NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

COURSE CODE: INR361

CREDIT UNITS: 3

COURSE TITLE: RELIGION, ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

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Course Writer/Developer: Mike Omilusi PhD
                             Department of Political Science
                             Ekiti State University, Nigeria

Course Editor   Dr. Moshood Omotosho
                             International Relations Dept.
                             Obafemi Awolowo University,
                             Ile-Ife Osun State.

COURSE MATERIALS

i. Course guide
ii. Study units
iii. Textbooks
iv. Assignment file
v. Presentation schedule.

STUDY UNITS

INR 361 is a 3-Credit Unit 300 Level course for undergraduate International Studies students. There are four modules in this course, and each module is made up of three units. Thus, there are 16 study units in this course in the whole text. Some units may be longer and/or more in depth than others, depending on the scope of the course that is in focus. The four modules in the course are as follows:

Module 1 Religion
Unit 1 What is Religion?
Unit 2 Religion and International Politics
Unit 3 Religion and International Politics: Conflict, Order and Religious Fundamentalism
Unit 4 Impact of Religion on International Politics
Module 2 Ethnicity
Unit 1 Meaning of Ethnicity
Unit 2 Ethnicity and Nationalism
Unit 3 Ethnicity and Nation-Building
Unit 4 Ethnicity and International Politics
Module 3 Nationalism
Unit 1 Nationalism
Unit 2 Nationalism and International Politics I
Unit 3 Nationalism and International Politics II
Unit 4 Nationalism and International Politics III
Module 4 Globalization and International Politics
Unit 1 Meaning of Globalization
Unit 2 Globalization and International Politics
Unit 3 Globalization and the Nation-State
Unit 4 Impact of Globalisation on International Politics

Each module is preceded by a listing of the units contained in it, and contents, an introduction, a list of objectives and the main content in turn precedes each unit, including Self-Assessment

Exercises (SAEs). At the end of each unit, you will find one Tutor-Marked Assignment (TMA) which you are expected to work on and submit for marking.

TEXTBOOKS AND REFERENCES

At the end of each unit, you will find a list of relevant reference materials which you may yourself wish to consult as the need arises, even though I have made efforts to provide you with the most important information you need to pass this course. However, I would encourage you, as a third year student to cultivate the habit of consulting as many relevant materials as you are able to within the time available to you. In particular, be sure to consult whatever material you are advised to consult before attempting any exercise.

ASSESSMENT

Two types of assessment are involved in the course: the Self-Assessment Exercises (SAEs), and the Tutor-Marked Assessment (TMA) questions. Your answers to the SAEs are not meant to be submitted, but they are also important since they give you an opportunity to assess your own understanding of course content. Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA) on the other hand are to be carefully answered and kept in your assignment file for submission and marking. This will count for 30% of your total score in the course.

TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

At the end of every unit, you will find a Tutor-Marked Assignment which you should answer as instructed and put in your assignment file for submission. However, this Course Guide does not contain any Tutor-Marked Assignment question. The Tutor-Marked Assignment questions are provided from Unit 1 of Module 1 to Unit 4 of Module 4.

FINAL EXAMINATION AND GRADING

The final examination for INR 361 will take three hours and carry 70% of the total course grade. The examination questions will reflect the SAEs and TMAs that you have already worked on. I advise you to spend the time between your completion of the last unit and the examination revising the entire course. You will certainly find it helpful to also review both your SAEs and TMAs before the examination.

COURSE MARKING SCHEME

The following table sets out how the actual course marking is broken down.

ASSESSMENT	MARKS
Four assignments (the best four of all the assignments submitted for marking)	Four assignments, each marked out of 10%, but highest scoring three selected, thus totalling 30%

Final Examination	70% of overall course score
Total	**100% of course score**

COURSE OVERVIEW PRESENTATION SCHEME

Units	Title of Work	Week activity	Assignment (end-of-unit)
Course guide	**Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism in International Politics**		
Module 1	**Module 1 Religion**		
Unit 1	What is Religion?	Week 1	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Religion and International Politics	Week 2	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Religion and International Politics: Conflict, Order and Religious Fundamentalism	Week 3	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Impact of Religion on International Politics	Week 4	Assignment 1
Module 2	**Ethnicity**		
Unit 1	Meaning of Ethnicity	Week 5	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Ethnicity and Nationalism	Week 6	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Ethnicity and Nation-Building	Week 7	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Ethnicity and International Politics	Week 8	Assignment 1
Module 3	**Nationalism**		
Unit 1	Nationalism	Week 9	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Nationalism and International Politics I	Week 10	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Nationalism and International Politics II	Week 11	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Nationalism and International Politics III	Week 12	Assignment 1
Module 4	**Globalization and International Politics**		

Unit 1	Meaning of Globalization	Week 13	Assignment 1
Unit 2	Globalization and International Politics	Week 14	Assignment 1
Unit 3	Globalization and the Nation-State	Week 15	Assignment 1
Unit 4	Impact of Globalisation on International Politics	Week 16	Assignment 1

WHAT YOU WILL NEED FOR THIS COURSE

First, I think it will be of immense help to you if you try to review what you studied at 100 level in the course, *Introduction to International Studies*, to refresh your mind of what strategy is about. Second, you may need to purchase one or two texts recommended as important for your mastery of the course content. You need quality time in a study-friendly environment every week. If you are computer-literate (which ideally you should be), you should be prepared to visit recommended websites. You should also cultivate the habit of visiting reputable institutional or public libraries accessible to you.

FACILITATORS/TUTORS AND TUTORIALS

There are fifteen (15) hours of tutorials provided in support of the course. You will be notified of the dates and location of these tutorials, together with the name and phone number of your tutor as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group. Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, and keep a close watch on your progress. Be sure to send in your tutor-marked assignments promptly, and feel free to contact your tutor in case of any difficulty with your self-assessment exercise, tutor-marked assignment or the grading of an assignment. In any case, I advise you to attend the tutorials regularly and punctually. Always take a list of such prepared questions to the tutorials and participate actively in the discussions.

CONCLUSION

This is a complex and theory course but you will get the best out of it if you cultivate the habit of relating it to international politics during the pre-Cold War era, Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

SUMMARY

This Course Guide has been designed to furnish the information you need for a fruitful experience in the course. In the final analysis, how much you get from the course depends on how much you put into it in terms of time, effort and planning.

I wish you success in INR 361 and in the whole programme!

INTRODUCTION

Welcome to INR361 Religion, Ethnicity and Nationalism in International Politics. It is available for students in the undergraduate International Studies programme. The course provides an opportunity for students to acquire a detailed knowledge and critical understanding of the ways in which the related phenomena of religion, nationalism and ethnicity have been historically constructed in globally since the eighteenth century, and to be able to question their taken-for-granted status in the modern world. Students who have gone through this course would be able to apply different approaches to religion, nationalism and ethnicity in wide and diverse areas of conflict including the nature and development of warfare, geopolitics and historical context of deterrence. Students would also be expected to know the mainstream literature in religion, nationalism and ethnicity in international politics and their discussion, and be able to apply concepts of religion, nationalism and ethnicity to International Politics. This course guide provides you with the necessary information about the contents of the course and the materials you will need to be familiar with for a proper understanding of the subject matter. It is designed to help you to get the best of the course by enabling you to think productively about the principles underlying the issues you study and the projects you execute in the course of your study and thereafter. It also provides some guidance on the way to approach your tutor-marked assignments (TMAs). You will of course receive on-the-spot guidance from your tutorial classes, which you are advised to approach with all seriousness. Overall, this module will fill an important niche in the study of International Politics as a sub-field of International Studies, which has been missing from the pathway of Politics and International Politics programmes offered in most departments.

INR361

MODULE 1 RELIGION

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this module is to enable you gain in-depth knowledge on issues in Religion and International Politics. The module will offer students a unique interdisciplinary program in which to explore the intersection of these two fields. Students develop a practical understanding of major religious actors, in-depth knowledge of a specific religious tradition, and a theoretical grasp of the relevance of religious ideas and actors to contemporary International Politics. This module ensures that students gain general foundational knowledge of Religion, International Politics and methodological training. Through this module, students gain specialized knowledge about specific areas of interest in religion and International Politics.

Subsequently, you will find the comprehensive explanations on module 1 under the following four units:

Unit 1 What is Religion?
Unit 2 Religion and International Politics
Unit 3 Religion and International Politics: Conflict, Order and Religious Fundamentalism
Unit 4 Impact of Religion on International Politics

UNIT 1   WHAT IS RELIGION?

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

The main thrust of the unit is to identify various efforts made by scholars, managers and thinkers in defining the concept of "religion". The theoretical problem of arriving at a universally accepted definition is also explored. This unit forms the bedrocks and modules are hinged on it therefore it demands that you give it the attention it deserves.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- understand the social construction of "religion"
- define the concept of religion, either in your own words or by integrating extant definitions, which have been made from various disciplinary perspectives
- state generally observable attributes of all the definitions
- explain the limit upon which other subsequent unions from a consensus definition of the concept of "religion".

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   What is Religion?

The English word "*religion*" is derived from the Middle English "*religioun*" which came from the Old French "*religion*." It may have been originally derived from the Latin word "*religo*" which means "*good faith*," "*ritual*," and other similar meanings. Or it may have come from the Latin "*religâre*" which means "*to tie fast*," or "bind together". Defining the word "*religion*" is fraught with difficulty and many attempts have been made. Definitions of religion are often vague but they tend to share a number of resemblances. In Durkheim's definition, 'all religions are comparable, all species of the same genus, they all share certain essential components

(Durkheim, 2001). The main resemblances are: the belief in an invisible supernatural being who has the ability to affect life in the material world; a strategy of communication between humans and the supernatural being or beings; some form of transcendent reality, e.g. heaven and hell; a distinction between the profane and the sacred; a worldview that interprets life on Earth and articulates the believer's role(s) within it; and a community of adherents with similar beliefs and practices. Viewed from these perspectives, Smith and Hackett (2012) define religion as 'a belief in the existence of an invisible world, distinct but not separate from the visible one that is home to spiritual beings with effective powers over the physical world'. According to Karl Max, "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature... a protest against real suffering... it is the opium of the people... the illusory sun which revolves around man for as long as he does not evolve around himself." Durkheim (2001), "Religion usually has to do with man's relationship to the unseen world, to the world of spirits, demons, and gods. A second element common to all religions is the term salvation. All religions seek to help man find meaning in a universe which all too often appears to be hostile to his interests. The word salvation means, basically, health. It means one is saved from disaster, fear, hunger, and a meaningless life. It means one is saved for hope, love, security, and the fulfillment of purpose." Comaroff, (2003) "The religious is any activity pursued on behalf of an ideal end against obstacles and in spite of threats of personal loss because of its general and enduring value." Religion is the set of beliefs, feelings, dogmas and practices that define the relations between human being and sacred or divinity. A given religion is defined by specific elements of a community of believers: dogmas, sacred books, rites, worship, sacrament, moral prescription, interdicts, organization. The majority of religions have developed starting from a revelation based on the exemplary history of a nation, of a prophet or a wise man who taught an ideal of life.

A religion may be defined with its three great characteristics:

- ➢ Beliefs and religious practices;
- ➢ The religious feeling i.e. faith;
- ➢ Unity in a community of those who share the same faith: the Church. It is what differentiates religion from magic.

The existing religions show the universal character of this phenomenon and a very large variety in the ritual doctrines and practices. One generally distinguishes the religions called primitive or animists, the Oriental religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Shintoism, Confucianism, Taoism etc) and the religions monotheists derived from the Bible (Judaism, Christianity, Islam). Christianity has itself given birth to several religions or Christian Churches (Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant, Evangelic etc).

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Identify other definitions of "religion" not listed above that can enhance your understanding of this course.

3.2 Religion and Politics
Politics (from Greek: politikos, definition "of, for, or relating to citizens") is the process of making decisions applying to all members of each group. More narrowly, it refers to achieving

and exercising positions of governance — organized control over a human community, particularly a state. Furthermore, politics is the study or practice of the distribution of power and resources within a given community (a usually hierarchically organized population) as well as the interrelationship(s) between communities. Religion and politics as a field covers a broad range of issues and concerns of interest to the student of international politics as a field: political theology, institutional formation and change, state power and authority, legitimacy and resistance, nationalism, as well as the shifting and productive boundaries between the sacred, profane, secular and religious. If we are to talk seriously about something, we ought to be able to say what it is. This is a commonsense principle of rational speech that is unfortunately is often regarded as an unduly burdensome requirement when it comes to religion. Scholars in the field of Politics exude confidence that we can talk about religion sensibly, but the issue of definition tends to be dismissed rather quickly, either by laying hold of one of the standard substantivist definitions that lie readily to hand, or by appealing to some version of "We all know it when we see it." Those scholars do not generally doubt that religion is out there; we just have trouble defining it. Like many large concepts—"culture" or "politics" perhaps—the edges are fuzzy, but we share a common vision of the core concept of "religion" such that we can move fairly quickly past questions of definition and start talking about the way that religion acts in the world. One problem with this breezy dismissal of the difficulty of defining religion is that it masks a significant diversity in the way that scholars address religion. Let us begin by laying out a typology of approaches that can be found in international politics literature.

3.2.1   Religion as sui generis

In this type of approach, religion is regarded as a *sui generis* impulse in human cultures that is essentially it is distinct from other types of human endeavor—commonly labeled "secular"—such as politics, economy, art, etc. Some cultures at some times are said to "mix" politics and religion in various ways such that in practice it can be difficult to separate the two. But religion is nevertheless essentially distinct from these other types of endeavor. It is also assumed in this approach that religion is a transhistorical and transcultural phenomenon, that is, it can be found in all times and places. Precolonial African ancestral worship and 21st century Scientology in California are both examples of religion. There are two variations in international politics of the idea of religion as *sui generis*.

3.2.2   Religion as not *sui generis*

There are those who do not believe that religion is a *sui generis* aspect of human life, essentially distinct from secular pursuits like politics, economy, art, etc. There are two variations of this approach as well. Some scholars regard religion as reducible to other more basic factors. A follower of Marx might regard religion as superstructural, a secondary effect of more basic economic causes. A follower of Durkheim might regard religion as the expression of more basic social dynamics of a given group. Scholars of this type may regard religion as found in all times and places, but as essentially illusory; that is, it never refers to something independent of more basic economic, social, or psychological processes.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
The concept of "religion and politics" remains a conceptual bag with which a little manipulation can be made to accommodate varieties of facts. Discuss.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Religion and politics present us with a sensitive and perceptive understanding of some of the processes by which human beings create, maintain and negotiate their identities. Religion is a phenomenon that refuses to lie down and rest in the 'civilised' world. The persistence of belief in God, the popularity of the so-called 'New Age' religions, the publicity accorded to many fundamentalist and evangelical groups, and the continued significance of mainstream churches as moral authorities are all testimony to the fact that religion is very much alive in the global world. Yet religion is like politics in that it too defies rational explanation. What is intrinsic to both of these phenomena is their appeal to the emotional rather than the rational side of our nature. At an international level, there has been a proliferation of high profile and often-violent expressions of international politics and religious identity.

5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, effort has been made to identify the various definitions that attempt an explanation of what "religion" entails. You have learned that there are various definitions to the concept as they are experts and commentators. Despite the multi-disciplinary nature of the concept, an interesting issue is that all the definitions point to the conscious efforts of global world in attaining predetermined goals.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you explain why it is nearly impossible to arrive at a consensus definition of religion.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Comaroff, J. (2003). '*Critical reflections on religion in conflict and peacebuilding in Africa'*, Unpublished paper presented in Jinja, Uganda
Durkheim, E. (2001). '*The elementary forms of religious life'*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
Haynes, J. (2001). Transnational religious actors and international politics', *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 143-158
Huntington, S. P. (1996). '*The clash of civilisations and remaking the world order'*, New York, NY: Simon & Schuster
Smith, H. J. (2012) '*Religious dimensions of conflict and peace in neoliberal Africa: An introduction'*, in James H Smith and Rosalind I J Hackett (eds), Displacing the state: religion and conflict in neoliberal Africa, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press

UNIT 2   RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit introduces students to the complex set of questions surrounding religion in International Politics. The unit begins by exploring contending social science understandings of religion at the turn of the 21th century. This therefore, is an attempt to display the failed assumptions of Western social scientists on the role of religion in International Politics. The discussion then turns to the relation between religion and international politics – with a focus on the question of Islamic revival and globalization. It then explores the relation between religion and violence in the process of modern state formation and by asking whether there is a genuine connection between religion and violence.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- understand the key debates surrounding the question of religion in international politics, from the 'clash of civilisations' to the 'power of secular formations'.
- summarise and critically evaluate the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of religion in international politics
- understand the role of religion and secularity in the processes of state formation, construction of security and production of political violence
- assess the role that religion plays in contemporary practices of emancipation and resistance
- identify key ethical and normative questions raised by religion in the public sphere and apply theoretical perspectives to case studies.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT
3.1   Religion and International Politics

International politics is the way in which sovereign states interact with each other. International politics should not be confused with global politics, which incorporates the roles of global interest groups and corporations in addition to governments. Religion is a domain of its own whereby International Politics is a domain in Social Science. The argument is that religion although sometimes rejected or denied by western social scientists, remains a force in our modern international political scenario. This is contrary to the old belief that religions as a primordial factor has no role in the international political sphere and that is what it called the failed assumptions. Those who have rejected the influence of religion, mainly western political thinkers, focused on western nations, where the influence of religion is not that obvious, and for that they wrongly assumed that the influence of religion on the eastern world will disappear as it picks up with the process of modernization or globalization. It seems however, modernity failed to lead to the demise of religion, or replace it; instead, it led to its resurgence not only in the East but also in the West, particularly in the Muslim World. The argument revolves around the notion that the more religion is ignored, undermined or misplaced in the study of International Politics the lesser we are nearing a solution to the political problems of the world. It further argues that International Politics as an essential field of study in International Studies, is a direct product of religious wars and its subsequent repercussions. Although history is rich in evidences that support the aforementioned contention, when evaluating the role of religion in International Politics, one finds no theory of International Politics that addresses religion and on those uncommon occasion that has been raised it is to the negative.

Kova, (2000) argues that: "Religion tends to be characterized as fundamentalist, extreme, radical or military". Other Western scholars also complain that religion is being treated as a sub-class or an outsider in International Politics: "The rare cases where International Politics literature deals with religion, it is presented as a secondary aspect of the topic" (Fox et al., 2004). In the theories and literature of international politics is a forgotten subject: "Western social scientists did not give religion much weight in their theories and in fact often predicted its demise as a significant social and political force…this is a tendency strongly rooted within the field of international politics than in the rest of the social science" (Fox et al., 2004). However, religion must be accepted and studied within international politics. Those who subscribe to this theory list various reasons on why religion was not taken serious in the study of international politics. First, social science has its origin in the rejection of religion and international politics evolved from this premise adopted by the western social scientists. Second, international politics is western centric. Third, the study of international politics is heavily influenced by behavioralism school of thought and the use of qualitative methodology. (Fox et al., 2004). These three reasons point to the fact that western research on social sciences is not compatible with religion as it adopts approaches that are not in temperament with religion. Simply put, the western modern thought could not understand religion as it is secular and it could not measure religion as it is quantitative. It has been argued by contemporary western social scientists that most of the western social scientists of the last three centuries including Durkheim, Marks, Freud, Comte, Nietzsche and Weber were of the opinion that enlightenment would overtake and subsequently replace religion (Appleby, 1994).

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Why - and to what extent - have Social Sciences (including International Politics) found themselves largely unprepared to deal with this new development?

3.2   Religion and Globalization

In today's world, religion and spiritually are globally taking different directions across countries and regions. Authorities on the subject are often of the opinion that the significance for the future of religion and its social impact appear strikingly different when seen from the global rather than a country by country or regional standpoint. This is very much true that religion today may not be well understood in isolation instead it should be seen in a worldwide context or in a scale of global society. The point here is that religious problems faced by Europe or South America may have originated from North Africa for instance, or any other place in the world, and that is exactly the meeting point of religion and international politics. As a matter of fact, religion in our present times is associated with globalization. Major religions in the world depict international outlook they see themselves as international, global and influential actor in international society. Indeed the Qur'an advocates Islam as a universal religion; a message which communicates the meaning that Islam is for mankind at large and humanity in its entirety, regardless of time and place. Similar views are held by other universal religions including Christianity. Another aspect of religion is that it is an institution that had existed from the emergence of the first man and it seeks to advance and expand without borders. On balance, it is a physical expansion of the geographical domain of the universe. In the history of the universe and mankind, the power of religion has influenced international political actors and players as well as economic factors of the world. Mahjabeen Khaled (2007) in an article entitled 'Globalization and Religion' presented in a Conference on Globalization, Conflict & the Experience of Localities, narrates the views quoted below:

> globalization evolved since Alexander the Great in 325 B.C., when Chandragupta Maurya becomes a Buddhist and combines the expansive powers of a world religion, trade economy, and imperial armies for the first time. Alexander the Great sues for peace with Chandragupta in 325 B.C. at Gerosia, marking the eastward link among overland routes between the Mediterranean, Persia, India and central Asia. Following this, in the first century, the expansion of Buddhism in Asia makes its first appearance in China and consolidates cultural links across the Eurasian Steppe into India, thus, establishing the foundations of the Silk Route. From the period of 650-850 A.D", (Khaled, 2007)

Religion also influences civilizations and changes the natural discourse of destiny. Islam has successfully done that to the Arabic peninsular and still incessant to influence nations across the world. Religion therefore has been a carrier of globalizing tendencies in the world.

> There was a vast expansion of Islam from the Western Mediterranean to India; thus, this not only saw to the adoption of the religion of Islam, but all the cultural, social, and educational aspects brought about by the Islamic Civilization. An example of this would be the Ottoman Empire in 1300 AD, which spanned from Europe, North

Africa, and the Middle East; this created the great imperial arch of integration that spawned a huge expansion of trade with Europe, (Khaled, 2007).

Likewise, the history of Christianity can be understood in parts as early effort to create global network of believers. Today, most popular religions are global in nature and they create new boundaries, breaking ancient frontiers of nations, culture and language. Indeed religion changes the ethnic origin of societies. Egyptians and some other Muslim nations are today referred as 'Arabs' but we know in reality, like other arabized societies Egyptians obtained their Arabic identity through the process of Islamization. Lehmann (2003) argues that religion as the globalizing force seems to change the location of the boundaries in two ways. The first one which he calls cosmopolitan brings old practices to new groups in new settings and the other variant is the 'global' which extends and intensifies transnational links among groups similar in their practices, and creates networks and sometimes even tightly-knited communities of people straddling vast distances and also straddling non-religious boundaries of language, ethnicity and race, such as Pentecostals, the pietism Muslim revival movement Tablighi Jama'at and ultra-Orthodox Jewish sects and cultures.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Religion as the globalizing force seems to change the location of the boundaries in International Politics. Discuss.

3.3   International Conflicts Emanate from Religious Grounds

In the past, state used to be the only actor in International Politics, over the period of time or in the passage of history, however this position has changed. Actors are now multifaceted as more different types of actors are gaining prominence. Religion is one of these actors that may overtake state to influence the future directions of international politics. As a matter of fact, the three decades of war in Northern Ireland was religious in nature. The Roman Catholics Nationalist Community was seeking union with Ireland whereby the Protestant Unionist Community was fighting to remain part of United Kingdom. The Ogaden revolt against the Ethiopian regime for decades is largely conceded based on religion; the one hundred percent Muslim Ogaden region intends to secede from Christian ruled Ethiopia. Cyprus conflict falls under the same category. This island is partitioned mainly because of the conflict between ethnic Greek Christians and the ethnic Turks Muslims. Back in Africa, the Cote d'lvoire conflict is also relevant. After the year 2000 election, the government security was said to have targeted Muslim civilians openly and explicitly on the ground of their religious beliefs. In this tiny nation, the overwhelmingly majority of the victims came from the largely Muslim dominant north of the country. In East Timor, Muslim Indonesian military systematically targeted Christian independency leaders after the former annexed to East Timor. As a result, Christian leaders as well as civilians were exterminated. It is well known how the Serbian Orthodox Christians and Roman Catholics carefully planned the program of genocide and religious cleansing against the Bosnian Muslims. India sporadically has to manage various conflicts resulting from the Hindus-Muslims or Christians and Sikhs minorities on religious grounds. In the province of Orissa the Hindu extremists occasionally attack the Christian minority civilians. In the state of Kashmir, the conflict is mainly due to the fact that Pakistan, a predominantly Muslim nation and India, mostly

Hindu, are involved on religious grounds. In Kosovo, the Serbian Orthodox Christians are up against the ethnic Albanian Muslims, also in Macedonia ethnic Albanians are targeted for their belief. International conflicts based on religion are also evident in the Philippines, Russia, Thailand and Sudan.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Critically examine how religion can influence the future directions of International Politics.

3.4   The Islamic Revival and International Politics

The current events in International Politics and the increasing role of religion in International Politics are both directly related to the revival of Islam among Muslims. From the 1950s to the present throughout and across the Muslim world; from Syria, Somalia and Sudan, to Egypt, Bosnia and Nigeria, to Jordan, Iran and Turkey, to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya, to Iraq and Saudi Arabia Islam as one of the major religions of the world influences International Politics. However, there is no agreement among scholars on the definition and factors that caused Islamic revival or resurgence. Some blame colonialism, others lament on the attitude of the secular governments ruling Muslim societies. Others argue that Muslims are not adequately committed to Islam, while others yet blame Israel and American foreign policy toward Muslims (Ayoob, 2008). Nonetheless attempt should be made to define it. Contemporary scholars of Islamic studies, or at least those who write in English among them, such as Mohammad Ayoob, John Esposito, Hillal Dessouki have contributed to the idea of giving meaning to the phenomenon.

According to Dessouki (1982) Islamic revival is a political activity in the name of Islam. Meanwhile Ayoob (2008), talks of the idea of regaining power and position by Islamists. In effect, the rest of the definitions revolve around these two definitions. It has been argued that the Islamic revival or resurgence or reawakening embodies a broader meaning than that mentioned above or that of fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism. It is a call to the return of Islamic values and its ethical political systems. It is a call upon all Muslims to re-evaluate themselves, their institutions, their educational system, political and social systems; it is a renewal of religious thoughts, cultural purification, Islamization of attitudes and return to pure Islamic teachings. It is a call of reorientation to understand the Qur'an so that Muslims could climb the hierarchy of success among nations in the world, compete in knowledge and command respect. It is a search for the true power that Muslims had lost, it is a search for the original position of the Muslims in this world (*Khaira ummatin*), it is an attempt to correct and shape a perfect worldview (*Tasawur Islami*), it is a comprehensive agenda. The core of these submissions emanates from the consensus of the international politics theorists. Samuel Huntington's clash of civilizations thesis which holds the view that religion has emerged as one of the primary causes of conflict in international politics in 1993.

Huntington (1996) predicted the likelihood of religion replacing the nation-state as the primary source of international conflicts. Here it may relate to his clash thesis. Huntington's theoretical framework of his clash thesis is based on two seismic, as he calls it, indicators or fault-lines between and among various civilizations; among them Islam. It was only after 11/9 that the

values of Huntington's predictive thesis were somehow appreciated and critics who earlier thought the thesis was full of exaggerations had come to terms with the essentials of the thesis. Huntington divided the world into eight major civilizations and the Islamic civilization as one of these civilizations was solely defined on the basis of religion. Huntington also grouped all Muslims under that civilization regardless of their background, localization, territorial, physical traits or nationality. In Huntington's view, three types of conflict will take place; first, state conflict; second, international fault-lines conflict; and third, domestic fault-lines conflicts (Huntington, 1996). The concern is that Huntington's argument that Muslim immigrants in many western countries will cause political tensions since the Islamic civilization, according to him, is the most violent of all civilizations with its bloody borders (Huntington, 1996). This sweeping statement is so persuasive for many in Europe or rather in the west. Nonetheless religions are not bloody, man is and Huntington erred on this assumption. But he was right on the assumption that religion, be it Islam or others, will play a role in International Politics.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
How can we explain the 'return' (?) of religious and civilizational discourses at the centre stage of world politics?

4.0   CONCLUSION

Both religion and International Politics are associated with peace, war, values, human nature and violence. Throughout the history of humanity, it seems violence and war remained part of human conditions. Although the text of the major religious scriptures advocates peace, in reality, we are living in a world that peace is seen respite. War, terrorism and violence - aberrant conditions- now dominate our world. The role of religion is obvious in these activities. Having highlighted the above, one must also add that we are at pivotal moment in the history of the relationship between religion and international politics. On the one hand, Muslim governments will remain under political duress from the West to eliminate religion in Muslim public life, education and politics and on the other hand, radical Muslim groups will persistently play the religious card to influence public opinion in both Western and Islamic worlds. However this approach will only consign religion on a popular stage in the international politics.

5.0   SUMMARY

After decades of overwhelming domination of certain conventional actors in International Politics, religion is now a contending actor therein. In fact, religion is increasingly becoming essential element in domestic affairs of the state level as well as in the international affairs of contemporary global politics.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summarize and critically evaluate how religion and International Politics are associated with peace, war, values, human nature and violence.

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UNIT 3   RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: CONFLICT, ORDER AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

This introductory unit shall examine how mainstream international politics theories explain religion and how this treatment is increasingly being challenged by the realities of religious resurgence. Finally, the paper concludes with a statement that international politics mainstream theories need to shake off their conservative baggage and accommodate new developments in the international political system, in order to be relevant in the 21st century knowledge production.

2. 0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine how mainstream International Politics theories explain religion
- examine how challenges to international order emanating from various entities, including 'Islamic extremists' and, more generally, those 'excluded' from the benefits of globalisation
- examine the contribution of religious traditions and political theologies to understandings of global order,
- examine the concept of 'religious fundamentalism' and assess its role in International Politics

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Theorising about Religion in International Politics

The International Politics mainstream is somewhat more complex and contested. It is partly as a consequence, rather more difficult to specify (Hay, 2002). It is necessary at this juncture to focus on the core of the mainstream, namely realism/neorealism, liberal internationalism and neo-Marxism.

3.1.1   Realism/Neo-realism

Realism/neo-realism is the oldest and most frequently adopted theory of International Politics (Donnelly, 2005). This is due in part to the history of the discipline, which almost exclusively focus on the state and the character of the international system. According to Gilpin (1986) human selfishness (egoism) and the absence of international government impose limitations on the international system, which require primacy in all political life of power and security. Realism focuses mainly on the struggle for power, security and survival among states as the primary actors in an anarchic world. Indeed, "the struggle for power is universal in time and space and is an undeniable fact of experience" for both domestic and International Politics (Morgenthau 1948). The lack of a centralised authority at the international level to bring states to a reasonable control underlines the centrality of anarchy and the general pattern of mistrust that characterise state behaviour.

Mearsheimer (2007) clarifies:

> In an anarchic system, where there is no ultimate arbiter, states that want to survive have little choice but to assume the worst about the intentions of other states and compete for power with them. This is the tragedy of great power politics. This scenario is encapsulated in the notorious concept of "security dilemma.

This intensifies balance of power politics and the subordination of all other issues to the security imperative.

Haynes (2004) buttresses this point:

> this is because the state is always the most important factor in international politics, and consequently any other form of international actor is, by definition subservient to the state …the structure of the international system shapes the character of the political order.

The international structure emerges from the interaction of states and thus constrains them from taking certain actions while propelling them towards others (Waltz, 1991). Thus International Politics is narrowed to issues of power politics and religion does not equate with the calculus of power. States remain the main focus because they are rational actors seeking to maximise gains in relation to each other, employing reasonable means including cooperation when necessary to realise their specific goals defined in the context of national interests. Realist/neorealist treatment

of religion is in tandem with the rationalist assumption of objectivity and observability in social enquiry.

Religion is seen as identity or part of culture lacking material or perceptible characteristics, as such it does not have implications on the security calculation of the state, nor constitute a regular pattern of human behavior that can be explained. Realists are more impressed by the repeated occurrence of certain patterns across time than by the undeniable historical and cultural diversity of actors and interactions in International Politics (Donnelly, 2005). As a form of knowledge, religion may be truthful but not useful in explaining the regularity in the pattern of state actions. Realist treatment of religion is however simply naïve and in a certain way unscientific. It fails to acknowledge the effects religious identity and values have in the construction of state policies. Its assumption of a monolithic state with a common national interest negates the reality of 'a multifarious body of primarily bureaucratic organisations and institutions' (Haynes, 2004).

The state is a body constantly factionalised and pulled in different directions by groups within and outside its territory. With reference to America, Brian Schmidt (2008) argues that in the formation of state policies regarding Israel and her neighbours, non-governmental groups within the U.S society play significant role in shaping foreign policy. Mearsheimer and Walt (2006) corroborate this view in what is regarded in some quarters as a controversial piece: Pro-Israel forces dominate in U.S think-tank which play an important role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy…pressure from Israel and the lobby was not the only factor behind the U.S decision to attack Iraq in March 2003, but it was a critical element. Consequently, states can no longer be conceptualised as unified actors but are themselves multi-centric and subject to a variety of competing domestic and international pressures (Hay, 2002).

Similarly, realism has also proved limited in explaining the profound changes taking place in the international political system that impact seriously on the territoriality/sovereignty of states, changes that emanate in some part from religious actors and organisations. The Roman Catholic Church's role in the anti-Communist revolution and democratisation in most of the developing world as perceived by Huntington's (1991) in his treatise "The third wave," has had far-reaching implications on the global system. Similarly, in some Muslim states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran to mention but a few, religion constitutes an important and critical element in the formation of foreign policy. With specific reference to Iran, Sarioghalam (2001) argues that,

> Iran's foreign policy is shaped, not mainly by international forces but a series of intense post-revolutionary debates inside Iran regarding religion, ideology and the necessity of engagement with the West and specifically the United States.

Tehran year 2001 also lends support to various Islamic radical organisations across the world as a way of challenging Western secular philosophy as well as spreading and preserving the Islamic doctrine. Also, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 2001 in U.S, 2004 in Madrid, 2005 in London, etc masterminded by the al Qaeda terrorist network have changed the whole character of international politics in ways unimaginable before now. American response was to change its military doctrine from that of Cold War deterrence to Bush's doctrine of a unilateral, preemptive war on terror, waged against individual acts of violence and linked to states wherever possible.

In fact, many observers think that the entire system of states has been compromised and may be in the process of being superseded and therefore require explanations from realists.

3.1.2 Liberal Internationalism and Religion

Liberal internationalism derives much of its assumptions from liberalism' a Western Enlightenment philosophy that champions limited government, scientific rationalism, individual freedom from arbitrary state power, persecution and superstition (Donnelly, 2005). Liberal internationalism is premised on the belief that political activities should be framed in terms of universal human condition rather than in relation to the particularities of any given nation (Stean and Pettiford, 2005). It points to the growing importance of multinational corporations (MNCs), international non-governmental organisations (INGOs), transnational bodies, etc., as evidence that states are no longer the only significant actors in international politics. According to Haynes (2004), the liberal internationalist paradigm begins from the premise that the state is invariably not the primary actor in international politics. The recent growth and expansion of transnational relations underscores the significance of some kind of cross-border, nonstate actors. Horrified by the brutality of war, the theory sought to build an institutional architecture of international mediation and mutual cooperation that might serve to guarantee perpetual peace (Hay 2002). It highlights the advantages of non-governmental and transnational relations between countries which encourage cooperation and solidarity across wide range of issues affecting humanity. Complex interdependence of nations (Keohane and Nye 1977; Keohane and Martin 1995) has become inevitable given the complex nature of both the contemporary globalised system and the massive problems associated with it (e.g. poverty, terrorism, global warming, proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), refugee/displaced people, etc).

