# INR 322:
# STRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE 20TH CENTURY



## NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

| COURSE |
| GUIDE |

**INR 322**
**STRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE 20TH CENTURY**

Course Developer/Writer        Terhemba Nom Ambe-Uva
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**Introduction**

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and the skills to evaluate and discuss strategic studies literature. They will also be able to apply key concepts in strategic studies to case studies, geographical area studies, and current world events, within this course and in other courses, which deal with conflict and international relations.

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- Describe the processes of strategy formulation
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I would advise you to carefully study each unit, beginning with this Study Guide, especially since this course provides an opportunity for you to understand the contribution of classical and modern thinkers to strategic studies. Also make a habit of noting down any question you have for tutorials. In addition, please try your hand at formulating or identifying theories relevant to, and that can be applied to strategic studies.

## Course Materials

i.Course guide
ii.Study units
iii.Textbooks
iv.Assignment file
v.Presentation schedule.

## Study Units

INR 322 is a 3-Credit Unit 300 Level course for undergraduate French and International Studies students. There are five modules in this course, and each module is made up of four units. Thus, you will find twenty units in the whole text. Some units may be longer and/or more in depth than others, depending on the scope of the course that is in focus. The five modules in the course are as follows:

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This is a theory course but you will get the best out of it if you cultivate the habit of relating it to strategic issues in international relations during the pre-Cold War era, Cold War and post-Cold War periods.

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This Course Guide has been designed to furnish the information you need for a fruitful experience in the course. In the final analysis, how much you get from the course depends on how much you put into it in terms of time, effort and planning.

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# MODULE 1 STARTING POINT: UNDERSTANDING STRATEGY

The general aim of this module is to provide you with an in-depth understanding of the concept of "strategy". Key issues include the question of the scope, focus, and methods of strategic studies. As a follow up to INR 201, *Introduction to Strategic Studies*, only a brief review of the concept of "strategy" and the elusiveness of defining the concept is intended here. The review aims at preparing your mind for the theoretical constructs of strategy and the contribution of modern thinkers to strategic studies in the 20th Century.

In this module, which is made up of four units, you will be introduced to the scope, focus and methods of strategy. In the first unit, you will refresh your mind on what strategy is all about. The second unit focuses on the scope and methods of strategic studies, while unit three elucidates on strategy formulation. The last unit describes the role of science and technology in strategic thinking and planning. After you have gone through the four units, the stage would have been set for you to appreciate strategic concepts and theories, and the contributions of modern thinkers to strategic studies in the 20th Century.

The four units that constitute this module are thematically linked. By the end of this module, you would have refreshed your memory on the concept of "strategy", conceptualised the scope of 20th Century strategic studies, and strategy formulation, and the reciprocal relationship of causality between science and technology, and strategy.

Unit 1        What is Strategy?
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# UNIT 1        WHAT IS STRATEGY?

## CONTENTS

1.0    Introduction
2.0    Objectives
3.0    Main Content
        3.1    What is Strategy?
        3.2    Inherent Features in the Definition of Strategy
        3.3    Types of Strategy
                3.3.1   Military Strategy
                3.3.2   Grand Strategy

## 1.0     INTRODUCTION

You must have read the Course Guide. I also assume that you have familiarised yourself with the introductory comments in Module 1. This unit is the first among the four constituent units of this module. The main thrust of the unit is to identify various efforts made by scholars, strategists, managers and thinkers in defining the concept of "strategy". The theoretical problem of arriving at a universally accepted definition is also explored. This unit forms the bedrocks and modules are hinged, and therefore demands that you give it the attention it deserves.

## 2.0     OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

• identify the numerous definitions purporting to explain the "concept of strategy"
• define the concept of strategy theory, either in your own words or by integrating extant definitions, which have been made from various disciplinary perspectives
• state generally observable attributes of all the definitions
• explain the limit at upon which other subsequent uniions of a consensus definition of the concept of "strategy".

## 2.0     MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1     What is Strategy?

It is important to emphasise the importance of a starting point. If you start at the right point, you would certainly end at the right point. Even though your earlier study of the course *Introduction to Strategic Studies* would have introduced you to what "strategy" is all about, nevertheless, this unit will still begin with the question: what is strategy?

To a layman, certainly, strategy may be seen as the means by which objectives are pursued and obtained overtime, or in its simplest terms, the way you get what you want. For you however, this simple definition is rather too elementary. You will need to arm yourself with numerous available definitions, both old and extant, and how these may help in

building up your own definition. The concept of "strategy" is derived from a Greek word, *stratos* (army) and *ago* (leading). *Stratogos* referred to an Army General during the age of Athenian democracy. Defining the concept as you would have learned is not as easy as what a layman may put forward, yet the definition is critical for students of strategic studies. Although commonly used in non-military fields, for example a business strategy, or an education strategy, most usage focus on the national security arena and particularly on grand strategy and military strategy. In that context, strategy has equal applicability for peace and war, although it is commonly associated more strongly with war. Therein, lies the absence of consensus about the definition of the concept, even in the national security arena. The gulf as you would soon see in the proceeding definitions is between military and non-military strategists. As a student of strategy however, your task must be to develop your own definitions.

There are many definitions of strategy as they are experts and commentators in the field. A sample of these is given below. They illustrate the fact that despite the choice of words and phrases, there is considerable agreement on what constitutes the essential characteristics of strategic management.

According to Ansoff (1965:118-121),
>       Strategy is a rule for making decisions determined by product/market scope, growth vector, competitive advantage, and synergy.

According to Baron de Jomini (1971:62),
>       Strategy is art of making war upon the map, and comprehending the whole theatre of war.

According to Ackoff (1974:29),
>       Strategy is concerned with long-range objectives and ways of pursuing them that affect the system as a whole.

According to Clausewitz (1976),
>       Strategy is the use of the engagement for the purpose of war.

According to Ohmae (1983:248),
>       Strategy is really no more than a plan of action for maximising one's strength against the forces at work in the business environment.

According to Digman (1990),

Strategy is the organisation's pre-selected means or approach to achieving its goals or objectives, while coined with current and future external conditions.

According to the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (2007),
Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a synchronised and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national, and/or multinational objectives.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

Identify other definitions of the concept of "strategy" not listed above that can enhance your understanding of this course.

## 3.2     Inherent Features in the Definition of Strategy

The definitions above clearly show that strategy can be used in two senses. As an adjective assigning particular importance to some action, activity or process, it is possible to speak of strategic management, strategic planning and strategic decision making, all deemed to be activities which are essential  to the organisation's survival. It is also used as noun, to describe a pathway along which the organisation moves towards its goals.

