel uprising
- ✓ Syrian civil war and the response of international community

3.0 Main content

3.1 SYRIA

The revolution against President Bashar al-Assad began in March 2011. Just like Tunisia's revolution was ignited with a relatively insignificant event—a fruit vendor's self-immolation—the trouble in Syria started when several youngsters, influenced by the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, were arrested in the southern city of Daraa for writing anti-government graffiti (“the people want to topple the regime”) on a public wall.

In Tunisia, the leader went into exile before a single shot was fired. In Egypt, the leader was forced into exile by the military after a few weeks of fighting. In Libya, the leader was killed after a prolonged attack assisted by NATO warplanes. In Yemen, the leader is gone, but the control of the country remains, at least in part, with his family and loyalists. But in Syria, the leadership sitting tight, responded to the revolt and protests with horrific violence such that an end to the killings seem elusive as the days go by.

BACKGROUND

Syria, which is in the Middle East between Lebanon and Turkey, and also borders Iraq, Jordan, and Israel, is a little larger than North Dakota. It is almost 90% Arab and also includes a smaller Druse, Kurdish, Armenian, and Christian population. Over 70% of the population is Sunni Muslim (CIA, 2012). President Assad's lineage is from an unorthodox, or breakaway, type of Shiite Islam called Alawites. The Alawites split from the main branch of Shiism more than 1,000 years ago (Ruthven, 2011); they make up only about 12% of the population that they rule with increasing cruelty. Syria's major cities are Damascus, the capital; Aleppo; Homs; and Hama. The political party of Assad is the Arab Socialist Renaissance, or Ba'ath Party, which had also been the political party of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Following World War I and the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, France became the colonial master of Syria.

Syria gained independence from France in 1946. A brief union with Egypt occurred thereafter, but in 1961, the two countries separated, and the Syrian Arab Republic was formed. After a series of military

coups, Hafiz al-Assad seized power in 1970. His son Bashar, who had trained in England as an ophthalmologist, became the Syrian president in 2000 upon the death of his father; another son, Maher al-Assad, leads the Syrian army's dreaded Fourth Armoured Division and Republican Guard. The Assads' loyalists in the minority Alawite community, which used to be called Nusayris, named for their 9th-century founder, Ibn Nusayr, have fought to keep the Assad dynasty in power. Minority Christians hold a number of senior government officials, and they have mostly supported the Alawites, as have businessmen. But that support has been eroding as the assaults on the Syrian people continue (Amos, 2012).

3.2 The Protests and the Vicious Response

Calling for an end to the emergency law that allowed secret detentions for any reason—or no reason at all—the protestors have been insistent in their demands that Assad should step down. Some of the worst military attacks have come as protestors bury other protestors. Syrian security forces have repeatedly fired their weapons into crowds of mourners. Unlike revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the Syrian government prohibits foreign journalists or human rights activists from entering the country. It shut down Internet services and all cell phones within governmental control (Ruthven, 2011). Groups of exiled activists have smuggled in satellite phones, modems, laptops, and cameras (Shadid, 2011).

In April 2011, the military surrounded Daraa, the poor and drought-stricken city near where the children had written anti-government slogans on the walls. The military cut electricity and phones and stormed the town with tanks and soldiers (Shadid, 2011). As he continued to do, Assad blamed others for his army's atrocities: A global conspiracy of the United States, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Israel and hard-line Salafists, Islamists, and others were all offered up by Assad as the real culprits. Since then, protests and fierce crackdowns have occurred in many parts of Syria: In May 2011, the military attacked the Sunni

Muslim town of Baniyas, on the Mediterranean coast and Homs, the second largest city in Syria. A subsequent attack on the city of Hama called Assad's father's treatment of an uprising of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, when Assad's army massacred somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 Sunni Muslims (The Economist, 2011). After the Hama massacre, the elder Assad banned all Islamist parties, including the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood; many of those not killed were imprisoned. Other areas, including Aleppo, Syria's second largest city, have been bombarded, as has Moadimiyeh, which is just outside of Damascus.

For the past year, the reported number of deaths in Syria mounted almost daily. Likewise, although difficult to know with certainty, the number of people secretly detained by the security forces continues to expand; detainees are often brutally tortured. Estimates of death vary widely, with the Syrian government saying in May 2012 that just over 6,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed; the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights put the death toll at over 11,000 (Khera, 2012). Many Syrians have been forced to flee their homes. According to the Syrian Arab Red Crescent, which is a humanitarian agency that is affiliated with the Red Cross, an estimated 1.5 million people are homeless within their own country, and another 115,000 have fled to Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq (Day Press-News, 2012).

Assad pledged early on in the revolt to remove the almost five-decade-old emergency law that allows his security forces to detain citizens for any cause, but his rhetoric did not match the actions of his military. It is no wonder that many fear that Syria will be consumed by sectarian violence if Assad remains in power; Assad's regime is known to have chemical weapons, and many fear that he would use them against NATO or other invading forces. Likewise, if his regime crumbles, sectarian violence pitting Sunni Muslims against the Shite Alawites and the Christians is of major concern. If Assad's regime topples, some type of peacekeeping force will likely be necessary to prevent a civil war.

3.3: The World's Reaction

The reaction from the world to the violence in Syria has been much less straight-forward than it was in Libya, where the UN Security Council approved a no-fly zone and NATO airstrikes. No such assistance has been given to Syrian rebels. The UN Security Council could not move forward because of threatened vetoes to military action from Russia and China. Finally, in August 2011, the UN Security Council issued a condemnation of the violence, but in February 2012, Russia and China vetoed a resolution to back the Arab League's peace plan for Syria. Many countries have recalled their ambassadors to Syria, including the countries that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council: Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. Turkey, a long time ally of the Assads, issued several strong rebukes of the regime. The Arab League severed trade and investments in Syria. Eventually, the Arab League sent in monitors, but the killing continued, forcing the withdrawal of the observers.

Kofi Annan, a former secretary general of the United Nations, was appointed an envoy to Syria. Assad verbally accepted a cease-fire, but thus far, the military has not pulled out of the Syrian cities it encircles. When UN monitors have been allowed in Syria, they have often been barred from the sites of massacres. The United States has limited options in Syria. In April 2011, the U.S. Department of State urged Americans not to visit Syria and advised Americans already there to leave. The State Department advised the evacuation of diplomats' families and some diplomatic personnel (Shadid, 2001). In May 2011, the United States imposed sanctions on Assad and some his government colleagues, freezing their assets in U.S. financial institutions and prohibiting trade with Syria. Of course, the Assads could have tucked their apparent fortune elsewhere.

The Syrian revolution is still on-going; in fact, Syrian air defence shot down an Israeli war plane in February 2018. Aljazeera in 2018 pointedly stated that the governments of majority-Shia Iran and Iraq, and Lebanon-based Hezbollah, have supported Assad, while Sunni-majority countries, including Turkey,

Qatar, and Saudi Arabia supported anti-Assad rebels. Peace negotiations have been ongoing between the Syrian government and the opposition in order to achieve a military ceasefire and political transition in Syria

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES(SAEs)

1. Discuss the implications of Syrian civil war for state terrorism.
2. Discuss the features of the Syrian revolution, highlighting the nature and consequences of the government's response pattern.

5.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS(TMA)s

1. Give a brief highlight of factors that engender revolution in the Arab world.
2. What were the immediate causes and events that ushered in the Tunisian revolution?
3. Discuss the events that led to Bouazizi's self-immolation and compare them with similar events that take place in the Nigerian society by giving suitable instances.
4. Discuss some similarities and differences in the events that took place after the Egyptian revolution and the revolution that took place in Libya.
5. Highlight some of the events that propelled the Libyan Revolution?

REFERENCES

Al-Haj, A. (2011). Officials: 57 militants escape Yemen jail. *Yahoo News*. June 22.

Amos, V. (2012). Syria crisis: Valerie Amos Describes Homs 'Devastation'. *BBC News*, March 7.

Chivers, C.J. (2011). Qaddafi Troops Fire Cluster Bombs Into Civilian Areas. *New York Times*, April 15.

Duss, M. (2012). *The Dynamics of Egypt's Elections*. Middle East Research and Information

El Rashidi's, Y. (2011). *Eyewitness Account of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution*, New York Review Books.

Fahim, K. and Mazzetti, M. (2011). Allies Defending Actions in Libya After Airstrike. *New York Times*, May 1.

Fahin, J. (2011). *The Roots of Terrorism*. New York: Routledge

Gibaly, E. and Amerjune, D.S. (2011). Clashes Ease in Cairo, but Underline Nation's Fragile Condition. *New York Times*, June 29.

Heard, L.S. (2011). Resurgent Salafist movement troubles secular Egyptians. Gulf news. Available at: <http://gulfnews.com/opinion/thinkers/resurgent-salafist-movement-troubles-secular-egyptians-1.795632>

Khera, J. (2012). Syria Crisis: Counting the Victims. BBC News, May 29.

Kirkpatrick, D.D. (2011). A Tunisian-Egyptian Link That Shook Arab History. *New York Times*. February 13.

Kirkpatrick, D.D. (2012). Named Egypt's Winner, Islamist Makes History. *New York Times*, June 24.

Kirkpatrick, D.D. and Chivers, C.J. (2011). Tribal Rifts Threaten to Undermine Libya Uprising. *New York Times*, August 13.

Mahan, S. and Griset, P.L. (2012). *Terrorism in Perspective (Third edition)*. United States: Sage Publications.