It further assumes that territoriality and sovereignty of the nation-state have become anachronistic and no longer of any analytical value in explaining the character of the 'New World Order', hence the so called International Institutions to mention a few, have been set-up to address specific issues of international character. The theory while acknowledging religious actors as one of the non-state transnational actors, insists that religion has limited influence on global outcomes. Religious bodies are not treated as serious contenders in international politics, but as private organisations engaged in identity issues and concerns that have very inconsequential impact on global outcomes. The reason for this argument is not difficult to discern. It derives more from the rationalist ontology of the theory itself and its commitment to the idea of secularism- separation of religion from the state. Interestingly, despite its pretension to the contrary, liberal internationalism still takes the nation-state as its reference point and to that extent retains traces of nationalism and statism in its analysis of international politics. This almost automatically magnifies the idea of states as interest maximising rational-actors. Liberal internationalists like realists/neo-realists are at heart, rationalists, committed to a notion of states as rational actors carefully weighing up the respective merits and demerits of various courses of action in an attempt to maximise their utility (Hay, 2002). Religion is therefore considered an idiosyncratic exercise which feeds on man's irrational impulse with limited material implications for the conduct of global relations. This view is however limited in explaining the network of relations and influences in international politics. Its rationalist content tends as Hay (2002) puts it

to concentrate too heavily on political inputs in explaining outcomes, ignoring the key mediatory role of political institutions.

Religious actors in today's world are pointedly more politically active and are engaged in activities that have transformatory effects on the conduct of state, its created bodies and its deployment of power. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) with large Muslim membership does have influence in the shaping of policies by states and transnational organisations involved in the Middle East politics (Haynes 2007). Also, since the early 1980s according to Weinberg et al (2002) most, but not all terrorist attacks have been by religious terrorist groups. And as Fox (2006) noted, many of these groups act internationally and include members from multiple states and the notable attacks like those of 9/11 2001 in the U.S. and the attack of March 11, 2004 in Madrid have considerable impact on the foreign policy of a number of states. Here, "radical religious ideologies have become vehicles for a variety of rebellions against authority that are linked with myriad of social, cultural and political grievances and challenge the Western established global order" (Juergensmeyer, 2005).

At another level, the Roman Catholic Church and the Organisation of Islamic Conference are religious organisations with transnational outlook and interests influencing global outcomes through the wielding of 'soft power," namely ideational power (Haynes, 2007, Attina, 1989). In this sense, in the last two decades beginning from the 1990s, religious actors from different faiths have become involved in both domestic and international attempts to resolve conflicts and build peace (Bouta et al., 2005). Summarily, liberal internationalism's predisposition to routine and convention leads it more towards descriptive analysis of realities rather than explanatory interpretation, which unravels causal relationships in social investigation. In the contemporary world characterised by "The Clash of Civilisations" (Huntington, 1993), religious ideas are veritable images in institutional decision-making processes that cannot be ignored. And liberal internationalism has failed to incorporate this reality in its explanation of international politics. This weakens its analytical potency and vitiates its conclusions.

3.1.3 Neo-Marxism and Religion

Neo-Marxist theory of international relations draws its roots from the timeless writings of Karl Marx and his later disciples, especially Lenin (1968). It is sometimes referred to as structural Marxism or scientific Marxism (Stean and Pettiford, 2005). Marxism recognises the primacy of material things as opposed to idea and speaks so much about the transformation of material reality through a dialectical process of thesis, anti-thesis and synthesis. The general nature of dialectics which Marx developed from his critical examination of capitalism in Europe (Rupert, 2007) is that, it is the science of interconnectivity. Its laws are abstracted from the history of nature and human society. It is these laws of material production that drove the capitalist man (bourgeois) in Europe into international production that created the world capitalist system, which is characterised by structural division between core, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries (Wallerstein, 1974). It was the contradictions generated by capitalist production including under-consumption and the poverty of the workers that led to capitalist expansion to non-European countries in search of raw materials, cheap labour and avenues for investments. Imperialism became both the process of counteracting the impediments to capitalist production

and a means of creating capitalist system of domination and subordination. This is the world the European bourgeoisie created in its own image, which is a material and not an idealist/religious world. The materialist conception of reality as laid down by Marx is what the neo-Marxist scholars adopted in explaining international relations. It is a world characterised by class struggle for control and domination of the social world of production. At the international level, the dominant core capitalist countries and their powerful money classes are represented by bodies such as MNCs, IMF, World Bank, WTO, etc. These are the latest institutions in the neo-imperialist world of capitalist domination of weak, powerless and unindustrialised peripheral countries. Following the principles and laws underlying its roots, neo-Marxism pays very little attention to religion which it sees more as a form of idea and an element of the superstructure. The theory emphasises the superiority of material things over ideas.

Marx had argued that 'It is not the consciousness of man that determines his social being, but on the contrary, it is man's social being that determines his consciousness' (Donnelly, 2005). Social being represents the material world of production in the international system made up of the core, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries. Conversely, consciousness includes the spiritual and ideational world of man from where religion occupies a prime place. Religion in neo-Marxist terms is an unknowable and unobservable world devoid of any material essence. It is what Marx called "false consciousness" or the "opium of the masses"- an escape route from the material and objective world of reality to the spiritual. Thus to focus on religion in social analysis is to move away from the real world of class struggle and domination between countries and multilateral institutions that constitute it to an unreal and unscientific world.

Neo-Marxist conceptualisation of international relations like other mainstream theories borrows heavily from rationalist ontology. It claims that the world is material and knowable, and that man's knowledge of the world is based on experience and observation. That human reason can penetrate the internal nature of things and recognise their essence. This again falls short of acknowledging the influence and effects of ideas and identity on international social relations and the productive system deriving from it. It fails to capture the ever visible and observable materialist engagement of religion in contemporary world politics. The theory denies how the so-called "false consciousness" feeds into social and political structures and transforms them into religious images that influence state and multilateral decisions and policies. The challenges posed by increased religious fundamentalism which have pitched Islam against the West are global currents that can only be ignored at the expense of the 'New World Order'. Tibi (2008) aptly postulates on religious extremism that "It is rather a powerful challenge to existing order of the International System of capitalist.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
The International Politics mainstream is somewhat more complex and contested. Discuss.

3.2   Religion and International Order

In recent years, there have been a number of challenges to International Order emanating from various entities, including 'Islamic extremists' and, more generally, those 'excluded' from the benefits of globalization are sometimes the same people. Among the 'excluded' can be noted

various social and ethnic groups who, for whatever reasons of culture, history and geography, find themselves unable to tap into the benefits of globalisation. It is often suggested that the 'Muslim world' is the greatest victim in this regard and, as a result, Islamic extremist pathologies present themselves in their most dangerous forms (Fox, 2006). Such concerns generally highlight more on how various issues linked to religion in international politics have become widely significant for international order since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, especially when linked to the often polarising economic and developmental impact of globalization (Tibi, 2008). This context is also informed by events following the end of the Cold War – the cessation of a four decades long battle for supremacy between competing secular ideological visions: communism and liberal democracy/capitalism – that ended with a near-global collapse in the efficacy of the former and a growing, but by no means universal, acceptance of the desirability of the latter (Rupert, 2007). Two key issues in this regard are: (1) How International Order has changed as a result of globalisation and the end of the Cold War, and (2) How this change can be interpreted regarding the impact of religion on International Politics. This commentary refers to selected transnational religious actors in relation to International Order. There is renewed interest in religion and International Politics, encouraged both by the fall of Soviet-style communism in the early 1990s and a decade later by the events of September 11, 2001 ('9/11') (Schmidt, 2008).

Religion's re-emergence at this time could be observed among various cultures and religious faiths, and in different countries with various levels of economic development. For many observers, the re-emergence of religion in International Politics was unexpected, because it challenged conventional wisdom about the nature and long-term, historical impact on societies of secularisation, widely thought to involve both 'political development' and a more general, non-religious 'modernisation'. It did this by calling into question a core presumption in most Western social science thinking: modernisation of societies and polities invariably involves increased secularisation. During this process, religion became excluded from the public realm, becoming both marginalised and 'privatised'. Consequently, the 'return' of religion to International Politics involves religious deprivatisation, with both domestic and international ramifications; often there are political impacts with, for example Islamic extremism having pronounced effects on International Order. What is 'International Order'?(Waltz, 1991).

It can usefully be thought of as a regime with widespread acceptance of particular values and norms of behaviour, comprising various actors, rules, mechanisms and understandings. This includes the expanding corpus of International Law, as well as the organisations and institutions that seek to develop and enforce it. The goal is to try to manage the co-existence and interdependence of states and important non-state actors. On the other hand, it is a truism that International Order is what is created and developed in the interests of some actors only. Opinions about the current involvement of religion in International Politics and its impact on International Order tend to be polarized (Lenin, 1968). On the one hand, re-emergence of religion into International Politics is often seen to present increased challenges to International Order, especially from extremist Islamist organisations, such as al-Qaeda or Lashkar-e-Taibar, implicated in the recent atrocities in Mumbai. A new and growing threat to international order comes from transnational religious terrorist groups, notably al-Qaeda, as emphasised in the 2005 Haynes (2007) stated that international terrorism is the only form of political violence that appears to be getting worse. Some datasets have shown an overall decline in international

terrorist incidents of all types since the early 1980s, but the most recent statistics suggest a dramatic increase in the number of high-casualty attacks since the September 11 attacks on the US in 2001. The annual death toll from international terrorist attacks is however, only a tiny fraction of annual war death toll. Similarly, international religious terrorists fundamentally deny the (1) legitimacy of the secular international state system, as well as (2) foundational norms, values and institutions upon which contemporary international order is based (Keohane and Martin, 1995).

On the other hand, some religious actors may help advance international order, for example the Roman Catholic Church and its widespread encouragement to authoritarian regimes to democratise that significantly affected governments in Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s (Keohane, 2002). There is also the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and its important role in helping to promote dialogue and cooperation between Muslim and Western governments. Other actors may however be viewed more ambiguously, such as states like China that, in emphasising cultural characteristics rooted in Neo-Confucianism, appear to promote a 'non-Western' perspective which potentially highlights different conceptions of International Order (Morgenthau, 1948). Thinking of International Order more generally, the issue of international conflict seems never to be far away. To focus on current International Order is to note that various aspects of international conflict have significantly changed in recent years, with frequent involvement of religious, ethnic and cultural non-state actors, including, for example, Hamas (Palestine) and Hizbullah (Lebanon). Change in this regard is manifested in various ways. First, there are now fewer interstate wars – yet significant numbers of intrastate conflicts; all affect international order. Second, there are significant numbers of serious conflicts within countries at the present time – and many involve religious, cultural and/or ethnic actors. While numbers of international wars and war-deaths have declined in recent years, some 60 armed conflicts raged around the globe in 2005; over 70 per cent were classified as communal wars, that is, conflicts significantly characterised by religious, cultural and/or ethnic factors and combatants (Hay, 2002).

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Critically highlight how International Order has changed as a result of globalisation and the end of the Cold War, and how this change can be interpreted regarding the impact of religion on International Politics.

3.3   Religion and International Conflict

Throughout the world, no major religion is exempt from complicity in violent conflict. Religious conviction certainly was one of the motivations for the September 11 attacks and other violent actions by Muslim extremists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some Buddhist monks assert an exclusively Buddhist identity for Sri Lanka, fanning the flames of conflict there. Some Christian and Muslim leaders from former Yugoslavia saw themselves as protecting their faiths when they defended violence against the opposing faith communities in the Balkan wars. Yet we need to be aware of an almost universal propensity to oversimplify the role that religion plays in international affairs. Iran's international assertiveness is as much due to Iranian-Persian nationalism as it is to the dictates of Shiite clerics. The international policies that Iran's clerics

adopt are rarely based driven by theological precepts or religious doctrine, but are rather more political power calculations and a desire to preserve the quasi-theocratic status quo (Smock, 2006). Similarly, in Iraq, conflict between Sunnis and Shiites rarely stems from differences over religious doctrine and practice, but rather more from historical and contemporary competition for state power. Sunni and Shiite identities are as much ethnic as religious, and intergroup relations between the two are very similar, though more violent, than relations between Walloons and Flemish in Belgium or between English and French in Canada, where language and culture rather than religious belief constitute the primary sources of division (Sarioghalam, 2001).

Meanwhile, the Kurds—the third principal constituent community in Iraq—are ethnically based. Most Kurds are also Sunni Muslims. This is not to suggest that religious identity is synonymous with ethnic identity, as in many circumstances religious identity implies explicitly religious behavior and belief. But in many cases the lines between ethnic and religious identities become so blurred that parsing them to assign blame for violence is difficult if not impossible. Religious identity has often been used to mobilize one side against the other, as had happened in Iraq, Sudan, and elsewhere; populations have responded to calls to defend one's faith community (Sarioghalam, 2001). But to describe many such conflicts as rooted in religious differences or to imply that theological or doctrinal differences are the principal causes of conflict is to seriously oversimplify and misrepresent a complex situation. The decades-long civil war in Sudan is often described as a religious conflict between Muslims and Christians, with the north being predominantly Muslim and the south predominantly Christian or animist. There is some truth to this characterization, particularly after 1989, when an Islamic fundamentalist government came to power in Khartoum with an agenda to Islamicize all of Sudan. But the differences between north and south go well beyond religion and rarely are the disagreements religious or theological in character. Northerners speak Arabic and want Arabic to be Sudan's national language (Mearsheimer, 2007). Southerners generally speak Arabic only as a second or third language, if at all, and prefer English as the lingua franca. Northerners are more likely to identify with the Arab world, whereas southerners tend to identify themselves as Africans.

Thus, racial identity is fundamental to the division between north and south. The religious division between Christian and Muslim happens to overlap with these racial, ethnic, and geographical divisions, but the conflict's divide has not been confined to or even dominated by religion. British colonial policy also reinforced the divisions between north and south, and over the past twenty years, Christians have fought Christians in the south and Muslims have fought Muslims in Darfur (Juergensmeyer, 2005). In Nigeria, religion is divisive and a factor in conflict, but it is often exaggerated as the cause of conflict. The popular press asserts that tens of thousands of Nigerians have died in religious warfare over the last decade. True, many died, both Christians and Muslims, in riots over Danish cartoons depicting Mohammed. Others were killed when Christians opposed extending the authority of sharia courts in several northern states. But the causes of many of the killings have not been exclusively religious (Huntington, 1993). In places like Kaduna and Plateau State, conflicts described as religious have been more complicated than that; the causes also include the placing of markets, economic competition, occupational differences, the ethnic identity of government officials, respect for traditional leaders, and competition between migrants and indigenous populations. In both Somalia and Afghanistan, one source of the conflicts is over which brand of Islam will prevail (Rupert, 2007).

But in both cases clan and ethnic differences define the composition of the forces in conflict as much as religious differences do. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the management of and access to religious sites are sources of serious disagreement and extreme religious groups—both Jewish and Muslim—exacerbate the problem. But religion is not the principal factor underlying the conflict; rather, conflict is principally over control of land and state sovereignty (Juergensmeyer, 2005). All of these cases demonstrate that while religion is an important factor in conflict, often marking identity differences, motivating conflict, and justifying violence, religion is not usually the sole or primary cause of conflict. The reality is that religion becomes intertwined with a range of causal factors—economic, political, and social—that define, propel, and sustain conflict (Huntington, 1991). Certainly, religious disagreements must be addressed alongside these economic, political and social sources to build lasting reconciliation. Fortunately, many of the avenues to ameliorate religious violence lie within the religious realm itself.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Interfaith dialogue is another form of religious peacemaking. Discuss.

3.4 Religious 'Fundamentalism' and International Politics

Countries (Nigeria, Sudan, Somalia etc) with Muslim majority are in grip of religious fundamentalism in various forms and shapes. Some countries (Somalia, Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan etc) are more hit than others but this menace is spreading slowly but steadily in all countries. It has emerged as a great danger to the democratic gains that has been achieved by the great uprising of the masses of these countries. Religious fundamentalism is not just a phenomena spread by individuals, groups, mosques, madrassas or cluster of these groups such countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan were able to use the state powers, sometimes for a short period and in other cases, they have consolidated their grip on state structures. The aim is not to spread it to one continent or over the entire world, but to enable them to continue the struggle for implementation of their political Islamic agenda till the "judgment day". Understanding roots of the growth of religious fundamentalism in the countries of Middle East, is absolutely a clear fact that the American and British imperialism presented political Islam in a conscious manner as a counter offense to the rise of nationalist and socialist movements that spread thoughout the fifties and sixties. On 5th January 1957, the US president Eisenhower asked Congress for a resolution authorizing him to pledge increased military and economic aid, even direct US protection, to any Gulf nation willing to acknowledge the communist threat. Two months later "Eisenhower doctrine" was passed by the Congress. To save Middle East from communism, Washington turned to political Islam, which is commonly known as religious fundamentalism. The "religious approach was adopted side by side the "police and military approach" (Haynes, 2001).

Eisenhower's doctrine was first put to test in Jordan 1951 where nationalists were brutally crushed, with the Muslim Brotherhood on the monarchy's side of Shah Hussein. Ever since then civil liberties had been curtailed in Jordan. Earlier in 1951, Mohammed Mosadeq, the Iranian prime minister who dared to nationalize Anglo Iranian Oil Company was overthrown in a coup staged by CIA and Ayotollah Kashani was on the side of the coup plotters. These historical references are among several more that will help, at least partly; explain how imperialism fathered Hamas, Hezbollah, Mehdi Militi, Alqaida, Taliban and Iranian Ayatollahs (Attina,

1989). Latest in the list is DAASH that was initially helped by imperialist forces to counter the uprising in the Middle East and to overthrow the ones that were no more in their darling lists. DAASH has now emerged as the most barbarian terrorist group that the world has ever known, all in the name of "Islamic State". The breeding of religious fundamentalism in Muslim countries by the imperialist forces was their greatest political and organization blunder in forming strategies to safe capitalism from opposite ideologies (Gilpin, 1986). Side by side, the Saudis have played an important role in strengthening and helping religious groups across Muslim countries in promoting their Wahabi ideology. Saudi financing goes much beyond Middle East. Saudi also gives huge cash subsidies to right wing groups in Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia and Maldives. Iran supports the Shia groups like Hezbollah. Kuwait and Qatar supports various groups including Hamas and Taliban in several manners (Haynes, 2003). Religious fundamentalist groups in various Muslim countries are using all sorts of medieval terrorist acts to frighten the opponents. The barbarian acts of burning prisoners alive by pouring oil on them and killing prisoners by shooting and releasing their videos have shaken the world tremendously. The first religious fundamentalist government in a Muslim country was in Iran. Since 1979, it has stabilized its basis initially by physically killing all opposition groups and later by forced enforcement of so called "Islamic laws" mainly against women, democracy and working class. The Iranian regime has helped fanatic Shia groups around the globe against Sunni and Wahabi Muslims (Hay, 2002).

In Afghanistan, the nine years power period of religious fanatics from 1992 to 2001 played a decisive role in promoting religious fundamentalism not only in Muslim countries but also across the globe. It introduced "Jihad" as the main weapon of spreading fanaticism. It turned Islam into "political Islam". Osama Bin Laden used Afghanistan as his base camp to plan and carry out all terrorist activities (Haynes, 2004). Pakistan became a refuge for him in the later years of his life. In Pakistan, the 16 December 2014 was the most deadly attack on any school by religious fanatics. 146 were killed in a Peshawar Army Public School, including 136 children with their ages ranging from 10 to 17 years. They asked the children to recite 'Kalma' and then fired at them. It was an attack on Muslim children by Muslim fanatics. Almost 11 percent of the total children enrolled in the school were killed within 15 minutes of their occupation of the school (Keohane, 2002). The day shocked Pakistan and the world. The news of the killing of the innocent children was flashed all over the world as the main story of the day. There was a great anger and shock. The Pakistani state failed miserably to curb the rise of religious fundamentalism. There is always a soft spot for them. For a long time, they were encouraged by the state as a second line of security. The security paradigm meant an anti-India enmity was the core purpose of state patronage. Pakistan is situated in a region where fundamentalism has been posed, of late, as one of the most threatening questions. The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan really began in the 1980s. On the one hand, the military dictator, General Zia ul-Haq of Pakistan, was using religion to justify his rule and was 'Islamizing' laws and society. On the other hand, Pakistan had become a base camp for the forces opposing the Afghan revolution. After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the Zia allies with US used Islam to consolidate his power by passing pro-Islamic legislation, and creating many madrasahs and his policies created a "culture of jihad" within Pakistan that continues until present day.

Recently Islamic fundamentalism has risen as an alternative political phenomenon not only in Pakistan but also in the entire Muslim world. Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan is partly a link of this international phenomenon and partly caused by specific local reasons. When analyzing Islamic fundamentalism, one must understand that the religion of Islam and Islamic fundamentalism are not one and the same thing. Islamic fundamentalism is now a reactionary, nonscientific movement aimed at returning society to a century-old social set-up, defying all material and historical factors. It is an attempt to roll back the wheel of history. Fundamentalism finds its roots in the backwardness of society, social deprivation, a low level of consciousness, poverty and ignorance. Let us go back to the example of Pakistan.

Apart from creating and supporting Jihadist groups, for decades, the state and military with the financial and political assistance of imperial powers has indoctrinated millions with conservative Islamic ideology for the purpose of safeguarding its strategic interests. The three decades since 1980 are seen as the years of madrassas, over 20,000 at present providing home ground for recruitment for suicidal attackers. Supported mainly by Saudi Arabia and many million Muslim immigrants, they have become the alternative to the regular school system. Most of the terrorist activities carried out in Pakistan and elsewhere are linked to the organizational and political support of these madrassas. After 9/11, the state's close relationship with the fundamentalists has changed to some extent but not broken in real terms. Pakistan has become more conservative, more Islamic and more right wing resulting in the growth of the extreme Islamist's ideas. Blasphemous laws are frequently used for settling personal and ideological scores. Religious minorities, women and children are the easy targets. These soft targets are paying the greatest price for this decisive right wing turn. The rise of religious fundamentalism has emerged as the most serious challenge not only to progressive forces but also to the very foundation of a modern society. Education and health are the real targets of the fanatics. Polio workers, mainly women, were killed by fanatics, on the assumption that a team working for the elimination of polio led to the discovery of Osama Bin Ladin, leading to his assassination. The net result is that the World Health Organization has recommended a ban on all Pakistanis traveling abroad without a polio vaccination certificate.

Religious fanatics groups are the new version of fascism. They are fascists in the making. They have all the historic characteristics of fascism. They kill opponents en mass. They have found considerable space among the middle class, particularly the educated ones. They are against trade unions and social movements. They are promoting women as inferior to men, and aim to keep them in the home and attacking the religious minorities has become a norm. The religious fanatic groups are internationalists. They want an Islamic world. They are against democracy and promote Khilafat (kingdom) as a way of governance. They are the most barbaric force recent history has seen in the shape of "Islamic State" and Taliban. There is nothing progressive in their ideology. They are not anti-imperialism but anti-America and anti-West. They have created and carried out the most barbaric terrorist activities in the shape of suicide attacks, bomb blasts, mass killings and indiscriminate shootings. They must be countered. The American way of fighting back in shape of "war on terror" has failed miserably.

Despite all the American initiatives of occupations, wars and creating democratic alternatives, the religious fundamentalists have grown with more force. Fundamentalists are stronger than

they were at 9/11, despite the occupation of Afghanistan. A whole package is needed. The state must break all links with fanatic's groups. The mindset that religious fundamentalists are "our own brothers, our own people, our security line and guarantee against "Hindus", some are bad and some are good" and so on must be changed. The conspiracy theories are most favorable arguments among the religious right wingers. They do not want to face the reality. There is no short cut to end religious fundamentalism. There is no military solution. It has to be a political fight with dramatic reforms in education, health and working realities in most Muslim countries. Starting from nationalization of madrassas, it must go on to provide free education, health and transport as one of most effective means to counter fundamentalism. Right wing ideas are promoting extreme right wing ideology. A mass working class alternative in the shape of trade unions and political parties linked with social movements is the most effective manner to counter religious fundamentalism. Avoiding a 'clash of barbarisms' between imperialist barbarism and that of organizations like the DAASH and Al-Qaeda, is a must Imperialist barbarism and its dictatorial supporters oppress millions of people daily around the world. This is the fertile ground in which fundamentalist and terrorist organizations prosper. They feed off international interventions such as the ones led by the US and other western powers in Afghanistan, the Middle East and Iraq, and other regional powers.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
Religious fundamentalism is not just a phenomena spread by individuals, groups, mosques, madrassas or cluster of these groups. Discuss.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Fundamentalism is not simply a religious or political option in terms of belief perspective. It is a package-deal phenomenon marked by a sequence of factors whose cumulative impact can be devastating. The Taliban, to return to this example of extreme Islamist fundamentalism, took an absolutist, inerrant and exclusivist line with respect to religious identity and behaviour, which was extended to include all who were within their purview – namely, the inhabitants of Afghanistan.

5.0   SUMMARY

The term 'fundamentalism', broadly speaking, names today a religio-political perspective found in many if not all major religions in the contemporary world. Most disturbingly, it is associated with variant forms of religious extremism and thus religiously-oriented terrorism, in particular – though by no means exclusively – that of an Islamic ilk. Movements of a fundamentalist type are certainly evident in Islam, but they may also be found in Christianity, in Hinduism, in Judaism and other religious communities. Contemporary fundamentalism is not the sole province of any one religion. And an upsurge in the totalising claims of fundamentalist ideologues, of whatever religion, together with the utilisation of globalized communication, transportation and related modern technologies, means that the issue of religious fundamentalism itself requires, once again, some careful attention. Although both Christianity and Islam are susceptible to imperialist impositions of one sort or another, as history only too clearly has demonstrated, it is nonetheless the case that Islamic modalities of terrorism has presently taken centre-stage in current world

affairs. However, the religious fundamentalism with which Islamist extremism is associated arguably follows an identifiable paradigm that has a wider purview.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summarize and critically evaluate the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of religion in international politics.

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UNIT 4   IMPACT OF RELIGION ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

CONTENTS

2.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit shall examine the impact of religion on International Politics and how this treatment is increasingly being challenged by the realities of religious resurgence. Finally, the paper concludes with a statement that international politics need to shake off their conservative baggage and accommodate new developments in the international system, in order to be relevant in the 21st century knowledge production.

2. 0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine the roles of religion in both exacerbating and resolving international conflicts.
- examine how religion can affect the formulation of underlying foreign policy considerations and policies of states.
- examine the Interactions between domestic and international spheres
- examine various ways in which transnational religious actors can challenge and/or undermine state sovereignty

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Introduction: Impact of Religion on International Politics

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and especially after the vent of 9/11 there has been increasing talk of the determining role of religion in shaping the pattern of the behavior of states and non-state actors. The first indication of this new found interest was the publication of Samuel Huntington's article on the coming Clash of Civilizations in which he argued that religion will

become the most important marker of identity and the determinant of patterns of international conflicts and amities. This was followed by other books and articles with titles such as Religion the Missing Dimension of International Politics, The Mighty and the Almighty –this one by Madeleine Albright!!—just to name two. With growing interest in the subject major universities in the US began offering courses in Religion and International Politics under a variety of programs and guises, and think tanks began focusing on the topic. Interestingly none of the books and articles and few of courses focused on analysis of the role of religion in international affairs by examining systematically how and in what ways religion affects behavior of international actors or ask the question of has really the role religion become as important as some claim to the point of eclipsing the role of other determinants of state behavior. Or more fundamentally why this new found interest in religion as a force in international relations?

3.2   The end of ideologies and the paradigm vacuum

Answering the last question first, the reason for the new interest in religion has been largely due to the fact that with the collapse of the Soviet Union the era of life and death ideological conflicts came to an end. This left many feeling disoriented by the more fluid and complex character of Post-ideological international relations, thus setting them off in search of a new paradigm which could simplify and explicate this new and confusing state of affairs. Sam Huntington's clash of civilization was a direct result of a Soviet era intellectual's effort to recreate the simplicity of Cold War paradigm. But as Cold War paradigm never either completely determined the character of international relations nor explained its complexities and shifts, the theory of clash of civilizations has proven equally faulty, although it has possibly caused more damage than the cold War paradigm.

3.3`   How Religion affects International Politics

Religion affects the character of International Politics the same way as do other value systems and ideologies by influencing the behavior of states and increasingly non-state actors. Moreover, although mostly unrecognized, as part of states and other actors value systems religion has always played a role in determining the character of the behavior of various international actors. In the case of state actors and, depending on the nature of their political systems, the impact of religion has been principally felt in the following ways: activities of religious groups aimed at influencing state behavior in democratic systems and; the proclivities of key political leaders. For example it has been noted that US policy during the Cold War in addition to the ideological animosity between socialism and Liberal capitalism was influenced by the fact that US society was quite religious and hence viewed the atheist communists as evil. The importance of the religious proclivities of key leaders on state behavior needs hardly to be emphasized. It is well known that President Jimmy Carter's approach to the Middle East conflict and issues of human rights was to a great extent determined by his deep Christian faith. Similarly, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Tony Blair's policies on issues ranging from war on terror to Iraq's invasion were highly influenced by their respective religious beliefs. However, it would be a mistake to believe that it was religious factors that were solely responsible for the decisions on these issues. Rather security concerns, economic interests and the desire to prevent any

undermining of the international balance of power played much more important roles in these regards.

What the religious factor –together with other value- based arguments such as spreading democracy—did was to provide an idealistic gloss to decisions made on purely worldly reasons. In other words religion played the same role that ideologies of various kinds have played namely to legitimize policy decisions and garner popular support for them. In the case some countries such as Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran which are based on different interpretations of Islam, religion is the official ideology and the basis of state legitimacy. As is the case with secular ideologies, both countries believe that the spread of their particular brand of Islam will advance their interests and increase their regional and global influence. However, what is important to point out is that religion, like secular ideologies, plays a purely instrumental role namely that of justifying and legitimizing state policies rather determining them. The behavior of non-state actors, including those identified as religious, such as HAMAS, Hizbullah, and groups engaged in terrorism such as Al Qaeda, also are determined by a mix of religious and worldly motives. For instance, it is not merely Islam which influences HAMAS' position on the Arab-Israeli conflict but also Palestinian nationalism. To note, the question of Jerusalem is as important to secular Palestinians as HAMAS. Hizbullah also has non-religious motivations for some of its activities.

For instance, according to Sheikh Nasrullah, Hizbullah's support for the Palestinian cause is partly to gain legitimacy for the Shias in overwhelmingly Sunni Arab World. The question which the above observations raise is thus the following: if religion is not the determining factor behind the activities state and non-state actors, what becomes of the arguments recently raised that religion can become a factor for international cooperation and Peace?   The answer to this question is that as long as other sources of conflict have not been eliminated and areas of mutually beneficial cooperation have not been identified and pursued mere exhortation that we all should heed the call of the Almighty and treat each other fairly will not succeed. If this were sufficient the world should have been at peace, fairness would have ruled human relationships and there would not have been abuses of power at least for two thousand years. In sum, state behavior, as individual behavior, is the result of complex set of impulses and motives and cannot be explained by a single factor. Religion, in the past, had influenced the behavior of international actors without determining it, although its role often went unnoticed. This situation, notwithstanding the new found fascination with the impact religion on International Politics, has not changed. Religion is neither the source of conflicts and disputes nor a panacea for global problems.

3.4   Critical Ways Forward

Critical Theorists would be the first to admit that reducing religion to a cover for material interests does not tell us very much. This is especially true as capitalism has matured. In fact, figures associated with the Frankfurt School found ways to maintain the critique of capital while taking religion very seriously indeed. For example, could it be that capitalism is made possible by structures of thinking that are themselves religious, or more accurately, Judeo-Christian? If so, the 'deconstruction' of capitalism requires a deconstruction of the deeply embedded mental

assumptions rooted in religion that enclose us (Nancy 2008). Consider in this context the writings of Walter Benjamin: "one can behold in capitalism a religion, that is to say, capitalism essentially serves to satisfy the same worries, anguish, and disquiet formerly answered by so-called religion" (Nancy 2008). According to Benjamin, capitalism rests on shame and guilt for its expansion. A sort of functionalism about religion is evident here, to be sure. But there is more: what are the conditions that make it possible for such an immanent theology to be transferred to others with different religious traditions? How does the theological substructure of capital (thus religion is not only superstructure) interact with other religious forms? Thinking along Gramscian lines, could it be possible that our common-sense assumptions about material inequality and the status quo draw on patterns of thinking that are embedded in religious tradition, and if so, how might different (non-monotheistic?) traditions react to the expansion of capitalism into their own contexts? This is particularly pertinent as capitalism continues to spread around the world. The arrival of capitalism into other contexts could be explored through the lens of Gramsci's two categories of hegemonic analysis, the religion of the intellectuals and the religion of the people.

Practically, what might this mean? Simply that up-and-coming scholar of religion and international relations should examine the relationship between religion and the state, or religion and the capitalist world order, from a perspective outside of monotheism. There is very little in the International Politics tradition on Buddhism, Daosim, and Hinduism, for example. The study of religion in non-monotheistic contexts should be a central part of the project to de-center international relations from its Eurocentric—and Abrahamic—insulation.

There are other possibilities for critical engagement as well. We can investigate how discourses about and definitions of religion—the 'religion of the intellectuals'—finds its way into security discourses of states. This is the general approach I have taken, for example, to Western state discourses about religion and security in the wake of 9/11 (Bosco 2014). The causal arrow can work the other way, too. The state can also promote certain interpretations of religion in civil society. Russell McCutcheon demonstrates for example how the rise of the academic study of religion as a humanistic discipline with a strong emphasis on toleration and citizenship is impossible to understand outside the context of the Cold War (McCutcheon 2004). States can also use religion to increase their legitimacy abroad in hopes that they will gain access to important economic opportunities. Competition among China and India has intensified in recent years over who is the true protector of Buddhism. This race to demonstrate Buddhist credentials is in large part driven by emerging economic opportunities in Burma/Myanmar.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
What is the position of Religious in International Politics?

4.0   CONCLUSION

The marginalization of critical perspectives from International Politic's newfound engagement with religion is unwarranted. It is simply untrue that critical perspectives dismiss religion as the 'opiate of the masses' or consider religion a crude reflection of material interests and therefore irrelevant to international politics. No one would reject these simplistic assumptions more

strongly than critical theorists themselves. Critical approaches hold great promise for the future study of religion and international relations. In fact, I predict that the subfield will very soon begin to move toward the sorts of questions raised above. Scholars of religion in International Politics, casting for new ways forward, would be well-served to explore critical avenues, both traditional and contemporary. There is no loss of explanatory power or disciplinary cache if the study of religion in International Politics moves closer toward critical perspectives on religion. It should also be observed that this confluence is more likely to happen—and in fact is beginning to happen—in European intellectual circles than in American ones. Understanding the reasons behind this difference of approaches to religion in global politics is itself a potential critical project.

5.0   SUMMARY

The question is not anymore on the nature of religion but more on how historical processes and cultural transformations inform the tensions of religion versus politics or secular versus religious that we witness everywhere. Such a perspective requires a longue duree, historicized and interdisciplinary approach that drastically challenges the dominant rational choice-centered theories implemented through fixed variables that still dominate the IR discipline. But it will allow a better grasp of the increasing fluidity of the boundaries between national and international as well as secular and religious that are key to the "neo-Westphalian" order in which we live.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summarize and critically evaluate the impact of religion on International Politics.

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MODULE 2 ETHNICITY

INTRODUCTION

The module is intended to provide a basic understanding of the politics of race and ethnic nationalism, their impact on inter-state relations, patterns of conflict management strategies. Majorly the main thrust of this module is to familiarize the students with the meaning of ethnicity, ethnicity and nationalism including ethnicity and nation-building in International Politics.