The language of strategy stems from the natural, physical, behavioural and military sciences, but much of the origin betrays its origins. For example, there are strong parallels between the behaviour in the corporate society, and that of the military world. As well, many of the survival solutions and behaviours exhibited by life forms in the natural world are mirrored in business and other human organisations.

One major observable feature of the definitions however, is their compartmentalisation into military and non-military arenas. For instance, Clausewitz's definition has been criticised for unduly focusing on the development of a theatre or campaign strategy. What Clausewitz describes as strategy deals only with the military elements and is the operational level rather than strategic.  The same can be said of the United States Military definition which unfortunately recognises strategy as a national security function. A similar weakness befalls definitions that focus exclusively on business.

A growing consensus however remains that strategy has widespread application beyond the military sphere. Since World War II, civil institutions i.e., business, corporations, non-military government departments, universities etc. have come to develop strategies, by which

they usually mean policy planning of any kind. But here too, there are various opinions of what strategy is and does. You may wish to note that the following viewpoints enjoy agreement among experts:

(i)      Strategy concern both organisation and environment: the organisation uses strategy to deal with changing environments.
(ii)     Strategy affects overall welfare of the organisation: strategic decisions are considered important enough to affect the overall welfare of the organisation.
(iii)    Strategy involves issues of both content and process: the study of strategy includes either the actions taken, or the content of strategy and the processes by which actions are decided and implemented.
(iv)     Strategies exist on different levels: firms have corporate strategy (what business shall we be in?) and business strategy (how shall we compete in each business?).
(v)      Strategy involves various thought processes: strategy involves conceptual as well as analytical exercises.

Having established these basic assumptions about strategy, in my own opinion, strategy is simply a problem-solving process. It is a common and logical way to approach any problem, be it militarily, national security, personal, business, or any other category one might determine.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

The concept of "strategy" remains a conceptual bag with which a little manipulation can be made to accommodate varieties of facts. Discuss.

## 3.3    Types of Strategy

Having now understood that the concept of "strategy" can either be used as an adjective and as a noun, in military and non-military arenas, let us briefly identify the different types of strategies, and how these can enhance your understanding of this course.

### 3.3.1  Military Strategy

Military strategy is a collective name for planning the conduct of warfare. Derived from the Greek *strategos*, strategy was seen as the "art of the general". Military strategy deals with the planning and conduct of campaigns, the movement and disposition of forces, and the deception of the enemy. The father of modern strategic study, Carl von Clausewitz, defined military strategy as "the employment of battles to gain the end of war." Hence, he gave the pre-eminence to political aims over military goals, ensuring civilian control of the military.

### 3.3.2  Grand Strategy

Grand strategy is military strategy at the level of movement and use of an entire nation state or empire's resources. Issues of grand strategy typically include the choice of primary versus secondary theatres in war, the general types of armaments to favour manufacturing, and which international alliances best suit national goals. It has considerable overlap with foreign policy, but grand strategy focuses primarily on the military implications of policy. Some have extended the concept of grand strategy to describe multi-tiered strategies in general, including strategic thinking at the level of corporations and political parties.

Grand strategy is typically directed by the political leadership of a country, with input from the most senior military officials. Because of its scope and the number of different people and groups involved, grand strategy is usually a matter of public record, although the details of implementation (such as the immediate purposes of a specific alliance) are often concealed. The development of a nation's grand strategy may extend across many years or even multiple generations.

### 3.3.3  Management Strategy

Management strategy is an ongoing process that assesses the business and the industries in which the company is involved; assesses its competitors and sets goals and strategies to meet all existing and potential competitors; and then reassesses each strategy annually or quarterly [i.e. regularly] to determine how it has been implemented and whether it has succeeded or needs replacement by a new strategy to meet changed circumstances, new technology, new competitors, a new economic environment., or a new social, financial, or political environment.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3**

Identify three other types of strategy known to you.

### 3.0    CONCLUSION

From time immemorial, organisations have recognised the need to manage both material and human resources to achieve predetermined goals. To be effective strategists, decision makers in organisations, be they military, firms, education, financial etc. must be able to "picture" themselves, their organisations, and their environment in certain ways. In particular, they need to be:

- able to see and work with parts as well as the whole of the organisation

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- aware of, and responsive to, situational contingency factors and flexible in the use and interpretation of rule-governed behaviour
- sensitive to the flow and evolution of phenomena, as well as the influence of time and change on the behaviour and culture of organisations
- comfortable in multi-tasking environments and be able to handle multiple parallel demands on their time, attention and energies
- able to strike a workable balance between the use of intuition and logic in managing and planning.

## 4.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, effort has been made to identify the various definitions that attempt an explanation of what "strategy" entails. You have learned that there are various definitions to the concept as they are experts and commentators. Despite the multi-disciplinary nature of the concept, an interesting issue is that all the definitions point to the conscious efforts of organisations (micro and macro) in attaining predetermined goals.

## 5.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Submit a two-page essay (A4, 1½ spacing) in which you explain why it is nearly impossible to arrive at a consensus definition of strategy.

## 6.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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**UNIT 2     SCOPE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE 20TH CENTURY**

**CONTENTS**

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

The introductory unit sought to introduce you to the various definitions of strategy. This unit, as a follow up, is a complimentary effort to expose you to the scope and focus of strategic studies in the 20th century. Your keen familiarisation with numerous concepts and names of strategic thinkers is also expected. Though these concepts and thinkers would be considered in detail in the proceeding modules, occasionally, references would be made to them. This unit therefore introduces you to the sub-discipline of strategic studies, its scope, focus, methods for tests and the execution of strategy.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

•      define the sub-discipline of strategic studies
•      identify the scope and focus of 20th Century strategy
•      describe the methods for tests for strategy
•      explain the process of strategy execution.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    The Sub-Discipline of Strategic Studies

The foregoing definitions in the previous unit immediately suggest what we mean by strategic studies. The term in its military sense refers to the art and science, which deals with the relationship between politics and military power including the preparation, the threat and use of force, and its latent presence in interactions. Though the end of cold war has profoundly altered the nature of war, the bitter civil wars in the Balkans, Central Asia and Africa as well as the most recent instances of military response to the threat of international terrorism indicate that force continues to play a major role in politics.

At the non-military level, strategic studies refers to an inquiry into the way and manner organisations are organised, structured and oriented towards the attainment of the goals and objectives of the organisation through the combination of human and material resources, and the function of time.

While the two definitions are basically the same, geared towards the study of the structures, processes, cultures and resources of an organisation in achieving preconceived goals and objectives, in almost every part of this course, our usage of the concept will equate to the former definition, conceptualising these goals and objectives as power. The field of strategic studies therefore intends to help you to understand the nature of force in world politics. Whether you would participate in military affairs or world politics (as diplomats, analysts, journalists, military officers, or students), the knowledge of strategic studies would prepare you to make intelligent and well-informed assessments on a wide range of strategic issues.