Nossiter, A. and Fahim, K. (2011). Revolution Won, Top Libyan Official Vows a New and More Pious State. *New York Times*, October 23.

Project, 264.

Ruthven, S. (2011). The Paradox of Revolution. *Public Choice*, 11(1), 89–99.

Savage, C. (2011). Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen. *New York Times*, October 8.

Sayare, S.(2011). Tunisia is Uneasy Over Party of Islamists. *New York Times*, 15 May.

Shadid, A. (2011). Syria Escalates Crackdown as Tanks Go to Restive City. *New York Times*, April 25.

Shahid, A. (2011). Islamists Flood Square in Cairo in Show of Strength.*New York Times*, July 29.

The Economist (2011). The Tide Turns against Bashar Assad. November 19.

Tisdall, S. (2011). The Consensus on Intervention in Libya has Shattered. *The Guardian*, March 23.

Trager, E. (2011). Who's Who in Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood? *Policy Analysis. The Washing Institute*

Wright, B. (2011). *Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World*. New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks.

MODULE 4 PROTESTAND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

This module is concerned with issues affecting the world today. In fact, hardly will a day pass without reports of protest and myriads of social movements across countries of the world. It appears that the world is currently filled with political, ideological and philosophical contradictions. This is evident in the decision of United Kingdom to exit European Union (EU). While the Prime Minister, David Cameron wanted his nation to remain in the EU, about fifty two percent of the people voted to leave. It was shocking to know that some powerful people such as Donald Trump, President of the United States of America, and many highly respected people hailed the decision of majority of Britons to leave the European Union. The results of the referendum led to protest among the dissatisfied population; hence, the call for a second referendum.

Protests and social movements are usually witnessed in every sector of human endeavor, we see protest among workers (economic protests), among supporters of politicians and political parties (political protests), among adherent of religions (religious protests), etc. In many states of Nigeria, there have been several protests such as the Biafra protests “Our Mumu Don Do” protest, Occupy Nigeria protest, Shiites protest and many more.

Protest as common as it may sound may lead to serious economic and social consequences if not properly planned and managed. It is important to stress that protest is an important starting point for the formation of social movement. If a protest persists for too long without any favourable response from the party protested against, it is likely that some radical entities of the protest will resort to

organizing a movement-which may take actions that have deleterious consequences.Like the other three modules presented earlier, this module also has four units that are logically connected.

Unit 1: Introduction to protest and social movement

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Introduction

3.2 What is social movement?

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This is the first unit of module 4; it contains background information about the phenomena of protests and social movement. Some forces responsible for the upsurge of social movements are also mentioned. Importantly, definitions and meaning of social movement are presented

2.0 Objectives

The aims of this study are to:

- ✓ Introduce you to some critical issues surrounding social movements
- ✓ Expose you to the meaning of social movements

3.0 Main content

3.1 Introduction

In the late 1960s, the world was apparently undergoing deep, dramatic transformations– even a revolution, some thought. American Civil Rights and Anti-War Movements, the Mai 1968 revolt in France, students' protests in Germany, Britain, or Mexico, the Worker–Student Coalitions of the 1969

“Hot Autumn” in Italy, the Pro-Democracy Mobilizations in locations as diverse as Francoist Madrid and Communist Prague, the growth of critical Catholicism from South America to Rome, the early signs of the women’s and environmental movements that would shape the new politics of the 1970s: all these phenomena – and many more – suggested that deep changes were in the making. Accordingly, the study of social movements developed at an unprecedented pace into a major area of research. If, at the end of the 1940s, critics lamented the “crudely descriptive level of understanding and a relative lack of theory” (Strauss, 1947), and in the 1960s complained that “in the study of social changes, social movements have received relatively little emphasis” (Killian, 1964), by the mid-1970s, research into collective action was considered “one of the most vigorous areas of sociology” (Marx and Wood, 1975). At the end of the 1980s commentators talked of “an explosion, in the last ten years, of theoretical and empirical writings on social movements and collective action (Morris and Herring, 1987).

Over a long stretch of time, the study of social movements has been solidly established, with specialized journals, book series, and professional associations. In Nigeria’s history, the excitement and optimism of the roaring 1960s may be long gone, but social and political events since then have hardly rendered the investigation of grassroots activism any less relevant or urgent. To the contrary, social movements, protest actions, and, more generally, political organizations unaligned with major political parties or trade unions have become a permanent component of Western democracies. It is no longer possible to describe protest politics, grassroots participation, and symbolic challenges as “unconventional.” Instead, references to a “movement society” seem increasingly plausible (Neidhardt and Rucht, 2002).

3.2 What is Social Movement?

Defining what, exactly, a social movement is can be difficult. It is not a political party or interest group, which are stable political entities that have regular access to political power and political elites; nor is it

a mass fad or trend, which are unorganized, fleeting and without goals (Freeman & Johnson, 1999). Some characteristics of social movements are that they are “involved in conflictual relations with clearly identified opponents; are linked by dense informal networks; [and they] share a distinct collective identity” (De la Porta & Diani, 2006). Social movements, then, can be thought of as organized yet informal social entities that are engaged in extra-institutional conflict that is oriented towards a goal. These goals can be either aimed at a specific and narrow policy or be more broadly focused at cultural change.

To early scholars such as Marx, collective action was inherently oriented towards change. Some of the earliest works on social movements were attempts to understand why people got caught up in collective action or what conditions were necessary to foment social movements. These works were rooted in theories of mass society. Mass society theory was concerned with the increasing industrialization of society, which many felt led to a sense of alienation among individuals as traditional social structures and support networks broke down. The study of social movements as specific social processes with specific patterns emerged from this field of study.

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

1. What do you understand by the term social movement?
2. Highlight and discuss the features that differentiate a protest from a social movement.

UNIT II: FOUR STAGES OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Four stages of development

3.2 Emergence

3.3 Coalescence

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

In this unit, you will learn about stages of social movement. As was indicated in the introductory part of this module, a social movement does not just begin, there are processes and stages that the formation goes through; such stages of formation are our concern in this unit. There are four stages highlighted in this module, two of them will be discussed in this unit, while the remaining two stages will be discussed in the next unit.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

- ✓ Understand the concept of emergence as the first stage in the formation of social movement
- ✓ Grasp the concept of coalescence as it relates to formation of social movement

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 FOUR STAGES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SOCIAL MOVEMENT

One of the earliest scholars to study social movement processes was Herbert Blumer, who identified four stages of social movements' lifecycles. The four stages he described were: "social ferment," "popular excitement," "formalization," and "institutionalization" (De la Porta & Diani, 2006). Since his early work, scholars have refined and renamed these stages but the underlying themes have remained relatively constant. Today, the four social movement stages are known as:

1. Emergence,
2. Coalescence,
3. Bureaucratization, and
4. Decline

3.1 EMERGENCE

Emergence, or, as described by Blumer, the "social ferment" stage (De la Porta & Diani, 2006). Within this stage, social movements are very preliminary and there is little to no organization. Instead this stage can be thought of as widespread discontent (Macionis, 2001). Potential movement participants may be unhappy with some policy or some social condition, but they have not taken any action in order to redress their grievances, or if they have it is most likely individual action rather than collective action. A person may comment to friends and family that he or she is dissatisfied with conditions or may write a letter to the local newspaper or representative, but these actions are not strategic and not collective. Further, there may be an increase in media coverage of negative conditions or unpopular policies which contributes to the general sense of discontent.

This early stage can also be considered within a specific social movement organization (SMO). A social movement organization is an organization that is or has been associated with a social movement and which carries out the tasks that are necessary for any social movement to survive and be successful. An example of a social movement organization is the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which was one of the many social movement organizations that organized during the American Civil Rights Movement. Within the emergence stage, then, an SMO and its members serve as agitators. Agitators raise consciousness around issues and help to develop the sense of discontent among the general population.

An example of this stage would be the early 1950's for the Civil Rights Movement. There was, of course, among the African-American population in the South, a general and long standing sense of discontent. Further, there were SMOs such as the NAACP that provided agitation, but were not yet organizing the mass and continued actions that came to later characterize the Civil Rights Movement. It was not until after the Brown v. the Board of Education Supreme court decision (1954), which outlawed segregation in Public schools, and following the arrest of Rosa Parks in Montgomery, Alabama for refusing to comply with segregation laws on city buses by giving up her bus seat to a white man, that the American Civil Rights Movement would proceed to the next stage – coalescence.

3.2 COALESCENCE

At this next stage in the life cycle, social movements have overcome some obstacles which many never overcome. Often, social unrest or discontent passes without any organizing or widespread mobilization. For example, people in a community may complain to each other about a general injustice, but they do not come together to act on those complaints and the social movement does not progress to the next level. Stage two, known as coalescence, or the “popular stage,” is characterized by a more clearly defined sense of discontent. It is no longer just a general sense of unease, but now a sense of what the

unease is about and who or what is responsible. Rex D. Hopper (1950), in examining revolutionary processes, states that at this stage *“unrest is no longer covert, endemic, and esoteric; it becomes overt, epidemic, and exoteric. Discontent is no longer uncoordinated and individual; it tends to become focalized and collective”*. Further he states *“this is the stage when individuals participating in the mass behaviour of the preceding stage become aware of each other”*.

At this point leadership emerges and strategies for success are worked out. Also, at this stage mass demonstrations may occur in order to display the social movement’s power and to make clear demands. Most importantly, this is the stage at which the movement becomes more than just random upset individuals; at this point they are now organized and strategic in their outlook.