The module is fragmented into four connected units to facilitate your understanding on ethnicity and International Politics:

Unit 1 Meaning of Ethnicity
Unit 2 Ethnicity and Nationalism
Unit 3 Ethnicity and Nation-Building
Unit 4 Impact of Ethnicity on International Politics

UNIT 1 MEANING OF ETHNICITY

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity is a complex phenomenon. The task of the theoretician is to outline at least what can be said to be the essential dimensions of this phenomenon and to indicate the directions of their possible variations. If students choose to study in-depth only one or a few aspects of the phenomenon, it is logically incumbent upon them to point out how these selected aspects may relate to the other aspects of the phenomenon.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- understand the social construction of 'ethnicity';
- examine types of ethnicity and types of ethnic groups;
- analyse the forms of ethnic identity;
- understand the ways in which ethnicity has become 'naturalized' in the contemporary world;
- critically assess those concepts related to ethnicity and the categorisation of difference, such as indigeneity, hybridity, authenticity, invention of tradition, and race.
- consider the ways in which ethnicity is being transformed as a result of globalization.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Meaning of Ethnicity

Ethnicity has been a major subject in the social sciences for the past several decades. It first appeared in the Oxford English Dictionary in 1972 and it has recently become a source of debate in the field of International Politics where many scholars have investigated the relationship between ethnicity and civil war, growth, institutions and violence using econometric tools. Defining ethnicity is a minefield, as many authors have recognized. As we shall see in this section, scholars have proposed a bewildering variety of approaches to ethnicity, all of which are currently in use. Much of the confusion stems from the fact that as already mentioned, ethnicity is a new term in the Social Sciences, even though the word "ethnic" has been used in the English language since the mid-fourteenth century. Its meanings have changed radically throughout history: originally referring to heathens, pagans or gentiles, it acquired racial characteristics in the nineteenth century and was used in the twentieth-century U.S. English as a way to refer to those immigrants of non-northern or western European descent (Eriksen, 1993). It first grew in importance in the social sciences as anthropologists tried to make sense of the emergent social and cultural formations within Africa and other parts of the Third World in the 1960s (Eade, 1996). Hence ethnic groups took on a new meaning; namely the idea of tribe, formerly used to refer to a sociopolitical unit whose members were related by kinship ties. This shift in meaning took place as many social scientists attempted to critique the eurocentric discourse in which the peoples of the developing world were referred to as "tribes" while those in the developed world remained 'peoples' or even 'nations'. This latest incarnation of ethnicity means that, for the first time in the history of the word, it was – and continues to be – applied universally across the globe. An 'ethnic group' has been defined as a group that regards itself or is regarded by others as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics that will help to distinguish the group from the surrounding community. Ethnicity is considered to be shared characteristics such as culture, language, religion, and traditions, which contribute to a person or group's identity. Ethnicity has been described as residing in:

- the belief by members of a social group that they are culturally distinctive and different to outsiders;
- their willingness to find symbolic markers of that difference (food habits, religion, forms of dress, language) and to emphasise their significance; and
- their willingness to organise relationships with outsiders so that a kind of 'group boundary' is preserved and reproduced (Eade, 1996)

This shows that ethnicity is not necessarily genetic. It also shows how someone might describe themselves by an ethnicity different to their birth identity if they reside for a considerable time in a different area and they decide to adopt the culture, symbols and relationships of their new community. It is worth noting that the 'Traveller Community' is recognized as a distinct ethnic group in the UK and Northern Ireland, but only as a distinct cultural group in the Republic of Ireland. Ethnicity is also a preferential term to describe the difference between humans rather than 'race'. This is because 'race' is a now a discredited term that divides all peoples based on the idea of skin colour and superiority. There is only one 'race', the human race as we are

essentially genetically identical. For example, there is no French 'race' but the French people could be described as a separate ethnic group. Ethnicity is a social-psychological process which gives an individual a sense of belonging and identity. It is of course, one of a number of social phenomena which produce a sense of identity (Eriksen, 1993). Ethnic identity can be defined as a manner in which persons, on account of their ethnic origin, locate themselves psychologically in relation to one or more social systems, and in which they perceive others as locating them in relation to those systems. By ethnic origin is meant either that a person has been socialized in an ethnic group or that his or her ancestors, real or symbolic, have been members of the group. The social systems may be one's ethnic community or society at large, or other ethnic communities and other societies or groups, or a combination of all these.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Ethnicity is not necessarily genetic. Discuss.

3.2   Types of Ethnicity

Confusion as to the nature of ethnicity has often been derived from the lack of an adequate typology of ethnic groups and ethnic identities. Significant criteria of classification of any phenomena can be those which refer to those characteristics of the phenomena which have an effective influence. In our case, on interethnic group relations and on the interaction process among individuals of various ethnic backgrounds, it uses as criteria of classification locus of group organization, degree and nature of self-awareness in ethnic organization, structural location in interethnic relations and the generational factor. According to these criteria, we can distinguish the following types of ethnic groups: primary and secondary ethnic groups, folk-community and nationality-community ethnic groups, dominant majority and subordinate minority ethnic groups, immigrant or 'young' and established or 'old' ethnic groups.

3.2.1   Primary and secondary ethnic groups

This distinction refers to the place of origin where the group's culture emerged as a distinct entity. Primary ethnic groups are those which exist in the same place in which historically, they have been formed. They are indigenous groups. Examples are the French in France, Germans in Germany, Native Indians in the Americas, Andalusians in Spain, etc. Secondary ethnic groups are those which have their origin in society different from the one in which they currently exist, as for example, the Italians, Germans, etc. in Canada or the United States. They are as it were, transplanted groups which share their cultural and historical background with the society from which they emigrated, but do not depend any more on the original society for their existence (Redfield, 1960). This does not preclude the possibility that the primary ethnic group at some time in history might have been itself a secondary ethnic group in relation to its own ancestors. In history however, the shift from the secondary to primary ethnic groups has been rather infrequent. In the past, great migrations of peoples have taken place only in certain periods of history. Migrations of peoples who provided the bases for the European primary ethnic groups have taken place in prehistoric times and formation of most European ethnicities, the German, French, Italian, Polish, Ukrainian, Russian, etc. was a long historical process after the original migrations. Indeed, often it is forgotten that contemporary ethnic groups have important features

which trace their origins to prehistoric times and which are still quite viable. In modern times, in the Western world, American, Canadian and several Latin American ethnicities can be said to be in the process of formation as primary ethnic groups (Zielyk, 1975). Development of secondary ethnic groups has been a much more common phenomenon in modern times, especially in the context of migration to the New World, and it can be argued that the secondary ethnic groups will be even a more prevalent phenomenon in the future as international migration increases.

3.2.2   Folk-community and nationality-community ethnic groups

The distinction between the folk community and nationality as types of ethnic groups was originally drawn by Ihor Zielyk (1975). It can be incorporated here with some modifications. The basic principle of distinction here is cultural self-awareness. Nationality groups are those which are culturally highly self-aware. That is, their members share an image of themselves as a collectivity united by a distinct culture rather than by their kin or clan. An essential part of this image is a conception of the history of the group as legacy. Organizational life of the ethnic community articulates this image in its normative systems. As Zielyk (1975) has pointed out, the significance of nationality is anchored in the conception of uniqueness, irreplaceability or superiority of cultural values that are seen as preservable or possible to develop only through the efforts of the group itself. This includes a certain sense of collective mission. An ethnic group which is a folk community is one whose members are predominantly of peasant background. The community has little difference in social status. The character of social relationships among the members of the community is determined by kinship and close family friendships. The centre of social organization is the religious institutions, around which develop other organizations and which exerts a pervasive influence on the whole community.

Folk community groups lack a developed conception of the group's history as legacy. The folk community's culture is what Robert Redfield (1960) describes as the "little tradition", embodied in custom, song and transmitted in a proverbial manner. Members of the nationality community are differentiated in social status. Many of them have experienced some form of social mobility into professional occupations. Likewise, organizationally, it is a differentiated community. But the manifest goals of the organizational life are not the fulfillment of individual members' interests, but rather the fulfillment of collective goals of the community to which individual interests are expected to be subordinated. There is also a tendency toward integration of organization into all-inclusive bodies. The culture of the nationality community develops what Redfield (1960) called a "great tradition", including literary, artistic and intellectual achievements. The culture however, tends to center around an ideology. An essential part of the ideology is a conception of the group's history as legacy. This may be an ideology of messianism referring to freedom from collective oppression or exploitation or an ideology of maintaining and fostering a "cultured" or a "civilized" way of life. Modern and contemporary history is characterised by many previously folk community-type groups transforming themselves into nationality-type groups. Nationalism has been a central factor in the process of this transformation. In this process, many groups focalize their ideology around a territory which they claim to be legitimately theirs. Examples can be Quebec, the Native peoples in Canada, Native peoples in Australia and other parts of the world. Hence a strong feature of the ideologies expounded by these groups is irredentism and the idea of sovereignty or self-determination.

Many of these groups refer to themselves as nations. Sociologically, a nation can be defined as a nationality community that has its own independent state. A nation, thus, can be conceived as the outgrowth of a high degree of self-awareness of an occupationally differentiated ethnic group with a territorial claim.

3.2.3   Dominant Majority and Subordinate minority ethnic groups

Sociologically, the concepts of majority and minority refer not to numbers but to power. Simply stated, the distinction is between those groups which have or do not have power in a society. Often the concept of ethnicity is confused with that of minority and all ethnic groups are seen as minorities. By this, the majority groups become ethnicity less and it becomes difficult to understand what culture of the "general" society is all about, or if it is there at all, and consequently the meaning of interethnic relations becomes confusing. Majority ethnic groups are those who determine the character of the society's basic institutions, especially the main political, economic, and cultural institutions. They determine the character of the norms of society as a whole, including the legal system. Their culture becomes the culture of the total society into which the minority ethnic groups assimilate. The minority groups may preserve their institutions and culture in larger or smaller degree or they may influence the character of the dominant institutions in larger or smaller degrees, but usually, the framework for intergroup processes is provided by the institutions deriving from the culture of the majority groups. The majority groups, because of their position of power, usually are at the top of the ethnic stratification system, and the status of other ethnic groups is assessed in relation to them. Much of the dynamics of interethnic relations are derived from the structure of dominance and subordination involved in the majority-minority ethnic group relations. Majorities are the main definers of external ethnic boundaries hence are in a position to have the deciding voice regarding public policies and legislation regarding minorities (Breton et al. 1990).

3.2.4   'Immigrant or Young' and 'Established or old' ethnic groups

A common confusion in the discourse on ethnicity is that of ethnicity and immigration. Ethnicity often is erroneously identified with immigrants, but immigrants make up only one type of ethnic groups. This can distinguish between "young" groups, i.e., those made up predominantly of the first - the immigrant - generation, and whose second generation is either small in size or young in age. The "old" groups are those already established in the larger society, i.e. they have at least a high proportion of adult second and adult third or consecutive generations. By this distinction, it is incorrect and misleading to speak of all ethnic groups as if they were immigrants. Members of the old, established ethnic groups usually do not like to be confused with immigrants. The issues which these two types of ethnic groups pose are different (Eade, 1996). The concerns of the young groups can be characterized as essentially the problems of adjustment to society at large, whereas those of the old groups, as interests of persistence. Among the old ethnic groups in Canada, one can include the British, French, German, Scandinavian groups, Dutch, Ukrainian, Russian, Polish, Jewish, Doukhobors, Mennonites, Indians, the Inuit, Blacks, except for those from the West Indies, Chinese, Japanese and others. Among the relatively young groups, one can include the Greeks, Portuguese, various Latin American groups, East Indians, except for the Sikhs, and others. In classifying ethnic groups as young and old, one should take regions into

account. Groups which are old may be old in one region of the country but young in another (Lieberson and Waters, 1990).

Chinese, for example, is an old group in Western Canada, but a young group in the Toronto area. The old ethnic groups can be subdivided further into those which add significantly to their population by means of a relatively continuous stream of new immigrants and those who have no significant numbers of new immigration as such can increase their population only by natural growth. Such groups as the French, Native Peoples and Doukhobors and others are examples of the latter. Groups with a continuous stream of new immigration face special problems of interrelationship between the old and the new sectors of the ethnic community. Among such problems are the questions as to what extent the ethnic institutions and organizations established by the old community are able to serve the needs of the new immigrants, to what extent status or class differences between the old community and the new immigrant create tensions or conflict between them, to what extent the demands exerted on society by the new immigrants differ from or contradict the demands placed on it by the old community, etc (Eade, 1996)

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Class differences between the old community and the new immigrant create tensions or conflict between them. To what extent does the demand exerted on society by the new immigrants differ from or contradict the demands placed on it by the old community? Discuss.

3.3   Forms of Ethnic Identity

Retention of ethnic identity from one generation to another does not necessarily mean retention of both its external and internal aspects, or all the components of each aspect in the same degree. Some components may be retained more than others; some may not be retained at all. A member of the third generation may subjectively identify with his ethnic group without having knowledge of the ethnic language or without practising ethnic traditions or participating in ethnic organizations. Or, inversely, he or she may practice some ethnic traditions without having strong feelings of attachment to the group. Furthermore, the same components of external identity may acquire different subjective meaning for different generations, ethnic groups, or other subgroups within the same ethnic group (Eriksen, 1993). Therefore, it should not be assumed that the ethnic identity retained by the third generation is of the same type or form of identity as that retained by the first or the second generation. Furthermore, an ever increasing number of persons in North American societies acquire multiple ethnic identities. The relationship among these multiple identities can be varied, allowing for variation of types of identity complexes.

3.3.1   Variations in external and internal components of identity

The differential variation of the components of ethnic identity thus allows us to distinguish various forms of ethnic identity. For example, a high level of retention of the practice of ethnic traditions accompanied by a low level of such subjective components as feelings of group obligation may be one form of ethnic identity: say, a *ritualistic ethnic identity*. By contrast, a high intensity of feelings of group obligation accompanied by a low level of practice of traditions would be a completely different form of ethnic identity: say, an *ideological identity* with

different implications for the collective aspects of ethnic group behavior (Eriken, 1993). Negative images of one's own ethnic group, accompanied by a high degree of awareness of one's ethnic ancestry, may be still be another form of ethnic identity, a *rebelling identity*, and positive images of one's ancestral group accompanied by a frequent practice of highly selected traditions, particularly by the third or a consecutive generation, may still be another form of ethnic identity, that of *ethnic rediscovery*. A few selected images of one's ancestral group without any feelings of obligation toward it and with only occasional, recreational practice of some traditions, may be still another form, say, *fringe identity*. This typology has an hypothetical character. It has to be empirically tested out. The study reported below indicates that there is empirical basis for at least some of these forms (Eade, 1996).

3.3.2   Single and multiple identities

A multiethnic society inevitably produces multiple ethnic identities. As a rule these identities correspond directly to the objective aspect of ethnicity, that of ancestry. Single identity is usually defined when both parents are claimed to be of the same ethnicity. In a multiethnic society, however, over the span of generations those who identify only with the general society as the primary ethnic group, e.g. Canadian or American, without any knowledge of ancestors other than those of the general society, can be said to have purely single identity. They, however, are most probably the exception rather than the rule (Lieberson and Waters, 1990). All others can be said to possess multiple identities. These can be of two types, the typical hyphenated identities, reflecting an individual's identification with both the society at large and his/her ancestral ethnicity or ethnicities and multiple identities of ancestral ethnicities themselves without direct reference to society at large. There is some empirical evidence however which indicates that individuals with multiple ancestral identities tend to choose one, the father's side identity, as more important to them (Breton, *et al*., 1990). This indicates that individuals tend to organize their multiple identities in some meaningful, hierarchical order. Different hierarchical types, however, are possible. To ascertain this, more research than what is available is necessary.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Highlight 3 forms of ethnic identities reflecting an individual's identification.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Building on recent literature, this unit discusses ways of studying the relation between ethnicity and nationalism. The first is to treat ethnicity identities and ethnic group, along with ethnicity and race, as *analogous* phenomena. The second is to specify ways in which ethnicity helps *explain* things within international community - its origin, its power, or its distinctive character in particular cases. The third is to specify modes of interpenetration and intertwining. The unit concludes by reconsidering the forms of ethnic identities reflecting an individual's identification.

5.0   SUMMARY

Students are expected to obtain a critical understanding of the ways in which the related phenomena of ethnicity have been historically and globally constructed in since the eighteenth century, and to be able to question their taken-for-granted status in the modern world.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you explain the social construction of ethnicity.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Eade, J. (1996). "Ethnicity and the Politics of Difference: An Agenda for the 1990s?" *In Culture, Identity and Politics: Ethnic Minorities in Britain*, eds. Terence Ranger, Yunas Samad and Ossie Stuart. Aldershot, UK: Avebury.

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Redfield, Robert (1960) *The Little Community and Peasant Society and Culture*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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UNIT 2   ETHNICITY AND NATIONALISM

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Today, it is widely acknowledged that ethnicity plays a crucial role in nationalism, especially after the recent ethnic based conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in the former Soviet Union. However, there are few detailed studies that focus on the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism and especially in the comparison of Anthony D. Smith and Ernest Gellner as two distinctive scholars on these concepts. This unit I simply sought to bridge this gap. Accordingly, ethnicity and nationalism are highly inter-related but what is the relationship between them? This analysis attempts to shed some light on this issue by considering the works of two aforementioned authors who made considerable contributions in developing of theories relating ethnicity. Finally, the unit also analyses ethnic conflicts in particular parts of the world.

3.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- understand the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism;
- examine the causes of ethnic conflict debated by political scientists;
- analyse the major theories applied to ethnicity and ethnic conflict;
- understand the ethnic conflict in the post–Cold War world

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Ethnicity and Nation

Ethnicity is a very recent term. It could mean kinship, group solidarity and common culture as well as "foreign barbarians" and "outsiders" as used to characterize non-Romans and Greeks during the ancient times. Nevertheless, there are some common points that led scholars to agree in similar terms on the definition of the ethnic groups. For instance Schermerhorn (1970) defines ethnic group as: A collectivity within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood. Smith (1986) explains the examples of such symbolic elements as kinship patterns, physical contiguity, religious affiliation, language or dialect forms, tribal affiliation, nationality, phenotypical features, or any combination of these. In his survey of the field, Smith (1986) gives a special focus to the emotional intensity and historical heritage of ethnies. Smith (1986) believes that nationalism derives its force from "inner" sources like history and culture. According to Smith (1986), ethnicity mainly relies on myth, values, memories and symbol where myths are tales that are widely believed and therefore links the present with a communal past. Moreover through its symbolism, myths unify classes by spreading ethnic culture. Smith (1986) identifies six criteria for the formation of the ethnic group. They are:

1. Ethnic group must have a name in order to developed collective identity.
2. The people in the ethnic group must believe in a common ancestry.
3. Members of the ethnic group must share myths (common historical memories).
4. An ethnic group must feel an attachment to a specific territory.
5. Ethnic group must share same culture that is based on language, religion, traditions, customs, laws, architecture, institutions etc.
6. Ethnic group must be aware of their ethnicity. In other words, they must have a sense of their common ethnics.

Given the summary of all these points, Smith (1986) defines ethnic community as: A named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared memories and cultural elements, a link with an historic territory or homeland and a measure of solidarity. Smith (1986) stresses the importance of ethnicity by arguing that ethnicity is anything but primordial for the cohesion and self-awareness of that community's membership. Thus he argued that ethnicity may persist even when "long divorced from its homeland, through an intensa nostalgia and spiritual attachment" (Smith, 1986). Finally, Smith (1986) argues that ethnicity always remains in some form and could only be eliminated in two ways: Either by genocide (mass death of a cultural group like Nazi policies against Jewish and Gypsies) or by cultural genocide (the assimilation of culture by another dominant culture). However, Smith (1986) stresses that very rarely are ethnicity completely extinguished. Accordingly, Smith's (1986) definition of ethnicity is a valid and complete one especially on reflecting contemporary cases. Arguably, the notion that ethnicity (and ethnic consciousness) may persist even if the members of an ethnic group live outside their country is a convincing one. For example, the existence of strong and influential Jewish, Greek and Armenian lobbies, notably in the United States of America, proves that identity of these

ethnic groups has remained through their *diaspora* despite the changes of their territory, economic and social activities. The ethnic conciseness within these groups are very strong and solid (although they have been living separately from their countries for a long time, in most cases almost a century) through "an intensa nostalgia and spiritual attachment" as Smith (1986) stated.

Greenfeld (1992) suggests that the idea which lies at the core idea of nationalism is the idea of the nation. Therefore if the nation is the core idea of nationalism, then we should focus on the concept of 'nation' itself in order to identify the main differences between Smith and Gellner in which neither Gellner nor Smith denied the importance of the nation in the formation of nationalism. Smith (1986) argues that any attempt to explain how and why nations emerged must start from ethnic ties and identities, which have commonly formed their cultural basis. Smith (1986) claims that the nation is a community of common myths and memories as in an *ethnie*. In other words, Smith (1986) suggests that there is continuity between pre-modern ethnies and modern nations, because modern nations are commonly formed by pre-modern ethnies 'cultural basis' and nations are inconceivable without that cultural basis. Smith (1986) defined cultural basis as "cohesive power, historic primacy, symbols, myths, memories and values" of the ethnic group that formed the nation. Thus, Smith (1986) defines nation as: Population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members.

Smith (1986) claims that ethnic differences and ethnic nationalism are unlikely to be eroded mainly because of the constantly renewed impact of ethnic myths and ethnic heritage on modern nations. As a supportive point to his argument, Smith (1986) claims that ancient Egyptians like the Assyrians had an ideal typical nation because they were a named population with historic territory, myths, memories, mass culture and even a common economy and legal code. More significantly Smith (1986) has also emphasised that the first modern states like Britain and France are founded around a dominant *ethnie*. Eventually, since Britain and France were the dominant colonialist powers, both of them influence their colonies along with other communities with their Anglo-French state-nation model. In other words, historical priority of the Anglo - French state-nations model presented a basic model for the rest of the world as to how a national society and national state should be formed and sustained. Smith (1986) claims that only in several exceptional cases, have states formed nations without an immediate antecedent *ethnie*. The United States of America, Argentina and Australia could be examples of this category. In these countries, there was the elite class who began a process of nation formation because of the absence of distinctive *ethnie*.

To sum it up, Smith (1986) argues that ethnicity is the most influential origin of the nation-states. Smith bases this argument on three main reasons: First of all, nations were formed on the basis of pre-modern ethnic cores, therefore "being powerful and culturally influential, they provided models for subsequent cases of the formation of nations in many parts of the globe". Secondly, ethnic model of the nation has become popular because "it sat so easily on the pre-modern demotic kind of community that had survived into the modern era in so many parts of the world". Finally, ethnic unity is a necessary condition for national survival and unity because it would be very hard for a community to survive without a coherent mythology, symbolism of history and

culture. Contrary to Smith (1986), Gellner (1983) defines nations as "groups which will themselves to persist as communities." Crystallisation of these groups could be by "will, voluntary identification, loyalty and solidarity, as well as fear, coercion and compulsion." Gellner (1983) suggests that ethnicity is neither a prerequisite nor a required element in the formation of nations. Gellner (1983) argues that the nation depends upon political and intellectual elite imposing a shared culture on the whole population in a territory particularly through the national education system. In this way, all the members of the nation have minimum flexibility to fulfill a variety of roles. Kohn (1961) like Gellner (1983) argues that only nation-states could form the ideal form of political organisation as the source of all creative cultural energy and economic wellbeing. Therefore the supreme loyalty of man is to his nationality rather then his ethnicity. In conclusion, Gellner (1983) suggests that nations are not a universal necessity like states. In other words, Gellner (1983) argues that states emerged without the help of the nations and therefore nations could not be prerequisite for the state.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Smith (1986) argued that ethnicity always remains in some form and could only be eliminated by two ways, either by genocide or by cultural genocide. Discuss.

3.2   The Relationship of Ethnicity to Nationalism

After analyzing the definitions of ethnicity and nation, now the relationship between ethnicity to nationalism is essential. In explaining the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism, Gellner (1983) states that a necessary 'precondition' is that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones and ethnic boundaries should not separate the power holders from the rest. Gellner (1983) argues that 'ethnicity' enters the International Politics as 'nationalism' at times when cultural homogeneity or continuity is required by the economic base of social life and when, consequently, culture linked class differences become noxious, while ethnically unmarked, gradual class differences remain tolerable. Gellner (1983) argues that nationalism could use existing cultures but cannot caused conflict because of them simply because there are too many ethnic cultures. Thus, they cannot be more influential than modern states' high and superior cultures. Moreover, not all-ethnic groups could become nation-state because there is only a limited amount of 'space' for them in this world.

Simply, Gellner (1983) contend that nationalism is the construction of long process and since many ethnic groups cannot manage to become nation, nation-states are not the ultimate destiny of ethnic or cultural groups. Therefore, ethnicity could not cause nationalism simply because nationalism cannot emerge without a nation and industrial society (that is mobile, literate, interchangeable and culturally standardised) and therefore will not be influenced by their periphery low (ethnic) culture. Thus, ethnicity cannot cause nationalism even if they have territory and energetic intellectual class. In contrast, according to Smith (1986), ethnic nationalism is the mobilisation of ethnic groups by using language, ethno-history, religion, traditions and customs. In other words, Smith (1986) argues that through the rediscovery of an ethnic past, national identity could inspire ethnic communities to claim their rights as nations. Smith (1986) suggests that the desire to protect a cultural heritage and tradition inspire a sense of superiority to an ethnic group. Moreover, discrimination in division of economic beneficiaries,

along with cultural oppressions to a cultural group, could lead to ethnic nationalism, because in each case it would be a centralised state itself that is held to blame. Thus, Smith (1986) argues that ethnic identity could cause nationalism because of its power to convince people. Ethnicity could convince people, if people thought that their homeland is 'God-given', it is the place where their fathers and mothers lived, their heroes fought, their saints prayed and their forefathers laid down their lives for the freedom of their territory. Furthermore, this conviction (that is caused by myth and ethnic identity) about possessing 'only true faith', higher morality and civilisation could cause war.

Finally, Smith (1986) asserts that after ethnic category transforms into an ethnic community and spreads to the relevant area, ethnic intellectuals should apply the ideas of self-determination to *ethnie*. In other words, for the emergence of ethnic nationalism, intellectuals should mobilise the *ethnie*. Guibernau (1996) also confirms Smith (1986) argument by suggesting that when a nation faced resistance from ethnic groups within the country, it could cope with it either by destroying them or granting them a degree of autonomy. Guibernau (1996) concludes that "if state fails to do either of these, ethnies themselves may develop in the direction of ethnic nationalism, seeking to establish their own states". Gellner like Smith does not deny the importance of ethnicity in nationalism. However according to Gellner (1983), the formation of new social organizations, where social life has an economic base and depends on high culture, is more important in the formation of nationalism than ethnicity. Another basic difference between two theorists is their preconditions for the development of nationalism. On one hand, Gellner (1983) stresses the importance and the necessity of the political and cultural proximity of the ethnic groups as the cause of nationalism. On the other, Smith (1986) stresses the importance of the pre-existing *ethnies* on nationalism.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Ethnicity could convince people, based on their thought that their homeland is 'God-given'. Critically discuss.

3.3 Major Theories Applied to Ethnicity

In International Politics, there are two major schools of thought that guide theories and explanations of this area of study. These major branches are Functionalism and Conflict. Each perspective offers its own key to understanding, and no one perspective is believed as being entirely sufficient on its own; rather, each one provides an important way of understanding part of the political process. Together, they provide very powerful insight and numerous strategies for understanding political phenomena.

3.3.1 Functionalism

Functionalism is the most uniquely 'political idea' of the theoretical perspectives. Emile Durkheim (2001) developed it around 1900. Durkheim (2001) argues that political problems do not need to be explained on a case-by-case basis. There are patterns to political behavior that fluctuate at certain times between cultures and across groups. Durkheim (2001) seeks to explain political problems in terms of political institutions. When the political institutions that provide

stability and meaning for people (especially family and religion) have a weak hold in a given society, people become confused, weak, and disorganized. Basically, Durkheim (2001) argues that when working properly, political institutions keep people happy, well-behaved and cooperative. The underlying assumption is that social institutions keep society in a state of balance and that any temporary political problems may be indicative of temporary dysfunctions that will be overcome, thereby returning society to its harmonious nature. From a Functionalist perspective, numerous issues exist regarding the introduction of various ethnicities into a given society. When outside groups enter into a new society, their very presence is disruptive to the political balance. If the new group shares a great deal in common with the society they enter, the dysfunctions should be moderate. However, if the new group appears different (as with race) it may take longer to integrate into the group, resulting in dysfunctions during the transition. Ethnicity has been used to validate war and genocide for thousands of years. In conjunction with the notion of ethnicity, race can take on a much more permanently dysfunctional character. The reason for this is that ethnicity includes *religion*.

Religion is a very powerful political institution, as it provides answers to existential questions, ascribes meaning to birth and death, sanctions political practices, and governs political norms. These sound like good things – and they are – but if two groups live in close proximity to each other, yet share divergent religious beliefs, then they are bound to experience ongoing conflict as a result of this proximity. The presence of an alternate set of norms challenges the norms of the group. As a result, groups may develop overt hostility towards other groups whose basic assumptions and beliefs put their own in question. This is a functionalist explanation because it reiterates that the integrity of political norms and values, upheld through political institutions, is important for political solidarity. Even genocide gives the aggressive group a common enemy, unity of purpose and a stronger rationale for preserving their culture. For those being attacked, they also experience integration as an effect of their persecution. For a well-documented example of this, examine the Jewish culture as a result of the Holocaust.

3.3.2 Conflict

Conflict theory was developed by Karl Marx during the 1800s. It is included in the repertoire of political theories even though it pre-dated the formal classification of political as a discipline. It is included because Marx's theory provides a needed counterpoint to the Functionalist explanations. Marx argues that the basis of all society is *conflict* over access to the means of production. He contends that when people are shuffled into political groups (he uses two: owners and workers) based on their group membership, they are either oppressors or oppressed. Those who are owners are the oppressors because their role is to control workers and to keep a lion's share of the profits for themselves. Marx did not see this as a personal shortcoming of owners, but as an inevitable byproduct of political structure. He examines the historical organization of political power to demonstrate this point. Marx argues that there is an inherent source of conflict between workers' needs to survive and the interests of the owners who want to extract as much wealth as possible from the labor of the workers.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Analyze the major theories applied to ethnicity in International Politics.

3.4   Ethnic Conflict

An ethnic conflict involves two contending groups who fulfill the criteria for ethnicity, namely a "myth of common descent". While the source of the conflict may be political, social, economic, etc., the combatants must be expressly fighting for an ethnic issue or for the ethnic group's position within the society. This is the final criterion that differentiates an ethnic conflict from other forms of armed struggle in international politics. Ethnic conflict does not necessarily need to be violent. In a multiethnic society where freedom of speech is protected, ethnic conflict can be an everyday feature of plural democracies. For example, ethnic conflict might be a non-violent struggle for resources divided among ethnic groups. However, the subject of the confrontation must either be directly or symbolically linked with an ethnic group. In the case of healthy multiethnic democracies, such conflicts are usually institutionalized and channeled through parliaments, assemblies and bureaucracies or through non-violent demonstrations and strikes. While democracy cannot always prevent ethnic conflict flaring up into violence, institutionalized ethnic conflict does ensure that ethnic groups can articulate their demands in a peaceful manner, which reduces the likelihood of an outbreak of ethnic violence. On the other hand, in authoritarian systems, ethnic minorities are often unable to express their grievances. Grievances are instead allowed to fester which might lead to long phases of ethnic silence followed by a violent outburst.

3.4.1   Theories of Ethnic Conflict

The causes of ethnic conflict are debated by political scientists who generally fall into one out of the three schools of thought: primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist. More recent scholarship draws on all three schools.

3.4.2   Primordialist

Proponents of primordialist accounts of ethnic conflict argue that ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location'. The primordialist account relies on a concept of kinship between members of an ethnic group. Donald L. Horowitz (1985) argues that this kinship "makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances". Clifford Geertz (1963), a founding scholar of this school of thought, asserts that each person has a "natural" connection to one's perceived kinsmen. In time and through repeated conflict, essential ties to one's ethnie will coalesce and will interfere with ties to civil society. Therefore, in a primordialist account, ethnic groups will always threaten the survival of civil governments but not the existence of a nation formed by one ethnic group. Thus, ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic society is inevitable through a primordial lens. There are a number of political scientists who refer to the concept of ethnic wars as a myth because they argue that the root causes of ethnic conflict do not involve ethnicity per se but rather institutional, political and economic factors. These political scientists argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it leads to an essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in fact the wars that occur between them occur are often as a the result of political decisions.

Moreover, primordial accounts do not account for the spatial and temporal variations in ethnic violence. If these "ancient hatreds" are always simmering under the surface and are at the forefront of people's consciousness, then we should see ethnic groups constantly ensnared in violence. However, ethnic violence occurs in sporadic outbursts. For example, Varshney (2002) points out that although Yugoslaiva broke up due to ethnic violence in the 1990s, it did experience a long peace before the USSR collapsed.

Therefore, it is unlikely that primordial ethnic differences alone caused the outbreak of violence in the 1990s. However, primordialists have reformulated the "ancient hatreds" hypothesis and have focussed more on the role of human nature. Gilley (2004) argues that the existence of hatred and animosity does not have to be rooted in history for it to play a role in shaping human behavior and action: "If "ancient hatred" means a hatred consuming the daily thoughts of great masses of people, then the "ancient hatreds" argument deserves to be readily dismissed. However, if hatred is conceived as a historically formed "schema" that guides action in some situations, then the conception should be taken more seriously". However, it is difficult to measure the importance of emotions in leading to outbreaks of ethnic violence and identifying the factors that influence the intensity of hatred that ethnic groups harbor towards each other over time.

3.4.2 Instrumentalist

Donald Horowitz (1985) notes that the instrumentalist account "came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, in the debate about (white) ethnic persistence in what was supposed to have been an effective melting pot". This new theory sought to explain such persistence as a result of the actions of community leaders "who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes". In this account of ethnic identification, "[e]thnicity and race are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as a means to particular ends". Whether ethnicity is a fixed perception or not is not crucial in the instrumentalist accounts. Moreover, the scholars of this school generally do not oppose the view that ethnic difference plays a part in many conflicts. They simply claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts. Mass mobilization of ethnic groups can only be successful if there are latent ethnic differences to be exploited, otherwise politicians would not even attempt to make political appeals based on ethnicity and would focus instead on economic or ideological appeals.

Hence, it is difficult to completely discount the role of inherent ethnic differences. Furthermore, ethnic mass mobilization is likely to be plagued by collective action problems, especially if ethnic protests are likely to lead to violence. Instrumentalist scholars have tried to respond to these shortcomings. For example, Ashutosh Varshney (2007) argues that ethnic mobilization faces problems of coordination and not collective action. He points out that a charismatic leader acts as a focal point around which members of an ethnic group coalesce. The existence of such an actor helps to clarify beliefs about the behavior of others within an ethnic group.

3.4.3 Constructivist

The third which is the constructivist set of accounts stresses the importance of the socially constructed nature of ethnic groups, drawing on Benedict Anderson's concept of the imagined community. Proponents of this account point to Rwanda as an example because the Tutsi/Hutu distinction was codified by the Belgian colonial power in the 1930s on the basis of cattle ownership, physical measurements and church records. Identity cards were issued on this basis, and these documents played a key role in the genocide of 1994. Constructivist narratives of historical master cleavages are unable to account for local and regional variations in ethnic violence.

For example, Varshney (2007) highlights that in the 1960's, "racial violence in the USA was heavily concentrated in northern cities; southern cities though intensely politically engaged did not have riots". A constructivist master narrative is often a country level variable whereas we often have to study incidences of ethnic violence at the regional and local levels. Scholars of ethnic conflict and civil wars have introduced theories that draw insights from all three traditional schools of thought. In The Geography of Ethnic Violence, for example, Monica Duffy Toft (2003) shows how ethnic group settlement patterns, socially constructed identities, charismatic leaders, issue indivisibility, and state concern with precedent setting which can lead rational actors to escalate a dispute to violence, even when doing so, it is likely to leave contending groups in a much worse state. Such research addresses empirical puzzles that are difficult to explain using primordialist, instrumentalist, or constructivist approaches alone. As Varshney (2007) notes, 'pure essentialists and pure instrumentalists do not exist anymore'.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
Analyze the major theories applied to ethnic conflict in International Politics.