## 3.2.1   Scope and Focus of 20th Century Strategic Studies

The reasons that have spurred people to engage in strategic studies from time immemorial remain basically unchanged. However, why there may be nothing particularly contemporary about the questions of war and peace, we are made to understand that in the 20th century, such issues have become paramount to the life and death of whole societies. When examining those weapons of mass destruction and the strategies so crucial to their deployment, attention needs to be focused on the ways of thinking that have guided practitioners of policy. A significant body of critical peace research has, in the last quarter of a century, contributed to a detailed understanding of how war and armaments accumulation have shaped and is shaped by strategic studies in 20th century, and have often devastated Third World affairs. In the West however, available works

produced by analysts in strategic studies are preoccupied with issues of deterrence and security pertaining to the major states and their two respective alliances, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the former Warsaw Pact. Third World regional security issues acquire relevance only when they are slotted in the overall pattern of major power geopolitical global conflict. From the foregoing, one is wont to see that strategic studies focus in both the West and in the Third World is to a significant extent shaped by different outlook. In addition, recent issues of international terrorism, especially the post-September 11 conception of security has significantly altered the scope and focus of strategy in the 20th century [This issue would be addressed in detail in subsequent modules].

### 3.2.1  The State of Strategic Studies

Much of modern social science is predicated upon an analysis of a world that stands on its own, which researchers look to. The task of rigorous academic investigation is to enable us devise terms of analysis and understanding that come as close to human understanding of reality. The model of the natural scientists thrives to achieve that as an actually achievable standard. Nonetheless, as students of strategic studies, it is important that you should set aside your subjective biases and values, and confront issues and events, with the hope of gaining mastery of the world, beyond prejudices based on your own values, class, race, gender, ethnicity, or emotion.

Avoiding subjectivity demands that you must familiarise yourself with various definitions of "strategy", various theories and approaches of strategies, to enable you select the best approach or a combination of approaches for the situation you face. In that respect, strategy is much like carpentry. Both are skills intended for solving problems. The carpenter uses a saw to cut, a hammer to drive, sandpaper to smoothen and a myriad of other tools depending on the need- there is a tool for every job. Similarly, the strategist needs to have a wide assortment of tools in his/her kit bag and be able to select the proper one for the task at hand. There is an old saying that if the only tool one has is a hammer, all problems look like a nail. That is as bad a solution in strategy as it is in carpentry.

### 3.3    Methods of Tests for Strategy

An essential concern of the student of strategy in the 20th century is the tests for strategy. One can test a possible strategy by examining it for suitability, acceptability and feasibility. Those three adverbs test each of the three components of strategy. Suitability tests whether the proposed strategy achieves the desired end- if it does not, it is not a potential

strategy. Acceptability tests ways: Does the proposed course of action or concept produce results without excessive expenditure of resources and within acceptable modes of conduct? Feasibility tests means: Are the means at hand or reasonably available sufficient to execute the proposed concept? Therefore, the sub-discipline of strategic studies in the 20th century must concern itself with the above questions, as any modern strategy must meet all three tests to be valid, but there is no upper limit on the number of possible solutions. The art becomes the analysis necessary to select the best or most efficient strategy.

Of the three tests, suitability and feasibility are straight forward and require no further explication. Acceptability, however, has some complicating features. The morality and legality of strategies is an obvious point- morality and legality vary widely by nation, culture, and even individual. However, these are not the only complicating feature of acceptability. For example, Colin Gray talks about what he calls the social dimension of strategy (Gray, 1999:28). That is really an expression of the relation of the acceptability of a Clausewitzian trinity (three legs). Beyond morality and legality, a truly acceptable strategy must fit the norms of the **military**, **government**, and **people**. Strategies that only meet the norms of one or two of the legs are possible if they are not in major conflict with deeply held norms of the other legs, but they must be achievable very quickly to avoid possibly disastrous conflict over acceptability. The U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989 is an example of this phenomenon. It was an invasion of a sovereign foreign nation justified by fairly innocuous (certainly not vital) political issues. That was against the norms of all three legs of the American trinity; however, the government had convinced itself that the action was necessary, and the military agreed or at least obeyed orders. The problem was the response of the American people. Initial reaction was the predictable support for troops being deployed in harm's way. That support could have quickly turned into opposition had the operation not been extremely rapid and relatively casualty-free. Even though one might occasionally get away with violating norms, one cannot safely violate deep-held norms even briefly. Thus, the United States for instance has a norm against assassination (reinforced by a self-imposed presidential directive that adds a legal dimension).

## 3.4    Executing Strategy

Also central and germane to the sub-discipline of strategic studies is the execution of strategy. Before you proceed, it is useful to address the issue of whether strategy is necessary. It is certainly possible to conduct a war without a strategy. One can picture very fierce combat divorced from any coherent (or incoherent) plan for how that fighting would achieve the aims of war fighting for the sake of fighting. Alternatively,

pre-emptive surrender is always an option for the state interested in avoiding political strategic decisions; the only drawback is that pre-emptive surrender is incapable of achieving positive political objectives other than avoidance of conflict. Rational states, however, will always attempt to address their interests by relating ends with ways and means. Given the fact that they are fighting for some reason- that is they have an end- there will be some (even if unconscious) design of how to use available means to achieve it. Thus, why strategy may not technically be unnecessary, it is usually present, even if poorly conceived and executed. The point made here is that in the 20th century strategy studies, there has been a tremendous demand on not only the way strategy is conceived, but equally, the manner it is executed. Countries that adopt coherent and buoyant strategies are more likely to project their influence and achieve their national interests than countries with ill-conceived strategies. However, strategies are only relevant when they are backed with the resources and will to execute them.

## 3.5    The Importance of Strategy

In the dynamic environment of today, it is not only desirable but rather essential for any organisation, be it military, or non-military to have a strategy. The operating decisions, however effectively made and implemented, cannot ensure long term success. As strategic decisions tend to be non-self generative, the management of the organisation must see to it that such decisions are constantly updated. The strategic management process consists of determination of mission and objectives of the organisation in the light of its unique strengths and weaknesses and the assessment of opportunities and threats. It then goes on to formulation of strategy, its implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The feedback obtained from the review and evaluation can be used for revising the objectives and strategies.

The importance of strategic decisions cannot be over-emphasised. An incorrect strategic decision may wipe out a whole nation, whereas incorrect operating or administrative decisions can usually be weathered.

Strategic management is both a skill and an art (Ghosh, 2004:13). It is a skill because there is a body of knowledge that can be learnt and techniques that can be used with greater or lesser competence. It is an art because it deals with the future that is unknowable and with the hearts that transcend reason. Good strategic management requires both clear thought and sound judgement.