The American Civil Rights Movement of 1950s provides a good example. After the initial emergence, the movement began a series of high profile campaigns, which sought to highlight the plight of African Americans in the segregated South. These campaigns included the Montgomery Bus Boycott and lunch counter sit-ins in which black students would sit down at segregated counters and wait to either be served or be dragged out by the police. These events galvanized support for the movement and displayed the brutality to which white segregationists would resort in order to protect the status quo. At this point too, prominent leaders of the movement begin to emerge, such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. After many years of successful, but hard fought campaigns and strong leadership, the movement became a more prominent political force.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISES(SAEs)

1. Attempt a criticism of the concept of “emergence” as the starting point in the formation of social movements.
2. Mention and discuss the four stages of a social movement.

UNIT III FOUR STAGES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (CONT'D)

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Bureaucratization

3.2 Decline

3.2.1 Repression

3.2.2 Co-optation

3.2.3 Success

3.2.4 Failure

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This unit is a continuation of the previous one; here, you will learn the remaining two stages: bureaucratization and decline. You will see that social movements are not randomly formed, they

have processes similar to that of a bureaucracy; they have leaders and members of executive with each person recognizing its own duties and responsibilities in the attainment of the goals of the movement.

2.0 Objectives

- ✓ To show you the rules, regulations and procedures in the establishment of social movement
- ✓ To teach you the sub-stages in institutionalization

3.0 Main content

3.1 Bureaucratization

The third stage in the formation of a social movement is known as bureaucratization. This stage is defined by Blumer as “formalization,” (De la Porta & Diani, 2006), and is characterized by higher levels of organization and coalition-based strategies. At this stage, social movements have had some successes in that they have raised awareness to a degree that a coordinated strategy is necessary across all of the SMOs. Similarly, SMOs will come to rely on staff persons with specialized knowledge that can run the day-to-day operations of the organization and carry out movement goals. Social movements in this stage can no longer just rely on mass rallies or inspirational leaders to progress towards their goals and build constituencies; they must rely on trained staff to carry out the functions of organizations. In this phase their political power is greater than in the previous stages in that they may have more regular access to political elites. Many social movements fail to bureaucratize in this way and end up fizzling out because it is difficult for members to sustain the emotional excitement necessary and because continued mobilization becomes too demanding for participants. Formalization often means that paid staff can fill in when highly enthusiastic volunteers are not readily available (Macionis, 2001).

3.2 DECLINE

Finally, the last stage in the social movement life cycle is decline, or “institutionalization.” Decline does not necessarily mean failure for social movements though. Instead, Miller (1999) argues, there are four ways in which social movements can decline:

- a) Repression,
- b) Co-optation,
- c) Success, and
- d) Failure

3.2.1 REPRESSION

The first way social movements can decline is through repression. Repression occurs when authorities, or agents acting on behalf of the authorities, use measures (sometimes violent) to control or destroy a social movement. Further, Miller (1999) states “repressive actions may be defined as legitimate by the state...but they are never legitimate from the perspective of the movement”. This means that governments will often pass laws outlawing specific movement activities or organizations, or justify attacks on them by declaring them somehow dangerous to public order. This type of repression makes it exceedingly difficult for social movements to carry out their activities and recruit new members. An example of state repression of social movement activity is that which was carried out by U.S. authorities against many New Left Organizations in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Many movements and their leaders were spied upon, jailed and even killed as a part of this repressive effort, leading to eventual break up (Boren, 2001).

3.2.2 CO-OPTATION

Movements can also decline, if their organizations are highly dependent on centralized authority or on charismatic leadership, through co-optation. Co-optation occurs when movement leaders come to

associate with authorities or movement targets more than with the social movement constituents. For example, a leader could be asked to work for the organization that is the target of a movement with offers of being able to change things from the inside. Instead they themselves become integrated into the organization and take on its values, rather than the social movement's values. Leaders could also be paid off by authorities or target groups who ask them to redirect their activities in exchange.

3.2.3 SUCCESS

Of course, not all social movements end in defeat through repression or co-optation; some decline because they are successful. Smaller, localized movements with very specific goals often have a better chance at outright success. Miller (1999) uses the example of an area that mobilizes to halt the construction of an airport. He also mentions that the women's suffrage movement, which began in 1848 in New York, was a national organization that achieved its goals and thus declined. Both of these examples point to movements with very specific goals. Many social movements have goals that are much less clearly defined and many organize new campaigns once others are wrapping up either through success or compromise.

3.2.4 FAILURE

In his analysis of the decline of SDS, Miller (1999) notes that SDS declined for many of the reasons stated above, but he also argues that the organization was not able to handle the rapid expansion that occurred because of their success and due to organizational strain, it collapsed into different factions. Failure of social movements due to organizational or strategic failings is common for many organizations. When failure occurs at the organizational level, Miller argues, it is usually for two reasons: factionalism and encapsulation.

As SDS grew, and partly due to its open structure in which everybody was encouraged to take part in the decision making process, the organization began to be controlled by different factions that were operating within the organization for the benefit of outside organizations – in the case of SDS they were dealing with the increasing power of the Progressive Labour Party faction. As the factionalism grew worse and repression continued, Miller argues that groups became increasingly insular, leading to encapsulation. This is the process wherein a cadre of activists become isolated from the broader movement because they come to share many of the same habits and culture and their ideology becomes more similar to one another's and at the same time more rigid. They become so dedicated to the movement that they fail to sympathize with those who do not make the movement the dominant aspect of their life. Likewise, potential recruits find it hard to penetrate the close knit group (Miller, 1999).

3.3 Establishment with the Mainstream

Some people have noted that a fifth reason for decline of social movements exists; mainly, that an organization becomes established with the mainstream. That is, their goals or ideologies are adopted by the mainstream and there is no longer any need for a movement. An example of this would be the labour movement in the United States. For many years the labour movement was brutally repressed by authorities, but today the U.S. labour movement is well integrated into the political and economic system. Collective bargaining rights are guaranteed by the federal government (in most cases) and the labour movement is well established within the political system (Macionis, 2001).

4 Self-Assessment Exercises(SMAs)

1. Of what relevance is the application of stages of social movement to Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND)?

Unit 4. Types of Social Movement Organizations

1. Introduction

2. Objectives

3. Main content: Types of social movement organizations

3.1 Professional movement organizations

3.2 Participatory movement organizations which include Mass protest organizations and Grass root organizations.

4. Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This is the last unit of module 4; here, we will discuss types of social movement organization so that you can categorize MASSOB, MEND, BBOG and many others effectively. You should note that movements are established for different purposes and that modes of operation of each organization vary. In addition, you will see how categories of different social movements determine the approaches-whether violence or dialogue- they use in attaining their goal(s).

2.0 Objectives

In this unit, you will learn:

- ✓ The different types of social movement organization
- ✓ The approaches and formation of each type of social movement organizations

3.0 Main content: Types of Social Movement Organizations

3.1 Professional Movement Organizations

A professional social movement organization is characterized by “(1) a leadership that devotes full time to the movement, with a large proportion of resources originating outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent;(2) a very small or non-existent membership base or a paper membership (membership implies little more than allowing a name to be used upon membership rolls); (3) attempts to impart the image of ‘speaking for a constituency,’ and(4) attempts to influence policy toward that same constituency” (McCarthy and Zald, 1987). Ordinary members have little power and “have no serious role in organizational policymaking short of withholding membership dues. The professional staff largely determines the positions the organization takes upon issues”, (*ibid*).

However, professional SMOs do not necessarily address themselves to their“natural” constituents, i.e., those groups (whether dispossessed like the unemployed or the homeless, or fairly well-off like in many new middle-class mobilizations)whose interests they promote, the way a normal pressure group would. Rather, they have a “conscience constituency” composed of those who believe in the cause they support. Their leaders are entrepreneurs whose “impact results from their skills at manipulating images of relevance and support through the communication media”. They rely more on their reputation for technical expertise on specific matters than on mass mobilization(McCarthy and Zald, 1987).

There are recognizable advantages associated with professional organizations. Back in the 1970s, in his comparative analysis of American social movements, Gamson (1990) found that challengers are more likely to win when they possess a well-structured organization. Formal organizations would appear better placed to mobilize “because they facilitate mass participation, tactical innovations, and rapid decision-making” (Morris 1984). Structured organizations are also more likely to survive beyond a wave of protest to favour mobilization in succeeding waves (McCarthy and Zald, 1987). Professional organizers often spread mass defiance rather than dampening it, and “professionalization of leadership and the formalization of movement organizations are not necessarily incompatible with grass-roots

protest” (Staggenborg, 1991). Moreover, long-term survival is favoured by the presence of motives for and methods of action which are already legitimated (Clemens and Minkoff, 2004).

However, there are also problems. While professional organizations can generate a constant flow of funding they are bound by the wishes of their benefactors. The growth and maintenance of organizations whose formal goals are aimed at helping one population but who depend on a different population for funding are ultimately more dependent upon the latter than the former (McCarthy and Zald, 1987). Patrons provide important resources, but they are usually available only for groups with low-level claims and consensual legitimacy – the disabled rather than the unemployed, for example (Walker, 1991). Similar consequences may result from growing collaboration with authorities: The establishment of a working relation with the authorities also has ambivalent implications for the development of the SMO: On the one hand, public recognition, access to decision-making procedures and public subsidies may provide crucial resources and represent important successes for the SMO; on the other hand, the integration into the established system of interest intermediation may impose limits on the mobilization capacity of the SMO and alienate important parts of its constituency, with the consequence of weakening it in the long run (Lahusen, 2004).