3.5 Ethnic Conflict in the Post–Cold War World

The term 'ethnicity' as used today arose in the mid-20th century, replacing the terminology of "races" or "nations" used in the 19th century. Regular warfare was formerly conceived as conflicts between nations, and only with the rise of multi-ethnic societies and the shift to asymmetric warfare did the concept of "ethnic conflict" arise as separate from generic "war". This has been the case since the collapse of the multi-ethnic Soviet Union and of the relatively homogeneous Yugoslavia in the 1990s, both of which were followed by ethnic conflicts that escalated to violence and civil war. The end of the Cold War thus sparked interest in two important questions about ethnic conflict: whether ethnic conflict was on the rise and whether given that some ethnic conflicts had escalated into serious violence, what, if anything, could scholars of large-scale violence (security studies, strategic studies, and international politics) offer by way of explanation? One of the most debated issues relating to ethnic conflict is whether it has become more or less prevalent in the post–Cold War period.

At the end of the Cold War, academics including Samuel P. Huntington (1993) and Robert D. Kaplan (1994) predicted a proliferation of conflicts fuelled by civilisational clashes, tribalism, resource scarcity and overpopulation. The post–Cold War period has witnessed a number of

ethnically-informed secessionist movements, predominantly within the former communist states. Conflicts have involved secessionist movements in the former Yugoslavia, Transnistria in Moldova, Armenians in Azerbaijan, Abkhaz and Ossetians in Georgia. Outside the former communist bloc, ethno-separatist strife in the same period has occurred in areas such as Sri Lanka, West Papua, Chiapas, East Timor, the Basque Country Southern Sudan and Hazaras in Afghanistan under the Taliban.

However, some theorists contend that this does not represent a rise in the incidence of ethnic conflict, because many of the proxy wars fought during the Cold War as ethnic conflicts were actually hot spots of the Cold War. Research shows that the fall of Communism and the increase in the number of capitalist states were accompanied by a decline in total warfare, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars, and the number of refugees and displaced persons. Indeed, some scholars have questioned whether the concept of ethnic conflict is useful at all. Others have attempted to test the "clash of civilisations" thesis, finding it to be difficult to operationalise and that civilisational conflicts have not risen in intensity in relation to other ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War. A key question facing scholars who attempt to adapt their theories of interstate violence to explain or predict large-scale ethnic violence is whether ethnic groups could be considered "rational" actors.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the consensus among scholars of large-scale violence was that ethnic groups should be considered irrational actors, or semi-rational at best. If true, general explanations of ethnic violence would be impossible. In the years since, however, scholarly consensus has shifted to consider that ethnic groups may in fact be counted as rational actors, and the puzzle of their apparently irrational actions (for example, fighting over territory of little or no intrinsic worth) must therefore be explained in some other way. As a result, the possibility of a general explanation of ethnic violence has grown, and collaboration between comparativist and international politics subfields has resulted in increasingly useful theories of ethnic conflict.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 5
The fall of Communism and the increase in the number of capitalist states were accompanied by a decline in total warfare, interstate wars, ethnic wars, revolutionary wars and the number of refugees and displaced persons, Is it true?

4.0   CONCLUSION

The importance of ethnicity as a force shaping human affairs, as a phenomenon to be understood can no longer be denied. Ethnicity is in the center of politics in almost every country, a potent source of challenges, conflicts and international tension. Nevertheless, we are only at the early stages of understanding this complex phenomenon. For some of us, ethnicity is a sense of belonging or attachment to a particular kind of group. For others, ethnicity is a social construct or a rational personal choice. One recent view treats ethnicity above all as a cognitive process. Therefore, the aim is to analyze the discourse of ethnicity in different political theories of international politics and then try to examine how different theories explain the force of ethnic discourse and the major role of ethnicity on the contemporary international stage. Thus, ethnicity

and ethnic discourse has become a magnet for researchers and elites who try to explain and understand world affairs.

5.0   SUMMARY

By presenting us different aspects and dimensions of ethnicity, all these social theories help us better understand the complex phenomenon of ethnicity and its implications on the international system. However, researchers in social sciences have not reached yet a consensus regarding the nature, origins and causes of ethnicity. Therefore, ethnicity remains a mystery but a magnet for researchers and others, a fact whose importance and relevance on the world political stage can no longer be denied.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you explain the relationship between ethnicity and nationalism, the causes of ethnic conflict debated by political scientists, and ethnic conflict in the post–Cold War world.

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UNIT 3 ETHNICITY AND NATION-BUILDING

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

'Nation' became an important term in International Politics at the beginning of 18th century. At the beginning of 21st century, the word 'Nation-building' became a widespread political process among States, together with the powerful "nationalist" movement. . Compared with these terms, "ethnicity" only appeared recently in the 20th century. At the beginning of the 21st century, there were about 200 sovereign states around the world that were recognized by the international community. An important phenomenon is that political boundaries have not always been drawn according to human group inhabitance but often oppositely, have been affected by wars, treaties and international powers.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- understand the relationship between the nation-building and ethnicity;
- examine the diversity of human groupings and their indigenous terms;
- analyse how the people's group identity is a continuum at different levels;
- understand the current ways by which human rights should be the ideal framework to solve international ethnic conflicts

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Nation-Building and Ethnicity

There are many terms for defining human groups as they emerge in various societies with different histories and cultural traditions at different times. The meanings of these terms become more confusing when they are translated into different languages. In English, there are terms to describe human groups such as "race," "tribe," "clan," "nation," "people," "country," "state," etc. These terms emerged in Western Europe, the countries initiating the industrial revolution, then they were introduced into other parts of the world accompanied by the western merchants, priests, and armies. These Europeans introduced their political and social systems as well as their ideology and values to other people by cultural influence or military force. "Nation-state" was the form of political entity first appearing in Western Europe, then adopted by colonies when they sought independence. "Nation" became an important term in international politics in the 21st century. "Nation-building" became a widespread political process among Asian, African and American countries, together with the powerful "nationalist" movement. Compared with these terms, "ethnic group" and "ethnicity" only appeared recently in the 20th century (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975). At the beginning of the 21st century, there were about 200 independent countries around the world that were recognized by the international society (the United Nations). An important phenomenon is that political boundaries have not always been drawn according to human group inhabitance but often, oppositely, have been affected by wars, treaties and international powers. Therefore, there are many different human groups living in the same countries; populations originally from the same group now living on both sides of a boundary. Many international conflicts, wars, foreign interventions, separations and independence movements in today's world are directly or indirectly related to the distribution of human groups across boundaries.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
All human groups seek political independence and build their own "countries". Discuss.

3.2   Diversity of Human Groupings and their Indigenous Terms

It should be said that scientifically human beings emerged through the evolutionary process in many parts of the earth. There is no evidence that all human beings come from the same origin. On the contrary, archeological findings show the traces and the wide spreading of early human in Asia, Africa and Europe. These human groups are different from each other in biological characteristics, language, cultural tradition and forms of society. When these different groups meet each other, they all needed terms to call themselves (us) and the other groups (them, or A and B, if they referred to two other groups) for distinguishing themselves. The terms varied in their coverage and meanings under different circumstances or environments. The people on the Madagascar Islands might have had some terms for small groups, because their total population size was large, and some characteristics (e.g. lineage or family) meaningful in the local context, while on the East Asian Plain such characteristics were ignored because of the small population and the more significant differences existing among the large groups. Therefore, there has been a

pattern of diversity in the terms people use to distinguish each other in different regions for a very long time before the world became smaller.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
There are differences among human groups in administrative identity and "national identity". Discuss

3.3 People's Group Identity: A Continuum at Different Levels

First, a person's image and identity about groups are not innate but learned from experiences after birth. Each different society has its own system of group identity. In some societies, family connection is more emphasized in identity, while in other societies geographic connection (place of origin) or religion is more emphasized. It is easy to understand that a person's network has many levels: very close family members, relatives, lineage with the same surname, place of origin, province, nation, race and finally human being. Which identity becomes the most important and significant is largely related to circumstances.

For instance, a Mongolian herdsman thinks family and relatives are important when he stays in the grasslands; he thinks herdsmen are important characters when compared with farmers when he visits a Mongolian village in the agricultural areas; he thinks being a Mongolian (ethnic identity) is important when he visits the city in Inner Mongolia where many Han work and reside; he thinks the identity of being from Inner Mongolia is important when he visits Beijing and meets Uygurs, Tibetans and more Han people; and he also thinks a Chinese citizen and a racial Asian is important when he visits the United States of America. These are samples of identity levels. In other studies, a similar framework of "an articulating hierarchy of relational alterities" in identity analysis was discussed (Gladney, 1996).

In the modern world, the most important group identity is country citizenship. This identity is associated with legal rights and responsibilities under the constitution of the country. In the very complicated process of nation-building in each country, many factors affect the final formation and geographic-population coverage of each nation. This is why there are many human groups who are transnational. To a certain extent, where the line of "national border" was drawn is determined by many factors, even by accident. Once the "border" was drawn, the system would run following its government's direction within the border and gradually the "border" would become significant not only administratively but economically and culturally as well. East Timor and Gibraltar are examples. Their people feel that they are different from those in Indonesia and Spain after the administration of a foreign government for years.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Is it possible to keep the current political structure in the world stable while making most human groups feel that their rights are respected and protected? Discuss.

3.4 The Multi-group Entity: A Common Form in the Past and the Present

When we look at the histories of the countries around the world, wars and conquests have made most old kingdoms and empires a combination of many different groups. In many cases, these kingdoms and empires include groups speaking different languages, having different life customs, sometimes even having different religious beliefs, as in the case of ancient China. The "nation-state" is just a phenomenon which appeared in modern history, beginning in Western Europe. According to Anthony Smith (1991), there are two models of "nations": one is "a civil model of the nation" in western Europe; another is "an ethnic model of the nation" in eastern Europe and Asia suggests that "nation-state" or "a civil model of the nation" is a new phenomenon appearing in the 17th or 18th centuries, and not a universal form of political entity because there are multi-ethnic entities in China and India as well as in other Asian countries.

In the period of industrialization and the development of international trade, capitalists in Western Europe wanted to build up their "national" markets and tax systems to protect their "domestic market," while expanding into the markets of other countries. Therefore, the big empires fell apart in the "nationalist movements." In the East, when the old empires (such as China) were threatened by Western imperialists and colonialists, all groups within the empire were forced to unite together to protect their common interests. In this process, the old country was organized into the new form it learned from the West, and this process actually became the process of "nation-rebuilding." In some cases, such as Indonesia, the colonies controlled many groups and its administration became the base of the nation-building for a new country (Anderson, 1983). After the Second World War, large scale international labor migration following the labor shortages in Western Europe and the United States made these countries more multi-ethnic. The distribution of refugees and expansion of international enterprises also worked in the same direction. The multi-ethnic entity (independent country) has become a common phenomenon in today's world.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
The 'nation-state' is just a phenomenon which appeared in modern history. Discuss.

3.5 The Most Important: Identity and Order

When the terms "ethnic group" and "ethnicity" appeared, they mainly referred to the different groups within countries. These groups might have different racial backgrounds, speak different languages and have different cultural traditions. In the case of immigration, they might have different places of origin. Such examples are Blacks, Asians and Hispanics in the United States. The term is also used in similar cases in European countries. These terms can also be used in the multi-group countries on the other continents. One general division can be suggested to define "domestic minorities" as "ethnic groups" regardless of their historical status. If this division can receive common agreement, it will certainly solve many problems and conflicts in international politics.

When compared with the group structure and relations in Western countries, the minority groups in China (Tibetans, Mongolians, Manchurians, Hui, Uygur, etc.) should be considered as "ethnic

minorities" like the racial and ethnic groups in the United States (Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics), and not as "nations" or "nationalities." They should enjoy all rights and responsibilities as citizens and also enjoy their cultural traditions and religious freedom. But they cannot establish political organizations to seek "separation" and "independence." The same opinion can be applied to any other country. Muslims in India, Tamils in Sri Lanka, and Tajik in Afghanistan are "ethnic minorities" in these nations.

The "nation-building" process is completed when a nation is recognized by the international society whose legal forum is the United Nations. The principle of "self-determination" should not be in practice in today's world. All domestic minority groups are "ethnic groups," not "nations" or "nationalities." They are parts of the "pluralist unity" of their nation. The international society or any given country should not encourage any of these domestic ethnic minority groups to launch "nationalist separatism" and seek "independence." Of course, it is possible that one country might encourage an ethnic group to launch a "separatist movement," even a civil war in another country in order to seek its own strategic goals or practical interests. This kind of action is selfish and very harmful to the target country as well as world order. There is no need to say that terrorist attacks are a common measure of a small group of people to threaten the majority. It naturally becomes the weapon of the various "nationalist separatists."

In the 21st century, the most important thing is to maintain the peace of the world. Recognition of all independent and sovereign states that currently exist is the precondition for such a goal. All current boundaries should be fully respected and any effort to change them should not be allowed. If there are still boundaries unresolved among countries, or colonies whose statuses are still unclear, these issues should be resolved as soon as possible by the involved countries, with the assistance of the United Nations if necessary.

There are different trends in different parts of the world today. In Western Europe, countries are eager to establish a united league, the "European Union." They have no passport control and taxes within the borders of the Union. They now use the same currency. In this region, where two world wars started, territory has become less significant. Capital and labor move freely across the border and cooperation has brought economic prosperity for all participant nations. On the other extreme case, the wars and conflicts among ethnic groups (Serbs, Croatians, Muslims, Albanians, etc.) made the nation of Yugoslavia fall apart and completely destroyed the political stability and economic achievement of the last half century. The most important reasons for this human disaster were "nationalism" and the seeking of political independence for each ethnic group in a new "nation-building" process. This is a misleading direction to resolve the problems between ethnic groups in a modern nation.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 5
What is Nation Building? Discuss

3.6   Human Rights: Ideal Framework for International Ethnic Conflicts

The United States treats its ethnic groups as "cultural minorities" and never allows them to become a political power seeking "independence" or control a territory. At the same time, the United States has the policy to help and assist its ethnic minorities under the principle of "human

rights" and the "rights of citizenship." It has been quite successful in smoothing down racial and ethnic conflicts in the US. Contrarily, the US encourages the ethnic groups in other countries to fight for "independence" and connects the previous principle of "self-determination" to the issue of "human rights." This is a typical double standard viewpoint to deal with domestic and foreign affairs. It will be helpful to resolve problems by applying the US policy dealing with its international ethnic issues to other parts of the world. In general, all social problems related to ethnic groups should be handled as international "human rights" and "rights and responsibility" issues. The international society will pay attention to help nations to improve their situation of "human rights" according to their history and conditions in political progress and economic achievement. If these ideas and suggestions are acceptable, this world will certainly become more peaceful and many ethnic groups will be able to obtain their rights and interests without destroying their nation and themselves.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 6
Critically discuss the issue of "human rights" and "self-determination" in International Politics.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Nation-Building is a highly complex and risky undertaking. It involves a wide range of actors, of interests, mechanisms, strategies and potential outcomes. It can lead to stable, successful Nation-States or to war and chaos. The questions of ethnicity and other forms of political identities is therefore one of the key factors. But at this point in the research process, it looks like the state being at the center of importance. The state in Nation-Building processes generally is both an actor and a means it is both the problem and part of the solution. The state structures and their relation to different segments of society are at the core of Nation-Building. Many sectors of society may try to influence, to infiltrate or even control or conquer it. The state can help regulate and moderate societal processes of integration or it can become a tool of dominance of some elites over the whole of society or competing elites and contribute to fragmentation. The state and its relationship to diverse and heterogeneous societies may very well be the key point to analyze complex processes of Nation-Building.

5.0 SUMMARY

A viable nation-building must not be a project designed by external powers, (i.e. in Afghanistan, and Iraq) but a project by the citizens of a particular country. When nation-building is homegrown, it acquires national legitimacy. Political leaders committed to the development and security of their society should embrace nonkilling idea as a major pillar of harmonious democratic entity. Ethnic diversity should not be an obstacle for nation-building if it is channelled positively. There is always strength in diversity which if harnessed, will provide a template for a society free from carnage. A transforming approach to effective management of 'lethal ethnicity' (i.e. ethnic rivalry, marginalization) while building a nation will require values-creating mechanisms, this requires linking decisions about nation-building to economic development, food production and nonkilling society. The tragedies and loss of lives as a result of adversarial policies elevates the need for vision and goal for policies of nation building that

focuses on people's needs and welfare in all countries. Until that is done the dream of a harmonious and stable democratic nation will remain a mirage.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you are to explain Nation-Building and Ethnicity in the global world.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 4   IMPACT OF ETHNICITY ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

CONTENTS

4.0   INTRODUCTION

This introductory unit shall examine how Ethnicity is an identity category that signifies membership in a group bounded by shared descent, history, myths, symbols, and cultural practices. Ethnicity and ethnic group belonging matters for politics when it becomes the basis for political mobilization, competition, and conflict. Ethnicity matters for international relations when ethnically framed politics leads to instability, violence, or war within and between states. Much of the international relations literature related to ethnicity therefore address the causes of conflict between ethnic and national groups. One of the major debates within the literature revolves around the causal significance of ethnicity: is there something uniquely conflict prone about ethnicity as a form of political identity? Some scholars see ethnic diversity and politicized ethnicity as inherent problems for democratic and international stability or argue that conflicts over culture are more likely to lead to intractable, large-scale violence.

2. 0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine Ethnic Identity and International Politics
- examine how challenges to International Politics emanating from various ethnic identity from the benefits of globalisation
- examine the contribution of ethnic identity to understandings of global order,
- examine the concept of 'Primordialists and constructivists' and assess its role in International Politics

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Introduction: Ethnic Identity and International Politics

Ethnic identity refers to a set of characteristics by which an individual is recognizable as a member of a discrete group united by ties of blood and heritage. Ethnic identity forms the core of national identity for most of the world's people. Scholarly debates in global studies center on nature of ethnic identity--whether it is immutable and primordial or a social construction shaped by dynamic historical conditions and crafty ethnic politicians. The fate of ethnic identity is also a key issue of debate in the current literature on globalization. On the one hand, many observers argue that globalization erodes distinct ethnic identities by erasing boundaries that separate people and unleashing forces that would create a "global culture." Others argue that globalization reinforces exclusive ethnic identities as a more interdependent world exposes more visible difference through more frequent contact. Furthermore, as transnational migration has led to ethnic diversity across the globe, minority ethnic groups have asserted their rights and called upon their collective identities in order to build solidarity and to affirm their group's claims to territory and to resources. This unit expands on the definition of ethnic identity and briefly examines the historical relationship between ethnic identity and national identity in the context of global studies. It then surveys alternative explanations for the role that ethnic identity plays in international relations. Finally, it provides an overview of the debates over the effects of globalization on the continued role of ethnic identity in world politics.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
The Ethnic Identity in International Politics mainstream is somewhat more complex and contested. Discuss.

3.2   Ethnic Identity in International Politics

Ethnic identity refers to an individual's identity with a group of people who share physical and/or cultural traits that signal a blood relationship or a common and enduring descent. Beyond physical similarities, those characteristics include: a common language, common ancestry, and shared history, traditions, culture, religion, and/or kinship. When an individual recognizes that he or she shares these characteristics with others, unique individual and personal identities can dissolve, and a common identity with an enduring collectively can emerge.

Although ethnic identities can manifest themselves simply as distinct cultural practices and institutions of a particular ethnic group (i.e. "Chinese" food, "Latin" music, the "German" language, the "Russian/Greek/Serbian" Orthodox Church), ethnic group identity has had profound political consequences in international relations. In world politics, ethnic identity is often linked with claims to territory believed to be the exclusive "homeland" of a particular ethnic group. The ideology that legitimates this claim is an exclusive nationalist doctrine that is sometimes referred to as "ethnic nationalism." Ethnic nationalism is the belief that the members of a particular ethnic group are a "nation"-- part of an extended family with intrinsic rights to a particular piece of land. They believe that other groups that might inhabit or claim that land do

not have those same rights. This belief has particular emotive power, providing ethnic groups with a crucial source of solidarity while it reinforces ethnic identity.

This ethnic nationalist ideal has been largely realized across the globe. In fact, the current system of nation-states is, for the most part, the product of a violent process of ethnic separation or outright destruction of ethnic groups too weak to claim territories of their own. In Europe, after massive population transfers in the wake of the two world wars, every state except two— Belgium and Switzerland--was designated as the territory of a single dominant ethnic group. For much of the developing world, decolonization led to violent ethnic disaggregation and the creation of states with distinct ethnic identities through the exchange or expulsion of local ethnic minorities. Salient examples include India, Pakistan, Kashmir, and Israel. During the Cold War, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia were the only multiethnic states in the Soviet bloc. But at the cold war's end, each of these countries broke apart along ethnic lines, and their separate ethnic populations demanded a "homeland" of their own. Sometimes they achieved that goal: Czechs and Slovaks achieved it peacefully, Serbs and Croats achieved it through violent conflict. In some areas, ethnic groups have settled for ethnic minority status--with its accompanying limited rights and opportunities-- in the "homeland" of a dominant ethnic group. Examples include Hungarians in Serbia, Russians in Ukraine and the Baltic states, Turks in Germany, and Roma throughout the countries of Europe. Some are still fighting for a separate homeland or control of land claimed by another ethnic group: South Ossetiaians, Abkhazis, Chechens, Kosovars, and Tibetans are prominent examples of self-identified ethnic groups seeking varying degrees of autonomy that would grant them a homeland of their own.

The process by which ethnic identity groups achieve or wish to secure a homeland for themselves is far from complete. And that process is often violent when territory is contested. When two or more exclusive ethnic groups with emotional attachments to a piece of territory and claim the same homeland, they often resort to violent political struggle to determine whose homeland that territory will become. In fact, since the end of World War II, ethno-cultural conflicts over land have become the most common sources of political violence in the world. Many observers argue that "partition" is the most peaceful solution to these conflicts: a state and piece of land for each ethnic group, i.e. the Palestinians, the Kosovars, and the Chechnyians. But, given the multiplicity of ethnic groups in the world who seek a homeland they can call their own, there is not enough land to go around.

Many scholars have sought explanations for the rise of ethnic nation-states, for the oppression of one or more ethnic groups by others, and for ethnic conflict over territory. Two views dominate the debate: the "primordialist," and the "constructivist." The "primordialist" view asserts that ethnic identity is part of our essential human constitution and that our desire to identify with a group whose characteristics we possess is simply reflexive. Furthermore, the argument goes, we as humans indentify ourselves in opposition to other ethnic groups: the urge to reject "the other" was encoded in our oldest human ancestors. That urge has often resulted in oppression of weaker ethnic groups by more powerful ones, as well as xenophobia, and violent "ethnic cleansing," the removal of one ethnic group from the land by another group who wants exclusive rights to the same land. The primordialist argument suggests that ethnic identity, with its markers of

collective exclusivity, and tendencies toward xenophobia and intolerance are "natural" to the human condition. This explains the enduring role that ethnic conflict plays in world politics.

The "constructivist" argument, on the other hand, assumes that ethnic identity is malleable and dynamic rather than innate and unchanging. This view asserts that ethnic identity--indeed any identity-- is "constructed" by social, political, and historical forces, and that individual identities change over time as social contexts change. Furthermore, people exhibit different identities in different contexts. Identities disappear and return (or are "re-invented"). If, for example, an ethnic group is oppressed on the basis of ethnic identity, its members can either try to assimilate into the dominant group, taking on its identity for their own, or they can try to intensify group solidarity and identity in an effort to resist and struggle for equal rights or political control for the benefit of their own ethnic group. As equal civil rights have been granted to ethnic groups in the United States, for example, ethnic identity has gradually weakened, and there is little talk within those groups of achieving political autonomy. Constructivists hasten to argue that this does not mean that ethnic identity has lost all meaning; it simply means that it has become one of the many ways that individuals in the United States identify themselves and that ethnicity does not form the core of national identity in most developed multi-ethnic societies. They point out that in many world regions, ethnic groups sharing the same land, who once fought fiercely with one another, have also made peace, and different groups have found their loyalty transferred to a multi-ethnic nation. Examples include Whites, Africans, and African ethnic groups in South Africa, Pomaks, Turks, and Bulgarians in Bulgaria, or the Chinese and the Malay in Malaysia. Ethnic tensions continue in these places, as well as in the United States but apart from a few extremist notions, national identity is not linked to the belief that the nation is the "homeland" of one specific ethnic group. In these examples, even if accumulated hatreds once fanned the flames of violent conflict, they were attenuated by alternative memories, more current experience, and institutional incentives. From the "constructivist" perspective, primordial explanations that call on "centuries of accumulated hatreds" cannot account for situations in which different ethnic groups coexist peacefully.

Some constructivists explain ethnic separation and conflict in multi-ethnic societies as a result of the manipulation of ethnic identity by "ethnic entrepreneurs" in the political process. Ethnic entrepreneurs are politicians who appeal to a common ethnic identity in an attempt to gain support in their struggle for political power. They often have the incentive and the opportunity to exploit ethnic cleavages under conditions of injustice that their co-ethnics experience. "Bandwagoning effects" can work to the ethnic entrepreneur's advantage, intensifying ethnic identity: if one person sees his co-ethnics agreeing with the rhetoric of an ethnic entrepreneur, the costs of agreement with and support for that political entrepreneur decrease. Indeed, the costs of *not* joining might go up if co-ethnics accuse non-supporters of group betrayal. Furthermore, when one ethnic group jumps on the ethnic bandwagon, other groups are motivated to jump on ethnic bandwagons of their own in order to balance against the first group's strength. Ethnic identity is thus strengthened. Constructivists point out that this is the process by which ethnic entrepreneurs were able to gain adherents in the republics of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia after 1989, and why, for example, the separatist appeals of Abkhaz and Sikh ethnic entrepreneurs resonated with significant elements of the populations in these regions in different historical periods.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Critically highlight how ethnic identity influence International Politics as a result of globalisation and the end of the Cold War.

3.3   The Impact of Globalization on Ethnic Identity

Many who believe that ethnic identity is "constructed" by large historical forces and reinforced by specific ethnic entrepreneurs have suggested that under globalization, the concept of ethnic identity is eroding and that ethno nationalist states are unraveling. Globalization, they argue, is dampening ethnic identity and weakening ethnic nationalism. This is because the global spread of market imperatives, the growing universal importance of science and technology, and the global diffusion of information and ideas demand less identification with a specific ethnic group and less attachment to homeland. As globalization intensifies, constructivists argue, the process of separating ethnic identity groups by rigid borders--so painfully achieved in the twentieth century-- is coming to an end. Market imperatives demand a common language, produce common behaviors, and create cosmopolitan identities. The requirements of science, technology, and information create a demand for universal standards and language, which in turn requires the removal of obstacles to free communication across borders. Progress in science and technology demands objectivity, impartiality, rationality and open communication. These forces eat away at national differences. Societies have become more knowledgeable of one another as international travel has become faster, easier, and cheaper. Different ethnic groups have come to appreciate one another as people, music, art, food, and film flow across weakened national borders. As goods, ideas, technology, culture, and information seep through national borders and single market rationality entrenches itself throughout ethnic nationalist homelands, cultures are converging, and local ethnic identities are weakening.

Primordialists often make two counterarguments. First, some suggest that globalization will have little impact on ethno-nationalist identity because, with the global reach of the multinational corporation, jobs can be brought to the workers instead of the workers to the jobs. And with the rise of information technology and instant communication, people in far flung nations can be part of technical, medical, legal, and other professional teams without leaving their homelands.

Second, primordialists argue that the process of globalization can actually enhance the power of ethnic identity and exacerbate conditions that cause conflict among ethno-nationalist states. With its speed and ease of communication, globalization has decreased the world's size. In a small world, interdependence means constant contact; the closer the contact, the more visible the differences; close contact gives groups more to fight about, and thus--the argument runs-- intense interdependence may actually stimulate belligerence. For the primordialist, contact breeds contempt. They point out, for example, that the integration of constituent republics of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, including their mixed populations and economic interdependence, did not prevent the disintegration of these two countries into separate ethnic homelands. Many suggest that the industrialized West is not immune to these same primordial forces: Immigration has ignited conflict throughout Europe as it has turned homogeneous nations into heterogeneous societies with vast differences in appearance, wealth, values, and cultural practices. Native populations have often turned against these immigrants: hate crimes against foreigners have

multiplied in recent years, and European governments have taken increasing measures to plug leaks in porous borders. In a world still dominated by ethno-nationalist states, but marked by growing immigration, native populations and their governments assert their ethnic identity as they seek or try to keep states "of their own" for themselves.

Within this context, both primordialists and those constructivist observers who focus on "ethnic entrepreneurs" also argue that, like any powerful movement for change, globalization encounters resistance. Integration in the global economy—even if the result is net aggregate growth—creates economic winners and losers, both in the domestic and international economies. Global economic forces can cause distinct cultural groups in multi-ethnic societies to suffer disproportionate economic hardships and gains and can cause some ethno-nationalist states to prosper while others suffer. If economic hardship falls disproportionately on distinct cultural groups, economic grievances can be transformed into a resource for political mobilization. Groups with grievances are ripe for recruitment efforts by ethnic entrepreneurs. Joerg Haider, for example, the former leader of Austria's extreme right wing party, was a popular ethnic entrepreneur, gaining particular support among Austria's unemployed native citizens as jobs disappeared with Austria's integration into the European and international economies. His electoral campaign speeches portrayed immigrants as being responsible for both unemployment and increased public expenditure, as well as posing a threat to the preservation of Austrian 'identity.' Primordialists and constructivists alike suggest that, although the forces of globalization may have created a cosmopolitan identity—particularly among elites—they have failed to erase and even deepened ethnic divides.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Primordialists and constructivists alike suggest that, although the forces of globalization may have created a cosmopolitan identity—particularly among elites—they have failed to erase and even deepened ethnic divides. Discuss.

4.0   CONCLUSION

The concept of ethnic identity and its power to unite large groups of people in their quest for land and resources is central to the study of world politics and to global studies more generally. Certainly the world of the 21st century is still gripped by ethnic nationalism, ethnic tensions continue to simmer in many multi-ethnic societies, and ethnic identity is still at the heart of national identity throughout most of the world. Scholars of global studies, however, disagree about the nature of that identity--whether it is innate or malleable and whether ethnic divides can or should be overcome. The phenomenon of globalization has sharpened those debates. Globalization appears to be a double-edged sword. It weakens the boundaries between nation-states as it increases their interdependence and promises to weaken the power of ethnic identity to shape global politics. But it also creates close contact between some formerly separate ethnic groups, and it creates winners and losers along ethnic divides. Disappearing borders separating distinct ethnic groups can thus ignite ethnic conflict.

5.0   SUMMARY

Ethnic identity is one of the greatest pillars of any society world-wide. The variety and competition that comes with it is good for social-economic growth. However, ethnic groups' interests and completion for scarce resources among the different groups brings about ethnic polarization. Most countries especially in Africa have experienced a form of conflict that has an ethnic relation. These wars take an ethnic perspective even when the real cause could be land/natural resources, politics, discrimination or unequal distribution of resources. Ethnic conflicts have caused a lot of destruction in many great nations. Therefore structures and policies have to be put in place in countries with potential of this conflict in order to immunize national economy from annihilation.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summarize and critically evaluate the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of ethnic identity and International Politics.

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MODULE 3 NATIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

This module is interesting and vital for your understanding of Nationalism which is a multi-faceted phenomenon. Expressing both claims for recognition and for superiority, it is marked by an intrinsic moral ambivalence. Politically, its emergence has coincided with the affirmation of liberal and democratic ideas, and in particular the notion of popular sovereignty. It expresses the political identification of citizens with their state, and the policies of governments to reinforce such identification. It is based on the existence of a shared national identity, relying on the presence of historical, cultural, language or religious bonds. However, because of the imperfect congruence of states and national identities, nationalism has also developed outside and against nation state, to affirm the rights of minorities. Since the international system is based on sovereign nation-states as its constituent units, nationalism is an intrinsic feature of it, often underestimated by International Politics. Nationalist policies of states, the competition for economic and political power in an international context where economic and political power differentials remain outspoken, contribute to the persistence of nationalism. Because statehood is the established form of recognition of national identities, the international system is moreover confronted with a permanent tension between maintaining the stability of the state system, and claims of minorities for statehood. While reluctant to accept such claims, except in the specific case of colonies, the international system has been more attentive to the cultural, linguistic and religious rights of minorities.

You will find the comprehensive discussions of this module under the following units:

Unit 1 Nationalism
Unit 2 Nationalism and International Politics I
Unit 3 Nationalism and International Politics II
Unit 4 Nationalism and International Politics III

UNIT 1 NATIONALISM

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is one of the most ancient forces that influence world events. Objectively, it can be said to play a dual role in International Politics. Nationalism is one of those things that most of us take for granted, but which nobody ever stops to think about. Nationalism, like ethnicity, is something whose exact definition is elusive. Just as there are many definitions of ethnicity, many have tried to exactly define what nationalism is, with no clear consensus. Still, there are a few factors that are common in the discussions of nationalism, such as language, ancestry, and nationality.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- introduce you to the central concepts in the study of nationalism and International Politics
- develop your comparative skills of analysis of differing international problems and policies related to nationalism
- promote critical engagement with the nationalism literature
- enable you to demonstrate this engagement by developing your ability to present, substantiate and defend complex arguments.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Meaning of Nationalism

Nationalism, in particular, remains the pre-eminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political communities, claim rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by reference to "the people" of a country. Nationalism is defined as a collective sentiment or identity, bounding and binding

together those individuals who share a sense of large-scale political solidarity aimed at creating, legitimating, or challenging states. As such, nationalism is often perceived or justified by a sense of historical commonality which coheres a population within a territory and which demarcates those who belong and others who do not (Greenfeld, 1991).

According to Greenfeld (1991) such "a specific sentiment of solidarity may be linked to memories of a common political destiny." But such boundedness is not one that is historically given; instead such cohesion must be and has been actively constructed by both elites and commoners. It may then be solidified as a fundamental political belief, inspiring and inspired by engagement with state authority. For nationalism as a particular collective sentiment and related discourse to become a historical force, it must so refer to a state as an existing structure or potential object of engagement. This definition of nationalism does not specify the locus of its initiation. It instead only stipulates that such a subjective collective sentiment or identity claim coincides with or refers to existing or emergent institutionalized state power. Nationalism often inspires support for elites ruling a state, though its basis is not necessarily an elite ideology but rather a more widespread sentiment that may or may not be inspired by an elite or coincide with the interests of a particular elite nor is it necessarily in opposition to such an authoritative elite. So defining nationalism as a mass sentiment for or against state power specifies our subject. If nationalism is not defined with reference to the state, then it would remain too vague a subject of analysis.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Explain the distinction between the political doctrine of nationalism (i.e. what it claims) and the reality or otherwise of the nation.

3.2   The Emergence of Nationalism

Historically, an important part played by nationalist ideologies in many contemporary nation-states has been to integrate an ever larger number of people culturally, politically and economically. The French could not be meaningfully described as a 'people' before the French revolution, which brought the Ile-de-France (Parisian) language, notions of liberal political rights, uniform primary education and, not least, the self-consciousness of being French, to remote areas - first to the local bourgeoisies, later to the bulk of the population. Similar large-scale processes took place in all European countries during the 19th century, and the modern state, as well as nationalist ideology, is historically and logically linked with the spread of literacy (Goody, 1986), the quantification of time and the growth of industrial capitalism. The model of the nation-state as the supreme political unit has spread throughout the 20th century. Not in the least due to the increasing importance of international relations (trade, warfare, etc.), but rather the nation-state has played an extremely important part in the making of the contemporary world. Social integration on a large scale through the imposition of a uniform system of education, the introduction of universal contractual wage work, standardization of language, etc., is accordingly the explicit aim of nationalists in, for example, contemporary Africa.