Effective strategic managers should have the knowledge, the skills and vision necessary to:

i.      understand the total organisation i.e its mission, its goals, or its objectives, its culture, and the activities of the different functional areas;
ii.     understand the environment in which the organisation is operating, with particular reference to the opportunities and threats that are present;
iii.    develop strategies that are appropriate to the organisation and its environment;
iv.     implement chosen strategies; and
v.      control, evaluate and amend the strategies that have been selected.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Briefly state the importance of strategy.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

In conclusion, you should see the sub-discipline of strategic studies, itself an offshoot of international relations as focusing on the study of how organisations try to maintain a strategic fit between an organisation's goals, its internal makeup and the dynamic environment. Strategy in the 20ᵗʰ century has however undergone some changes, basically as a result of the advancement in science and technology and the moral and legal norms in the international system. As would be shown in subsequent units, the end of the cold war, and the rise of international terrorism do also affect the scope and focus of strategic studies. Strategy has also evolved from its confinement to war periods to peace times as well.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned about the scope and focus of 20ᵗʰ century strategy. You now know the imperative of objectivity in strategic studies. You have also learned that the discipline of strategic studies concern itself with testing whether a strategy meets the three requirements of suitability, acceptability and feasibility. While suitability and feasibility are straightforward, acceptability is essentially difficult to conceptualise as it involves legal and moral norms. We conclude here by noting that the industrial revolution, which led to the improvement in science and technology, has significantly shaped strategy, especially as it led to the production of Weapons of Mass Destructions, and better means of transportation and communication. However as would be shown in unit 4, the relationship between science and technology, and strategy is bi-causal, and not as straightforward as most writers posit.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

The challenge of the sub-discipline of strategic studies has become enormous due to the fact that strategy in the 20th century is a matter of life and death of a whole society. Discuss.

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## UNIT 3      STRATEGY FORMULATION

**CONTENTS**

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

In the previous units, you have learned the various definitions of "strategy" and the scope and focus of 20th century strategy. Before you will be introduced to the major concepts and theories in strategic studies, it is pertinent to first and foremost understand the various theories in strategy formulation. These theories have been developed through the research of observers and writers on strategic studies over the last 50 years. The various schools of thought are largely from the work of Mintzberg, who identified a range of perspectives, each of which helps to highlight and clarify an aspect of the way in which strategic management process works within organisations.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the successful completion of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the various schools of thought in strategy formulation
- differentiate between Prescriptive and Process views of strategy formulation
- apply the various schools of thought to real life situations
- identify the weaknesses inherent in the various schools

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    Schools of Thought in Strategy Formulation

There are basically two models that purport to explain strategy formulation: these are the **Prescriptive** and the **Process** views of strategy formulation.

**Prescriptive: How strategies should be formulated**

| *To the following Schools:* | | *Strategy Formation is seen as:* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Design | School | a Conceptual | Process |
| Planning | School | a Formal | Process |
| Positioning | School | an Analytical | Process |

**Process: How strategies do in fact get made**

| *To the following Schools:* | | *Strategy Formation is seen as:* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Entrepreneurial | School | a Visionary | Process |
| Cognitive | School | a Mental | Process |
| Learning | School | an Emergent | Process |
| Political | School | a Power | Process |
| Cultural | School | an Ideological | Process |
| Environmental | School | a Passive | Process |

**Life Cycle Models**

| *To the following School:* | | *Strategy Formation is seen as:* | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Configurational | School | an Episodic | Process |

[Smith, W. Robin (2003) *Introduction to Strategic Management.* Vancouver: The Commonwealth of Learning].

The above typology from Smith identifies ten different ways of looking at strategy. These ten perspectives can in turn be grouped into three clusters. Each cluster represents a viewpoint: Prescriptive, Process, and Life Cycle.

**Prescriptive**: seeks to define the way in which strategy should be approached; it is strongly normative (what ought to be) in its orientation.

**Process:** looks at what actually goes on in practice, and defines strategy in terms of observational wisdom.

**Life Cycle Model**: combines both of the above but visualises the strategy process as an unfolding event constantly changing in response

to environmental conditions, interacting with the internal process, culture and structure of the organisation.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

How true is it that a holistic approach to strategy formulation is adjudged the best tool for strategic management.

## 3.2    An Overview of Prescriptive Views

The Prescriptive view, which is normative in nature, includes three so called "schools" that share some elements while exhibiting their own areas of emphasis- 'design', 'planning', and 'positioning'. As noted by Smith (2003:30), it emphasises the importance of processing and applying agreed procedures and guidelines to the planning function, the importance of the qualitative perspective alongside the quantitative and the need for data-informed and qualified decision making. The rational, scientific approach to crafting and implementing strategic decisions is promoted as necessary to effective and efficient use of resources in often constrained and conflicting environments. All the three schools emphasise the importance of formal planning and the need for rationality rather than subjectivity to undertake strategic choice.

Let us briefly look at an overview of the three Prescriptive schools of strategy formulation.

## 3.2.1  The Design School

The basic assumptions of this school are that:

i.Strategy formulation should be a controlled, conscious application of thought to action
ii.Strategy should be developed neither intuitively nor in emergent fashion, but in a conscious, deliberate manner based on formal training
iii.Responsibility for that control and consciousness must rest with the chief executive officer: that person is THE strategist
iv.There should be a single responsible agent who is the final 'architect' or strategy- the other managers and employees are the builders of that strategy
v.The model of strategy formulation must be  kept simple and informal; elaboration will kill it
vi.Strategies should consist of 'imposing ideas' that provide the compass points and navigational charts that give direction to the organisation
vii.Strategies should be unique; the best ones result from a process of creative design
viii.Strategies emerge from this design process full-blown

ix.Good strategies will reflect the unique conditions at work in the organisation and treat each as a separate event horizon- they should reflect 'Situational Philosophy'

x.These strategies should be made explicit and, if possible articulated, which means they have to be kept simple

xi.This design approach leads to a 'grand strategy'- hence the characterisation of the process as one which focuses on the conception side of strategy development and only then on its implementation

xii.Finally, only after these unique, full-blown, explicit and simple strategies are fully formulated can they be implemented.

### 3.2.2  The Positioning School

The main concern of this school is that:

i.Strategies are generic, specifically common, tangible positions in the market place

ii.The market place is economic and competitive

iii.The strategy formulation process is therefore one of analytical selection based on calculation, in order to select the optimal  strategy

iv.Strategies as positions lead other types of strategies

v.Analysts play a major role in this process, feeding the results of their calculations to managers, who officially control the choices

vi.Strategies must emerge from this process in full depth, and are then articulated and implemented; thus, market conditions dictate positional strategies that dictate other strategies that dictate organisational structures that determine performance.