Echoing Robert Michels’ analysis of the bureaucratization of socialist parties, Piven and Cloward, 1977) have been most explicit in considering the development of formal organizations as hampering goal attainment in protest movements of the poor. Investment in building a permanent mass organization was seen as a waste of scarce resources. Moreover, such organizations tended to reduce the only resource available to the poor: mass defiance. It is certainly true that even professional bureaucratic organizations may promote radical challenges and defiance, and engage in various forms of vicarious activism on behalf of a fee-paying passive membership (Diani and Donati, 1999). But organizations

focused entirely on fund-raising and the attractions of financial resources are likely sooner or later to face problems with their capacity to mobilize people (Diani and Donati, 1999). All in all, according to critics, professionalization might lead to defeat by taming protest (Piven and Cloward, 1977).

The same dilemmas characterize an organizational type that has recently gained increasing attention, the transnational social movement organization (TSMOs). Jackie Smith defines TSMOs as international nongovernmental organizations engaged in explicit attempts to [change] some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of society (1999), and show they grew from 110 in 1953 to 631 in 1993. Their growth has exceeded that of international nongovernmental organizations at large (Anheier and Themudo, 2002). TSMOs comprise a small number (sometimes referred to as “the Big Ten”) of organizations with numerous national chapters, membership in the millions, and strong levels of bureaucratization. These include the likes of Amnesty International (over a million members, formal chapters in 56 countries, 7,500 action groups in nearly 100 countries: (Anheier and Themudo, 2002), Greenpeace (between 2 and 3 million), Friends of the Earth (a federation of 61 national associations that coordinates about 5,000 local groups and a million members (Anheier and Themudo, 2002), WWF (5 million), or Oxfam (a confederation of 12 organizations). These organizations display many traits of the professional organization, even though participation is encouraged – if largely in the form of voluntary work and contributions to specific projects, rather than in decision-making processes, and with low levels of investment in the building of internal solidarity. However, TSMOs also include organizations with a distinctive profile but much smaller in terms of resources and less neatly fitting the professional model. Well-known examples include ATTAC, an organization that campaigns against the deregulation of financial markets, founded in 1997 in France though it has made significant inroads in other Western countries (Ancelovici 2002; Kolb 2004); ACT UP, active since the 1980s in challenging the consequences of AIDS (Gould, 2002); or conservation organizations such as Conservation International or the Environmental Defense Fund (Lewis, 2000).

3.2 Participatory Movement Organizations which include Mass protest organizations and Grass root organizations as follows:

Mass protest organizations

This model combines attention to participatory democracy with certain levels of formalization of the organizational structure. In the social movements of the 1970s, many political organizations like the communist K-Gruppen in Germany, the New Left parties in Italy, the Trotskyists in France, had adopted fairly rigid and hierarchical organizational structures, close to the model of the Leninist party (Della Porta, 1995). Gradually, however, this model fell out of favour for its excessive emphasis on the professional revolutionary role, and its indifference to grassroots democracy. With the crisis of the 1970s protest movements, alternative forms of organization developed, as exemplified by the emergence of green parties. These were formed for the most part during the 1980s campaigns on environmental issues, and nuclear energy in particular, although they have never been the official political representatives of the environmental movement (Rootes, 1994). In seeking to defend nature, these parties also sought to apply the “think globally, act locally” principle to their organizations. The greens rejected, initially at least, any structured organizational power, just as they rejected centralizing technologies. They developed a ritual of direct democracy by introducing consensual decision-making, rotation of chair roles, and so on.

The model of open assemblies and always revocable delegates did not survive long, however. Participatory democracy may often reduce the decision-making efficiency of assemblies and lead to very long periods of confusion and uncertainty. Particularly after they entered first regional and then national parliaments, the greens began to develop stable organizational structures, with membership cards, representative rather than direct democracy within the party, and a stable leadership. Public funding of the parties created a constant and generous flow of finance which was used to develop a professional

political class, set up newspapers and supportive associations. The green parties' structure thus became formal and centralized. Participation moved towards excluding membership of other organizations, and ideological incentives began to predominate. Recently, however, grassroots democratic practices have been revitalized in the context of the growth of global justice mobilizations, and also extended to non-traditional unions such as the Cobas in Italy or Sud in France.

It is not difficult to identify the processes behind these recurrent switches. They not only have to do with the oligarchic tendencies to be found in any sort of organization, but also with problems associated with the model of participatory organizational democracy. In fairness, the concrete realization of the organizational principles of grassroots democracy has never been a simple matter. Many activists have complained of the de facto oligarchies which tend to form and impose their will when collective decision-making becomes difficult. An organized minority can win out in an assembly by wearing down the majority, and forcing them to give up and leave after hours of strenuous discussion. In a few extreme cases physical force has been used by some groups to occupy important decision-making positions such as the chair of meetings. Even without reaching those excesses, the risks of a "tyranny of emotions," whereby the most committed activists profit from the lack of formal procedures and secure control of decision-making processes, have been pointed out in reference to several movements of the recent and not-so-recent past (Polletta, 2002).

Grassroots Organizations

In contrast to the mass protest model, the grassroots model combines strong participatory orientations with low levels of formal structuration. The existence of organizations of this kind depends on their members' willingness to participate in their activities. Such participation may be encouraged through different combinations of ideological and solidaristic incentives. Oftentimes this is related to locality. For example, the local groups that opposed road building in many corners of Britain in the 1990s (Drury et

al., 2003) could not rely on a strong ideological profile given the heterogeneity of their participants, and instead emphasized shared concerns in specific issues; so do the single issue citizens' committees that characterize so much political activity in contemporary democracies (della Porta, 2004) or the residents' associations promoting environmental justice collective action in deprived urban areas (Taylor 1995). Other times, shared critical attitudes play a stronger and more explicit role in motivating participation, as in the semi-formal direct action groups that have developed in the context of growing opposition to neoliberal globalization (Doherty, Plows, and Wall 2003), or in the local independent women's groups that marked the spread of feminist movements in the 1970s and 1980s (Whittier, 1995).

Despite their lack of resources, there are innumerable examples of grassroots organizations that have been successful in the pursuit of their goals, both in countries lacking a vibrant civil society (Ray, 1999) and in Western countries. For example, grassroots environmental mobilizations have proved a constant feature of Western democracies, stopping threatening projects on innumerable occasions (Rootes, 2003). At the same time, depending so heavily on their members' voluntary participation, grassroots organizations' capacity to act with continuity over time is obviously limited. Many of them actually see an alternation of phases of activism and latency, comparable to those identified by Melucci and his associates (Melucci, 1984) for social movements as a whole. They operate as "intermittent structures," i.e., "organizations or organizational units which are deployed and then "folded up" until their period of activity arrives again" (Etzioni, 1975: quoted in Lindgren, 1987). "Intermittent social movement organizations" (Lindgren 1987), that resurface each time their issues of concern become salient political topics again, remind us that permanent stable structures are not necessarily a requirement for success.

Grassroots organizations may also face problems if they rely too heavily on ideology to secure their members' cohesion and commitment. Ideological incentives are an important surrogate for the lack of material resources, but their use increases the rigidity of the organizational model because

transformations have to be incorporated into the normative order of the group (Zald 1970). Moreover, organizations employing symbolic incentives will run a greater risk of internal conflict (McCarthy and Zald, 1987). Especially for grassroots groups with very critical views of mainstream society, closure to the external world helps the formation of identity but also reduces the capacity to handle reality and identify reasons for failure.

MODUS OPERANDI OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE NIGERIAN SOCIETY

Most professional social movement in Nigeria operates through some of this method discuss below:

1) Strikes: To register their grievances and discontent about obnoxious policies, most professional social movements in Nigeria embark on strikes. This is because they know their services are very crucial to the survival of the Nigerian society. Their embarking on strike will force other quarters of the society who needs their services to protest about the decisions of government and most times force government to answer and settle with these professional social movement. The protest embarked on by student during ASUU strike and relatives of sick and dying patients is a testimony to this fact.

2) Protest: Many a times, members of professional organizations or social movements embark on organized protest to register their grievance when all other avenue of dialogue had failed. This is very common when the authorities' concern fail to answer or come to terms with their demand a good example of this is the mass protest embarked upon by the Nigerian universities teachers when the government fails to meet their demand.

3) Litigation: Sometimes in order to adequately press home their demand, professional social movement can go to court by suing the offending authority, institution or party while their protest is ongoing. This is done to ensure that they do not break the law or found wanted in the space of time while their protest is ongoing.

4)The use of mass media: Professional social movements within the Nigerian society also make use of the mass media to ensure that their agitations are widely spread to all nooks and cranny of the society and also to have far reaching effects and ensure that their demands are met.

4.0Self-Assessment Exercise(SAEs)

1. Discuss the different types of social movement organizations and state examples of movements that can be found under each.

5.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS (SMAs)

1. What are Social Movements?
2. Discuss four (4) stages of social movements that you have witnessed or commonly seen?
3. What kind of Social Movements qualifies to be called 'Professional Social Movements'?
4. List three type of professional social movement within the Nigerian society and discuss briefly their modus of operandi within the society?