It is, of course, possible to achieve this end through contrasting the nation with a different nation or a minority residing in the state, which is then depicted as inferior or threatening. This strategy for cohesion is extremely widespread and is not a peculiar characteristic of the nation-state as such: similar ideologies and practices are found in tribal societies and among urban minorities alike. Insofar as enemy projections are dealt with in the present context, they are regarded as means to achieve internal national cohesion since international conflicts are not considered. Nationalism as a mode of social organization represents a qualitative leap from earlier forms of integration. Within a national state, all men and women are citizens and they participate in a system of relationships where they depend upon and contribute to the existence of a vast number of individuals whom they will never know personally. The main social distinction appears as that between insiders and outsiders; between citizens and non-citizens. The total system appears abstract and impenetrable to the citizen who must nevertheless trust that it serves his needs. The seeming contradiction between the individual's immediate concerns and the large-scale machinations of the nation-state is bridged through nationalist ideology proposing to accord each individual citizen particular value. The ideology simultaneously depicts the nation metaphorically as an enormous system of blood relatives or as a religious community.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Identify other definitions of "nationalism" not listed above that can enhance your understanding of this course.

3.3   The modernity of Nationalism

The discourse of nationalism is distinctively modern. It is variously argued to have originated in the seventeenth century British rebellion against monarchy (Kahn, 1944), the eighteenth century struggles of New World elites against Iberian colonialism (Anderson, 1991), the French revolution of 1789 (Alter, 1989), and the German reaction to that revolution and to German disunity (Breuilly, 1982). But as Best (1982) puts it:

> Historians of nationalism agree to differ in their estimates of how much of it (and what sorts of it) already existed in the Atlantic world of 1785. They are at one in recognizing that that world by 1815 was full of it, and that although each national variety had of course its strong characteristics, those varieties had enough in common for it to constitute the most momentous phenomenon of modern history.

In the early modem era the idea of nation as an aggregate of people linked by co-residence or common sociocultural characteristics took political and cultural connotations in struggles with and between states and over state-building. This led to the distinctively modem invocation of nationalism as "a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones and in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state-a contingency already excluded by the principle in its general formulation should not separate the power-holders from the rest" (Anderson 1991). As Anderson (1991) sums up a generation before, the discourse of nationalism ideal-typically offers three propositions: "that humanity is naturally divided into nations, that nations are known by certain characteristics which can be ascertained and that the only legitimate type of government is national self-government".

Nationalism has become the preeminent discursive form for modern claims to political autonomy and self-determination. The term was apparently coined in German by the philosopher Herder (Berlin, 1976) and in French by the Abbe Barruel (Anderson, 1991) just less than 200 years ago. It was linked to the concept of nation-state in the notorious formulations of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations (Mayall, 1990). In the wake of communism's collapse, nationalism and ethnic conflict appeared as the primary issues in the realignment of Eastern European politics and identity (Chirot, 1991). Indeed in many instances, communist governments had been cynically and idealistically active involved in nationalist mobilization in varying degrees cynically and idealistically (Connor, 1984). Appeals to the idea of nation organize movements of ethnic separatism from Quebec (Birch, 1989) to the postcolonial states of Africa (Davidson, 1992). Nationalism is equally prominent in movements to integrate disparate polities, as in twentieth century Arab nationalism (Anderson et. al., 1994) and nineteenth century German nationalism before it (Coetzee, 1990). New nationalisms proliferate throughout the developed West (Smith, 1981) and attempts are made to decolonize the discourse of nationalism in the Third World and claim it for indigenous movements and meanings (Blaut, 1987). In East Asia, nationalism has throughout the twentieth century been the rhetoric not only of anti-imperialist struggles but of calls for strengthening and democratizing states from within (Chow, 1960). Nationalism is anything but a thing of the past and even the newest claims to nationalism are often rooted in rhetoric of pre-existing ethnicity.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
How useful for an understanding of modern nationalism are the distinctions between civic and ethnic nations?

3.4   Nationalism as a Discourse

Despite the agreement about the contemporary salience of the discourse of nationalism, Anderson (1991) makes a sharply contentious assertion when he writes "the basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity." Even the repetition of the term modem in both subject and predicate of his sentence does not save it from controversy, for Anderson is arguing against a widespread view of both academics and nationalists themselves. This is the view that modern nations are based on ethnic identities that are in some sense ancient, primordial, possibly even natural or at least prior to any particular political mobilization. A great deal is at stake in this argument. Most crucially, can "nationhood" be taken as the prior basis for nationalist claims? Is self-determination, for example, a political right to be accorded all "true" nations, as the apostles of nationalism assert in the mid-nineteenth century "springtime of the Peoples" (Kahn, 1962)? Are Serbs intrinsically a nation, to revert to our opening example, such that any claims of multiethnic Bosnia-Hercegovina to include large Serbian populations are infringements on the rights of the Serbian nation? Or, is "nation" at best a rhetorical mode of making political claims and at worst a way for certain elites to manipulate mass sentiments in the pursuit of power? In more academic terms, does the prior existence of ethnicity explain nationhood and does nationhood explain nationalism? Or is the notion of membership in a common nation (and perhaps even in an ethnic group) a product of nationalist (or ethnic) mobilization? Is nationalism simply a derivative result of state-formation and other "material" aspects of modernization, or is it one of the primary constituents of modernity? This

issue is hard to keep entirely clear in our minds because most variants of nationalist rhetoric claim the nation as an always-already existing basis for action, whether as the continuation of ancient ethnicity or as the result of historically specific acts of foundation. As modems, we are all participants in the discourse of nations whether we like it or not. Many of the categories and presumptions of this discourse are so deeply ingrained in our everyday language and our academic theories that it is virtually impossible to shed them, and we can only remind ourselves continuously to take them into account. A simple example is the assumption that "society" is a noun referring to self-sufficient units with clear boundaries.

Tilly (1984) makes this the first of his "eight Pernicious Postulates of twentieth-century social thought": "Society" is a thing apart; the world as a whole divides into distinct "societies, each having its more or less autonomous culture, government, economy, and solidarity". This is a usage produced by the discourse and political salience of the modem idea of nation (and specifically its hyphenated conjunction with "state"). As Halle (1962) puts it, "perhaps the idea alone can give the community the singleness and integrity which we attribute to it when we think of it as a corporate person." In fact, societies have not always been and are not everywhere equally bounded, nor is it clear that they are as bounded in the archetypal cases of modern nation-states (Anderson, 1991). Even island Britain manifests a complex history and present struggle over external as well as internal boundaries (Anderson, 1991). Given the multiple and overlapping networks of our social relations (Mann 1986 and forthcoming), and given the large scale international flows of our ideas, language, and cultural productions (Alter 1989). It should perhaps be a matter of principle to avoid using terms like society as though they referred to unitary, clearly demarcated objects. But this would be an extremely difficult principle to live up to. We live in a world-system which is organized into states and which thematizes certain cultural differences as constituting "cultures," while others are suppressed as unimportant internal or cross-cutting variations. This world-system makes both nationalism and claims to ethnic identity as problematic as they are imperative, even while it makes it hard to escape from the power of received categories to understand why they are problematic.

This is one reason why "nationalism" and corollary terms like "nation" have proved notoriously hard concepts to define (Alter 1989). The notion of nation is so deeply imbricated in modern politics as to be essentially contested, because any definition will legitimate some claims and delegitimate others. It also reflects more general problems with essentialist definitions (Fuss, 1989). Thus, not only because they bias usage for or against various political claims, but because they are based either (i) on qualities which putative nations or nationalist movements share with admitted non-nations (such as ethnicity), or (ii) on qualities which are not clearly shared among all recognized members of the set of nations (like control over or ambition to control a state). Though nationalisms are extremely varied phenomena, they are joined by common involvement in the modem discourse of nationalism. They are common objects of reference in international law, political debate, and even economic development programs.

As Anderson (1991) has stressed, once the idea of imagining political communities as nations was developed, it was "modular" and could be transplanted into a wide range of otherwise disparate settings. This is what raises the issue of whether Third World or postcolonial nationalisms express "authentic" indigenous concerns or are in some sense derivative discourses

(Chatterjee, 1986). The discourse of nationalism is inherently international. Claims to nationhood are not just internal claims to social solidarity, common descent or any other basis for constituting a political community. They are also claims to distinctiveness vis-a-vis other nations, claims to at least some level of autonomy and self-sufficiency and claims to certain rights within a world-system of states (Breuilly, 1982). In other words, however varied the internal nature of nationalisms, in other words, they share a common external frame of reference. Thus, even if nationalist claims to be of primordial origins, ancient ethnic pedigrees, or hallowed founding histories were all true, and even if every nation had premodem roots (something manifestly impossible in the case of such settler societies as the United States, Australia or South Africa-at least as defined by their European populations), nationalism would still be a modem phenomenon. This is true even of "extreme" forms such as National Socialism, despite the tendency of modernization theorists and others to treat Nazism as a throwback to the premodem (Bendix, 1964) rather than a problem of modernity (Alter, 1989). Indeed, this phenomenon of claiming state-centered political rights on the basis of nationhood is arguably one of the defining phenomena of modernity.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
Compare and contrast the civic and ethnic nationalist positions with respect to the use of force between states.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Nationalism is a sense of identity with the nation. It is similar to tribalism, and like the family, it is held together by a sense of kinship. Liah Greenfeld (1991), Professor of Sociology at Boston University has defined nationalism as "an image of a social order, which involves the people as a sovereign elite and a community of equals". The original use of the term nationalism refers to elite groups, but in modern usage it usually refers to a very large group, sometimes as large as an empire. A nation differs from a tribe in that it is larger. The greater literacy and the improved communications and transportation rendered by industrialization make the nation possible. The nation is unlike an empire, which is held together by military force, by police and sometimes by religion as with a god-king. The relationship between the members of an empire is an unequal relationship between the ruler and the subject. The relationship of the members of a nation is theoretically, an equal relationship between citizens. It develops differently in different national communities under different historical circumstances.

5.0   SUMMARY

Nationalism is a shared group feeling in the significance of a geographical and sometimes demographic region seeking independence for its culture and/or ethnicity that holds that group together. This can be expressed as a belief or political ideology that involves an individual identifying with or becoming attached to one's nation. Nationalism involves national identity, by contrast with the related concept of patriotism, which involves the social conditioning and personal behaviors that support a state's decisions and actions. From a political or sociological perspective, there are two main perspectives on the origins and basis of nationalism. One is the primordialist perspective that describes nationalism as a reflection of the ancient and perceived

evolutionary tendency of humans to organize into distinct groupings based on an affinity of birth. The other is the modernist perspective that describes nationalism as a recent phenomenon that requires the structural conditions of modern society in order to exist.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
What are the basic assumptions of nationalism?

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UNIT 2 NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS I

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

The word 'nation' as a fundamentally contested concept that can be defined in either civic or ethnic terms; Civic nations are understood to be comprised of modern unions of citizens as expressed in the political will of individuals (contracts, covenants, plebiscites, etc.) and the democratic institutions that these acts create and sustain. In contrast, ethnic nations are folk communities of language and culture with origins in the primordial past. The several divergent definitions of 'nation' are associated with equally divergent theoretical explanations of the origin and spread of nations: modernism and primordialism. The analytical content and political implications of these conceptual and political debates will be identified and discussed.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

By the end of this unit, and having completed the further readings and activities, you should be able to:

- explain the distinction between the political doctrine of nationalism (i.e. what it claims) and the reality or otherwise of nation
- discuss the two main interpretations of nation: the civic and the ethnic
- identify the main features of the modernist explanation of the rise of nationalism
- identify the main features of the primordialist explanation of the rise of nationalism.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Introduction: The Rise of Nationalism: Concepts and Definitions

This unit first reviews the doctrine of nationalism, then the distinction between civic and ethnic nations, and the rival modernist and primordialist explanations for the rise of nationalism.

3.1.1   The doctrine of Nationalism

In one of the most influential studies on the subject, Elie Kedourie (1960) described nationalism as: a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. It asserts that humanity is naturally divided into nations, and on this basis claims to supply a criterion for the determination of the unit of population proper to enjoy a government exclusively its own, for the legitimate exercise of power in the state, and for the right organisation of a society of states.

Not everyone, not even all nationalists, would accept all parts of this definition, and in particular the claim that nations are 'natural'. Since many do make this claim, it is worth asking yourself at the outset before you get too deeply involved in the subject what it might mean to say that nations are natural. Clearly, they are not natural in the way that for example, a flower is natural or human beings can be described by their possession of natural attributes such as a nose, two arms and legs, or the fact that they walk upright. But although some nationalists might accept that nations are social and historical constructs rather than natural phenomena, few would quarrel with the rest of Kedourie's description. They all accept that as a matter of fact, the world is divided among a number of national communities, and that it is these that should form sovereign states. Note that the doctrine seems to rule out the legitimacy of empire, at least if imperialism is understood as the rule of one people by another. Logically this is correct.

Unfortunately the reality is not so straightforward. It is certainly true that many nationalist movements have arisen in opposition to foreign rule and/or perceived imperial exploitation. But few nationalists are entirely consistent: they are often prepared to deny to others the independence they claim as a right for themselves. In doing so they use whatever arguments best suit their case, for example that there are 'natural frontiers' (e.g. mountains, deserts, rivers and lakes) which in certain circumstances may justify expansion: or that some historical site, such as Kosovo for the Serbs or Jerusalem for the Israelis, is the spiritual and symbolic heart of the

nation and must be retained regardless of the ethnic or national identity of its present population; or that their power and civilisation entitle them to control countries beyond their own frontiers. It was versions of this last argument that were used by the European nation states, particularly Britain and France, to justify the expansion of their power around the world in the nineteenth century. We shall consider some of the consequences of nationalists denying to others what they claim for themselves in later sections of this guide. The point you should note here is that nationalism is not invariably a doctrine that appeals to the poor and dispossessed. It can also appeal to the strong, powerful or arrogant. The reason why nationalism can have this double appeal is that it claims only that existing nations should have their own state; it says nothing about who or what constitutes a 'nation'.

3.1.2   Rival Definitions of the Concept 'Nation'

Any discussion of nations and nationalism is usually confronted by the continuous controversies that surround the main terms of the debate. The 'nation' is a fundamentally contested concept. Although academics, policy-makers and nationalist leaders use the language of nationalism on a daily basis, the precise meaning of the term defies easy explanation. Is 'nation' simply a by-word for political communities that have acquired recognition as independent sovereign states? Or should it also extend to sub-state cultural communities, variously described in literature as 'stateless nations' or 'national minorities'? A universally agreed definition of the concept of 'nation' does not exist, in large part because the politics of nationalism is one of inclusion and exclusion. Thus, whoever sets the terms of the debate also sets the criteria for national membership and belonging – a few powerful nationalists are prepared to relinquish. And while the various academic definitions of 'nation' on offer may share certain key characteristics relating to a shared identity, territory and history, the precise emphasis given to these core 'national' ingredients shifts often considerably, from one commentator to another. Indeed, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's first High Commissioner for National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, when asked to define the communities falling under his remit, famously resorted to the expedient view, 'I know one when I see one!' (Stoel, 1994)

It may strike you as odd that political claims should be advanced on behalf of communities whose defining characteristics are themselves disputed. And so it is. The explanation seems to be that for nationalists, the existence of a nation, be it Cuba, France, India, Japan or wherever, is self-evident. It is simply taken for granted – that is, it is regarded as a fact which does not require further investigation or theoretical analysis. However, as soon as one asks what is to happen when the claims of one national group conflict with another, for example over territory, the problems come crowding in. In these circumstances, most nationalists will advance as the basis of national identity whatever allegedly 'objective' criteria they believe will strengthen their own side of the argument. Some nationalists, for example, will emphasise the racial homogeneity of the population, as white South Africans did during the Apartheid era. Others may point to the historical antiquity of their own ethnic group, defined not by race in the biological sense, but by the fact that it traces its descent from a common ancestor and/or shares a foundation myth about the establishment of their nation in their homeland.

For nationalists, whatever criteria are chosen will seem inseparable from their identity. By contrast, students of nationalism will quickly notice that there is very little agreement as to what these criteria might be. This is not simply an academic question. There is more than one answer to these questions although, as nationalism appears to have a universal appeal, not surprisingly there are some common grounds. For most, nation is a group which shares a common culture, inhabits an ancestral homeland, has been (or is becoming) shaped by common experiences of peace and war, and can be enjoined to share a vision of its common destiny (Mayall, 1995). As soon as one seeks to go beyond this rather bland statement, the agreement breaks down.

3.1.3 Contested Origins/Contested Futures

The national discourse is a core component of contemporary political life, so much so in fact that ours is a world of 'nation states', 'national sovereignty' and 'national identities'. Yet, despite the clearly defined lines on the modern political map, ours is also a world of ethnocultural diversity, within as well as between states. 'National' identities are malleable rather than fixed and they can and do conflict. Thus, perhaps, it is only to be expected that the term 'nation' is a fundamentally contested concept that defies easy definition or explanation. We may think we 'know one when we see one' but others are likely to disagree with our perceptions, not only for academic but crucially also for political reasons. This unit has sought to demonstrate that academic controversies surrounding the origin of 'nations' are intricately entangled in current political controversies regarding the future of 'nations'. To ask the question 'what is a nation?' unavoidably also requires reflection on the underlying issue 'when is a nation?'; and when we locate and define a 'nation's origins' we are, in effect, also mapping – often literally – its current political claims and aspirations.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Why is it argued that nationalism developed and spread around the world in response to the breakdown of traditional society?

3.2   Nationalism and the structure of international society

This section review the traditional model of international society and the impact that nationalism has had upon it with respect to legitimacy, the use of force, and the extension of the system.

3.2.1   A Real Estate Model

International society is a real estate model. The idea of sovereignty that emerged from the 1648 Peace of Westphalia reflects a territorial understanding of political power. From this time onwards, each and every state is understood to be a geographically self-contained political community with its own law and government. Within this geographically bounded political community, one law prevails; beyond the boundary, another law rules. As James Mayall (1990) points out: [T]he value which sovereign states cannot sacrifice is their independence. What this means in practice is that they cannot surrender their territorial integrity. To defend the state is thus to defend its international boundaries – hence the mental image of ramparts, moats and battlements. Crucially, international boundaries do not exclusively belong to particular states but

are in fact shared social conventions. The plurality which boundaries maintain is constitutive of the society of states as a whole. If international boundaries disappear there would no longer be separate sovereign communities. This explains why non-intervention is the grundnorm of international society. Non-intervention is intended to preserve the power of existing international boundaries and the sovereign communities within them. Similarly, just as security for the state is equally associated with defending a particular boundary or frontier, the security for the society of states is associated with the preservation of that existing social division that boundaries create, hence the international presumption in favour of the territorial integrity of existing states and against secession and irredentism.

3.2.2   The Principle of Legitimacy

The principle of legitimacy determines political relationships within as well as between states and so 'marks the region of approximation between domestic and international politics' (Wight, 1977). Initially, the sovereign's legitimate right to rule was based not on a popular principle but on a divine mandate. According to the 'divine right of kings', a sovereign's legitimate right to rule came from above (god), not from below (the people). As long as a sovereign could demonstrate that they were the legitimate heir to a particular dynastic family which possessed a divine right to rule, their authority was legitimate. In this context, the people were little more than dynastic property. Territories and the peoples within them were transferred between sovereigns on the basis of conquest, purchase, marriage, inheritance or exchange without any regard to the views of the populations so affected. Similarly, there was no presumption in favour of a common identity between sovereigns and their subject populations.

An ethnically German prince ruling over a motley assortment of German, Slavic and Hungarian peoples seemed a perfectly reasonable arrangement. All of this changed towards the end of the eighteenth century, with the rise of popular sovereignty as the new principle of legitimacy. Popular sovereignty was both a response to and a catalyst for changing international circumstances. But once accepted as the dominant paradigm of political authority, it politicised popular consent and with its popular identity, in ways hitherto unimaginable. As Ivor Jennings famously remarked, while 'on the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide [it] was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people' (Jennings, 1956). It is at this point in the history of political ideas that the doctrine of nationalism enters international relations. Who are the people in whom sovereignty resides? The people are the nation and the state exists as an expression of the national will. As the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen so eloquently phrases it; the principle of all sovereignty rests essentially in the nation. No body and no individual may exercise authority which does not eminate from the nation expressly.

Although the doctrine of nationalism has inspired many hitherto subject peoples, it has also offered little guidance in determining which collectivities may reasonably claim a right to sovereignty and which may not. In other words, this is an 'imperfect solution of the ancient problem: where does sovereignty lie?' (Hinsley, 1966) That is because as we saw in section, the 'nation' remains a fundamentally contested concept which can be defined on either a civic or an ethnic basis. If the people are an ethnic nation then sociological criteria such as religion, race,

language or ethnicity are the appropriate basis for claiming sovereignty. If the people are a civic nation then pre-existing jurisdictions (e.g. colonies, constituent units of federations, etc.) or plebiscites are the basis for claiming sovereignty. The politicisation of identity had an important, if unintended, consequence. The people qua nation, once empowered with sovereignty, had the power to make and to break the territory of the state. In other words, the dual principles of territory and population, both integral to the definition of a state and by extension to international society, were no longer necessarily mutually reinforcing. Instead the territorial principle and the popular principle could conflict with devastating results for international peace and stability. Consequently, international society has assumed a contradictory stance towards national identity depending upon the level – state or sub-state – at which it exists. On the one hand, international society seeks to preserve those national identities reflected in its plural state membership. At the same time, however, there is a tendency to control or suppress national identity within states which threatens to disrupt or destabilize international order defined as the continued existence of international society as a whole – although not necessarily the independence of particular states (Bull, 1977).

3.2.3   The Use of Force

While the divine right of kings prevailed as the basis of legitimate rule, war was an acceptable part of the international order. Nowhere is this more readily apparent than in the right of conquest. If a sovereign demonstrated military superiority on the battlefield, his claim to any territory and people so acquired was absolute. Nevertheless, the use of force was still required to satisfy expectations with regard to its appropriate conduct. The dynastic sovereigns effectively civilised war by defining the concept of a fair fight (*ius in bello*). Once this was accepted, war became a rational endeavour (cold, calculating and legalistic) rather than an act of passion knowing no restraint. As Mayall (1990) notes in his book *Nationalism and International Society*, the nationalists found this 'war compact' uncongenial. The central premise behind national politics is that the political map should reflect a principle of identity and consent, both of which have strongly emotive implications. Nationalists tend to imagine war as an act of liberation or as a struggle for survival, neither of which are a good fit with the rubric of cold and rational calculation. You may therefore be inclined to conclude that the doctrine of nationalism has made war more destructive and in so doing has contributed to the militarisation of the planet. In fact, the impact of nationalism on war is rather more contradictory, again owing to the distinction between civic and ethnic nationalists.

Civic nationalists expect nation states to practise democratic government and guarantee the rights of the individual. Following Kant, they believe that once the political map reflects only sovereign democratic nations the tendency to war will diminish because democracies do not wage war against one another. Civic nationalists thus tend to regard war as a fundamental breakdown of international order. Accordingly, they seek to limit the use of legitimate force to self-defence. This civic nationalist ideal is apparent in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the current United Nations Charter. The right of conquest is now extinguished in international law such that military might is no longer a legitimate means of acquiring control over territories or populations. As a result, when one state militarily interferes in the jurisdiction of another it must justify this intervention in terms of defence or invitation by the state in question to help restore

order there. In practice, of course, the use of force remains problematic and controversial because defence is a notoriously malleable concept that is open to interpretation and abuse. Ethnic nationalists take a rather different view of the legitimate use of force.

For ethnic nationalists, war is neither a subject of political calculation nor one limited to self-defence. It is an ethical act involving the total commitment of a nation to fight for its own survival and that of the unique organic community it embodies. We can discern evidence of this understanding of conflict in the initial enthusiasm of all the belligerents involved in the First World War, in the German quest for *Lebensraum* (living space) during the Second World War, and in the justification of those self-declared freedom fighters engaged in what they regard as contemporary wars of national liberation. Ultimately, what civic and ethnic nationalists dispute is the definition of self-defence. Civic nationalists tend to privilege the rights of existing nation states. As a result, civic nationalists generally do not recognise armed struggles by groups within states who wish to challenge the authority and representative character of the current government as acts of defence.

3.2.4 Extension of the System

The rise of nationalism also had a profound effect on the extension of international society. While the dynastic order prevailed, international society was a small and intimate club, mostly limited to West European princes who were closely related to one another in terms of religion, race, language, ethnicity, culture and in many cases, marriage and descent. In each state, politics was the preserve of elites and excluded the majority of the population. Once popular sovereignty and its concomitant doctrine of nationalism became the basis of legitimate rule, international society was extended in two directions: horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, the boundaries of international society were successively expanded first in Europe and then beyond Europe until they became coextensive with the globe.

Vertically, politics within states came to include the entire adult population while at the same time politics between states took on an increasing range of transnational relationships (e.g. international and non-governmental organisations, multi-national corporations, global civil society, etc.). As we shall see in the remainder of this subject guide, the increasing breadth and depth of international society has had a profound effect on the character of international politics. Indeed, some commentators go so far as to suggest that the very extension of the international system brought about in response to the rise of nationalism may, ultimately and ironically, herald the end of nationalism. We will consider these claims when we discuss the future of nationalism.

3.2.5 The Terms of Nationalist Discourse

Having reviewed the different ways in which nationalism has transformed the structure of international society, you will now need to familiarize yourself with a few key terms that are frequently used in discussions of nationalism and international relations. Let us here briefly consider five.
They are:
- national self-determination

- national minority

National Self-Determination
This principle is derived from the liberal principle of individual self-determination. It is held to follow from the observation that human beings are social not solitary in nature. To quote John Stuart Mill (1993), one of the leading nineteenth century political thinkers to have advocated the principle:

> [O]ne hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves.

After the First World War, the principle was advanced by the US President Woodrow Wilson as a right of all peoples and the basis for creating states from the dismembered dynastic empires. The right of all peoples to self-determination is also included in the United Nations Charter (Articles 1, 2 and 55). It has thus become the legal principle underpinning the legitimacy of the nation state.

National Minority
The attempt to re-draw the political map by applying the principle of self-determination ran into difficulties in Europe because the different linguistic and ethnic groups were both widely dispersed and mixed up. Consequently wherever the boundaries were drawn, there would be trapped minorities. Under the League of Nations, attempts were made to guarantee their rights by treaty. These mostly failed and were abandoned by the United Nations which concentrated instead on guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state on the one hand and protecting the human rights of the individual on the other. Since the end of the Cold War, as it has become clear that democratisation alone will not necessarily end ethnic conflict and may indeed exacerbate it, interest in minority rights has seen a resurgence. There remains an important dispute among international lawyers over how these rights should best be protected. Most lawyers and human rights experts in North America and Britain argue that among the rights that all individuals enjoy is the right to associate with any minority group to which they may belong. There is the freedom of religious worship, education, the use and protection of their language, and so on. In their view these rights, although exercised within a minority community, are still attached to individuals. The alternative view which is more common in continental Europe is that both the definition of a national minority and membership of it should be established by objective criteria, such as numbers and length of residence in the country. Once this has been accomplished, the minority should have its rights guaranteed by law and as a group, it should then have a claim on state resources (e.g. for the building of churches or schools). These different approaches broadly reflect the different historical experiences of countries whose nationalism is of the civic and ethnic kind respectively.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
1. Is international society today still a 'real estate model'?
2. Why is international society ill-disposed towards secession?

3.3 Introduction

Since the emergence of popular sovereignty towards the end of the eighteenth century, International Relations have been much affected by both nationalist conflicts and broader transnational ideological confrontations. These influences have interacted with one another in complex ways. In section I, we will consider the relationship between nationalism and other ideologies in general and then examine in turn its relationship with liberalism, communism and fascism as they have evolved both in theory and in practice.

3.3.1 Ideology and International Relations

An ideology is a system of ideas and ideals that forms the basis of economic and political life (OED, 2010). Ideology thus provides the justification for existing economic and political arrangements. By the same token, ideology can also offer a plan of action for those seeking to change the prevailing economic and political order. Hence, in order to be legitimate, governments must demonstrate a popular mandate. Nationalism can be used to identify the people in whom authority resides. But it does not provide a system of ideas and ideals about what form of economic or political life ought to prevail within a popularly sovereign state. The great political ideologies of the modern period – liberalism, communism and fascism or National Socialism – are intended to provide exactly this more detailed vision of the form and content that popular sovereignty ought to assume within the state. In so doing, of course, these same ideologies have important consequences for relations between states for the simple reason that ideology determines foreign as much as domestic policy.

3.3.2 An Ideology for Nationalists?

Nationalists want an independent state of their own. However, once they have got it, however, nationalist ideology will not dictate what should be done. It is needful to recall that the doctrine itself reduces to the simple proposition that every nation should have its own state. Irrespective of whether the nation is defined as civic or ethnic, it will not of itself generate a political programme other than to oppose all forms of alien or imperial rule and to favour national independence. Nationalism by itself does not prescribe any particular method (e.g. armed or non-violent forms of struggle). Through its appeal to an emotional need to belong to a community, and to the values of loyalty and solidarity, nationalism is able to arouse great enthusiasm.

All over the world, people have repeatedly shown that they are willing to sacrifice themselves for their nation. But when it comes to framing a policy, nationalists find themselves forced to borrow from other ideologies which do have ideas about how to organise society and pursue their goals. Two of these other ideologies – liberalism and Marxist communism – have the opposite strengths and weaknesses. They are relatively strong on political and economic ideas, but weak when it comes to mass mobilisation. Their dependence on abstract and theoretical reasoning means that they are more likely to appeal – initially at any rate – to intellectuals rather than the population at large. In practice, this has led to cooperation between the two kinds of ideology. One seldom, if ever, encounters a pure nationalist: they are nearly always liberal nationalists or national Marxists. Nevertheless, the relationship remains an ambiguous one

because as we shall see, both liberalism and Marxism find it difficult to accord the nation an independent status.

3.3.3 Liberalism and Nationalism

Liberalism has a strong claim to be considered the first modern political philosophy. It developed out of the social contract theories of the seventeenth century, the ideas of the French and Scottish Enlightenments in the eighteenth century, and the political experience of the American and French Revolutions, the first sustained attacks on the old dynastic order of rule by prescriptive right. At the same time, this multiple ancestry means that there is no authoritative text which sets out the liberal world view. There are many kinds of liberals. Modern liberal political thought would not have developed without the writings of John Locke, but the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and countless others have all contributed to what might be called the modern liberal point of view. If we are to understand the tension between liberal and nationalist thought, namely the way in which liberals have very often been both repelled by and attracted to nationalism, we must identify certain common themes that run through their otherwise disparate political theories.

Essentials of Liberal Thought

For our purposes, it will be sufficient to note three of these essential ingredients.

1. All liberals share a belief in individual freedom. For most liberals, freedom is defined negatively – that is, as freedom from restraint, the right not to be subject to arbitrary arrest, torture, etc. Perhaps the most classic statement of this fundamental liberal belief is to be found in the American Declaration of Independence, which speaks of the self-evident truth that all men are endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. There is an ambiguity in this famous formula, because while it is clear that governments may not deny their people the right to life and liberty, it is not clear whether the pursuit of happiness merely requires the authorities to leave people free to pursue their own private ends, or whether they are required also to provide them with some positive entitlements (e.g. the means of subsistence, housing, health care and so on). Some liberals have held the former position, others the latter. The dispute rumbles on and arguably is, in principle, impossible to resolve. It explains, for example, why the United Nations failed initially to agree on a detailed enumeration of the human rights to which they had committed themselves in the Universal Declaration in 1948. Conclusively, in 1966, they fell back on drafting two separate covenants: one on civil and political rights, and one on economic and social rights. The former is concerned with the negative rights of the individual while the latter with his or her positive entitlements as a member of a community.

2. As a consequence of the belief in individual freedom, it follows that the sphere of government must be limited. Or to put it another way, in any liberal society there will be a distinction between the private and the public domain; between civil society and the state. Law, order and defence belong to the public domain, whereas, in most early accounts, the economy belongs to the civil society. The logic here is as follows: if people are to be free to pursue their own interests, the fruits of their labour (or of labour which they had purchased with their capital)

necessarily belonged to them. The right to property, including commodities produced in this way, is thus frequently believed by liberals to be inalienable as a consequence of the right to freedom. It follows that the individual has to be free to dispose of his or her property in any way he or she pleased, subject only to the laws of fair competition. For most liberals, the proper role of the state is to protect civil society from external aggression, and at home to provide a framework of laws to enable competitive markets to operate smoothly.

3. If the role of government is to be limited and civil society protected, there has to be checks against the abuse of power. Liberals have not generally maintained that these checks must invariably be of the same kind – only that they should exist. However, it is difficult to conceive of a liberal society without an independent judiciary. In international affairs, most early liberals believe in a minimalist state which would not interfere in the domestic affairs of other states and would not discriminate against foreign goods. These ideas have lived on and find expression, for example, in Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, which protects Member States' sovereignty over their domestic affairs, and in the free trade ideas that underlie the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Originally their justification was both theoretical, deriving from the belief in freedom and practical in that it was believed that a lightly armed state would be less likely to turn its guns on its own population.

3.3.4   Communism

Marxists, no less than classical liberals, have theoretical problems with nationalism, and like them, once they achieves power, they discovered that political survival depends on reaching an accommodation with it. However, unlike liberals, Marxists could never take the nation for granted. For theorists, the 'nation' remains a problem that has to be explained while socialist government's claim legitimacy by professing to base their policies on the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin (Benner, 1995).

3.3.5   Fascism and National Socialism

It may be helpful to summarise the problem that we have been examining so far in this section. Why should nationalists be driven to ally themselves with other ideologies, and conversely why should these alternative doctrines seek to accommodate nationalism? In large part the answer lies in the complementary strengths and weaknesses of nationalism and liberalism and Marxism, the leading gladiators in the ideological struggle for the political soul of the twentieth century. Nationalism is a doctrine based on sentiment, capable of mobilising entire populations, if necessary, to make heroic sacrifices in the name of the nation, but it is weak when it comes to specifying policies and programmes. By contrast, liberalism and Marxism, both of which have universal pretensions and can generate such programmes, are relatively weak in attracting mass loyalty and have to be applied in the 'real' non-universal world. Hence, despite the continuing tension between rationalist and sentimental aspects of the two sides, they have found it necessary and convenient to cooperate. With the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, it seemed at first that the ideological struggle had been won by liberal democracy and the market economy. Within a short time however, there was a revival of ultra-nationalisms, primarily but not solely in Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union. In these circumstances, there

has been much speculation about a possible revival of fascism. Admittedly the term remained in use throughout the Cold War period, frequently being employed loosely by those on the left to describe almost any authoritarian regime. But among the most serious students of the subject, fascism and National Socialism (Nazism) are regarded as a specific and, therefore, not to be repeated episode in modern European history.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
'The emotional power of nationalism combined with its lack of intellectual content forces nationalists to borrow from other ideologies.' Discuss.

4.0   CONCLUSION

The unit reviews the traditional model of international society and the impact that nationalism has had upon it with respect to legitimacy, the use of force, and the extension of the system. In this context, the key enduring feature of international society is its emphasis on the territorial integrity of existing states. For this reason, secession and irredentism are considered anathema to international peace and stability. This also explains why nationalists are more likely to succeed if they align their national ambitions with the existing structure of international society.

5.0   SUMMARY

The unit explores the ambiguous relationship between nationalism and ideology. A key weakness of nationalism is that it is able to give very little practical guidance in programmes of political action other than to oppose alien rule and to favour national independence. Nationalists have therefore been forced to borrow from other ideologies in order to construct their political plans. This unit explored the uneasy alliances nationalists have formed with liberals, communists and fascists, and the extent to which these various associations may account for the wide variation and frequent contradictions between nationalists and the tactics they employ in pursuit of their goals.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Should the concept of national sovereignty be included in a list of essentially contested political concepts alongside liberty, justice and democracy?