### 3.2.3  The Planning School

The basic assumptions are:

(i)     That strategy formulation should be a controlled, conscious and formal process, decomposed into distinct steps, each delineated by checklists and supported by techniques.

(ii)    That responsibility for the overall process rests with the chief executive in principle; responsibility for its execution rests with the staff planners in practice

(iii)   Strategies emerge from the process in the form of full and detailed reports, so that they can then be implemented through careful attention to goals, objectives, policies, budgets, programmes, and operating plans of various kinds.

### 3.3    An Overview of Process Views

The six 'Process schools' have a diverse range of perspectives on the ways in which the strategy processes of organisations can be interpreted and explained. Rather than looking at the 'ought' aspect, they focus on describing and analysing the 'what is'. The proceeding sub-sections would briefly itemise the assumptions of the process views schools.

### 3.3.1  The Cognitive School

The main assumptions of this school are:

i.Strategy formulation is a cognitive process that takes place in the mind of the strategist

ii.Hence, strategies are perspectives, or concepts, that form in the mind

iii.The strategists environment is complex, their cognitive capabilities limited by comparison factors; consequently, the receipt of information is restricted and biased and the process of strategy formation is thereby distorted

iv.As a result of their individual cognitive make up, strategists vary significantly in their styles of strategy formulation.

### 3.3.2  The Entrepreneurial School

The main assumptions of this school are:

i.Strategy exists in the mind of a single leader as a perspective; specifically, as a sense of long-term direction, a vision of the organisations future

ii.The process of strategy formulation is semiconscious at best, rooted in the experience or the intuition of the leader

iii.The leader maintains close personal control of the implementation as well as the formulation of the main vision, tying the two together tightly through personalised feedback on actions

iv.The strategic vision is thus malleable, existing within a simple structure responsive to the leader's directives

v.Entrepreneurial strategy tends to take the form of a niche, one or more pockets of market positions projected from the forces of outright competition.

### 3.3.3  The Political School

The main assumptions of this school are:

i.Strategy formulation is fundamentally a political one- usually serving parochial ends that often generate conflict, whether focused within the

organisation (micro politics) or reflecting actions by the organisation (macro politics)

ii.Political strategies, whether realised by deliberate plan or emergent patterns, tend to take formed positions and ploys rather than perspectives

iii.In micro politics there is no dominant actor, but rather a number who vie with each other to control organisational outcomes, or to challenge vulnerable actors

iv.In macro politics, the organisation promotes its own welfare through aggressive deliberate strategies of a political nature

v.Micro politics tends to take place in times of major change, either imposed on the organisation externally or else arising internally as a result of realignment of the organisations power system (such as the rise of previously weak source of influence or the breakdown of an established one)

vi.Macro politics reflects the closed-system nature of an organisation, namely, its power, relative to the external influences around it.

### 3.3.4  The Learning School

The main assumptions of this school are:

i.The complex and dynamic nature of the organisation's environment, often coupled with the diffusion in the organisation of its knowledge base for strategy-making, provides deliberate control.

ii.Strategy making must, above all take the form of a process of learning overtime, in which, at the limit, formulation and implementation become indistinguishable while the leader must learn and sometimes can be sole learner.

iii.More commonly, the learning proceeds in an emergent fashion, through behaviour that stimulates thinking retrospectively, so that sense is made of action.

iv. The role of leadership then becomes not to pre-conceive deliberate strategies but to manage the process of strategic learning.

v.Accordingly, strategies appear first as patterns out of the past, and only later perhaps as deliberate plans for the future.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

Compare and contrast the Political school and the Learning school

### 3.3.5  The Environmental School

The main assumptions of this school are:

i.The environment, in general is manifested as a set of abstract forces, dictates strategy by forcing organisations or their attributes into ecological-

type niches; those that refuse to adapt must eventually 'die' (essentially, Darwinian in its approach)

ii.Thus, there is no real internal strategists nor any internal strategy in policy making process, and leadership, as it has long been depicted in the strategic management as well as its own literature, is a myth

iii.Strategies are positions, niches where organisations are sustained until whatever nourishes them there runs out.

### 3.3.6  The Cultural School

The main assumptions of this school are:

i.      Strategy formation is fundamentally a process of collective behaviour, based on the beliefs shared by the members of an organisation

ii.     As a result, strategy is rooted in intentions (though not necessarily explicit) and reflected in patterns, which make it appear deliberate

iii.    Co-ordination and control in the organisation are largely normative, ought and should, and based on the influence of the shared beliefs

iv.     Given the importance of the internal belief systems, the organisation tends to be proactive in comparison with the environment that appears to be passive and diffuse in its influence

v.      Culture and especially ideology, do not encourage strategic change so much as the perpetual existing strategy; at best they allow for shifts in position within the organisation's overall strategic perspective.

### 3.3.7  The Configurational School

The main assumptions of this school are:

i.The behaviour of organisations are best described in terms of configurations: distinct, integrated clusters of dimensions concerning state and time.

ii.In particular, strategy formation is an episodic process in which a particular type and form of organisation, matched to a particular type of environment, engages in a particular form of the process for a distinguishable period of time.

iii. Accordingly, the process can be one of:

- conceptual design or formal planning;
- systematic analysis or intuitive vision;
- individual cognition and/or collective learning or politics
- driven by personalised leadership, organisational culture, or the external environment.

iv. The resulting strategies can take the form of:

- Plans or patterns, ploys, positions, or perspectives
- Each must be found at its own time and its own context
- These periods of the clustered dimensions tend to sequence themselves over time in patterned ways that define the common life cycles of strategy formulation.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3**

Compare and contrast the Configurational school and the Environmental school.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

The basic assumptions of all the above mentioned schools of thought are true to a point. Each of the schools contributes one part only of the total picture. If each were part of a Strategy Elephant, it would not be possible to see the full picture of the animal until the insights contributed by the parts were brought together. Consider the following poem from Saxe (1816-1867):

### The Blind Men and the Elephant

It was six men of Indostan
To learning much inclined
Who went to see the elephant
(Though all of them were blind)
That each by observation
Might satisfy his mind.
The First approached the Elephant,
And happening to fall
Against his broad and sturdy side,
At once began to brawl:
"God bless me but the Elephant
Is very like a wall".

The Second feeling for the tusk,
Cried, "Ho! What have we here
So very round and smooth and sharp?

To me 'tis mighty clear
This wonder of an elephant
Is like a spear!"

The Third approached the animal,
And happening to take
The squirming trunk within his hands,
Thus boldly up and spake:
"I see," quote he, "the Elephant
Is very like a snake."