REFERENCES

- Ancelovici, M.(2002). Organizing Against Globalization: The Case of ATTAC in France. *Politics and Society*, 30, 427–63.
- Anheier, H. and Themudo, N.(2002). Organizational Forms of Global Civil Society: Implications of Going Global. In Marlies Glasius, Mary Kaldor and Helmut Anheier (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2002*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 191–216.
- Boren, M. E. (2001). *Student Resistance: A History of the Unruly Subject*. New York: Routledge.
- Clemens, E. S. and Minkoff, D.(2004). Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of Organizations in Social Movement Research. In David A. Snow, Sarah H. Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*. Oxford: Blackwell, 155–70.
- De la Porta, D. & Diani, M. (2006). *Social Movements: An Introduction* (2nd Ed). Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- della Porta, D.(1995). *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State*. Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Diani, M. and Donati, P. R. (1999). Organizational Change in Western European Environmental Groups: A Framework for Analysis. *Environmental Politics*, 8, 13–34.
- Doherty, B., Plows, A., and Wall, D.(2003). The Preferred Way of Doing Things: The British Direct Action Movement. *Parliamentary Affairs*, 56, 669–86.
- Drury, J., Reicher, S., and Stott, C.(2003). Transforming the Boundaries of Collective Identity: From the “Local” Anti-road Campaign to “Global” Resistance? *Social Movement Studies*, 2, 191–212.

- Etzioni, A.(1975).*A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations*. New York: Free Press.
- Freeman, J. & Johnson, V. (1999) *Waves of Protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gamson, W.(1990).*The Strategy of Social Protest* (2nd edition). Belmont, CA:Wadsworth
- Gould, D.(2002). Strategic Framing, Emotions, and Superbarrio – Mexico City’sMasked Crusader.*Mobilization*, 7 (2), 201–16.
- Hopper, R. D. (1950). The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of revolutionary Movements. *Social Forces* 28 (3), 270-280.
- Killian, L.(1964). Social Movements.In Robert E. Farris (ed.), *Handbook of Modern Sociology*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 426–45.
- Lewis, T. L. (2000). Transnational Conservation Movement Organizations.*Mobilization*,5, 105–23.
- Lindgren, E. H. (1987). The Informal-Intermittent Organization: A Vehicle forSuccessful Citizen Protest. *Journal of Applied Behavioral Research*, 23, 397–412.
- Macionis, J. J. (2001) *Sociology* (8th ed). Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Marx, G. T. and Wood, J.(1975). Strands of Theory and Research in Collective Behaviour.*Annual Review of Sociology*, 1, 363–428.
- McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1987). Resource Mobilization and Social Movements:A Partial Theory. In M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy, *Social Movements in an OrganizationalSociety*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction (originally published in *American Journal of Sociology*, 82 (1977), 1212–41).

- McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (1987). The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization. In M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy, *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1987, 337–91
- Melucci, A. (1984). *Altri codici: Aree di movimento nella metropoli*. Bologna: il Mulino.
- Miller, F. D. (1999). The End of SDS and the Emergence of Weatherman: Demise Through Success. In J. Freeman & V. Johnson, (Eds.), *Waves of protest: Social Movements Since the Sixties* (pp. 303-324). Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
- Morris, A. and Herring, C. (1987). Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2, 137–98.
- Neidhardt, F. and Rucht, D. (2002). Towards a “Movement Society”? On the Possibilities of Institutionalizing Social Movements. *Social Movement Studies*, 1, 7–30.
- Piven, F. F. and Cloward, R. (1977). *Poor People’s Movements*. New York: Pantheon.
- Polletta, F. (2002). *Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
- Ray, R. (1999). *Fields of Protest: Women’s Movements in India*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Rootes, C. (1994). *Parties and Movements as Alternative Modes of Collective Action: Green Parties and Environmental Movements in Europe*. Paper presented at the Thirteenth World Congress of Sociology, Bielefeld, July.
- Staggenborg, S. (1988). The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice Movement. *American Sociological Review*, 53, 585–606

Strauss, A. L. (1947). Research in Collective Behaviour: Neglect and Need. *American Sociological Review*, 12, 352–354

Taylor, B. (1995). *Ecological Resistance Movements*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Walker, J. L. (1991). *Mobilizing Interest Groups in America: Patrons, Professions, and Social Movements*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Whittier, N. (1995). *Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Women's Movement*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Zald, M. N. (1970). *Organizational Change: The Political Economy of the YMCA*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press

MODULE 5 CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

This section is deliberately installed in the last part of this module to reflect the popular that *who laughs last laughs best*, so this segment appears to be crucial as it constitutes a key variable in the social sciences and humanities theory. In Political Science or Sociology and some other social sciences, a research work is not complete until backed up with theories. You might have heard the word theory several times, let me expose you a little to its meaning.

The word “theory” means different things to different people, for instance, people often say that teachers need to be less theoretical and more practical or factual in their classroom teaching. To this set of people, theory is the direct opposite of practice. This is obvious in the statement of one chemical engineering student when he said that: *“you people are enjoying in political science, sociology, etc. as your work is more of theory than practice so your exams will be easy, but in chemical engineering, we go to laboratory where we do practicals”*. To him, the act of learning without going to the laboratory is regarded as theory. In reality, practice or fact is not opposite of theory, but in a scientific sense, are essential components needed to test the validity of a theory. A good scientific theory should be well supported using observed facts and should also have practical value (Bhattacharjee, 2012).

According to Stolley (2005), a theory is the analysis and statement of how and why a set of facts relates to each other. In political science, theories help us understand how political phenomena relate to each other. Theories help political scientist explain why and how society works. Through the use of theory, they work to answer such questions as “why are things as they are? What conditions produce them? And what conditions change them into something else? If we have such a theory, we will at last be in a position to know what we really *can* do about the shape of our society” (Collins, 1988). By

understanding the real causes of how and why things operate as they do, we can find ways to address the things that need improvement.

There are many benefits of using theories in research. First, theories provide the underlying logic of the occurrence of natural or social phenomenon by explaining what are the key drivers and key outcomes of the target phenomenon and why, and what underlying processes are responsible for driving that phenomenon. Second, they aid in sense-making by helping us synthesize prior empirical findings within a theoretical framework and reconcile contradictory findings by discovering contingent factors influencing the relationship between two constructs in different studies. Third, theories provide guidance for future research by helping to identify constructs and relationships that are worthy of further research. Fourth, theories can contribute to cumulative knowledge building by bridging gaps between other theories and by causing existing theories to be re-evaluated in a new light (Bhattacharjee, 2012).

Indeed, a good research work must be grounded in a sound theoretical framework for it to be acceptable as credible in the academia. For the purpose of this module, theory is defined as a model, assumption, or frame of reference that is used to explain or describe social phenomena. Hence, theories involve constructing abstract interpretations that can be used to explain a wide variety of empirical or 'factual' situations (Giddens, 2009).

The following theories are relevant to our discussion of revolution and society as they show why social movements emerged and how they gradually expand and acquire prowess to initiate a revolution.

The four theories are:

Unit 1 Mass society theory

Unit 2 Relative deprivation theory

Unit 3 Resource mobilization theory

Unit 4 Structural strain theory

UNIT 1 MASS SOCIETY THEORY

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Mass society theory

3.2 Critique of mass society theory

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

Have you ever wondered why some dangerous groups such as Boko Haram (originally known as Jama'atu Ahlus Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad) are able to successfully recruit new members?(Mohammed, 2015). Have you ever thought of why someone would volunteer to be a suicide bomber at the detriment of his/her own life and his/her own people? You may find the answer to the questions in the unit. *Social isolation* and *mass media* are the constructs. In society where able and agile men- in their working ages- are not carried along or are neglected by the social system, such men feel isolated; hence, they become loyal to any sect or group who pretends to care for their welfare at that moment. In addition, you will see the roles of the media in the emergence of social movement organizations.

2.0 Objectives

Here you will:

- ✓ Learn about the roles of social media in the operations of social movement
- ✓ Know about the core assumptions of mass society theory

3.0MAIN CONTENT

3.1MASS SOCIETY THEORY

Mass society theory is an interdisciplinary critique of the collective identity that results from the mass commodification of culture and the mass media's manipulation of society. Mass society theory invokes a vision of society characterized by alienation, absence of individuality, amorality, lack of religion, weak relationships, and political apathy. Mass society theory developed at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries in response to the rise of the media industry and the socio-political changes created by industrialization, urbanization, and the fall of established political regimes. Major contributors to mass society theory include Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Emil Lederer (1882-1939), José Ortega y Gasset (1883-1955), Robert Nisbet (1968-present), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Herbert Blumer (1900-1987), William Kornhauser (1896-1990), Ferdinand Tönnies (1855-1936), and Karl Mannheim (1893-1947).

Early mass society theory asserted that the new urban masses, comprising uprooted and isolated individuals, were vulnerable to new forms of demagoguery and manipulation by the media (Hamilton, 2001). While popular media existed in the nineteenth century, mass media, as a discrete concept, did

not develop until the early twentieth century with the advent of national circulation newspapers and national media networks like nationwide radio. To mass society theorists, the media represents and promotes the worst problems of modernity. Early proponents of the theory believed that mass society is characterized by a collective identity and low-brow cultural interests. Because of these characteristics, they believed that dictatorships and bureaucracies can easily and quickly manipulate mass societies, making them vulnerable to extremist politics and the rise of disenfranchised.