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UNIT 3 NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS II

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

2.0   OBJECTIVES

Having completed this unit, and the further readings and activities, you should be able to:

- explain the distinction between the political doctrine of nationalism (i.e. what it claims) and the reality or otherwise of the nation
- discuss the two main interpretations of the nation: the civic and the ethnic
- identify the main features of the modernist explanation of the rise of nationalism
- identify the main features of the primordialist explanation of the rise of nationalism.
- explain why international society is regarded as a 'real estate model'
- define a principle of legitimacy and explain how it operates within international society
- explain the distinction between dynastic sovereignty and popular sovereignty
- compare and contrast the civic and ethnic nationalist positions with respect to the use of force between states
- identify how nationalism extended international society both horizontally as well as vertically
- define national self-determination, national minority, plebiscite, secession and irredentism.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Modernism and Primordialism

This distinction draws attention to an important disagreement among those who seek to explain the rise of nationalism. Modernists such as Hans Kohn, Elie Kedourie and Ernest Gellner, regardless of their other disagreements, they are united in seeing the nation as a modern invention. By contrast, primordialists, such as the nineteenth-century German romantic philosophers Herder and Fichte, or contemporary scholars, such as A.D. Smith and Walker Connor (2004), subscribe to different versions of the 'sleeping beauty' thesis, under which nations have always existed but have to be reawakened into political self-consciousness by the appearance of an appropriate leader and/ or as a consequence of a particular chain of circumstances. First, there are socio-biologists for whom primordialism means something rooted in human nature. Second, there are perennialists like Adrian Hastings (1997) who insist, simply as an empirical matter, that there have been nations and nationalism in the pre-modern period. Thirdly, there are ethno-symbolists like Smith (1998) who do not argue for the pre-modern existence of nationalism and even severely qualify what might be meant by 'nation' in the premodern period but do insist on the importance of pre-modern conditions for modern nation and nationalism. Finally, there are writers like Walker Connor (2004), for whom 'primordialism' does not refer to a long past or a biological drive but to the emotional sense that the nation is 'given' rather than constructed or invented. Connor's (2004) assertion that the nation can only exist when a very large proportion of its members feel such a bond masks the point at which primordialist views begin to merge into modernist accounts. Indeed, it is important to emphasise that contemporary writers who are sympathetic to the primordial position do not generally dispute that nationalism (i.e. the political doctrine of popular sovereignty) is a relatively modern development. But they do tend to challenge the modernist claim that the ideology precedes the formation of the national community itself.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Identify the main features of the primordialist explanation of the rise of nationalism.

3.2   Nations and Modernity

Theorists like Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Elie Kedourie espouse a modernist position on the origins of 'nations'. However, irrespective of their many other disagreements, view 'nation' as a relatively recent enlightenment invention intended to answer that most vexing of modern political conundrums 'where does sovereignty lie?' (Hinsley, 1966) For modernists, the emergence of 'nations' is fundamentally linked to the transformation of social, economic and political life that first began in Europe during the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth centuries and eventually spread around the globe through European overseas empire and subsequent decolonisation. What is sometimes referred to as the 'great transformation' (Polanyi, 1957) ultimately gave rise to consolidated territories with capitalist economies, a linguistically unified public, and a popularly sovereign government. It is at this point in the history of political ideas that the concept of the 'nation' achieves political salience. Who are the people in whom sovereignty ultimately resides? The people are the nation and the state exists as the expression of

the national will. As Article 3 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen so eloquently puts it:

> The principle of all sovereignty rests essentially in the nation. No body and no individual may exercise authority which does not emanate from the nation expressly. From this point onwards, the discourse of modernity was infused with a national rhetoric: 'national economies', the 'national interest', 'national self-determination' and, above all, the 'nation state' thus became the ultimate expressions of modern political life – so much so in fact that even one of the most highly regarded critics of the modernist position.

Smith (1995) concedes to this that 'the basic features of the modern world require nations and nationalism'. The pervasiveness of 'nations' and 'nationalism' in the modern world is nowhere more readily apparent than in the structures of international society itself. Whereas the premodern map of Europe was a complicated and confusing intermingling and overlapping of many juridical territories – empires, dynasties, principalities, ecclesiastical feudatories, etc. – the modern map discloses a clearly defined patchwork of nation states under sovereign governments (Jackson, 2000). But the modern world of nation states was also accompanied by an 'unprecedented attempt to *freeze* the political map' (Mayall, 1990). The initial redistribution of territory from empires to nation states was viewed as a 'one-off affair' despite the fact that many putative nation states were anything but homogeneous national communities, and numerous territorially 'trapped' sub-state national communities continued to aspire to independent statehood (Jackson Preece, 1998). Out of this fundamental discrepancy in the modern landscape of territorially defined nation states emerges the problem of national conflict.

Obviously, the 'great transformation' was a complex historical process involving a wide array of interrelated changes in society, economy and polity. For this reason, it is only to be expected that the causal interpretation of these factors varies significantly from one 'modernist' nationalism theorist to another. A brief comparison of the explanations put forward by three of the most widely cited modernist thinkers on nationalism illustrates both the commonalities and differences which characterise modernist perspectives on the origin of 'nations'. Elie Kedourie (1960) saw the 'great transformation' as a fundamentally top-down intellectual revolution. In his idealist account of the origin of nations, it was the new way of thinking about political life, as demonstrated in German idealist philosophy and the European Romantic Movement that was ultimately responsible for this transformation. This is why, as we have already noted, Kedourie famously characterised nationalism as a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century. In contrast to Kedourie, Ernest Gellner adopted a materialist view of the origin of nations and nationalism (Gellner, 1983).

For Gellner (1983), the transition from agrarian to industrial society was the key to explaining the origin of nations and its concomitant ideology of nationalism which asserts that the nation is the only legitimate basis for sovereignty. Industrial society is crucially dependent upon the effective organisation of the mass population, which in turn creates a mass, literate society. As people left their traditional rural communities to work in the large industrial cities, they increasingly needed to speak and ultimately also to read and write in a common language. In

Gellner's (1983) view, this bottom-up transformation was reinforced by a top-down imperative: employers, generals and ultimately the political rulers needed to be able to communicate with the newly industrialised masses in order to control them effectively. According to Gellner, these material changes set the crucial historical context for the emergence of 'nations' and the ideology of nationalism. Finally, Benedict Anderson in his constructivist account offers a middle way between the materialist Gellner and the idealist Kedourie. Anderson credits the rise of a mass vernacular print media and its effect on the emergence of a unified 'national' identity as the key component of the 'great transformation' (Anderson, 1991).

According to Anderson, the role of a vernacular media was crucial to the rise of nations because it created the context in which individuals imagined themselves members of mass, national communities beyond their immediate locale. The 'great transformation' was often a painful process of dislocation for the individuals caught up in it. Those peasants who became industrial workers lost their traditional way of life with its close association to village, church, extended family, and inherited custom. Relocated to the more anonymous landscape of the large industrial city they became, in the emotive language of Karl Marx, expendable 'cogs in the wheel' of factory output. A new sentimental attachment to the 'nation' provided a communal context to replace the familiar agrarian life that industrialisation destroyed. Hence, where once the seasons and the divine were glorified in song and celebrated in communal festivity, now the term 'nation' became the focal point of music, artistic representation and public commemoration. Without this public re-imagining, 'nation' could not have achieved its role as the basic organising idea of modernity.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Explain the distinction between the political doctrine of nationalism (i.e. what it claims) and the reality or otherwise of the term nation.

3.3   Nations before Modernity

Nationalism theorists like Adrian Hastings, Walker Connor and Anthony Smith who are sympathetic to what is often referred to as the 'primordial position' see the nation as a social category of a much longer duree (time period). They reject the core modernist assumption that nations emerged as a result of the 'great transformation'. As Smith (2004) made it clear in his famous 'Warwick Debate' with Ernest Gellner:

> Modern political nationalisms cannot be understood without reference to these earlier ethnic ties and memories, and, in some cases, to premodern ethnic identities and communities. I do not wish to assert that every modern nation must be founded on some antecedent ethnic ties, let alone a definite ethnic community; but many such nations have been and are based on these ties, including the first nations in the West – France, England, Castile, Holland, Sweden – and they acted as models and Pioneers of the idea of the 'nation' for others. And when we dig deeper, we shall find an ethnic component in many national communities since – whether the nation was formed slowly or was the outcome of a more concerted project of 'nation-building' (Smith, 1995).

The 'primordialist position' on the origin of nations may be traced back to those same German Romantic philosophers like Fichte and Herder that Elie Kedourie cited as 'inventors' of the modern discourse on nationalism. In their writings, the emphasis is not on modernity as the necessary precursor of an 'invented' national community but instead on ancient and inherited social practices – above all language – as the source of authentic 'national' community. These primordialist arguments give a whole new dimension to the political doctrine of nationalism. If the only genuine communities were associations of original language speakers, then linguistic affinity and vernacular speech was not simply a means to an end (the proper functioning of industrial economy, society and politics) but an end in itself (the basis of popular sovereignty). Similarly, whereas modernist theories of nationalism postulate a decisive break between the pre-modern agrarian past and the modern, industrial present, primordialist theories emphasise the primacy of continuity over change. Indeed, the political project of nationalism becomes as much a rejuvenation of past customs and practices as the creation of new motifs and usages. In this way, the nationalist discourse is said to emerge from the pre-modern past – primordialists thus subscribe to variations of what Mayall (1996) refers to as a 'sleeping beauty thesis', according to which 'nations' have always existed but need to be reawakened into modern political consciousness.

Contemporary scholars who are sympathetic to the primordialist position accept that the doctrine of nationalism as an adjutant to the doctrine of popular sovereignty is a modern development, but they challenge the modernist claim that the emergence of the ideology precedes the formation of the 'nation' qua community. For example, Adrian Hastings (1997) disputes the common modernist assumption that the social category of the 'nation' may be traced back only so far as the American and French Revolutions of the late eighteenth century: If nationalism became theoretically central to western political thinking in the nineteenth century, it existed as a powerful reality in some places long before that. Indeed, Hastings claims that England which he identifies as a prototype of both the 'nation' and the 'nation state' clearly manifests itself long before the 'great transformation': [A]n English nation state survived [the Norman Conquest of] 1066, grew fairly steadily in the strength of its national consciousness through the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but emerged still more vociferously with its vernacular literary renaissance and the pressures of the Hundred Years War [1337–1453] by the end of the fourteenth (Hastings, 1997). What then in Hastings' view gives rise to a 'nation' if not modernisation? He believes that a 'nation' arises where a particular ethnic group perceives itself existentially challenged either by external attack or by the state system of which it has hitherto formed part (Hastings, 1997).

Perhaps even more intriguingly, Walker Connor (2004) rejects the whole idea of 'dating' nations and the origins debate which follows on from it: Failure to appreciate that national identity is predicated upon sentient history undergirds a current vogue in the literature on national identity to bifurcate contributors in terms of (1) 'primordialists' and (2) 'social constructivists' / 'instrumentalists' / 'modernists'. Connor (2004) claims that the point at which a 'nation' come into being is irrelevant because it fails to appreciate the emotive essence of the idea itself. While he accepts that in strictly factual or chronological terms a 'nation' may indeed be a 'modernist' invention, he believes that in the minds of its members the 'nation' nevertheless remains

'eternal', 'beyond time', and 'timeless' and ultimately, it is not facts but 'perceptions of facts that shape attitudes and behaviour' (Connor, 2004).

Yet, even if we accept the primordialist contention that nations do indeed have a much longer duree than modernist accounts suggest, what explains the much more recent advent of nationalism? The ethnosymbolism approach favoured by Anthony Smith (1991) purports to offer a solution to this intriguing puzzle. According to Smith (1995), the enduring features of national identities are myths and memories. Writers and artists are the bridge between the primordial and modern nations precisely because they are able to re-fashion these ancient and inherited ethnic traditions into a contemporary national identity. This explains why national politics and policies often have symbolic goals such as access to education and broadcasting in the national language, the preservation of ancient and sacred sites such as the (Serbian Orthodox) Decani Monastery in (majority Moslem) Kosovo, the right to wear religious symbols such as headscarves and turbans in public places, and so on. Also Smith (1995), 'materialist, rationalist and modernist theories tend to have little to say about these issues, especially the vital component of collective memories'.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Explain the recent advent of nationalism?

3.4.   Tensions between Liberal and Nationalist Principles

There are two obvious problems with nationalist theory for those who subscribe to the core liberal doctrine. At the heart of liberalism is a belief in the individual and underlying this belief is an assumption that the system will maximize individual interests, and therefore welfare, is rational. Liberal thought is essentially universalist – its ideas stem from a view of a common human nature: either all human beings enjoy inalienable rights by virtue of their humanity or none do. By contrast, nationalism is a historical rather than a rationalist doctrine and it is based on the priority to be afforded to collective sentiment. For nationalists, it is not what human beings share in common that is of interest, but what differentiates them, their particular national histories and genius. Moreover, since nationalists habitually prioritise collective over individual interests wherever the two are in conflict, they are unlikely to accept that property is inalienable. Indeed, at different times and in different places, nationalists have frequently been attracted to such policies as the expropriation of assets which are held to be an integral part of the national patrimony, or income redistribution through the tax system, with the intention of binding the nation together.

Liberals have always tended to view society from the top down, concentrating on people's theoretical equality, rather than the actual inequalities that characterise most human societies. Nationalist movements have usually been led by intellectuals and/or members of the professional elite, but they have viewed society from the bottom up, aiming their appeal at the mass of the people and their perceived ill treatment at the hands of their rulers. Liberals, following Adam Smith, have usually viewed market competition as a form of social collaboration rather than conflict, and have reconciled the pursuit of individual interest with the welfare of all, by positing a natural harmony of interests. Nationalists have always been more interventionist, determined to

secure economic as much as political justice for the community and generally convinced that the two are inseparable.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
Identify the main points of divergence and convergence between liberal and nationalist thought

3.5 The Liberal Nationalist Accommodation

Despite the tensions between the liberal and nationalist worldviews, many liberals and most governments professing liberal values have been drawn to nationalism in practice. The essential reason for this stems from the liberal opposition to empire. Not all early liberals, including John Stuart Mill, who worked as a public servant for the British India Office, were opposed to empire. But in retrospect it is clear that they were only able to reconcile their universalist belief in freedom with the maintenance of imperial rule by seeing the history of humanity in evolutionary terms. Having made this move, they could then argue that what was suitable for civilised nations (i.e. their own) would not be appropriate for those barbarian states that were at an earlier stage of development. These attitudes lingered on and were even reflected in the League of Nations' mandate system and the United Nations Trusteeship Council, which after the two World Wars, parcelled out German, Turkish and Italian colonies among the victorious European powers.

In each case the theory was that these colonial populations were not ready for independent nation statehood and would have to be prepared for self-rule by one of the existing imperial powers. However by 1960, when General Assembly Resolution 1514 was passed, the idea of an international society, hierarchically arranged according to a standard of civilisation had been abandoned. Among other things, this Resolution stated that lack of preparation for self-rule could not be used as a reason for delaying independence. Most modern liberals regard empire – the rule of one people by another – as an abuse of power and a denial of the liberal tenet of individual freedom as indeed Mill did so far as Europe's dynastic empires were concerned. He set out the standard liberal argument for basing the state on the principle of national self-determination, although you should note that his main interest was in strengthening democratic institutions rather than in supporting nationalist doctrine for its own sake. What he seems to be saying is that where a political culture has been established before the age of democratic representation and national self-consciousness a civic nation may evolve, but where both ethnic politics and democracy emerged together, rival ethnic groups will destroy the possibility of democratic politics unless a partition can be arranged.

So his apparent support for ethnic or primordial nationalism is essentially pragmatic. He notes the power of nationalist sentiment and seeks to accommodate liberalism to it. In doing so, he implicitly raises a question of great contemporary relevance: is nationalism the enemy of democracy or an essential precondition for it? Two other historical developments have helped to bring about the accommodation between liberalism and nationalism, although they have been given insufficient attention in the literature. The first was the acceptance by governments of the need to qualify the emphasis on negative freedoms in the core doctrine with some positive entitlements in the interests of efficiency and equity. In most states, public education was the first of such positive freedom to be accepted as a legitimate charge on state revenues, and treated

as a public good like defence. After 1945, many industrial states extended the list further expanding the welfare state under which citizens had a range of entitlements from health care to unemployment pay and state-aided pensions. These measures were seldom adopted for explicitly nationalist reasons, but they had nationalist implications nonetheless: the running of a welfare state is expensive, and thus there is an incentive to confine the entitlements to nationals. It is no accident that all industrial democracies are actively trying to curb illegal immigration.

The second development that led to the accommodation between liberalism and nationalism was the need to catch up economically with more advanced states in order to compete in the increasingly global world market. In theory, liberals should be indifferent to the question of who supplies the goods that individual consumers purchase, and many liberal economists have opposed all forms of protection and economic nationalism. Others, such as Alexander Hamilton and Mill himself, argues strongly in favour of what came to be called 'infant industry protection' as a means by which industrial late-comers could overcome their handicap. The truth is that many, perhaps even most liberals simply took the existence of the nation for granted. An example is Adam Smith's great book published in 1776 which is widely accepted as the origin of modern liberal economics: it is called *The wealth of nations.* The classic statement of this kind of modernising liberal nationalism, which will repay study if you have access to it, is by List (1840).

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 5
Is nationalism the enemy of democracy or an essential precondition for it? Discuss.

3.6   Nationalism as false consciousness

The core of Marx's theory of society is its materialism. His claim which he considered a scientific discovery rather than an ideological belief was that at any particular time in history, the dominant forces of production (e.g. subsistence agriculture, craft industry, the industrial assembly line, etc.) determined what he called the relations of production (i.e. how society was organised – for example feudalism, merchant capitalism, finance capitalism, dictatorship of the proletariat, etc.). It followed that everything else that appeared to determine social life and behaviour – politics, law, art, morality, religion – was part of the superstructure: that is, they are ultimately dependent on the economic base of society and had no independent causal status of their own. Nationalism which in the Marxist views had much in common with religion, clearly belonged to this superstructural list. The question that arises is how people are brought to believe in these 'ideological' constructs.

Essentially, Marx believes that they stood in the way of people seeing clearly (i.e. scientifically) what their real interests are. In other words, religion and nationalism, like other ideological structures, are varieties of false consciousness. Since all pre-communist social orders served the interests of only some of the people (e.g. under capitalism those who owned the means of production), the working class – those who owned nothing but their own labour – had to be persuaded to accept the status quo and their inferior place in society. Appeals to religion and nationalism were two ways of achieving this objective. They would not accept their subordinate role forever; indeed, on Marx's argument, no social order can long outlive a fundamental change

in its material base. But he still had to explain the process of social change itself. This he did first by adopting a theory of historical evolution in which each change in the mode of production moved the society onto a higher level of material welfare and human civilization; and secondly by breaking with the liberal insistence on the primacy of individual freedom in favour of social classes.

Since the mode of production determined the relations of production (i.e. the social hierarchy) and since the objective interests of the social classes were different, class conflict served a progressive function in moving society forward. By the time Marx and Engels published the Communist Manifesto in 1848, they were convinced that capitalism was reaching its climax and that it needed a revolution to transfer power from the capitalists to the working class. The capitalists' monopolistic control of factories and machines had enabled them to exploit the working class, but it was their labour that was the true source of value. We are now in a position to see why Marx, Engels and their followers were so worried about nationalism. It cuts across class loyalties and prevented the working masses from rising to their historic revolutionary task. The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. As Erica Benner has noted, this famous sentence from the Manifesto 'remained the cornerstone of any acceptable revolutionary understanding of nationalism for generations of Marxists' (Benner, 1995).

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 6
Give an account of the reasons why nationalists are simultaneously repelled and attracted by other ideologies.

3.7   The impact of the Russian Revolution

The 1917 Revolution and the final victory of the Bolsheviks in the civil war that followed transferred the national question from a theoretical problem in Marxist philosophy to an urgent problem of practical politics. More precisely, the Bolshevik victory presented the communist leadership with two problems. The first was how to capture and hold the vast multiethnic Tsarist empire, and the second was how to deal at the international level with the stubborn refusal of capitalism to collapse everywhere in the face of successful revolution in Russia. The Bolshevik response to these problems is discussed in many books of which the most authoritative account of the first is Walker Connor's (2004) *The national question in Marxist- Leninist theory and strategy,* and of the second; Margot Light's *The Soviet theory of international relations 1917–82.* Both are included in the recommended reading lists for this section. Within the new Soviet state the problem was compounded by the fact that many of the subject nationalities had been among the most determined opponents of Tsarist autocracy. Not surprisingly they were attracted to the principle of national self-determination, which was championed as the new standard of legitimacy for international society by Wilsonian liberals.

Smith (1991) concludes that it would be necessary to purchase the loyalty of the nationalities by offering them the right of self-determination up to and including secession from the Soviet state. In other words, he believes that only if they were allowed to leave would they choose to stay. Needless to say, although the right was included in the first Soviet constitution as the Communist

Party consolidated its hold on the country, it made sure that the right of secessionist self-determination was not exercised in practice. Stalin, author of one of the most celebrated definitions of 'the nation', was entrusted with developing Soviet nationalities policy. The system that was devised consolidated the ethnic basis of the individual Soviet Socialist Republics and of the autonomous regions within the Russian Federation itself. The republics were then given considerable cultural autonomy, with funding for the protection of local languages and an emphasis on folkloric activities. Finally, the head of the local party apparatus was generally an ethnic national, even though his deputy and the head of the security services were almost invariably Russian. This method of managing the national question in the USSR – it can roughly be described as the Sovietisation of the nationalist movements – had long-term consequences for the resurgence of nationalism after the collapse of communism.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 7
Explain why, despite Marx's intellectual hostility towards nationalism, the Soviet constitution and political system and Soviet foreign policy ensured its long-term survival.

3.8   Marxist Leninism and Anti-Colonial Nationalism

In 1916, Lenin had published his short tract, '*Imperialism: the highest stage of capitalism'.* His argument dwells heavily on the work of the liberalanti-imperialist J.V. Hobson. Lenin argues that the ferocity of capitalist competition for markets and protected sources of raw materials had already led to the enclosure of the entire world and would inevitably lead the imperialist powers into conflict and mutual destruction. The survival of the capitalist powers after 1918, and their hostility to the fledgling Soviet Union, caused him to adjust this theory but not to abandon it. Seeing imperialism as the trigger for a general revolution throughout the capitalist world was only a short step from seeing it as the Achilles' heel, the weakest point in their defences. This adjustment had practical consequences for Soviet policy within the international communist movement: whereas, previously, communists had spurned bourgeois nationalists in the colonies, they now saw advantages in forging a broad front (sometimes referred to as the 'united front from above') of anti-imperialist forces, even if that meant communists serving in subordinate positions.

Until the 1950s, the Soviet Union successfully dominated the international communist movement, switching its policy of supporting or opposing Asian and African nationalist movements depending on their interpretation of the international situation and the interest of the Soviet state. Their position was that whatever was good for the Soviet Union, the leader of world revolutionary forces was good for world communism. So much for why Marxist Leninists overcame their theoretical objections and embraced nationalism, but we also need to ask why so many Asian and African nationalists were drawn to Marxism. Given the speed at which most of them abandoned it after the collapse of Soviet communism, it is tempting to conclude that for them too it was merely a marriage of convenience designed to extract diplomatic and financial support from the Kremlin. But since not all national Marxist states have abandoned their official ideology – China, Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba are still under communist rule – there is likely to be more to it than that, at least in some cases. Part of the appeal of Marxism in the Third World was that it was antiimperialist, anti-capitalist and modern all at the same time. Now that

confidence has been eroded in the Marxist-Leninist route to rapid modernisation and industrial success, it is not easy to see what is to replace it for those nationalist movements that are still driven by antiimperial or even anti-Western sentiment.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 8
How did Soviet policy on the national question differ from Marxist theory? Discuss.

3.9   A different kind of ideology

Fascism presents students with particular problems. It is fascinating if only because the fascist states wreaked such havoc on the world in the 1930s and 1940s, but its emphasis on will and on the superiority of action over thought tends to evade rational analysis. Although these elements of fascism had very wide appeal unlike liberalism and Marxism, it had no universal pretensions. Indeed fascism arose to challenge the abstract cosmopolitanism of both of these systems of thought. In its appeal to mass instincts, fascism is much more closely related to nationalism than the other twentieth century ideologies. Arguably also its central organizational doctrine – the idea of a corporatist state based on a working partnership between capital, labour and government – is not intrinsic to fascism but was adapted from social democratic theory and is therefore a derivative of liberalism. Fascism then does not stand opposed to nationalism in the same way as the other major ideologies.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 9
Set out the arguments for and against interpreting fascism as the logical culmination of nationalist ideas.

3.10   Pathological nationalism?

Should fascism be viewed as a phenomenon separate from nationalism or as its pathological form? Two of the leading authorities on nationalism – A.D. Smith and Eric Hobsbawm – provide powerful arguments in favour of the first of these alternatives. They admit that fascists and Nazis drew on the resources of the nation and nationalist doctrine, but also trace the ancestry of fascism to other traditions in European society and intellectual history (e.g. the social Darwinian theory of the survival of the fittest and authoritarian militarism, itself a hangover from a pre-industrial and predemocratic age). Insofar as the social and economic conditions that supported Mussolini's rise to power in Italy and Hitler's in Germany have been transformed out of all recognition, they are almost certainly right. If you recall Kedourie's definition of nationalism quoted in the previous chapter, you will see that when it was first formulated the doctrine was essentially pluralist: if a nation and only a nation should have its own state, then a nation is the basic unit of the society of states. By contrast, although the fascist powers formed an alliance of sorts during the Second World War, they were constantly at odds with one another.

One reason for this is posited by Alan Ryan in a review of two of the books on the reading list for this section. He argues that nationalism of the kind that fascism fed on and fostered is an exclusive creed. Italians were not taught that everyone ought to be attached to his or her own country to whatever degree was consistent with an orderly world: they were supposed to believe

that Italy was uniquely important and that the interests of all other countries were subordinate to hers. In the same way, Germans were supposed to believe in the absolute superiority of Germany to all other nations and so on. A measure of exclusivity however, seems to be an essential part of all nationalisms. They do not have to claim racial supremacy, as the National Socialists did in Germany, but all nationalists and many who do not think of themselves as such, would accept that it is normal for the state to protect the interests of its own national citizens when these come into conflict with the interests of those of other states. Indeed, even liberal trade rules based on the most-favoured nation (MFN) policy make this assumption. Since nationalism, even of the most 'normal' kind is self-regarding, it seems more sensible to acknowledge that it has its own pathology rather than to assume that fascism is a completely separate phenomenon which has been safely disposed of by history. This observation does not mean that we are about to witness a revival of fascism in Eastern Europe and Russia. There is very little chance that the European fascist movements will be revived, at least in the form they manifested themselves in the 1930s, despite the activities of fringe groups such as the German neo-Nazis. But there is nothing to be complacent about here: there is abundant evidence – for example Pol Pot's regime in Cambodia in the 1970s, ethnic cleansing by all sides in former Yugoslavia, the Hutu dominated genocide of the Tutsis in Rwanda in April 1994 – to suggest that 'normal' nationalism will always have the potential for perverse and malign mutations, of which fascism was one.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 10
Is fascism the inevitable consequence of the attempt to create a nationalist state? Discuss.

4.0   CONCLUSION

It examined the spread of nationalism; first within and then beyond Europe. In both cases, we reviewed the political landscape from which nationalism emerged, the interaction between nationalism and language (inside Europe) and race (beyond Europe), the emergence of a new principle of legitimacy (self-determination) intended to preserve a national territorial status quo, and its consequent effect on democratisation and minority rights within purportedly nation states. Finally, we considered the problems and possibilities that continue to confront those nationalists intent on breaking out of the current territorial strait-jacket, with particular reference to Kosovo and Eritrea. Finally, it reflected upon the future of nation states and nationalism in the context of current challenges associated with minorities, the resurgence of religion, economic nationalism, internationalism, globalisation and post-nationalism.

5.0   SUMMARY

The first serious study on the subject was published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs under the editorship of E.H. Carr in 1939. Until recently however, the subject has been strangely neglected in the international relations literature, in contrast to the large number of distinguished works by historians and sociologists. The resurgence of national and ethnic conflicts since the end of the Cold War has made it vital that students of international relations have a proper understanding of what is certainly one of the major forces to have shaped the contemporary world. Indeed, the assumption on which this subject is based is that an

appreciation of the way in which nationalist doctrine and practice have influenced the formation of states and their policies is a necessary ingredient in any serious study of international society.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
'The emotional power of nationalism combined with its lack of intellectual content forces nationalists to borrow from other ideologies.' Discuss.

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UNIT 4   NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS III

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Across the globe, trends of nationalization and economic nationalism have crept into the policies of nation-states recently. Fueled by popular nationalist sentiment, state elites from Bolivia to Russia have reasserted state control over resources connected with energy and industry and promoted the interests of a purely national economy. Economic nationalism has emerged as a powerful and attractive policy to press for national interests, achieve economic aims, and preserve the autonomy of individual nation-states in an increasingly internationalized world. Understanding how and why this process is taking place will be important to developing effective foreign policy and effective energy policy for the foreseeable future.

2. 0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine how trends of nationalization and economic nationalism have crept into the policies of nation-states
- examine how energy and industry promote the interests of a purely national economy.
- examine the contribution of the autonomy of individual nation-states in an increasingly internationalized world
- examine the concept of trends of nationalization and economic nationalism and assess its role in International Politics

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   The Nation-State and Globalization

Most recent authors writing about the future of nationalism foresee some transformation of the classic nation-state under globalization, and envision a decrease in nationalist sentiment over the

next century. These ideas come largely from Eric Hobsbawm (1992) and Ernest Gellner (1983), authors of two classic studies which are generally considered the foundations of nationalism studies. These authors have been the most cited and discussed, and have been most influential in creating the modern definition of nationalism. An exploration of their thoughts will serve as the basis for defining the terms "nationalism" and "economic nationalism" for the purposes at hand.

In his work Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Eric Hobsbawm (1992) argues that nationalism "is simply no longer the historical force it was" and adopts an overall negative view of the future for states in the age of globalization. For Hobsbawm (1992), the growths of the international economy and advances in communication and transport have undermined the vitality and purpose of nations. International associations, trade organizations, and transnational corporations are usurping economic powers from nations and replacing them as the "major building-blocks of the world system." Hobsbawm (1992) envisions nations as "retreating before, resisting, adapting to, being absorbed or dislocated by the new supranational restructuring of the globe." This rather ambiguous statement is pessimistic about the ability of nations to continue to dominate the international order and economy.

Similarly, Ernest Gellner (1983) writes that in order for nations to remain politically viable, the relationship between "class" and "nation" must be maintained in the minds of the elites and populaces of modern nation-states. Gellner (1983) writes, "the definition of political units and boundaries will not be able to ignore with impunity the distribution of cultures." The training required to maintain an advanced industrial society will preserve the nation-state as the primary agent behind the necessary standardization of language and culture. On the other hand, Gellner (1983) remarks that "late industrial society can be expected to be one in which nationalism persists, but in a muted, less virulent form." As long as differing nationalities do not self-identify themselves as subordinate "classes" within a state, violent confrontation between ethnicities will diminish. This point can also be transferred to the world order. Nationalist conflict between states often occurs as the result of perceived inequalities and competition. According to Gellner (1983), nationalism may thus resurge as a result of unfulfilled economic expectations. Also, if states feel inferior to, exploited by, or dominated by "advanced" powers, new forms of nationalism may appear to combat this perceived threat and will foster a politically divisive and tense environment.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
The trends of nationalization and economic nationalism have crept into the policies of nation-states is somewhat more complex and contested. Discuss.

3.2   Economic Development and Nationalism

For most recent authors, nationalism is tied to economic development and vice versa. Developing or transitioning modern industrial economies are quite unique in their individual models of development, restricting generalizations about a single set of economic conditions in each. Thus, to define how economic nationalism has emerged in these states, it is worth examining the importance of nationalist sentiments as a common attribute of them. Although development patterns are diverse and thus hotly debated, several authors have asserted that

uniting a populace under a national symbol has a strong influence on the rate of development. This link between national identity and growth lays the foundation for the contemporary conception and implementation of economic nationalism. In The Spirit of Capitalism, Liah Greenfeld (2001) asserts the centrality of nationalism in industrializing and advancing the major world powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: nationalism necessarily promotes the type of social structure which the modern economy needs to develop. Being inherently egalitarian, nationalism has as one of its central cultural consequences an open-or class-system of stratification, which allows for social mobility, makes labor free, and dramatically expands the sphere of operation of market forces.

Greenfeld (2001) thus connects the needs of capitalism with the origins of nationalism. She further argues for the importance of nationalism in economic development as long as "economic achievement, competitiveness, and prosperity are defined as positive and important national values." Similarly, shared economic development can serve as a national symbol with which individuals identify, along with identity markers such as shared language, culture, and territory.

Once a strong sense of national purpose supports economic development, a nation-state must appeal to popular sentiments in order to organize collective effort. Takeshi Nakano (2004) writes in "Theorizing Economic Nationalism" that "in order to mobilize economic resources, create an integrated national market and effectively implement economic policies," state elites must draw upon shared cultural resources and national allegiances. The confidence derived from allegiance to a strong national identity can strengthen economic growth by rallying a citizenry around a set of national objectives. According to Nakano (2004), "a large part of the national market is historically shaped by the state through the monetary system, legal system, system of education, transportation and information networks, trade policies and so forth." Therefore, in modern history, the centrality of the state as an agent of economic change involves a sociological component, which nationalistic ideologies can complement and even bolster.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Critically highlight how International Order has changed as a result of economic nationalism in International Politics.

3.3   The Origins and Goals of Economic Nationalism

Upon examining the relationship between nationalism and economic development, one next must select a definition of economic nationalism and its goals and purposes. The definition offered by Rawi Abdelal (2005) in his article "Nationalism and International Political Economy in Eurasia" is useful due to its concise nature and its consideration of most of the important factors discussed above. Abdelal (2005) states simply that economic nationalism involves the implementation of "economic policy that follows the national purpose and direction." In other words, economic nationalism prioritizes national interests above private property and profit motives. Instead of pursuing opportunities solely to increase capital, policymakers make economic decisions with the intention of uniting and strengthening the nation-state.

Clearly, the definition of economic nationalism is connected with a broader conception of nationalism, but the two are not exactly the same. Whereas contemporary concepts of nationalism posit that for every nation, there should exist a corresponding state that protects and vitalizes this nationality, economic nationalism goes one step further. Economic nationalism draws on the foundations of national identity, but concentrates on using economic means to unite a populace and increase the power of the nation-state in the world order. This emphasis on economic security may entail the nationalization of key industries, or simply the restriction of foreign influence and the protection and promotion of domestic labor and products. Nationalist sentiments are mobilized to ensure the economic autonomy of the nation-state.

The emergence of economic nationalism in a state generally occurs as a result of several conditions. First, the expansive processes of globalization may elicit strong reactions by ethnic nationalities which fear the eradication and subordination of their cultural identities. As promises of economic security and happiness remain unfulfilled by ineffective, selective, or uneven development and progress, individuals may blame groups or specific people that they see as responsible. Increases in movement and contact between states create both internal groups such as immigrants and external groups such as world powers, which can be seen as responsible for economic hardship or the destruction of traditional ways of life (Abdelal, 2005). Nationalist tendencies can reemerge as a reaction to these "enemies." Thus, economic and cultural grievances play a large role in precipitating nationalist sentiment under globalization.

Second, a set of elites and policy makers set nationalist goals of autonomy, unity, and identity to appeal to this sentiment and achieve several aims. Nationalism can be used as a political instrument by elites attempting to concentrate their hold on political power and increase the global status of their nation-state. These elites identify economic prowess as an effective means for protecting culture, promoting national power, and winning the support of citizens who feel disenfranchised and powerless as a result of the processes of globalization (Nakano, 2004).