The Fourth reached out an eager hand,
And felt around his knee,
"What most this wondrous beast is like
Is mighty plain" quoth he;
"'tis clear enough the Elephant
Is very like a tree!"

The Fifth who chanced to touch the ear,
Said: "E'en the blindest man
Can tell what this resembles most;
Deny the fact who can,
This marvel of an Elephant
Is very like a fan!"

The sixth no sooner had begun
About the beast to grope,
Than, seizing on the swinging tail
That fell within his scope,
"I see," quoth he, "the Elephant
Is very like a rope!"

And so those men of Indostan
Disputed loud and long,
Each of his own opinion
Exceeding stiff and strong,
Though each was partly in the right,
And all were in the wrong!

**Moral**

So oft in theologic wars,
The disputants, I ween,
Rail on in utter ignorance
Of what each other mean
And prate about an Elephant
Not one of them has seen!

**Source**: John Godfrey Saxe (1816-1887)

This poem has shown that the processes of strategy can only be fully pictured and understood by following and exploring each of these different models, as well as others that you yourself might consider relevant to the debate.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned that there are many positions and perspectives that can be adopted in strategic choice, action and behaviour. You have also learned that the three perspectives of looking at strategy formulation: Perspectives, Process, and Life Cycle model which use different lenses in looking at strategy are only potent if they recognise the strengths of each other. As a student of strategy, you should note that you will be required to put together the constituent's parts to get a whole picture of strategy.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Differentiate between Process views and Prescriptive views of Strategy Formulation.

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## UNIT 4        STRATEGY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

**CONTENTS**

1.0    Introduction
2.0    Objectives
3.0    Main Content
        3.1    Determinant View of Science and Technology on Strategy
        3.2    Determinant View of Strategy on Science and Technology

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

The impact of science and technology on strategy has been well documented. However, in order to capture the nature of the two, it is necessary for us to view it as a bi-causal relationship of causality. While other scholars look at science and technology, for instance, as being a determinant force on strategy, others are wont to see strategy as a determinant force in shaping the role and impact of science and technology. This unit conceptualises the two deterministic schools, and offers yet another perspective – the human will and resistance. It concludes that while science and technology is crucial in strategy, the latter also to a considerable extent defines the content, scope and parameters of the former.

The relationship between science and technology, strategy and tactics are so inter-dependent in the 20th century that it would be an injustice, as well as being an erroneous assumption to place one above another in the hierarchy. A valid argument would be that superior military technology is a necessary but never sufficient condition to win wars.

The 20th century has been an era of such technological advancement that it has permanently altered the landscape of everyday life. Technology is linear in progression, where each invention is more potent, lethal and improved than its predecessor. Technology which was earlier rebuffed by earlier strategies such as Clausewitz (you may wish to refer to Module 4, Unit 2) due to them   assuming that there would be no great technological revolution (van Creveld, 1989), has accelerated to such an extent that its influence and functionality has promoted future strategists to incorporate technological elements into the strategic and tactical doctrines. Whilst technology has all along been omnipresent in civilisations and military theatres, the expansion of technology in the 20th century has had such an immense impact that it has been internalised as being the indispensable instrument and a determining factor in warfare. This mentality is epitomised by nation states perpetually investing huge amounts of time, money and resources in purchasing and researching new technologies. The perspective of the essential-ness of science and technology was further fuelled by the staggeringly successful operational functionality of nuclear weapons in the Second World War (WWII) and the subsequent frantic Arms Race adopted by the two prior super powers. With the sheer amount of

resources and time invested in the Arms Race, it would be easy to be lulled into the conclusion of science and technology being the determining factor.

Thus, in the technology age there is a natural tendency to overestimate the role of weapons. There are certainly prevailing views that the degree of military technological progress was deemed to be so stupendous that it could prove to be decisive to the outcome of war. But what is the relationship between science and technology and strategy?

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the role of science and technology on strategy
- identify the impact of strategy on science and technology
- analyse the impact of human will and resistance on strategy
- show how science and technology, tactics, human will and strategy are interrelated.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

### 3.1    Deterministic View of Science and Technology on Strategy

The significance of technological progress in the military-tinted lens is that the new instruments could provide an absolute advantage that would be translated into decisive military victory. The progress made in the aviation field is such that **Douhet** posited that aircrafts could be a decisive determinant of warfare as there are essentially no limitations or effective defense mechanisms that could restrict the advances of aircrafts into enemy lines. **Mitchell** also testified that aircrafts are equipped with strategic capabilities that allow them to directly attack key enemy targets without having to encounter the main entourage of the enemy's defense. In naval warfare, the creation of submarines has the capabilities to remain submerged and undetected in enemy's waters where they have the means to perform valuable reconnaissance operations. Moreover, the submarines are equipped with a wide spectrum of conventional and unconventional missile war heads, which would undoubtedly assist in any military battle.

In the mechanisation of the army, **Fuller** endorsed that technology is the main determinant of warfare where the mobility and destruction capability of tanks would equate to a decisive advantage over the enemy. Finally, the invention of 'smart' weapons such as

intercontinental ballistic missiles that are aimed with GPS-based guidance technology, where coupled with the undoubted destructive potency, precision and accuracy are also inculcated. This is a clear juxtaposition to the lack of accuracy and precision of technological instruments in the World War I (Cleveland, 1989) and the failed strategic bombardment campaign of WWII. Hence in the military sphere, technology is an integral element of warfare. Moreover, if warfare is purely conducted within restrain where war is regarded as an end in itself, or what Clausewitz consider to be victory would be decisive.

In the civilian command, the options made available by technology would also induce the belief that technology is the determinant factor in strategy. Aforementioned, 'smart' weapons as well as aircrafts could dispense precise strategic targeting of key industrial and military institutions.

The examples listed below reinforce these positive outlooks of science and technology:

The WWII paradigm, where scholars have argued that the detonation of the nuclear warheads in Japan won the war. Also, the success of the US led United Nations (UN) involvement in the first Gulf War where advanced technological weapons such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, and fighter-jets overwhelmed the Iraqi defense forces as well as eradicating their war-making capabilities. Another 'technological successful' war would be NATO successful strategies combining campaign in Serbia in 1999 where the aim was to coerce Serbia to withdraw from Kosovo. This is an especially symbolic war where unlike the previous examples, no ground troops were deployed and there were minimum casualties involved.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

With relevant examples, explain how science and technology impact on strategy.

## 3.2    Deterministic View of Strategy on Science and Technology

It is imperative that the myth of science and technology being the determining factor is disabused. Whilst there is certainly little argument that could contest science and technology involvement, it would be simplistic to obfuscate science and technology as being the main determinant. The success of technology in strategy as delineated above might paint a deceptive picture of science and technology being the

means to the ends, as a salient point must be established that no modern war has been won by superior military technology alone. Beneath the glamour of technology in successful warfare, there exist the integral elements of strategy and tactics.