Mass society theory belongs to the larger body of interdisciplinary work called social movement theory. Social movement theory refers to the study of social mobilization, including its social, cultural, and political manifestations and consequences. Social movement scholarship is often motivated by a desire for social change and, consequently, integrates scholarship and activism. The field took shape during the late nineteenth century and has since come to comprise six main areas of study: mass society theory, relative deprivation theory, resource mobilization theory, structural-strain theory, value-added theory, and new social movement theory. At its core, social movement theory holds that social movements are, in many instances, created through the use and manipulation of frames, or cognitive structures which guide an individual's or group's perception of reality. Social movements influence and control their members through tactics such as mobilizing fear, engaging in frame appropriation, social constructionism, and counter framing. Sociologists analyse social movements in two distinct ways: social constructionist perspective and frame analysis (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Mass society theory emerged as a discrete field of interest at the turn of 20th century, in part as a result of the changes that scholars saw occurring in society as effects of industrialization, urbanization, and political change. During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the rise of industrialization and urbanization changed society. The industrial era in Europe and America, which approximately spanned from 1750 to 1900, was a time characterized by the replacement of manual labour with industrialized and mechanized labour, as well as by the adoption of the factory system of production. The industrial era included the period of the industrial revolution and the resulting rise of capitalism. The industrial revolution refers to the technical, cultural, and social changes that occurred in the Western world during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The period saw a major increase in the mechanization of agriculture, manufacturing, and transportation (Ahmad, 1997). The industrial revolution – which brought with it new types and conceptions of employment, time, scale, landscape, property, and social relationships – caused great social change. The nineteenth century saw major transformations in gender

and class hierarchies, family units, gender relations, immigrants' roles in society, and childhood. The industrial revolution, with its increased need for workers, created a new working, middle, and consumer classes. The family unit and gender roles changed, too, during the period, largely as because of the factory system which employed both men and women and removed the work place from the home (Abelson, 1995).

Mass society theory suggests that all these social changes created politically and psychologically unmoored masses. According to the theory, demagogues, or political leaders who achieve power by preying on people's emotions or prejudices, could easily manipulate these emerging mass. The rise of the media industry in the twentieth century provided a formal means of communication that was accessible to almost everyone in a society. Early theorists and the ruling classes quickly came to see it as being largely responsible for publicizing and disseminating the changes, unrest, and discontent which typified the period. They blamed the mass media (like the penny press newspapers that were popular during the 1830s) for giving credence to and perpetuating the industrial era's discontent, alienation, and decline in community (Hamilton, 2001). As a result, it came to be seen as a symbol of all that was wrong with society.

Mass society theory grew out of these concerns. It holds that the mass media has the power to change cultural norms and power relations, and can thus contribute to and change the social order. As such, it can work to shape people's perceptions of the world. Mass society theory tends to emphasize the breakdown of the primary groups in society such as the family and neighborhood. The theory does not apply to all modern societies, but rather to the most fragmented and decentralized political economies. These societies are most vulnerable to becoming mass societies because they contain vacuums created by declining participation in religious organizations, unions, political parties, and voluntary associations.

In the absence of such communal associations, the mass media, which provides both communication and entertainment, steps in to fill the void (Kreiser, 2002).

3.2 Critique of Mass Society Theory

Mass society theory is wholly accepted by neither contemporary social scientists nor society at large. During the mid-twentieth century, social science's strongest critique of mass society theory came from the limited effects model. The limited effects model, developed by Paul Lazarsfeld (1901-1976), asserts that the mass media does not diminish but instead enhances democracy and society. The limited effects model was based on Lazarsfeld's and his colleagues' a study of the media's effect on voting patterns in the US electorate, which led Lazarsfeld to conclude that the media's effect on voting patterns was limited. Lazarsfeld also contributed to the field of media effect studies, a field devoted to measuring the behavioural effects of media on society. While Lazarsfeld, and media effect studies in general, acknowledge that the media does influence society, Lazarsfeld's research suggested it had a limited role in the formation of public opinion. The limited effects model shaped media studies through much of the twentieth century (Smith, 2001).

Ultimately, mass society may not be as destructive to selves and democracies as previously asserted by mass society theorists. The theory developed at a time of extreme social upheaval, and its critics have argue that it is, by and large, grounded in the desire of nineteenth century upper class aristocrats to retain their powers and rights. Additionally, the theory's claims about the media industry, mass society, pluralism, and bureaucracy are difficult, if not impossible, to document, and, in some cases, research contradicts them. Arguably, some studies have shown that Mass society theory underestimates people's ability to make decisions on their own. Further, the theory may underestimate the continued existence of anti-media influences in people's lives. In the final analysis, mass society theory may have limitations

for contemporary sociology since it does not resonate with current studies of the media and society (Hamilton, 2001).

3.3 Relevance of Mass Society Theory to Revolution and Society

Mass society theory is important for its explanation of why and how people become revolutionaries and the category of people who are likely to join. The theory explains the importance of running an inclusive society which carries everyone along and ensures that no one is isolated as isolation is the breeding ground for revolutionary groups. A group of isolated individual tend to come together and to go anti-social.

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

1. State five core tenets of mass society theory.
2. How is your understanding of society central to the mass society theory?

UNIT 2: RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORY

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Relative deprivation theory

3.1 Issues

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This unit introduces you to relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation theory is very popular in the area of deviance, the theory associates factors related to the activities of the political state as being responsible for deviant behavior. In other words, the theory looks at the inability of the actors to meet some particular needs as the ultimate cause of involvement in deviance; such inability is usually attributed to state failure.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

- ✓ The latent consequences of social dissatisfaction among the populace
- ✓ State the core assumptions of relative deprivation theory

3.0 Main content

3.1 Relative deprivation theory

The Sociologist, Samuel A. Stouffer (1900-1960), is credited with developing relative deprivation theory after World War II. Stouffer first wrote of relative deprivation theory in his study entitled "The American

Soldier" (1949) which is part of a four-volume series entitled "Studies in Social Psychology in World War II." The series and its component study was a compilation of the data collected during a five-year war-time project that was funded by Carnegie Corporation and the Social Science Research Council (Heck & Wech, 2003).

Relative deprivation theory refers to the idea that feelings of deprivation and discontent are related to a desired point of reference (i.e. reference groups). Feelings of relative deprivation arise when desires become legitimate expectations and those desires are blocked by society. Social satisfaction is the opposite of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is generally considered to be the central variable in the explanation of social movements and is used to explain the quest for social change that inspires social movements; social movements emerge from collective feelings of relative deprivation (Morrison, 1971).

Relative deprivation theory is applied to socio-political, economic, and organizational problems. For example, relative deprivation theory is used to analyze the organizational issues of pay satisfaction and sex-based pay inequities. Relative deprivation theory focuses on feelings and actions. For example, the theory encourages the exploration of an individual's feelings of deprivation that may result from comparing his or her situation with that of a referent person or group as well as the behavioural effects of deprivation feelings. Relative deprivation theory distinguishes between egoistic deprivation and fraternal deprivation. Egoistic deprivation refers to a single individual's feeling of comparative deprivation. Fraternal deprivation, also called group deprivation, refers to the discontent arising from the status of the entire group as compared to a referent group. Fraternal deprivation may strengthen a group's collective identity (Singer 1992).

Relative deprivation theory has influenced the development of numerous fields in the social sciences including psychology, economics, and sociology. For example, the theory of relative deprivation has

influenced psychological theory. In particular, relative deprivation theory is the foundation of multiple theories of social psychology including frustration-aggression theory, equity theory, social comparison theory, and reference group theory. The concept of relative deprivation and its measurement is used in the field of economics. Economics focuses on the measurement and quantification of relative deprivation using multiple summary indices of deprivation including the Gini coefficient, the maximum index, and the coefficient of variation (Chakravarty & Mukherjee, 1999). In the field of sociology, relative deprivation theory is used to explain the root causes of social movements and revolutions (Krahn & Harrison, 1992).

Sociologists use relative deprivation theory to explain the origins of social movements. Social movements refer to a deliberate voluntary effort to organize individuals who act in concert to achieve group influence and make or block changes. Social movements are power-oriented groups rather than participation-oriented movements. This distinction means that the group actions of social movements are not necessarily of primary benefit to individual members but instead serve the groups' larger goals. Coordinated group actions are undertaken to make changes in the larger socio-political context. Social movements tend to be most successful in open, democratic societies in which social mobility and social change are accepted concepts. Norm-oriented social movements are more common than value-oriented social movements.

Sociologists use relative deprivation theory to explain the origins of the Labour and Civil Rights Movements in the United States. The early American Civil Rights Movement, which occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s, grew to include a wide range of groups united by a belief in equality and equal access to resources. Civil rights activists framed their demands in the language of relative deprivation, democratic rights and Christian universalism. The narrative of the Civil Rights Movement highlights the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision, famous public protests, as well as the passage of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (Morrisson, 1971). The early Civil Rights Movement was born from African Americans' feelings of deprivation in relation to Caucasian segments of society. Access to a public education was a defining issue of the Civil Rights Movement. In the 1950s, racial segregation in public schools was pervasive throughout the United States. At this time, the schools educating African-American students were inferior, as judged by limited resources and teacher quality, to schools educating Caucasian students.

3.2 Issues with Relative deprivation theory

Critics debate and question numerous aspects of relative deprivation theory. Namely, critics question the link between feelings of deprivation and the rise of social movements and argue that studies of relative deprivation must recognize egoistic deprivation, fraternal deprivation, and self-referenced relative deprivation.