Recent explosions in nationalist sentiments, such as those in Russia, conform to Gellner's theory that when "class" and "nation" combine, political activism erupts (Gellner, 1983). Pressure to conform to the models described by Meyer forces governments to adopt measures that promote the advancement of the economic security of national citizens (Meyer, 1997). As shown above, nationalism and the state have historically played crucial roles in economic development, prompting elites to strive to reinvigorate nationalism as a driving force for the economy.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
The contribution of the autonomy of individual nation-states in an increasingly internationalized world, Discuss

3.4   Misconceptions about Economic Nationalism

Gilpin, Robert, and Jean Gilpin (1987) and James Mayall (1990) argued in the late 1980s that economic nationalism is purely or primarily protectionist and mercantilist, and that it aims at the complete financial independence of the nation-state by countering the ventures of foreign capitalists and governments with trade barriers, tariffs, and other mercantilist policies. Although

the history of economic nationalism lends support to this theory, the continued spread of globalization has significantly changed the tone and direction of economic nationalists. The last decade has shown that cooperation with other national economies can foster greater growth and development and modern economic nationalist doctrine has become more flexible to take advantage of this opportunity (Pickel, 2003). For example, the aim of promoting local industries can lead governments to encourage expansion into new markets outside their own borders. Lifting certain trade barriers and encouraging foreign direct investment can actually assist certain areas of the economy and thus can be in the national interest. Therefore, economic nationalism need not solely be affiliated with protectionism, but may be simply the pursuit of national interests through economic means.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
The concept of trends of nationalization and economic nationalism has its role in International Politics. Discuss.

4.0   CONCLUSION

As a theory to counteract the perceived injustices and insecurities caused by globalization, economic nationalism has emerged as a popular and powerful theory that is supported by wide and diverse constituencies looking to preserve their cultural heritage and expand their state's international power. Nation-states must concentrate on building economic prowess in order to maintain or strengthen their international influence. However, the consequences of encouraging economic nationalism can involve the radicalization of politics and the persecution of segments of the national population, which can lead to fragmentation and eventual political and, hence, economic instability within a state. How this will play out in Russia and other countries where economic nationalist policies are being implemented is yet to be seen.

5.0   SUMMARY

This unit describes the role of the nation-state within the context of globalization and provides insight into both the structural conditions surrounding economic nationalism and the actions of state agents in the formation of popular nationalist sentiment in favor of specific economic policies.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summarize and critically evaluate role of the nation-state within the context of globalization in international politics.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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MODULE 4 GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this module is to enable you gain in-depth knowledge on issues in globalization and International Politics including its both positive and negative factors. The module provides students with a detailed examination - and critique - of theories of globalisation and assessment of contemporary globalising processes. It examines these influences through detailed analysis of contemporary manifestations of globalisation, including the study of global production and commodity chains, state-market relations, the nature and direction of capital flows, patterns of global inequality, international institutions and global governance, questions of cultural homogenisation/imperialism and globalisation, and anti-globalisation. The module aims to provide students with a well-rounded understanding of the globalisation debate, and how this relates to contemporary international and global political issues.

Under this module are four units, which contain comprehensive discussions for your study:

Unit 1 Meaning of Globalization
Unit 2 Globalization and International Politics
Unit 3 Globalization and the Nation-State
Unit 4 Impact of Globalisation on International Politics

UNIT 1 MEANING OF GLOBALIZATION

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

When discussing international politics, it is very difficult to do so without a thorough and thoughtful discussion about globalization; the definition of globalization, the history of globalization, the ways globalization exists in the world, as well as the pros and cons of globalization. Today, it seems that the world is becoming more and more "globalized". But what does that mean to be globalized, or to see an increase in globalization? And how can understanding 'what is globalization' help us to know better about various aspects of international politics? As we shall see, quickly increasing globalization is forcing us to re-examine our prior understandings about the role of the state, the non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations (which also includes but is not limited to multinational corporations, as well as individuals), along with themes such as international political economy, economic global trade, development, human rights and so on. This unit will go through the main questions surrounding globalization and international politics.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- understand the word "Globalisation"

- define the concept of globalisation, either in your own words or by integrating extant definitions which have been made from various disciplinary perspectives
- state generally observable attributes of all the definitions
- explain the limit upon which other subsequent unions of a consensus definition of the concept of "globalisation".

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   What is Globalization?

Scholars set out to understand globalization have offered a plethora of definitions about 'what is globalization'? The globalization definition is far from crystallized and agreed upon. Having said that there are many ways to explain what exactly globalization is. Richard J. Payne (2012), in his book 'Global Issues' says that

> Globalization refers to shrinking distances among its continents, a wider geographical sense of vulnerability and a worldwide interconnectedness of important aspects of human life including religion, migration, war, finance, trade, diseases, drugs and music. Globalization implies a significant and obvious blurring of distinctions between the internal and external affairs of countries and the weakening of differences among countries.

Giddens (1990) in McGrew (2008) says that globalization is the "intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa." Smallman and Brown (2011) cite Manfred Stegar, who in his book, 'Globalization: A Very Short Introduction', says that globalization is a

> multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, stretch and intensify worldwide social interdependencies and exchanges while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and the distant.

Others have suggested that globalization entails different definitions and different periods. For example, Henry R. Nau, in his book "Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, and Ideas," points to three periods of globalization, which are:

- "Early period of globalization from 1492-1800, driven by mercantilism and colonialism."
- "Later period of globalization from 1800 to 1950, driven by global market institutions such as multinational trading and manufacturing corporations."
- "Latest period of globalization starting in the second half of the twentieth century, driven by the flattening of the global playing field and the knowledge economy rather than by imperialism or manufacturing conglomerates."

The breakdown of various types of globalization at a minimum, reminds us that while the periods, sorts, and arguably the speed of globalization has varied, globalization seems to have always existed in some form.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Define the concept of globalisation, either in your own words or by integrating extant definitions which have been made from various disciplinary perspectives.

3.2 History of Globalization

Globalization, while showing itself in new ways, has been a part of the human history. Historically, globalization first took its form during the time of initial migration by humans out of the African continent and into other lands. As human history continued, due to local conditions, humans began to lack access to hunting, and finding food had to resort to move for new resources. Then, as they continued to spread throughout the earth and establish additional communities, they then started to produce more advanced tools which in time, resulted to trading with other communities. Although this might not be 'globalization' as we understand it today, societies throughout human history have continued to increase in terms of globalization (Serneau, 2012). Payne (2013) cites a table by Michael Pettis (2001) in his Foreign Policy article 'Will Globalization Go Bankrupt', which documents the various recent periods of globalization which are below:

- "Periods of Monetary Expansion and Globalization
- "Periods of New Technologies and Commercial Applications

1807-1844: Extensive canal building, railway boom, steam power used in manufacturing, improved machine tool design, invention of McCormick's reaper, commercial gas-lighting, and development of the telegraph.

1851-1873: Advances in mining, railways and shipping, and rapid growth of corporations.

1881-1914: Increased productivity in Europe and the United States, improvements in steel production and heavy chemical manufacturing, first power station, spread of electricity, development of the internal combustion engine and developments in canning and refrigeration.

1922-1930 Commercialization of automobiles and aircraft, spread of artificial fibers and plastics, new electrical appliances invented and telephone ownership grows.

1960-1973: Development and application of transistor technology, advances in commercial flying and shipping and the spread of telecommunications and software.

1985-Present Rapid growth in computer memory and information processing, advances in biotechnology and medical technologies and commercial use of the internet".

What seems to be different about these more recent periods of globalization is not only the fast improvements in technology, but the effects of this growth on the cost of communication across borders (Shangquan, 2000). People can communicate with one another at speeds never seen in the history of humankind; telephones and internet access allow us to send messages across the globe in less than a second. In addition to being able to send messages, either via email, sending video, or live chatting through programs such as Skype, the ability to travel thousands of miles within a day has allowed us to become further connected to our fellow human beings. As Shangquan (2000) explains, it is much cheaper to communicate as well as to ship products and

goods around the world, being in an age of high globalization clearly shaped culture, finances, and of course politics, international studies, and international politics.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
In not more than 2 pages, trace the historical background of globalization down to the 21st century.

3.3   Effects of Globalization

Scholars, policymakers and activists have debated the effects of globalization and continued to do so. Similar to many questions in international politics, the effects of globalization depend on who you are asking, i.e. individuals, also depends on their theoretical viewpoints, as well as beliefs about international politics, as they may have varying position about the true effects of globalization. Scholars have categorized the positions regarding the "effects of globalization" into three groups: "The hyperglobalizers and transformalists", "the skeptics", and the "weak globalizers" (Payne, 2013; McGrew, 2008, in Baylis, Smith, and Owens: 2008).

- Hyperglobalizers and Transformalists: Hyperglobalizers and Transformalists argue that globalization is essentially changing everything around us, which includes the amount of political power that states have had. To Hyperglobalizers, the state's power is being altered by non-state actors (McGrew, 2008). Supporters of this view might point to the increase in technology, and related to this, personal cell phones and recording devices, as well as social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter as evidence of the decline of the state. Access to cameras that can text, store pictures and record information have left states with less power over the individual. In addition, there are many examples of how social media has challenged state power. One of the more recent examples is the 2010-2011 Arab Uprisings or the 'Arab Spring'. The citizens in the Middle East and North Africa then took to the streets to protest the authoritarian regimes in power of their respective states. While many of the leaders such as Zine el-Abedine of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt attempted to crackdown on citizens, as well as disrupt political protests, internet and technologically savvy protesters were able to stay a step ahead of the governments by organizing the revolution with technology and more specifically, publicizing rights abuses through social media sites. It is no wonder that those within the hyperglobalizer and tranformalist camp would point to such events to show the weakening of the state in the context of globalization.

- Skeptics on the other hand argue that despite the idea that globalization is increasing; the power of the state in its domestic and foreign affairs has not diminished. As Payne (2013) explains, there are those in this camp who say "that globalization is largely a myth that disguises the reality of the existence of powerful sovereign states and major economic divisions in the world. National governments remain in control of their domestic economies as well as the regulation of international economic activities." This position says that regardless of how it seems that the state is weakening, they continue to have great holds on domestic power, as well as in terms of their interactions with other powerful states. However, they argue that much of the financial power is with the

economically developed states, whereas economically developing states are not as interconnected as some might think (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Hay 2000; Hoogvelt, 2001; Gilpin, 2002, in McGrew, 2008). Furthermore, while some hyperglobalizers suggest that cultures are becoming more interconnected, skeptics argue that cultures continue to actually be distant and people are more "suspicious of each other" (Spiro, 2000, in Payne, 2013).

- The weak globalizers or the transformalists take a middle position in the globalization debate. They recognize that while the state is not going anywhere anytime soon, politics is indeed becoming more "global" (McGrew, 2008). Thus, there clearly is change and globalization is happening, but historical political power structures such as the state continue to be dominant actors in the international system. In addition, while we are becoming more interconnected, there is still the desire for continued individual identity, and this can show itself in a variety of forms.

Globalization has many manifestations, with all of them having effects on the political and international politics landscape.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Globalization has many manifestations are they having effects on the political and international politics landscape. Discuss.

3.4 Types of Globalization

There are many types of globalization. We shall primarily focus on four, and they are: Economic Globalization, Military Globalization, Cultural Globalization and Political Globalization.

3.4.1 Economic Globalization

Economic Globalization has been defined by Gao Shangquan (2000) as "the increasing interdependence of world economies as a result of the growing scale of cross-border trade of commodities and services, flow of international capital and wide and rapid spread of technologies. It reflects the continuing expansion and mutual integration of market frontiers…". Historically, economic globalization was barely different from other forms of globalization; often economic, political, and cultural globalization was interconnected. As we see, economic globalization is happening all around us. Technologies are advancing at a rapid rate, which shapes how we do business. Transactions can be made with the click of a button, and markets can be monitored around the clock. In addition, companies can set up shop in any part of the world, as well as having a very established internet presence with extensive online activity. And with economic globalization is also the issue of how states and non-state actors can help address challenges such as economic development. Here, international organizations, as well as non-governmental organizations actively trying to help states in terms of building infrastructure, increasing jobs, as well as introducing capital (Smallman & Brown, 2011). But as we shall see, it is debated as to whether some of these developments are always positive; some worry that with

globalization, powerful states and multinational corporations have used the system to further their own power and influence at the expense of other weaker actors.

3.4.2 Military Globalization

Some have also created a separate category for what they see as military globalization which can differ from technological globalization. While weapons of course are part technological advancements, they can be seen as a separate aspect of globalization. Payne (2013) says that "[m]ilitary globalization is characterized by extensive as well as intensive networks of military force. This includes both the actual use of force and threats to use violence. The most obvious example of military globalization is the nuclear age and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". However, this of course is not a new military globalization; like other forms of globalization have continued to exist for centuries, whether it was the origin of weapons, rise of advancements in rifles, the introduction of handguns, or even the introduction of security regimes such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization amongst other organizations (Payne, 2013).

3.4.3 Political Globalization

Political advancements is another important aspect of globalization. If we look at the political makeup of the international system, there have been a number of new institutions and organizations. We do not have to go that that far back to see new developments such as international alliance institutions (e.g. the League of Nations, or more recently, the United Nations which has been a cornerstone of international human rights law, as well as environmental law). In addition, the rises of non-state actors have brought a new dimension to international politics, one that is quite new from a centuries long system of state power (Smallman and Brown, 2011). NGOs continue to work on political and social causes as they relate to international politics.

3.4.4 Cultural Globalization

Along with economic, military and political globalization has been the importance of cultural globalization. With the rise of technology, information is increasing. As alluded to, this can be related to political information, sharing of knowledge on science, or, in this case, the interexchange of ideas. As we see, we can hear music from anywhere in the world, follow the latest fashions, and watch television programs in multiple languages. The ability to share our respective cultures is quite feasible with the internet. But even without the computer, we are now able to move from city to city, state to state, or country to country easier than ever before. And with travel and migration (Smallman and Brown, 2011) come addition points of consideration namely: what happens when people move? How can we understand cultural exchange in this context?

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
How does cultural globalization relate to political or other subcategories of globalization?

3.5   Globalization Pros and Cons

3.5.1   Advantages of Globalization

To many, there are numerous advantages of globalization. As alluded to earlier through globalization, individuals are able to communicate with others throughout the world at much easier speeds. This has allowed the sharing of information with people that in years past would have taken much longer, or cost much more. In addition, with mobile video services, communication quality has also increased. Furthermore, with a globalizing world market, the ability to network in regards to new ideas and business opportunities has never been easier. The positive effects of this can be seen in many cases: information has led to better decisions in fields such as health and education. More effective medicines are being produced, which in turn can be shared more quickly around the globe. Moreover, if there is a concern regarding a global health issue, a political issue, or a natural disaster, we can now relay information to others immediately so that they can protect themselves better. As discussed above, the sharing of information has also allowed people to challenge human rights abuses that exist in society. Now, it is easier to record a military crackdown, or government rights violation. In addition, it has now become easier to organize protest movements against regimes which have led some to suggest a decline of the state. This was not possible even decades ago.

3.5.2   Concerns and Criticisms of Globalization

While there are many excellent benefits to globalization, not everyone has been excited about the effects of globalization. Some of them see the "advantages of globalization" as actually being "disadvantages of globalization," whereas others find that while globalization has brought about a number of life improvements, for some, there are also negative consequences of increased technological advancements when discussing globalization. For example, looking at the case of France, many French citizens have not embraced political and cultural globalization. As Payne (2013) argues, some of this is because of a want to maintain domestic sovereignty, and within this, ideas of maintaining "French" culture. With the increase in immigration to France, particularly from Muslim states in the Middle East and from North African states such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco (Payne, 2013), many in France have been hesitant to endorse globalization. Ideas of what it means to be "French" are ever-shifting, and this does not sit well with some in the country. However, they are not the only ones expressing this opinion; evidence of the rise of right wing parties in Europe (many of which speak out against immigration) suggests that they do not like the idea that globalization means increased influence of different cultures and political beliefs. There is also a push-back to globalization in the United States. While there are some similarities to what was discussed in the context of France, United States citizens have expressed other concerns resulting from economic globalization.

For example, the height of concern by some in the United States regarding globalization is how increased communications between states and technological advances throughout the world are affecting the political and economic situations domestically, and particularly in the context of US jobs. This concern is often within this context of the idea of outsourcing. According to Diana Mutz and Edward D. Mansfield (2013), Americans have heard a great deal about outsourcing

over the past fifteen years, both in media reports and in each of the past four presidential elections. Moreover, it is clear that people are not happy about this phenomenon. Based on a number of surveys that we have conducted, only 2 percent of American workers view offshore outsourcing favorably, whereas over 78 percent of workers are hostile to this phenomenon and another 20 percent have mixed views. Americans have a more favorable view of international trade than offshore outsourcing, but they are nonetheless ambivalent with more workers opposed to trade liberalization than favoring it while about a quarter having mixed views." Interestingly, those who are often the ones most vocal about the concerns of outsourcing are those that have the least to worry about regarding job security (Mutz and Mansfield, 2013).

And if this is the case, then why the intense backlash against globalization and outsourcing in the United States? It has been argued that for some, the disagreement with globalization is related to ideas of superiority of US goods to foreign products. And some politicians who are worried about their constituencies and local voting blocs may be more willing to make such arguments in order to protect their electoral support, even if the reality is far from what the citizens believe regarding the economy and globalization (Mutz and Mansfield, 2013). In addition to this idea of "superior" US product quality, a relationship between isolationism and globalization may also exist as a reason for disapproval of globalization (Mutz and Mansfield, 2013). As Payne (2103) explains, "Americans are increasingly embracing a view of sovereignty that rejects participation in a number of international regimes", and thus, there could be a relationship between these political views and their position on globalization. And one final point is that there may also be elements of ethnocentrism existing by Americans towards those from other countries (Mutz and Mansfield, 2013). Some of this seems to be parallel with some of the attitudes in Europe. This may also be a reason for the anti-globalization attitudes that we are seeing.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 5
Globalization has brought about a number of life improvements in this 21st century. Do you agree?

4.0 CONCLUSION

Globalization is simply not a process of breaking down barriers to interaction. Historically, trade, war and empire have often gone together though conceptually, trade and war are quite different ways of earning a living. Trade has the potential to create a single world but war cannot do this, since no single military force is capable of conquering the world. If trade points to unity, war leads to the division of the world into military economic blocs, or to the dissolution of all settled authority. So whether the trading or fighting urge is dominant will largely determine the organisation of the planet.

5.0 SUMMARY

"Globalisation" is a popular term used by governments, businesses, academics and a range of diverse non-governmental organisations. However, it is also signifies a new paradigm within world politics and economic relations. While national governments for many years dictated the international political and economic scene, international organisations such as the World Bank,

International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organisation have now become significant role players. In this "global village" national governments have lost some of their importance and perhaps their powers in favour of these major international organisations. Within the variety of federal systems found around the world, there is at least one common denominator which eradicates that there is more than one level or sphere of government with constitutionally allocated powers and functions. In these systems the changes in global or international politics referred to above have an additional effect on the particular countries. It causes provinces, states or *Länder* to re-evaluate their role, in particular their role in international politics. Global matters, for example; the creation of a free trade area has impacts at both the national or federal level of government, as well as at the provincial level. The effect of globalisation on government – in particular on provincial government – is an issue that has not been debated much in South Africa. It is against this background that an initiative was taken to have an in-depth discussion on various aspects of globalisation within the South African context.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summarises and critically evaluate globalisation and international politics.

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UNIT 2   GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

CONTENTS

1.0   INTRODUCTION

Globalisation has been a major topic in the study of International Politics for the past few decades. Almost all aspects of the modern day society have been influenced by it in some way. Moreover, globalization when understood as "an intensification of cross-border interactions and interdependence between countries" has brought about major change in the international system. This definition of the term globalisation allows us to comprehend the change of relationships between individual states from a more or less side by side existence towards their integration in an international system. In the system, they are more dependent on each other than before and events happening outside their territory are far more likely to have effects on them than they would have had about a century ago. This unit will analyse the different ways in which states have become more dependent on each other and how globalisation has brought about this change in the international system.

2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- understand the key debates surrounding the question of globalization in International Politics.
- summarise and critically evaluate the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of globalization in International Politics.
- understand the role of globalisation and secularity in the processes of state formation, construction of security and production of political violence.
- assess the role that globalisation plays in contemporary practices of International Politics.
- identify key ethical and normative questions raised by globalisation in the public sphere and apply theoretical perspectives to case studies.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Globalization and International Politics

Globalisation refers to the process of integrating national economies into a world-system through trade, investment and migration. The means of integration are private enterprise and markets. Thus, globalization means 'marketisation' or the globalisation of capitalism. However, it takes place in a world of states. For globalization to continue therefore, governments and populations must become increasingly indifferent to the origin of the goods and services they consume. The logical end point of globalisation would be a single global economy. Allocation of resources would be frontier and culture blind, leaving only geographical distance as an irreducible 'natural' barrier. Measured by this kind of standard, it is evident that globalisation is not still in its infancy; nor is it likely that the notional end point will ever be attained as long as human beings remain recognisable as such. In fact, it will almost certainly be halted, and may even be reversed, long before the end point is reached.

The reason is politics. Globalization, it could be said, stops where politics starts. This is too neat. Politics can help globalisation. Britain's repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 was a political decision; so were the decisions all over the world to abolish or emasculate capital controls in the 1980s and 1990s. The World Trade Organization was set up in 1995 by political agreement. What this means is that important political interests were aligned with globalisation. Political ideas have also helped the process along notably, the rejection of socialism and dirigisme in favour of free markets which swept the world in the 1980s and 1990s. We can also see emerging from the shadows a political superstructure – call it governance – of a global economy –far short indeed of a world government, but pointing in that direction. In organisations like the IMF, WTO, World Bank we have the start of an 'economic government of the world'. A global environmental regime was established by the Kyoto Protocol of 1998.

Newly proposed reforms of the United Nations Charter are designed to establish a right of intervention in the domestic affairs of rogue and failed states. The language of war is being replaced by that of 'crime' and 'police actions', analagous to that of a domestic jurisdiction. Some would see the European Union –the most advanced regional organisation in the world today –as a model for a global system of economic and political governance. Underlying these initiatives is the thought that a global economy requires public goods, including rules of the game just as much as does a domestic economy that without them, the world becomes an anarchy and economic integration goes into reverse. Within states these public goods are provided by governments. In a global economy which may eventually evolve into a genuine world government.

The developments suggest another truth: that economic interdependence limits politics, and robs it of some of its noxious potential. The greater a state's dependence on foreign trade or capital for its livelihood, the greater the costs to it at breaking the rules, formal and informal of inter-dependence, this is true even if it regards the rules as unfair. A state which relies on importing capital for its development has to have a budgetary policy which the investors regard as 'sound'.

A state which abuses the 'human rights' of its citizens risks a variety of economic and possibly military, sanctions. None of these penalties limit its sovereignty but raise the costs of it to exercise its sovereignty. Yet the idea that globalisation stop where politics begins retain a great deal of a bite.

The reason is that accountability – the accountability of rulers to their people stops at national frontiers. Nowhere has there been a decisive leap from national to world politics. No global or even regional, institution or set of rules commands the legitimacy that comes from popular consent. There is no global government, no global opposition, no global civil society – though some NGOs see themselves as starting to play the role of the last two. In a world of states, the ultimate decisions affecting globalization – how far it will go, what form it will take, whether it will be reversed, rest with the states and their citizens. There is no guarantee that the perceived interests of states and their peoples will remain on the side of globalisation. In fact, we see plenty of examples of the contrary the whole time.

The world today consists of 190 separate sovereign units. In most cases, their sovereignty is nominal. The political organisation of the world is extremely hierarchical. No more than half a dozen states decide practically everything of importance which happens, of which the United States is by far the most important. One can see in this concentration of power the potential for what the Marxist Karl Kautsky at the start of the last century called a 'super-empire'. The establishment of such an empire would certainly short-circuit the much more difficult and uncertain process of building a global democracy to govern a global economy. Perhaps this is what the American neo-conservatives have in mind.

However, there are two major obstacles. First, empire and democracy stand in opposition, and there is no political idea capable of reconciling them. In fact, tendencies to empire and tendencies to democracy are both increasing simultaneously, giving a new twist to the Hegelian dialectic. The second obstacle to World Empire is the 'balance of power', or the non-acquiescence of other great powers to a world vision articulated by the United States through the prism of American interests. The balance of power may not operate with the precision of physics envisaged by its 18th century theorists; but it is a pretty secure premise for International Politics. It simply reflects the fact that there is no 'view from nowhere' –no single world interest. A Palestinian leader puts this rather well:

> Moral arguments for the justification of the use of collective violence are [often] cosmetic constructs used either to drum up support for, or silence… opposition to, an action whose real motivation is the fulfillment of a perceived interest.

Thus the international politics may support globalisation or they may not. And usually, perhaps, they do not. For not only does globalisation challenge the sovereignty of states, but there also exists powerful political passions which are not importantly connected to economics at all and which throughout history, have shown a disturbing ability to overpower economic self-interest. The First World War which brought the first era of globalisation to an end is the best instance of this. This then is the skeleton of a 'political economy of globalization'.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1

What do post-Cold War theories of international politics –products of a completely different literature - tell us about the political context of globalization?

3.2   Globalization Theories

It has been argued that the cold war represents the best practical example of realism in action. The arms race, preoccupation with national security and the struggle for power were all in evidence here. However in the 1970's as the cold war "thawed" and the advent of the oil crisis persisted, scholars of international relations shifted away from national security towards issues of trade and environment at a time of détente in what was seen as Liberalism. In the mean time, other scholars moved towards globalization theories as an alternative to theories of Realism and Liberalism.

3.2.1   What is Realism?

Machiavelli (1513) once wrote in "Prince" that the sole aim of a politician is to seek power by all means irrespective of moral or religious considerations. In similar rhetoric, Thucydides (411BC) in his historical narrative of the 'Peloponnesian Wars' stated that the battle for power and the fear of losing it were at the heart of the Peloponnesian wars between Athens and Sparta. Power according to both Machiavelli and Thucydides is the ultimate goal of states and politicians. These were some of the historical theoretical assumptions that gave birth to Realism in contemporary politics. Realism is an ideology of international relations, especially quite dominant in the early-cold war era, whose overriding assumption is that state power and state interests determine the constraints under which world politics operate. It is based on four basic assumptions which according to Viotti and Kauppi (1999) are as follows; The first assumption is that states are the principal or main actors in international relations and as such non-state actors such as multinational corporations and international bodies and intergovernmental institutions like the UN are not important or only play a minor role. The state is and should be the dominant actor. Secondly, the state is seen as one unitary actor that speaks with one voice and presents solidarity and a common stand to the outside world. Although dissent or difference of opinion arises, it is corrected and dealt with by higher authorities in an effort to present an integrated unified voice. Thirdly, Realists view the state as a rational unitary actor that fulfills state objectives using rational means of decision making that take into account all feasible alternatives available to the state to arrive at the best possible decision that maximizes utility.

Although Realists affirm that the decision making process might be tinged with bias, uncertainty or lack of adequate information, they still declare that a states' choice, will at least be perceived as the satisfactory one, if not the best. The last and fourth assumption of Realists is that at the heart of the international relations between states, national security is the number one priority. Realists focus on actual or potential conflicts between states, the use of military force to resolve such conflicts and prevention of territorial violation. Realists view national security and military issues as stuff of "high politics" and issues such trade, social or environmental problems as "low politics" (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999). In a nutshell, Realists believe that other states are inherently anarchical, and aggressive with a sole aim of territorial expansion that is only constrained by opposing powers. It is a view made famous by Thomas Hobbes who viewed the state of nature as

inherently aggressive, anarchic and gladiatorial hence prone to war. This was the main ideology that dominated the cold war era, justifying subsequent arms races and war itself. Realism in essence is as far removed from idealism as one would imagine. However, this "state-centric" ideology did not explain the state of world politics as states became more increasingly co-operative in areas such as trade, and even the military at the time of détente. As states realized they had more to gain through co-operation, economic issues became just as important as security matters and another ideology emerged explaining the new international system. This was the emergency of Liberalism.

3.2.2   What is Liberalism?

Liberalism was used to underline the shift in international relations at the time of détente. Liberalism also has a number of basic assumptions on which it is based. The first is that non-state actors such as international institutions, multinational corporations and NGOs are also important and dominant actors in international relations. They assert a considerable amount of influence when setting the political agenda on the international stage. In an increasingly interdependent global economy, MNCs have also come to play a vital role in international relations and in some cases shaping political events in host states. Secondly, the state is not a unified entity as realists declare but is disaggregated into various competing components, bureaucracies and interest groups that are attempting to influence foreign policies. There is "competition, coalition building, conflict and compromise" as one would expect in politics. As such these actors are not impermeable to external influence as realists assert. The complexity of politics ensures that state actors are constantly subjected to external elements that include other states as well as non-state entities (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999; Martin, 2007). Thirdly, Liberalists challenge the notion that the state is a rational actor. This arises from the logical fact that the state is not seen as unitary in the first place.

Decision making that is subject to coalition and counter coalition building, bargaining and compromise may not yield a best or optimal decision. It might yield a decision with minimum consensus from a minimum winning coalition but this hardly means the decision process is rational. The very process actors go through means there will be bias, misperception, uncertainty, stress and other factors all of which undercut the idea of a rational decision making process. Realists such as Hans Morgenthau have nevertheless defended the rationality argument stating that it is simply the starting point for analysis rather than a concluding statement. The last point is that in Liberalism, other factors such as economic, social, environmental or other constantly changing world issues should also dominate world politics alongside military/national security issues.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Summarise and critically evaluate the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of globalisation and politics

3.3   Globalisation, Theories and International Politics
Globalization has been described as the "The process of increasing interconnectedness between societies such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on peoples and

societies far away" (Baylis and Smith, 2001). Globalization theories have four key concepts that underpin the ideology and indeed their outlook on international politics in fundamentally different ways from the other two. The first concept is that unlike Realism and Liberalism, Globalization theories assume that the starting point for debates on international politics is "the global context within which states and other entities interact" (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999). To understand the behavior of states in international politics, one needs to analyze the global environment within which such behavior occurs. The emphasis here is to examine how the global structure and system conditions and shapes the external behavior of states inclining them to behave in a certain way instead of looking at internal factors. Second, Globalization theories assert that history plays a very important role in how states relate to each other. It dictates the current environment within which international politics takes place. The defining characteristic of the international system is that it is capitalist. As such this requires the study of its origin in 16th century Western Europe, its effects, changes and expansion to a point of global domination. As such the main benefactors have been the original capitalist states with first mover advantages while other states haven't benefited from it.

To this effect, globalization theories assert that it is imperative to study how the capitalist system has conditioned and constrained behavior of all states and societies and how its evolution may have even contributed to the creation of states, not just their behavior (Viotti and Kauppi, 1999; Kofman and Young, 1996). Third, Globalization scholars realize the importance of states-as-actors, transnational corporations and international bodies and other coalitions but their emphasis is on how these entities and factors act as mechanisms of domination by some states, classes or elites benefiting from the capitalist system at the expense of others. More important is the development and maintenance of dependency relations among the industrialized developed nations (North America, Europe and Japan) and Less Developing Countries (LDCs) in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The key argument here is that the global political economy has progressed-intentionally or unintentionally - in a way that keeps the latter states underdeveloped. Although most LDCs are part of the world capitalist system and are fully integrated and integral to it, they are underdeveloped and most remain so. This integration according to globalization scholars is the problem. It is parasitic to LDCs because their integration only enriches the industrialized nations by providing them with cheap labor, raw materials and markets for their goods. This integration means they cannot choose their own autonomous path of political and economic development (Keohane and Nye, 1989; Viotti and Kauppi, 1999; Martin, 2007).

Lastly, Globalization theories as already evidenced place far greater emphasis on the importance of economic factors, when it comes to analyzing the workings of the international system. This is in stark contrast to realism which does not even consider them important. Liberalism does argue that it is an open question although they do reject the high versus low politics stance typical of the other two theories. It is imperative to declare that all three theories are not mutually exclusive in all respects. Some scholars of Realism do not deny the importance of economic factors rather they differ from Liberalism and Globalization theorists in how much relative importance is attached when compared to military security issues. Some scholars of Globalization also recognize the role of states in global politics but prefer to attach significant emphasis on economic factors and class relations.

Similarly, supporters of Liberalism place their greatest emphasis on non-state actors as well as transnational, socioeconomic factors that are seen as reducing the autonomy of the state actor. All three perspectives are not mutually exclusive and each has its strengths and weaknesses. The relative utility of each theory in generating helpful insight will vary depending on the particular theoretical question one may be asking. One can argue on the relative merits of using any of the three theories to answer political pressing questions but there is no one right dominant perspective. The more fundamental concern is the framework within which each perspective is used. None is more radical than the other but each simply offers an alternative lens through which to make sense of what we observe in the international political system.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Assess the role that globalization plays in contemporary practices of international politics.

4.0   CONCLUSION

Overall, it has been demonstrated that globalization has changed the international system quite significantly in so far as it made states far more interdependent and interconnected. The world is not a place of many different and separate countries anymore, but these states form almost one entity on many different levels. Problems do not arise in isolation anymore thus the solutions for these now also have to be found in collective action rather than individual responses. Intergovernmental Organisations, private sector bodies and global financial institutions – the products of globalization – have taken the leading role in trying to solve these global problems and in creating a global market and economy, and by doing so, they have simultaneously brought states closer together and thus made them more dependent on each other.

5.0   SUMMARY

So in conclusion, one can argue that Globalization theories are simply a theoretical alternative to both Liberal and Realist perspectives. They might seem radical in a sense that they throw out everything that has to do with the other two theories. As seen earlier, some Globalization scholars such as Wallerstein recognize the importance of states as actors as some Realists and Liberals recognize the importance of economic factors. The difference comes down to the relative importance each theory attaches to particular factors. Thus for Realists, states and state interactions are the most important factors. For Liberals, transnational interactions through communication via various entities is a central focus; and for Globalization theorists, issues of class (haves and have not) or North-South relations of dominance or dependence are crucial.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summarises and critically evaluate Liberalism, Realism and Globalisation are associated with International Politics.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 3   GLOBALISATION AND THE NATION-STATE

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- understand the key debates surrounding the question of globalization in the nation-state.
- summarise and critically evaluate the historical background to the study of globalization and nation-state.
- understand the role of globalisation and regional bodies in the processes of state formation and construction of security.
- assess the role that economic and political globalisation play in contemporary practices of international politics.
- identify key ethical and normative questions raised by globalisation in the public sphere apply theoretical perspectives to case studies e.g. 'South Africa'.

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Globalization and the Nation-State

The future of the nation-state is one of the most hotly debated issues of the post-Cold War world. Will the nation-state survive? Three "threats", if one may call it that, come to mind. The first is the economic globalization of the world, and the question is whether modern governments still have the power to direct their own economies in the way they used to a decade and longer ago. The second is a very new phenomenon: the intervention of the international community in the form of bodies such as the United Nations (UN) or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in places like Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as the internationalization of the prosecution

of those who commit crimes against humanity. In the third place is the development of international and regional bodies, such as the UN and allied organisations, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), etc. Does the growing importance of these phenomena not limit governments' freedom to manoeuvre in almost every respect? These questions are of course, not exactly new. Even in 1919, the economist John Maynard Keynes wrote in an often quoted passage about Europe before the First World War:

> The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of the world … The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internationalisation of which was nearly complete in practice.

These questions are of great importance to governments worldwide, simply because they have to know what the limits of practicality will allow. Any government that fails to realizes where the art of the possible ends will inevitably be penalised by the practical situation. This section of this unit will therefore attempt to explore the limits to state sovereignty in the present world in the light of globalisation.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
Is Globalization threatening the rise of the Nation-State? Discuss.

3.2   Globalization: Historical Background

The nation-state is one of those fixtures of political life without which one cannot imagine the world. Yet as things go, it is a relatively recent phenomenon, no more than five centuries. Approximately 1500 is usually taken as the point of origin of the modern nation-state in Western Europe. The main intellectual builder of this concept was the Dutch legal pioneer Hugo de Groot who mainly wrote under his Latinised name Grotius. Grotius is regarded as the father of modern international law in that he was the first to create a legal code for states to interact. He did not innovate all that much but mostly codified usages which already existed. Nevertheless, his work meant that the state for the first time became the basic legal and political unit in the network of International Politics, and that state sovereignty became one of the bedrocks of international law. The nation-state is therefore a typical Western phenomenon. Other states – such as the various Arab kingdoms, the Roman Empire or the Chinese Empire – were actually rather multinational conglomerates. In Africa, one may perhaps regard kingdoms such as that of the Zulu, Mali or Ghana as rudimentary nation states.