In WWII, whilst nuclear technology certainly prompted a decisive victory over the Japanese, the unleashing of nuclear weapons only occurred in the latter stages of the war. The Allies adopted strategies and tactics that were integral to continued presence of Hart's strategy of indirect approach. In the D-Day landing on the beaches of Normady in Operation Overload, the Allies avoided the direct approach of landing on the shores of Pas de Calais, 'along the lines of natural expectation' where instead, the biggest seaborne invasion was upset and the purpose of the strategy was to achieve a dislocation by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise. Moreover, the Allies also adopted a strategy that was reminiscent to what Sun Tzu preached, where successful warfare is based on psychology and deception. The Allies had employed a series of decoy to deceive the Nazis on the true location of its seaborne invasion, where one massive deception plan was Operation Bodyguard. This Operation involved the creations of an entirely fictitious First US Army Group and technology was harnessed, where false radio signals were deliberately transmitted to the German camp that the invasion would be at Pas de Calaris. Indeed the strategy was so successful that Hitler ordered 'Case 3', Rommel's elite Panzer division to be diverted towards a defense of Pas de Calais. Therefore, WWII victory could be attributed to a fluent marriage of strategy, tactics and technology.

Equally, even though the level of USA superior military technology undoubtedly superseded that of the Vietnamese, the USA superior technological weapons did not achieve the conventional theoretical assumption of translating to victory where the much adopted quote of 'winning every battle', but losing the war, is evident. Eventually, after close to a decade of engagements and with huge loss of lives and resources, the US finally pulled out of Vietnam. Also, in a similar theme, the Soviet Union invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 also incited similar consequences where despite overwhelmingly superior technological superiority; the Soviet Union was unable to emerge victorious. Technology is not a panacea that exists in a political vacuum and ultimately, when treated as such, strategy would be doomed to fail.

In an alternative and ironic outlook, it is also important to show that what is a traditionally non-military sphere of technology such as mass-communications devices such as the internet and news media of television have also become important albeit indirect factors in strategy, especially in the western democratic societies.

Also, great superiority in technology over the enemy such as the Vietnam paradigm, might culminate in negative public and world opinion, where criticisms and perceptions that the technologically superior USA is 'bullying' the hapless Vietcong with the pervade empowerment of knowledge that was a direct result of technology, there was rancour and resentment among the population and what culminated was a series of riots and demonstrations in the USA which threatened social anarchy. Finally, after tides of social pressure and discontent that had even managed to dislodge President Johnson from seeking re-election, the Vietnam quagmire concluded when USA pulled out from Vietnam. Thus, it is ironic that instead of being the 'positive' determinant factor, what culminated was that technology instead regressed to being a 'negative' determinant factor.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

With relevant examples, explain how strategy and tactics impact on science and technology.

## 3.3    Strategy and Human Will and Resistance

Quite opposed to the deterministic views considered above, there is an intangible element of the 'human will and resistance'. This particular factor has been evident in many famed wars in the 20th century where in WWII, Korea and Vietnam paradigms, the will, resistance, morale and determination to win at all costs, was a formidable opponent in the relentless onslaught on technological weapons, tactical formations and strategic manoeuvring. Whilst it irks to equate positive traits such as will and resistance to the era of terrorism, you must note that the will and resistance of terrorists is one of the key elements in their refusal to succumb to defeat.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3**

Explain briefly how the 'human will and resistance' condition strategy.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

Despite the importance of modern science and technology, it is only an instrument in strategy where, as other scholars promulgated, it is but one of the three elements essential for success in war, where strategy and tactics are key players too. Without a harmonious balance as advocated by Sun Tzu, between the three elements, victory could not be attained regardless of the efforts and technology invested. It is perhaps appropriate to cite Mao Tsu Tsung who was an avid opponent to the

dangers of over-reliance on material and technological factors in war, 'weapons are an important factor in war, but not the decisive factor… where the so-called theory that weapons decide everything is a subjective and one-sided view'.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have been exposed to the debate about the relationship between strategy, science and technology. You have learned that the deterministic views purporting to explain that strategy causes science and technology and vice-versa have their shortcomings. A corollary is the view of the human will and resistance. It has been stressed that for war to be successful, there is need for a harmonious balance between strategy, tactics, and science and technology. In the remaining modules, you will encounter the theoretical concepts in strategy, and the contributions of modern thinkers' to strategic studies.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Identify and critically discuss the points of convergence and divergence of strategy and science and technology. Do not write more than four typewritten A4 pages.

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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## MODULE 2 MODERN CONCEPTS AND THEORIES IN STRATEGIC STUDIES

Every academic discipline has concepts that to some reasonable degree, distinguish it from other disciplines. Experts in any discipline can easily identify their discipline by seeing its central concepts listed out. This module seeks to introduce you to the theoretical concepts in strategic studies.

Although, they are many concepts and theories in strategic studies, this module will only concentrate on four of them, namely, game theory,

operational research, theories of conflict and conflict resolution, and theories of war and peace. Many other concepts are specifically treated in the next module. As foundation concepts, they constitute a basis upon which a thorough comprehension of the contribution of strategists to 20th century strategy can be made.

The first unit focuses on the significant features of operational research and its usage in strategic studies. In the second unit, game theory and its application to strategic studies is highlighted. The unit reveals that game theory is a tool that can help explain and address social and strategic problems. In the third unit, theories of conflict and conflict resolution are discussed. The unit presents and critique central theories that have been used to analyse various social and political conflicts, and evaluates the usefulness of these theories by applying them to specific case studies. In unit four, which is the final unit of this module, theories of war and peace are discussed. An exegesis to the moral justification of war is also attempted.

We now turn to an elucidation of the concepts under the following units:

Unit 1          Operational Research
Unit 2          Game Theory
Unit 3          Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution
Unit 4          Theories of War and Peace

## UNIT 1          OPERATIONAL RESEARCH

## CONTENTS

1.0    Introduction
2.0    Objectives
3.0    Main Content
        3.1    Operational Research Defined
        3.2    Features of Problems for Operational Research
        3.3    The Emergence of the Field of Operational Research
        3.4    The Scope of Operational Research
4.0    Conclusion
5.0    Summary
6.0    Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0    References/Further Readings

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

Operational Research is a term used to describe the discipline of applying advanced analytical techniques to help make better decisions and to solve problems. The procedures of operations research have been used effectively during wartime in areas such as deploying radar, searching for enemy submarines, and getting supplies to where they are needed most. New analytical methods have been developed, and numerous peacetime applications have emerged, leading to the use of operations research in many industries and occupations.