Since the development of relative deprivation theory in the 1950s, sociologists have used relative deprivation theory to explain the origin of social movements. The central idea of relative deprivation theory suggests that individuals or groups feel deprived when their current circumstances are negatively compared to the situation of others. Scholars have questioned the link between relative deprivation and social movements. Much of the evidence linking social movements to feelings of relative deprivation is indirect. While absolute deprivation clearly leads to feelings of discontent and ultimately efforts to effect social change, feelings of relative deprivation may or may not definitively lead to the creation of social movements and collective identity (Morrison, 1971).

The second serious criticism of relative deprivation theory concerns a lack of focus on the individual. Critics assert that sociologists using relative deprivation theory tend to examine individual and collective relative deprivation but ignore self-referenced relative deprivation. Relative deprivation theory distinguishes between egoistic deprivation and fraternal deprivation. Egoistic deprivation refers to a

single individual's feeling of comparative deprivation. Fraternal deprivation, also called group deprivation, refers to the discontent arising from the status of the entire group as compared to a referent group (Singer, 1992).

3.3 Relevance of Relative Deprivation Theory to Revolution and Society

The relative deprivation theory helps to understand the consequences of gaps between expectation and reality. The theory shows why a group which is expecting to benefit a certain amount of privilege and opportunities may revolt if the reality falls short of expectation. For instance, various revolutionary groups in the Niger Delta claimed to be deprived despite being the producer of oil. Refusal of the government to meet up with the expectation was a reason for destroying of oil facilities.

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

1. Attempt a discourse on the nexus between the state and relative deprivation in Nigeria.
2. Discuss extensively the core arguments of the relative deprivation theory.

UNIT 3 RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Resource mobilization theory

3.1.1 Application

3.1.2 Issues

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

While earlier theories discussed focus on the pull factors that attract individuals to social movements, the resource mobilization theory focus on the capacities of the actors. Also, the theory does not see protesters or members of social movement as have-nots; but rather, they are seen as blessed with resources to the extent that they can gather enough financial and human resources to begin operation. The lesson here is that the theory assumes that social movements are likely to be more rampant in societies where the necessary ingredient- resources- are available.

2.0 Objectives

In this unit, you will:

- ✓ Be exposed to the nexus of material conditions and formation of social movements
- ✓ Understand the assumptions of resource mobilization theory
- ✓ Understand the roles of reputable figures in the success of social movement

3.0 Main content

3.1 Resource mobilization theory

Social movement theory as a field of inquiry was founded in the late nineteenth century. Social movement theory proposes that social movements are, in many instances, created through the use and manipulation of frames. Social movements influence and control their members through tactics such as mobilizing fear, engaging in frame appropriation, social constructionism, and counter framing. Social movements are analyzed in two main ways: social constructionist perspective and frame analysis (Benford & Snow, 2000).

Resource mobilization theory developed in the 1960s in opposition to collective behaviour theory (as advocated by Durkheim and Blumer), which considered social movements to be irrational and the outgrowths of personal grievances and discontent (Fuchs, 2006). In the 1960s, social science studies of collective action experienced a paradigm shift. Abstract theories of collective action evolved from a focus on mass behaviour in the early twentieth century gave way in the 1960s and 1970s to resource mobilization, which was in turn supplanted by new social movement theory in the 1990s (Edelman, 2001). Resource mobilization theory developed in reaction to traditional socio-psychological analysis of social movements. In developing it, theorists largely abandoned the social-psychological approach that characterized other social movement theories like relative deprivation theory, mass society theory, and collective behaviour theory. These social-psychological theories all focus on identifying factors that attract individuals to social movements (e.g. personality traits, grievances, disillusionment, and ideology). They also tended to consider participation in social movements to be irrational and unconventional behaviour.

Resource mobilization theory is one means sociologists use to explain the characters and outcomes of social movements. Understanding the principles, applications, and strengths and weaknesses of resource mobilization theory is vital background for all those interested in the sociology of social movements.

The resource mobilization theory of social movements holds that a social movement arises from long-term changes in a group's organization, available resources, and opportunities for group action.

Resource mobilization theory has five main principles (Jenkins, 1983):

1. The actions of social movement's members and participants are rational.
2. A social movement's actions are strongly influenced by institutionalized power imbalances and conflicts of interest.
3. These power imbalances and conflicts of interest are sufficient to generate grievances that lead to the mobilization of social movement's intent on changing the distribution of resources and organization.
4. Centralized and formally structured social movements more effectively mobilize resources and achieve goals of change than decentralized and informal social movements.
5. The success of social movements is heavily influenced by group strategy and the political climate.

The resource mobilization theory of social movements examines structural factors, including a group's available resources and the position of group members in socio-political networks, to analyse the character and success of social movements. According to resource mobilization theory, participation in social movements is a rational behaviour, based on an individual's conclusions about the costs and benefits of participation, rather than one born of a psychological predisposition to marginality and discontent (Klandermans, 1984).

The resource mobilization theory of social movements is used to explain how social movements since the 1950s have evolved from classical social movements, which are characterized by local leadership, volunteer staff, collective actions, large membership, and resources donated from direct beneficiaries; to professional social movements, which are characterized by professional leadership, paid staff, informal membership, resources donated from outside the movement, and actions that represent the movement but do not require member participation. Resource mobilization theory of social movements explains how social movements mobilize resources, from inside and outside their movement, to reach goals (Jenkins, 1983).

Resource mobilization theory argues that social movements succeed through the effective mobilization of resources and the development of political opportunities for members. Social movements can mobilize both material and non-material resources. Material resources include money, organizations, manpower, technology, means of communication, and mass media, while non-material resources include legitimacy, loyalty, social relationships, networks, personal connections, public attention, authority, moral commitment, and solidarity (Fuchs, 2006).

Resource mobilization theory holds that social movement organizations with powerless or resource-poor beneficiaries require outside support and funding. There are two types of members belonging to social movement organizations: conscience constituents and beneficiary constituents. Social movements often seek out and receive resources from conscience constituents. Conscience constituents refer to individuals or groups outside of the social movement who have a moral alliance with the social movement's cause, goal, or mission. The social movement and the mass media are responsible for framing the social movement's message and character. Resource mobilization theorists have found that conscience constituents tend to contribute more when beneficiaries are framed, by the social

movement itself or mass media, to emphasize commonalities with conscience constituents (Paulsen & Glumm, 1995).

3.1 APPLICATION OF RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

When applying resource mobilization theory to a social movement, sociologists examine how the movement mobilizes resources and what political opportunities, if any, it creates or seeks out. Resource mobilization theorists look for evidence of material resource used, including the use of money, organizations, manpower, technology, means of communication, mass media; and non-material resource use, including legitimacy, loyalty, social relationships, networks, personal connections, public attention, authority, moral commitment, and solidarity. Resource mobilization theory argues that a group's level of affluence influences whether or not a social movement will form. Resource mobilization theory also recognizes the importance of charismatic leadership for motivating members to mobilize resources (Fuchs, 2006).

Resource mobilization theory argues that social movements arise from the long-term changes in a group's or organization's access to resources and opportunities for group action. For example, resource mobilization theorists seeking to explain the formation and success of the Civil Rights Movement would observe that the early Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s did not use external resources to mobilize and achieve gains, but instead relied on local community networks. By the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement had made such sufficient gains within institutional realms, such as education and labour rights, that it could successfully mobilize resources from external sources.

3.2 ISSUES WITH RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY

While resource mobilization theory dominated social movement theory from the 1960s to the 1980s, critics have begun to find fault with the theory's narrow political and economic focus. A number of

issues pose a major theoretical challenge to the dominance of resource mobilization theory. For example, resource mobilization theory focuses almost exclusively on centralized social movement organizations and ignores decentralized social movement communities. Resource mobilization theory discounts the importance of a collective identity in the actions, characters, and outcomes of social movements, and it does not explain individuals' motivation to join and participate in social movements. In effect, resource mobilization theory's focus on large-scale analyses can undervalue the micro-level processes of individual motivation, personality transformation, and cultural change.

Further, resource mobilization theory limits the category of social movements to institutional change movement's intent on transforming the social structure or distribution of power and resources in society, claiming that all social movements are an extension of institutional actions. As a result, it ignores personal change movements, such as cults, communes, and religious sects, which the theory considers to rely on social interactions and charismatic leadership for defining goals rather than institutional structures. By so narrowly defining social movements, though, the theory can limit its applications.

3.3 RELEVANCE OF RESOURCE MOBILIZATION THEORY TO REVOLUTION AND SOCIETY

Resource mobilization theory helps to understand the fact that revolution and revolutionary groups do not just occur in societies; they require enough resources and funders who are members of the political class or elites in society. This reminds us of one of the conditions of forecasted Marxist revolution: members of the ruling class must have conflicting interest, and a part of them will fund the already aggrieved populace to cause revolution.

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs)

1. Apply resource mobilization theory in explaining the emergence and activities of any two social movement organizations in Nigeria.
2. Of what relevance is resource mobilization theory to your understanding of social movements and revolutions?

UNIT 4 STRUCTURAL STRAIN THEORY

1.0 Introduction

2.0 Objectives

3.0 Main content

3.1 Structural-strain theory

3.2 Application

3.3 Issues

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1.0 Introduction

This unit presents a core and widely applied theory in the sociological arena. Structural-strain theory is another theory that emphasizes the contradictions among the political state, societal prescribed goals, means to prescribed goals and current acquirement. You may have thought that every society recommend good things such as nice apartment, good cars and other nice things of life. So what happens if the state does not make generally available the approved means to attain those good things of life? What happens if you attain the approved means but you cannot access the prescribed goals? You should find out in this unit.