Under modern international law a few legal fictions were created to regulate states' interaction. For instance, all states – great and small, powerful and weak – were regarded as equal in law. No state had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. In theory, every government exercised sovereign power within its borders. (Of course in constitutional law, it became a question of who exactly was the sovereign; the monarch – parliament or the people – but that is a different matter). Like all things in life, theory and practice did not always see eye to eye. In practice, smaller and weaker states were frequently forced by bigger and stronger states to

regulate their internal affairs differently which in turn impinged on their sovereignty. Also, geopolitics for instance, forced the British and Dutch to become trading and maritime nations. On their part, the Germans' central geographical position in Europe made them extremely vulnerable to strategic encirclement from the west, south and east, and this complicated warfare for them immeasurably. Economic realities also fettered state sovereignty. The economic crisis which started with the Wall Street catastrophe in 1929 narrowed the limits of the possible to a great extent. This was exactly what the Hertzog government in the Union of South Africa had to learn when in the name of state sovereignty, it tried to cling to the gold standard but was forced to abandon it after a while when huge amounts of money started to leave the country. After the government bowed to the dictates of the market, the outflow was reversed. In the same way, apartheid and communism in the end failed, mostly because they did not take account of economic realities.

Here also, state sovereignty was not strong enough to allow a government to do what it felt was right. (Obviously, the fact that both systems were immoral is immaterial to this argument.) The point is, then, that the idea of state sovereignty remained a legal fiction which never existed unfettered in practice. The balance of military power, economic laws and geopolitics always conspired to limit state sovereignty to an extent that differed widely according to any given historical situation.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Summarise and critically evaluate the historical background to the study of globalisation and nation-state

3.3   Economic Globalisation

Economic globalisation is defined by the International Monetary Fund as a 'historical process, the result of human innovation and technological progress. It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly through trade and financial flows. The term sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labour) and knowledge (technology) across international borders. There are also broader cultural, political and environmental dimensions of globalisation that are not covered here'. It is clear from the Keynes quotation that globalisation is not exactly new. The occupation of most of the world by Europe in previous centuries led to a first wave of globalisation which reached its zenith in the years before 1914. As the American historian William R. Keylor (1996) observes:

> These impediments to the free movement of labour in search of jobs, savings seeking high returns, and exports seeking markets gradually disappeared during the second half of the [nineteenth] century. The advent of steamship and railway transportation around midcentury inaugurated a mass intercontinental and transcontinental migration unequaled before or since. Between 1860 and 1920 over 45 million people left the grinding poverty of overpopulated Europe for the sparsely settled spaces across the seas.

Accompanying this process, he continues,

was the infusion of European capital to the undercapitalized economies of these lands of recent European settlement. Britain, France and Germany especially invested heavily in the New World, and later even the United States (US) joined the fray. As a matter of fact, the value of world trade in 1913 was about 25 times bigger than in 1800 – and this actually understates the case because inflation is not taken into account in this calculation. By 1914 the Europeans had invested roughly $40 billion abroad. The British were investing about 7% of their annual national income abroad, slightly more than their investment in their entire domestic economy. As McKay, Hill and Butler formulate it:

In a general way, the enormous increase in international commerce summed up the growth of an interlocking world economy, centered in and directed by Europe. This phase of economic globalization was of course, not sufficient to counter the madness which swept across Europe in 1914, a madness which re-emphasised state sovereignty, but made the economic costs of the war immeasurably heavier. In the aftermath of the war, states increasingly sought to protect their own economies by import tariffs and subsidies, which undid most of the effects of the era before 1914. Not before the 1980s, and especially the 1990s, did a new phase of economic globalisation start to manifest itself. The drive for a new globalisation was started in 1993 with the conclusion of the so-called Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which sought to lower import tariffs and state subsidies and to increase world trade. It was estimated at the time that this would increase world economic growth quite a lot. But the effect is not simply on trade, however important this may be. Traditional multinational companies are being transformed into transnational companies. Peter F. Drucker writes: "In a transnational company there is only one economic unit, the world. Selling, servicing, public relations, and legal affairs are local. But parts, machines, planning, research, finance, marketing, pricing and management are conducted in contemplation for the world market.

One of America's leading engineering companies for instance, makes one critical part for all of its 43 plants worldwide in one location outside of Antwerp, Belgium – and nothing else. It has organised product development for the entire world in three places and quality control in four. For this company, national boundaries have largely become irrelevant. And Ulrich Beck (1999) echoes him: "The levying of taxes is the principle underlying the authority of the national state. Yet companies can now produce in one country, pay taxes in another and demand state infrastructural spending in yet another." Besides, Drucker states, the world markets, with currency fluctuations and the like have created: "virtual rather than real money. But its power is real. The volume of world money is so gigantic that its movements in and out of a currency have far greater impact than the flows of financing, trade, or investment. In one day, as much of this virtual money may be traded as the entire world needs to finance trade and investment for a year. This virtual money has total mobility because it serves no economic function. Billions of it can be switched from one currency to another by a trader pushing a few buttons on a keyboard. And because it serves no economic function and finances nothing, this money also does not follow economic logic or rationality. It is volatile and easily panicked by a rumour or unexpected event."

Since 1995, South Africa has had two experiences of the havoc this can create. The effect of this is enhanced by the Internet. It is not yet entirely clear what the effect of the Internet on humanity is going to be, but this much is already known: governments will find it ever harder to regulate financial transactions across borders and to control the flow of information and – perhaps even more importantly, opinions – across traditional national barriers. Money is being transferred from distant accounts to accounts in other places, without governments knowing about it and without tariffs or taxes being paid. People are exchanging information and views and influencing others. Dictatorships may try to limit this, as – for instance – China and Singapore are doing by intimidating Internet providers, but simply by entering through providers in other countries, this may very easily be evaded. The Internet is truly the face of globalisation in the 21st century; unregulated.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
Assess the role that economic globalisation plays in contemporary practices of international politics

3.4   Political Globalisation

Collective international intervention to defend the security and stability of the world order has been since the advent of the UN, whose Charter makes provision for it. The best known example of the UN actually going to war to resist aggression is, perhaps, the Korean War (1950–1953), but the body has also sent peacekeeping troops to several parts of the world, such as Cyprus, the Middle East, the Congo-Leopoldville, etc. To a certain extent, this amounted to international intervention in states' sovereignty, although the big powers were never affected and the intervention was strictly regulated. The scope and reach of such intervention has however, greatly intensified since the end of the Cold War. This type of new interventionism may be categorised in two types: military intervention and the internationalisation of the prosecution of those who commit crimes against humanity. The first differs quite distinctly from international intervention to stop aggression, such as the Gulf War of 1990–1991, ostensibly to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, but in reality more to safeguard the country's vital oil flow to especially the West. We are here solely concerned with armed international intervention to change a sovereign state's treatment of its own citizens. Previously, international action stopped at economic and political sanctions, such as those against South Africa during the apartheid years.

Armed intervention is something new. Examples of such intervention may be found in Somalia (1993–1994), Bosnia (1995), East Timor (1999) and Sierra Leone (2000). The fact that there was no intervention during the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is generally considered an indictment of the international community. Strictly speaking, this in itself boils down to the right of the international community through the UN to impinge on state sovereignty when the state in question does not comply with international human rights conventions. However, in 1999 this type of intervention underwent a further qualitative change with the intervention in Kosovo by NATO without seeking the sanction of the UN Security Council as is demanded by the UN Charter. What happened here in essence was that NATO took it upon itself to wage war against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a recognized sovereign nation-state, because of its treatment of the ethnic Albanian Kosovar minority to occupy Kosovo and transform it in practice into a

NATO protectorate. The Yugoslavian actions – which took the form of the mass deportation of the people – was admittedly horrible, but the fact that action was undertaken without the sanction of the Security Council made this technically, an illegal war. As Michael J. Glennon (1999), a law professor at the University of California, wrote:

> As the twentieth century fades away, so too does the international consensus on when to get involved in another state's affairs. The United States and NATO – with little discussion and less funfare – have effectively abandoned the old UN Charter rules that strictly limit international intervention in local conflicts. They have done so in favour of a vague new system that is much more tolerant of military intervention but has few hard and fast rules. What rules do exist seems more the product of after-the fact-rationalisation by the West than of deliberation and pre-agreement.

The other category also seems like a considerable limitation of state sovereignty. In view of the horrific war crimes in conflicts such as Rwanda and Bosnia, the UN has set up an International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague which has already begun proceedings against several individuals and completed them against a few others. The Pinochet case has gone even further. Because of alleged crimes committed by the Chilean military dictatorship against people within its own borders (admittedly, some of them were Spanish nationals), a Spanish court applied for the extradition to that country of the aged ex-dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, when he visited Britain for medical treatment. Against the vehement opposition of the new democratic government in Chile, where the transfer of power was done by way of agreement and compromise, the British Law Lords assented. In the end, they did allow him to return home because of his medical condition, but the legal precedent they created stands regardless.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4
Assess the role that economic globalisation plays in contemporary practices of International Politics

3.5   Globalisation and Regional Bodies

Historically, states entered into political and military alliances with one or more other states. These alliances were temporary in nature and states also switched allegiance according to how they saw their own interest: today's ally was frequently tomorrow's adversary. The first true multilateral regional alliance, albeit a very loose one, was the so-called Concert of Europe, an informal gathering of states created at the Vienna Conference of 1814–1815, with the purpose of strengthening monarchical autocracies and to fight the rise of liberalism and democracy. It was held together for a few decades, and saw governments harmonizing certain aspects of their internal policies. It was however, simply the harbinger of things to come and withered away during the 1850s and 1860s. Its true successor was the League of Nations, established in 1919 in the wake of the most terrible war mankind had hitherto experienced, with the main purpose of preventing another war. It too failed and gave way under the determined aggression of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. It was superseded in 1945 by the United Nations. Neither the League of Nations nor the United Nations were of course regional bodies, although the very fact of membership meant that states did voluntarily limit their sovereignty to a certain extent.

The post-war era, however, saw a proliferation of regional international organisations, the scope of which was much wider than simply preventing war. The mother of these bodies was the European Coal and Steel Community which was founded in 1949. Although the formal purpose was limited to economic cooperation, several visionary European leaders – people like Sir Winston Churchill of Britain and Robert Schumann of France – saw in this organisation the first seedling of an eventual federal United States of Europe. The Coal and Steel Community was in 1957 superseded by the European Economic Community (EEC) with six founder member states, which has now grown to the European Union with 16 member states and with far wider powers than the EEC of 43 years ago. There are, of course, several other regional bodies as well. Further afield there is the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Association of Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and MERCOSUR, the regional economic cooperation body of South America. In our own part of the world there is the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Customs Union. Elsewhere similar bodies exist in East and West Africa. It seems that two models apply to these bodies. The one is represented by the EU, while the others form a second model. The EU model clearly goes much further than the others. It consists of several bodies which gives it the appearance of a supranational nation-state.

Firstly, there is the European Commission, which acts as the executive council, with commissioners having a separate portfolio; and second is the European Parliament, with representatives directly elected by the voters of each member country. These even have decision-making and legislative powers, although limited in nature. The real powers are at present still largely in the hands of the member governments, meeting regularly in various ministers' councils, and government leaders' summits twice a year. In most cases, each government has a veto power, although it must be said that this has been limited to a certain extent, decisions in some cases now being taken by a majority vote. Allied to this, the European Court of Law under the auspices of the Council of Europe – formally a separate body, but cooperating very closely with the EU structures – has to some extent taken on the role of a supranational constitutional court. It has the power to test legislation of any member state to its Charter of Human Rights and to "advise" the relevant government to change it. In theory that government may, of course, refuse and there is very little the court can do about it. But it has never happened.

In theory therefore, the sovereign nationstate still very much holds sway in the EU. Nevertheless, in various ways the EU is seriously eroding state sovereignty in practice:
- In view of the planned enlargement of the Union with several Central and East European states, plans are being drawn up to limit the member states' veto power even more and extend majority vote decision making.
- This would even apply to foreign and security policy, a field where governments have hitherto been fiercely protective of their sovereignty.
- Slowly but surely, a common EU defence force is developing. Several states – e.g. Germany and France, Germany and the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark – have created common army corps, divisions and even brigades, while the navies of the Netherlands and Belgium have practically amalgamated with a common operational headquarters. The EU has even drawn up plans for a rapid deployment force of 50 000

soldiers which for the first time ever gives this body the military clout to intervene and stabilise crisis situations on the European continent.

- In view of the common internal market and the practical abolishment of internal borders, the EU structures have acquired the power to prescribe to member states a whole host of mundane matters in order to commonolise the economies.
- From the beginning of 2002, most national currencies were abolished in favour of a common currency, the Euro. The course is not yet without controversy. Britain especially is holding out on various matters, but at the cost of being shoved to the periphery of Europe.

Another matter is the incorporation of new member states who seem lukewarm to the rapid pace of integration. In answer to this, the idea of a "Europe of differing speeds" is being mooted and winning support. Also, the idea of European integration does not elicit great enthusiasm at grassroots level, where there is considerable unease and even resistance.

Nevertheless, in the broader scheme of things, the conclusion seems inescapable: the EU is inexorably moving in the direction of a confederation, which, in time, may even develop into a fully-fledged United States of Europe, with state sovereignty being the main casualty. Even now, while each member state retains the theoretical power to leave the Union, it would be a practical impossibility. No member state of the EU can therefore in reality, be called sovereign in the classical sense any more. The other model is a much more loose cooperation, mainly in two fields – economic and security. It seems that economic cooperation frequently is in the driving seat. NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and APEC are all primarily economic groupings, with security issues playing second fiddle, albeit at times an important second fiddle. All of these bodies are purely voluntary in nature, and none of them have eroded state sovereignty nearly to the same extent as the EU. Inasmuch as sovereignty has been limited, this is much the case as it always has been – by the limits of the possible, and not because of a formal integration and unification process such as in Europe.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 5
Identify key ethical and normative questions raised by globalisation in the public sphere apply theoretical perspectives to regional bodies.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 6
Critically examine globalization and international politics in South Africa.

4.0   CONCLUSION

The role of the nation-state in globalization is a complex one in part due to the varying definitions and shifting concepts of globalization. While it has been defined in many ways, globalization is generally recognized as the fading or complete disappearance of economic, social and cultural borders between nation-states. Some scholars have theorized that nation-states, which are inherently divided by physical and economic boundaries, will be less relevant in a globalized world. While increasingly reduced barriers in regard to international commerce and communication are sometimes seen as a potential threat to nation-states, these trends have existed throughout history. Air and sea transportation that made same-day travel to other

continents possible and greatly expanded trade among countries did not abolish the sovereignty of individual nations. Instead, globalization is a force that changed the way nation-states deal with one another, particularly in the area of international commerce. One commonly recognized effect of globalization is that it favors Westernization, meaning that other nation-states are at a disadvantage when dealing with the Americas and Europe. This is particularly true in the agricultural industry, in which second- and third-world nations face internal competition from Western companies. Another potential effect is that nation-states are forced to examine their economic policies in light of the many challenges and opportunities that multinational corporations and other entities of international commerce present. Multinational corporations, particularly, challenge nation-states to confront the unique issue of foreign direct investments, forcing nation-states to determine how much international influence they allow in their economies. Globalization also creates a sense of interdependence among nations, which could create an imbalance of power among nations of differing economic strengths. The role of the nation-state in a global world is largely a regulatory one as the chief factor in global interdependence. While the domestic role of the nation-state remains largely unchanged, states that were previously isolated are now forced to engage with one another to set international commerce policies. Through various economic imbalances, these interactions may lead to diminished roles for some states and exalted roles for others.

5.0   SUMMARY

If it is true that the nation state is likely to remain for some time to come a prominent reference point in the "cartography of governance"-the subject of this symposium-it is also true that the specific role of this administrative structure will be determined by more than structural or topographic features of a political system. To this extent,"meteorology of governance" is needed as well, for it addresses the dynamic though often unpredictable processes that occur across the political landscape. If the winds of political change are to sweep into the dusty halls of government, they will originate from the same place they have always arisen from time immemorial-they will flow from the voices of the people.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summaries and critically evaluate globalisation and international politics in contemporary South Africa.

7.0   REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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UNIT 4 IMPACT OF GLOBALISATION ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Ever since the end of the Cold War, people have been trying to picture what a 'world after communism 'would look like. The first attempts to discern the post-communist future revolved round the ideas of 'globalisation' and 'democracy'. Underlying both was the view that the main barrier to the spread of markets and democracy had fallen away, and that a 'new world order' was shaping up, or could be made to shape up, according to these two precepts. A crucial corollary of this was that war and the threat of war would become residual factors in the ordering of international relations because we had found a 'better way'. Free trade promised gains to all; and 'democracies do not go to war with each other'. Markets and politics would for the first time in human history work hand in hand to steer humanity to unparalleled prosperity and peace. It has not worked out like this- at least not yet. The clear outline of a world newly become prosperous and pacific has faded, precisely because many non-Western nations see markets and democracy as expressions of Western, particularly, US power. The 'peace dividend' from the collapse of the Soviet Union has mainly gone, with the 'war on terrorism' replacing the Cold War as the rationale for increased military expenditures. What kind of world have we entered? What should we be doing about it? This unit is a modest attempt to suggest some answers. The first part sketches a more realistic 'political economy' of globalisation than the one sketched out by its first enthusiasts. The second section fleshes out the 'political' part of the skeleton to explain why, after all, the coercive use of force has not disappeared. Finally, I discuss an ambitious attempt by the philosopher Peter Singer to show how the ideal of 'one world' can be realized by the application of a single principle –that of utilitarianism.

2. 0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- examine how new is globalization in mainstream of International Politics

- examine the contribution of Theories of International Politics to understandings of globalisation,
- examine the concept of Globalisation and New World Order in International Politics

3.0   MAIN CONTENT

3.1   Is there anything new about globalisation?

Humans have always been traders and warriors. They have constantly been inventing means of transport and communication to carry goods and armies over long distances. If globalisation is thought of simply as the breaking down of geographical and political barriers to the movement of goods, money, and people, it has been going on for a very long time. It has also continually met with strong resistances, and has been interrupted and reversed by natural and political disasters.

However, globalisation is not simply a process of breaking down barriers to interaction. Historically, trade, war, and empire have often gone together, though conceptually trade and war are quite different ways of earning a living. Trade has the potential to create a single world; but war cannot do this, since no single military force is capable of conquering the world. If trade points to unity, war leads to the division of the world into military economic blocs, or to the dissolution of all settled authority. So whether the trading or fighting urge is dominant will largely determine the organisation of the planet. So why have we coined a new word to describe the most recent twist in an age-old story? New words name new things, but there is no one-to-one equivalence. Meanings also migrate: post-modernism at first referred to playful tendencies in architecture; it is now being applied to certain types of states, as we shall see. Globalisation seems to have undergone a similar inflation of meaning.

Why is this? Mainly, it seems, because of our strong sense that in the last twenty years or so humanity seems to have crossed some sort of threshold, which transcends the inherent limitations of previous globalising efforts, and from which there is no going back; because of the consciousness that we now all inhabit a single space, that our fates are all linked together in a way they have never been before. A UN Report nicely captures this feeling: 'In the global village, someone else's poverty very soon becomes our own problem: of lack of markets for one's products, illegal immigration, pollution, contagious disease, insecurity, fanaticism, terrorism'. There is, that is, a heightened awarness of the causal interdependence of the universe –that if we clap our hands, the moons of Jupiter will be shifted from their orbits. There seem to be four main reasons for such a perception. First, for the first time in human history it makes sense to talk about a global economy rather than about a linked collection of national or regional economies. Secondly, our imagination is powerfully excited by the new technology of the Internet, which has so dramatically compressed distance and time. Thirdly, there is the sense that the current phase of economic integration is having much deeper transforming effects on cultures than in previous periods when societies were opened up to external influences. Finally, the absence of any coherent resistance to these processes has made them seem invincible, inevitable. This last point is particularly important. There was no alternative 'world-view' to that of globalisation. The debates to which the actual process of globalisation has given rise are largely debates about the rules of a global economy, not about its desirability. This has soured the

process without giving rise to an alternative structure. Globalisation has inherited all the problems of capitalism, but is bereft of their traditional solutions. Socialism and protectionism are both dead ducks.

Globalisation refers to the process of integrating national economies into a world-system through trade, investment, and migration.The means of integration are private enterprise and markets: globalisation means 'marketisation' or the globalisation of capitalism. However, it takes place in a world of states. For globalisation to continue, therefore, governments and populations must become increasingly indifferent to the origin of the goods and services they consume. The logical end point of globalisation would be a single global economy. Allocation of resources would be frontier and culture blind, leaving only geographical distance as an irreducible 'natural' barrier. Measured by this kind of standard, it is evident that globalisation is not still in its infancy; nor is it likely that the notional end point will ever be attained as long as human beings remain recognisable as such. In fact, it will almost certainly be halted, and may even be reversed, long before the end point is reached.

The reason is politics. Globalisation, it could be said, stops where politics starts. This is too neat. Politics can help globalisation. Britain's repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 was a political decision; so were the decisions all over the world to abolish or emasculate capital controls in the 1980s and 1990s. The WTO was set up in 1995 by political agreement. What this means is that important political interests were aligned with globalisation. Political ideas have also helped the process along, notably the rejection of socialism and dirigisme in favour of free markets which swept the world in the 1980s and 1990s. We can also see emerging from the shadows a political superstructure – call it governance – of a global economy –far short indeed of a world government, but pointing in that direction. In organisations like the IMF,WTO, World Bank we have the start of an 'economic government of the world'. A global environmental regime was established by the Kyoto Protocol of 1998. Newly proposed reforms of the United Nations Charter are designed to establish a right of intervention in the domestic affairs of rogue and failed states.The language of war is being replaced by that of 'crime' and 'police actions', analagous to that of a domestic jurisdiction. Some would see the European Union –the most advanced regional organisation in the world today –as a model for a global system of economic and political governance.

Underlying these initiatives is the thought that a global economy requires public goods, including rules of the game just as much as does a domestic economy: that without them the world becomes an anarchy and economic integration goes into reverse. Within states these public goods are provided by governments. In a global economy they must perforce be supplied by government equivalents, which may eventually evolve into a genuine world government. The developments suggest another truth: that economic interdependence limits politics, and robs it of some of its noxious potential. The greater a state's dependence on foreign trade or capital for its livelihood, the greater the costs to it of breaking the rules, formal and informal, of interderdependence is. This is true even if it regards the rules as unfair. A state which relies on importing capital for its development has to have a budgetary policy which the investors regard as 'sound'. A state which abuses the 'human rights' of its citizens risks a variety of economic,

and possibly military, sanctions. None of these penalties limit its sovereignty; but raise the costs to it of exercising its sovereignty.

Yet the idea that globalisation stop where politics begins retains a great deal of bite. The reason is that accountability –the accountability of rulers to their people -stops at national frontiers. Nowhere has there been a decisive leap from national to world politics. No global, or even regional, institution or set of rules commands the legitimacy that comes from popular consent. There is no global government, no global opposition, no global civil society –though some NGOs see themselves as starting to play the role of the last two. In a world of states, the ultimate decisions affecting globalisation –how far it will go, what form it will take, whether it will be reversed, rest with the states and their citizens. There is no guarantee that the perceived interests of states and their peoples will remain on the side of globalisation. In fact, we see plenty of examples of the contrary the whole time. The world today consists of 190 separate sovereign units. In most cases, their sovereignty is nominal. The political organisation of the world is extremely hierarchical. No more than half a dozen states decide practically everything of importance which happens, of which the United States is by far the most important. One can see in this concentration of power the potential for what the Marxist Karl Kautsky, at the start of the last century, called a 'super-empire'. The establishment of such an empire would certainly short-circuit the much more difficult and uncertain process of building a global democracy to govern a global economy. Perhaps this is what the American neo-conservatives have in mind. However, there are two major obstacles.

First, empire and democracy stand in opposition, and there is no political idea capable of reconciling them. In fact, tendencies to empire and tendencies to democracy are both increasing simultaneously, giving a new twist to the Hegelian dialectic.

The second obstacle to World Empire is the 'balance of power', or the non-acquiescence of other great powers to a world vision articulated by the United States through the prism of American interests. The balance of power may not operate with the precision of physics envisaged by its 18th century theorists; but it is a pretty secure premise for international relations. It simply reflects the fact that there is no 'view from nowhere' –no single world interest. A Palestinian leader puts this rather well: 'Moral arguments for the justification of the use of collective violence are [often] cosmetic constructs used either to drum up support for, or silence… opposition to, an action whose real motivation is the fulfillment of a perceived interest'. (Mittleman, 2000)

Thus the international politics may support globalisation, or they may not. And usually, perhaps, they do not. For not only does globalisation challenge the sovereignty of states, but there also exist powerful political passions which are not importantly connected to economics at all and which, throughout history, have shown a disturbing ability to overpower economic self-interest. The First World War which brought the first era of globalisation to an end is the best instance of this. This, then, is the skeleton of a 'political economy of globalisation'. What do post-Cold War theories of international relations –products of a completely different literature - tell us about the political context of globalisation?

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1
What do post-Cold War theories of international relations –products of a completely different literature - tell us about the political context of globalisation?

3.2   Theories of International Politics and Globalisation

Theories of international relations try to describe (but also to prescribe) the principles underyling the behaviour of states to each other. Since the fall of communism they have had to take into account the end of the era of great power rivalry, coexistence and war which dominated International Politics from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, and whose final simplification was the bipolar balance between the USA and the USSR after 1945. In the theories which conceptualised this kind of world, the context of interstate relations was the 'international anarchy', in which order was precariously maintained by a combination of empire (or hegemony) and the balance of power. The newer, post-Cold War theories have tried to portray the politics of a world in which it was no longer obvious that states were the dominant actors, or that they operated in an 'international anarchy'.

From the start two opposite interpretations of the post-communist world struggled for mastery. The first was western triumphalism. The collapse of communism, wrote US State Department official Francis Fukuyama in 1989 in his seminal article 'The End of History?', marked the 'triumph of the West, of the Western idea' in its form of markets and democracy. The West's victory would remove the main barriers to the 'Common Marketisation' of the world, since the ideological 'contradictions' which had led to the division of the world into two armed camps, had disappeared. The economic aspect of this vision, drawing on simplified free trade theory and the transforming effects of science and technology, looked more plausible than the political. But it was true that democracy and market economy rose together from the Soviet rubble; while the establishment of new bodies likes the World Trade Organisation, as well as further moves towards political union in Europe, seemed to confirm the rise of institutional and political counterparts to market-led integration. The attraction of Fukuyama's thesis was that it promised peace and prosperity without coercive power –an endpoint of history. President Bush's 'new world order' proclaimed in 1991 was influenced by Fukuyama. The collapse of communism was interpreted as a triumph of American values, not American power. If this was imperialism it was informal imperialism, which operated through 'soft power' institutions like the WTO and IMF, not through territorial conquests. At worst, there would be 'police operations' against a few rogue states.

But Fukuyama's was not the only conceptual map on offer. The opposite interpretation was that the US victory in the cold war masked the defeat of the West. In Samuel Huntington's account, the ideological rivalry and joint hegemony of the United States and the Soviet Union had suppressed a more fundamental clash of cultures or civilizations. With the collapse of biploarity, these fundamental forces would reassert themselves. On this view, the Cold War had imposed a temporary freeze on history, which was now free to resume. 'Buried alive, as it were, during the years of the Cold War, these civilizations…rose as soon as the stone was rolled off, dusted themselves off, and proceeded to claim the loyalty of their adherents' (Appadurai, 2001).

The political philosopher John Gray predicted that the collapse of Soviet Communism would soon be followed by the 'meltdown' of the American attempt to create a 'global free market'. Writing in The Times on 28 December 1989 Gray argued that 'the aftermath of totalitarianism will not be a global tranquillisation of the sort imagined by American triumphalist theories of liberal democracy. Instead, the end of totalitarianism in most of the world is likely to see the resumption of history on decidedly traditional lines: not the history invented in the hallucinatory perspectives of Marxism and American liberalism, but the history of authoritarian regimes, great-power rivalries, secret diplomacy, irredentist claims and ethnic and religious conflicts'. Whereas Huntington highlighted the collapse of western power, Gray focussed on the illusory nature of the western 'project', whether in its marxist or liberal form. Their common point was that the demise of communism signalled not the birth of post-history but the death of a particular kind of western history.

Events have been unkind to Fukuyama, but he was from being the Pangloss he is sometimes depicted as. He conceived of a post-communist world divided between 'a part that was historical and a part that was post-historical', with the 'vast bulk' of the Third World remaining 'very much mired in history'. Conflict between states 'still in history, and between those states and those at the end of history' would still be possible. But Fukuyama thought that 'ethnic and religious violence' would be confined to the frontiers of the 'post-historical' world, would not much affect the way it conducted its business, and would gradually die down, since it offered no alternative ideological goal to markets and democracy.

11 September 2001 showed that the 'historical' world could strike at the heart of the 'post-historical' one with deadly effect. History, it seemed, would not be confined to the peripheries of the 'common marketized' world, but was capable of invading and disrupting its command centres. Indeed the very forces of technology which were globalising the post-historical world were globalising the 'historical' resistances to it. No one can now be as confident as Fukuyama was in 1989 that history was a residual, that Islamic fundamentalism lacked 'universal significance'. The challenge today is to develop a conceptual map of a Janus-faced world –one that aspires to globalised, post-historical bliss, but still seems to be rooted in the conflict of states. In his intelligent and stylish book The Breaking of Nations, the diplomat Robert Cooper divides post-communist the world into three parts: the postmodern, the modern, and the pre-modern.

The postmodern part consists of states that have decided never to fight each other again and which value the rights of peoples (individuals) above the rights of nations. This enables their peaceful interdependence to be carried much further than in the past. The chief example of postmodernity is the European Union, 'a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs, right down to beer and sausages'. But postmodernity stretches beyond the European Union into all those multilateral organisations which constrain the sovereignty of states. Postmodernity does not say that the competiton of states has stopped; but that in parts of the world, and for some parts of their business with each other, states have abjured the use of force to settle their disputes: postmodern international politics has moved closer to the norms of domestic politics. Another sign of postmodernism is the revival of the 'just war' doctrine, one of whose criteria is that war should be used only as a 'last resort'.

The 'modern' world is the traditional world of the classical state system, whose members have not renounced the use, or threat, of force to achieve their goals. The ordering principles of this world remain that of empire and balance of power. The US, China, Russia, and India are the big beasts in this jungle. The pre-modern world is the chaotic world of 'failed' states –states which have regressed from the 'artificial' nationhood bequeathed by their colonial masters to tribalism and criminality. Many of them are in Sub-Saharan Africa: Yugoslavia is a rare European example. The language of postmodernism, modernism, and pre-modernism is helpful in making sense of the post-communist world.. It more accurately reflects its configuration, and the mingled possibilities it holds of progress and regresss, than do the one-dimensional constructions of Fukuyama, Huntington, and Gray. The 'breaking of nations' is occurring through the formation of multiple identities at the top and the retreat to tribalism at the bottom, this suggests a new pattern of both 'order and chaos'. In the top tier, the threat of war recedes; at the bottom violence is endemic; in the middle, classical schemes of order and disorder still reign.

Nevertheless, there are serious problems with the new map. Like all previous IP theories it is of Western provenance. It postulates the whole of humanity on a single ladder leading to an interdependent postmodernist utopia based on Western values. Some states are higher up on this ladder than others; there are also regrettable backslidings. I don't know what an Islamic or Chinese theory of International Politics would look like. It may very well embody an idea of progress. But it would surely be much more synthetic end state being aimed at, and consequently give a much higher role to conflict in bringing it about. The three-fold classification allows for too few identities.

Secondly, the new approach draw too simple a parallel between economic and politics. The ascent from pre-modern to modern to postmodern in politics goes together with the progress of economies from agricultural to industrial to service sectors. In that sense, it fits in with the long-run perspective of globalisation: particularly the view that technology is bringing about a post - historical world. But this is nonsense. It is best to think of technology as neutral between different aims. We know it can be used just as easily for destructive as for constructive purposes. One of the implications of the shrinking of time and space is that the same technology can be more rapidly diffused round the world than ever before. This does not make the world think the same; it just makes its technology the same is to signify that the nation state is ceasing to be the main source of people's identity. The postmodern achievement remains highly precarious. It is all very well to talk about multiple identities and imagined communities: the interesting question is which identity trumps the others when it comes to the crunch. There is no sufficient reason to doubt that national identity comes first. The EU, which is the most advanced postmodern construction, has not been able to transcend national limits to democracy. Unless this happens, war between the European states cannot be said to have been finally 'disinvented'.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2
Critically highlight the behaviour of states to each other since the fall of communism.

3.3 Globalisation and New World Order

After the international movement against neoliberal globalization took place, the powerful protests against the war on Iraq all over the world did once again reminded everyone that historical development is not simply the product of the schemes devised by the dominant forces of society, but the outcome of a struggle of contending forces, among which working people & the oppressed masses are a power to be reckoned with. In order to create an alternative to the above perspective, what was to be needed was a serious analysis of the underlying forces for the strategy of the new world order, announced with great fanfare in 1990, on the eve of the first gulf war, by George bush senior. This concept was too often been dismissed or on the left on the pretext that it is hardly anything more than a new world disorder.

This was later conceived by US imperialism as the ultimate destination to be reached through a series of violent upheavals in the existing world order. Hence, the disorder that is time, again denounced is infact the path that the world has to travel in order to reach that ultimate destination. It is, in other words, order through disorder by its very nature. Thus the NWO was, infact, can be termed to be as a dialectical unity in the true sense of the term: the, old order had been nullified violently so that the new order may be established as a synthesis of order & disorder. Pure denunciation or condemning also made it more difficult to analyze the methods and modalities through which the new order aspired to being built. It can be stated that US imperialism has been seeking world hegemony will not be able to do. We have to hold on to grip with the mechanisms & modalities through which it is doing so. In its turn, NWO cannot be understood in isolation but only as the political superstructure of the economic strategy of 'globalisation'.

SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3
In order to create an alternative to the above perspective, what was to be needed was a serious analysis of the underlying forces for the strategy of the new world order. Discuss.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Finally at the end the we can conclude with the summing up all the above details in brief like the introduction, origin, significance, consequences and so on like we can conclude here with globalization has had an impact on all nations as well as the proto nations. It has revived ethnic identity, which has challenged nationalism and the nation-states. Some even predicted that with globalization the nation-states would have been declined in significance. It appears here that the impact of globalization differs from country to country.

The influence of the developed and major countries over other states- developing and smaller countries has increased, both in economic and in political terms. it is obvious that developing countries benefited less than the developed ones from globalization but they are unable to escape the intrusion of globalization. They were and still they are continuing to adjust to this challenge. Globalization is often interpreted as westernization. This is due to the tremendous influence of the United States in its soft power, particularly through the mass media. However the pressure still can be felt and remains and some are worried that their culture will be overwhelmed. Some

are trying to combat the influence of western culture through ethnicity or even religious teaching but its results are uncertain.

5.0   SUMMARY

There is no doubt that both western & Asian nations have faced the challenges of globalization in recent decades, and they have become more intense since the 1990's. The decline of communism and socialism as ideologies, the decreasing importance of national boundaries for capital, companies, and even labour, have had profound implications for national identity. Nevertheless, the impact of globalization on the states is not seemed to be similar. It has been greater on some compared to others. What have been the effects? Did it lead to stronger nationalism or national disintegration? What happened to national identity? Is the concept of nation still relevant in the era of globalization? Based on the above raised questions, there were few nations selected to be surveyed on the basis of their homogeneity, multi-ethnic, immigrant and nationhood. Globalistion are neither willful, external, nor the result of bad management, but are produced by them & are seemed to be very essential within them.

6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT
Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you summarize and critically evaluate the dominant theoretical approaches to the study of globalisation in international politics.

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