2.0 Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will:

- ✓ Learn the contradictions of prescribed goals and approved means
- ✓ See the different styles that people resort to when they are unable to attain either the goals, or the means or both
- ✓ Grasp the tenets of structural-strain theory

3.0 Main content

3.1 Structural-functional theory

Structural-strain theory, developed by Robert Merton in the 1930s, was based on Emile Durkheim's theory of anomie. Anomie refers to the idea that the problems in society, such as crime and deviance, result from social deregulation. Building on Emile Durkheim's ideas about anomie, Robert Merton, Albert Cohen, Richard Cloward, Lloyd Ohlin, and Robert Agnew, each developed and contributed to structural-strain theory. Merton, Cohen, Cloward, Ohlin, and Agnew's strain theories assert that the frustration and stress caused by goal blockage increases the likelihood of deviance, criminality, and delinquency (Agnew, 1987).

The field of sociology quickly embraced structural-strain theory as a structural explanation for deviant behaviour. Strain came to be understood as the social-psychological mechanism that caused deviant behaviour from the effects of anomie. Structural-strain theory was the dominant explanation for deviance from the 1930s through the 1960s. But, starting in the 1970s, scholars began to question the empirical support and evidence for structural-strain theory. This skepticism within the field of sociology towards the structural-strain theory lasted into the 1970s and 1980s, but the theory experienced a rekindling of interest in the 1990s (Featherstone & Deflem, 2003).

Structural-strain theory refers to the idea that social structures put pressure on individuals to engage in deviant and criminal behaviour. Structural-strain theory is part of a larger body of ideas called strain theories. Structural-strain theory, and all strain theories in general, is a structural-functional explanation of deviance and criminality (Featherstone & Deflem, 2003). The concept of strain refers to the pressure on lower economic classes to engage in any means necessary to achieve society's goals of monetary

success. Sociologists use individual and group expectations, and a combination of income, education, and occupation, to measure strain.

There are two main types of strain in society that may promote deviance and crime: structural strain and individual strain.

1. Structural strain refers to the cycle of inadequate regulation at the societal level that negatively impacts how an individual perceives his or her needs, means, and opportunities.
2. Individual strain refers to the problems individuals experience as they work to meet needs and satisfy desires (O'Connor, 2007).

3.2 Application of Structural-strain theory

Sociologists use structural-strain theory to explain the causes of individual and group deviant behaviour and criminality. Sociologists and criminologists use strain theory to explain the activities and origins of gangs and subcultures. Gangs and subcultures are types of deviant social movements which refer to a deliberate voluntary organization of individuals who act in concert to make or block changes. Social movements, both mainstream and deviant types, tend to be power-oriented groups rather than participation-oriented movements. This distinction means that the group actions of social movements are not necessarily of primary benefit to individual members but instead serve the groups' larger goals. Coordinated group actions are undertaken to make changes in the larger socio-political context. Social movements tend to be most successful in open, democratic societies in which social mobility and social change are accepted concepts.

Structural-strain theory can be applied to predict and hypothesize about deviant group and individual behaviour. For example, sociologists and criminologists use general strain theory (GST) to understand the relationship between gender and crime. Sociological research demonstrates that the gender gap in

crime can be explained by gender differences in types of strain and reactions to strain. Higher rates of male crime are linked to the failure to achieve positively valued goals, the loss of positively valued stimuli, and the presentation of negative stimuli (Broidy & Agnew, 1997). Classic strain theory with its focus on poverty status, perceived blocked opportunity, and gang membership, can be used as predictors of adolescent violent behaviour (Vowell & May, 2000).

3.2 Issues with Structural-strain theory

Structural-strain theory, while widely used in sociology and criminology, is criticized for its vague and evolving nature. In particular, Robert Merton's work on strain theory has been criticized for being unfinished and changing. Merton never clearly distinguished between the concepts of strain and anomie. Instead, Merton allowed these concepts, which sociologists agree are distinct concepts, to be used interchangeably. In addition, Merton's definition of anomie has changed over time. He has referred to anomie as any kind of imbalance between cultural goals and institutionalized means and has also referred to anomie as a particular type of disjunction of social means and goals. Merton's strain has been celebrated as among the most significant of all major sociological theories and also criticized as being flawed. Merton's inconsistent use of related terms in his writings created confusion and mistrust. Ultimately, Merton's two distinct theories of anomie and strain remain inexorably connected in his social-structure and anomie paradigm (Featherstone & Deflem, 2003).

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercises

1. Of what relevance is the structural-strain theory to our understanding of the emergence of social movement organizations in Nigeria?
2. Attempt an interpretative understanding of the structural strain theory in relation to revolutions and social movements.

5.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENTS

- 1. Discuss how Merton's Structural-Strain theory can explain issues on conflict and revolutions.**
- 2. Discuss and critique the core arguments of the Mass Society theory.**
- 3. Show how the major assumptions of the Relative deprivation theory can lead to conflicts and revolutions in any given society.**
- 4. Identify and explain the five main principles of the Resource mobilization theory.**

READING LIST/REFERENCES

Abelson, E. S. (1995). Social Hierarchies -- Transforming Women's Work: New England Lives in the Industrial Revolution. *Contemporary Sociology*, 24(2), 188.

Agnew, R. (1987). On Testing Structural Strain Theories. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 23(4), 281-286.

Ahmad, I. (1997). Emergence of Sociology and its Relationship with Social Sciences. *Employment News*, 22(1), 1-3.

Benford, R. & Snow, D. (2000). Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 611-639. Retrieved April 22, 2008 from EBSCO Online Database

Academic

Search

Premier:

<http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=3780387&site=ehost-live>

Bhattacharjee, A. (2012). *Social Science Research: Principles, Methods, and Practices*. USF Tampa Bay Open Access Textbooks Collection. Book 3.

Broidy, L. & Agnew, R. (1997). Gender and Crime: A General Strain Theory Perspective. *Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency*, 34(3), 275-306

Chakravarty, S. & Mukherjee, D. (1999). Measures of Deprivation and their Meaning in Terms of Social Satisfaction. *Theory and Decision*, 47(1), 89-100. from EBSCO Online Database Academic Search Premier. <http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&AN=9603062262&site=ehost-live>

Edelman, M. (2001). Social Movements: Changing Paradigms and Forms of Politics. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 30(1), 285-317.

Featherstone, R. & Deflem, M. (2003). Anomie and Strain: Context and Consequences of Merton's Two Theories. *Sociological Inquiry*, 73(4), 471-489.

Fuchs, C. (2006). The Self-organization of Social Movements. *Systemic Practice and Action Research*, 19(1), 101-137.

Hamilton, R. (2001). *Mass Society, Pluralism, and Bureaucracy: Explication, Assessment, and Commentary*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001.

Heck, A. & Wech, B. (2003). Samuel A. Stouffer and The American Soldier: The Serendipitous Discovery of Relative Deprivation and its Contribution to Management Thought. *Journal of Applied Management and Entrepreneurship*, 8(4), 52-67.

Jenkins, C. (1983). Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 9(1), 527-554.

Klandermans, B. (1984). Mobilization and Participation: Social-psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory. *American Sociological Review*, 49(5), 583-600.

- Krahn, H. & Harrison, T. (1971). 'Self-referenced' Relative Deprivation and Economic Beliefs: The Effects of the Recession in Alberta. *Canadian Review of Sociology & Anthropology*, 29(2), 191-209.
- Kreisler, H. (2002). *Comparing Rich Democracies: Theory. Harold Wilensky Interview: Conversations with History*. Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley. Retrieved April 22, 2008 from: <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people2/Wilensky/wilenskycon5.html>
- Mohammed, K.T. (2015). The state and social movements in Nigeria: understanding the Boko Haram phenomenon. Proceedings of The IRES 19th International Conference, Dubai, UAE, 5th December 2015.
- Morrison, D. (1971). Some Notes Toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change. *The American Behavioural Scientist* (pre-1986), 14(5), 675.
- O'Connor, T. (2007). *Strain Theories of Crime. Megalinks in Criminal Justice*. Retrieved May 9, 2008, from: <http://www.apsu.edu/oconnort/crim/crimtheory11.htm>
- Orji, K.E. (2011). Revolutionary Pressures and Social Movements in Nigeria: The Niger Delta Experience. *African Research Review*, Vol 5(4): 449-461.
- Paulsen, R. & Glumm, K. (1995). Resource Mobilization and the Importance of Bridging Beneficiary and Conscience Constituencies. *National Journal of Sociology*, 9(2), 37-62.
- Singer, M. (1992). The Application of Relative Deprivation Theory to Justice Perception of Preferential Selection. *Current Psychology*, 11(2), 128-145.
- Smith, R. (2001). A Legacy of Lazarsfeld: Cumulative Social Research on Voting. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 13(3), 280-298.
- Stolley, K.S. (2005). *The Basics of Sociology*. London: Greenwood Press.

Vowell, P. & May, D. (2000). Another Look at Classic Strain Theory: Poverty Status, Perceived Blocked Opportunity, and Gang Membership as Predictors of Adolescent Violent Behaviour. *Sociological Inquiry*, 70(1), 42-60.