The renewed emphasis of operations research reflects the growing complexity of managing large organisations that require the effective use of money, materials, equipment, and people. Operations research analysts help determine better ways to coordinate these elements by applying analytical methods from mathematics, science, and engineering. Analysts often find multiple solutions or alternatives for meeting the particular goals of a project. These potential solutions are then presented to the decision-makers, who choose the course of action that they perceive to be in the best interest of the organisation.

The concern of this unit is to look at operational research, and how it can be used as a tool for problem solving, and aid for strategy.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define the concept of Operational Research
- explain how Operational Research can be used as a tool for strategy
- trace the evolution of the concept of Operational Research
- identify features of a problem that Operational Research seeks to solve.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    Operational Research Defined

Operational Research or Operations Research is an interdisciplinary branch of mathematics which uses methods like mathematical modelling, statistics and algorithms to arrive at optimal or good decisions in complex problems which are connected with optimising the maxima (profits, faster assembly line, greater crop yield, higher bandwidth, reliable striking force, etc) or minima (cost lost, lowering of risk, etc) of some objective function. The eventual intention behind using Operational Research is to elicit a best possible solution to a

problem mathematically, which improves or optimises the performance of the system.

Most operations researchers agree substantially with Beer (1959) suggestion that:

i.Operational research is the attack of modern science
ii.on problems of likelihood (accepting mischance)
iii.which arises in the management and control
iv.of men and machines, materials and money
v.in their natural environment
vi.its special technique is to invent a strategy of control
vii.by measuring, comparing and predicting probable behaviour
viii.through a scientific model of a situation (pp. 16-17).

The extent to which this list captures the accepted view of Operational Research and that included in each issue of the Journal of Operational Research Society from 1966 to 1984 is captured with the Journal's argument that:

Operational Research is the attack in modern science, on complex problems arising in the direction and management of large systems of men, machines, materials and money in industry, business, government and defence. The distinctive approach is to develop a scientific model of the system, incorporating factors such as chance and risk, with which to predict and compare the measurement of factors of alternatives decisions, strategies or controls. The purpose is to help management determine its policy and actions scientifically.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

What do you understand by the concept of Operations Research?

## 3.2    Features of Problem for Operational Research

Without dwelling too long on the numerous definitions of Operations Research, it is clear, from the above discussion, that operations research is concerned with tackling management problems in a scientific manner. The issue arises, then, of what types of problems can be usefully addressed in this way. Ackoff (1962:30) establishes these as being five in number the minimum necessary and sufficient conditions for a problem, which is capable of scientific resolution. The following features must exist:

i.     An individual who owns the problem (the decision maker)
ii.    An outcome which the decision maker desires (the objective)
iii.   At least two unequally efficient courses of action through which each have some chance of yielding the objective (the alternatives)
iv.    A state of doubt in the decision maker's mind over which alternative is best
v.     An environment in which the above features exist and that consists of factors which may influence them.

As presented above, to solve a problem means to choose one of the alternatives. Which is chosen will depend upon the objective, the full set of alternatives from which the choice is made, the measure of the "best" (the criteria of choice), and the factors as identified as lying in the environment. Thus, Operational Research as problem-solving is a choice process and includes the activities of establishing the set from which the choice will be made, analysing the situation to enable an informed rather than a random choice to occur, and providing information on the meaning of the choice in practical terms.

## 3.3    The Emergence of Operational Research

Most disciplines or significant themes within a discipline, which have stood the test of time, can trace their origins back to an individual or group whose work is spread, if not a lifetime, then over a significant number of years. Thus, positivist sociology is usually taken to begin with the work of Saint-Simon and Comte in the mid-nineteen century. A few years earlier than this, von Humboldt and Ritter were laying the basis of regional geography. The start of classical economics is usually associated with the work of Adam Smith. Many historians therefore find it difficult when considering the roots of a particular discipline.

This is not the case to the same extent with Operational Research. It is possible, with reasonable accuracy, to refer to the first use of the term and hence to identify a starting date for the activity carried out under the name. In December 1967, a meeting was held at the Royal Society, London to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the use of the term Operational Research. The first use of the label is clearly not necessarily equivalent with the introduction of the activity it is applied to, and at the meeting, one of the pioneers of Operations Research, E. C. Williams, noted that, although the first use of the name occurred in 1937, the activity of operations research predated this use by at least one year.

Operational Research as a body of knowledge emerged in the decade following the conclusion of Second World War (Keys, 1991), in the British armed forces in the period 1935-1945. There can be no argument

that the term was introduced in 1937 and that the specific activity to which it is referred began sometime in 1946.

Scientists in the United Kingdom notably Patrick Blackett, and in the United States, George Dantzig looked for ways to make better decisions in such areas as logistics and training schedules. Blackett's team made a number of crucial analyses, which aided the execution of the war. Britain introduced the convoy system to reduce shipping losses, but why the principles of using warships to accompany merchant ships was generally accepted, it was unclear whether it was better for convoys to be small or large. The reason for this non-clarity was the argument that small convoys would be harder for German U-boats to detect. On the other hand, large convoys could deploy more warships against an attacker. Blackett's staff clearly showed that:

a) Large convoys were more efficient
b) The probability of detection by U-boat was statistically unrelated to the size of the convoy
c) Slow convoys were at greater risks (although considered overall, large convoys were still preferred).

In a related work, Blackett's team analysed a report of a survey carried out by Royal Air Force (RAF) Bomber Command. For the survey, Bomber Command inspected all combers returning from bombing raids over Germany over a particular period. All damage inflicted by German air defenses was noted and recommendations were given that armour be added in the most heavily damaged areas. Their suggestion to remove some of the crew so that an aircraft lost would result in fewer personnel lost was rejected by RAF Command.

Blackett's team instead made a surprising and counter-intuitive recommendation that the armour be placed in the areas that were completely untouched by damage, according to the survey. They reasoned that the survey was biased, since it only included aircraft that successfully came back from Germany. The untouched areas were probably vital areas, which if hit would result in loss of the aircraft.
After the Second World War, the British economy was in need of rejuvenation, and the election of a Labour government in 1946 led to a nationalisation programme over the next few years. Throughout this programme, which saw coal, the railways and other important parts of the industrial base taken over by the state, the research associations of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) remained and flourished. These associations formed a natural home for operational research in Britain. A similar trend was witnessed in the United States, with management and business schools in universities and

similar institutions acting as catalysts for bridging military Operational Research expertise into industrial and commercial organisations.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

Briefly sketch the evolution of the field of Operational Research.

## 3.4    The Scope of Operational Research

The purpose of this section is to show how the scope of Operational Research methodology can be interpreted as being a problem-solving system. Already, you have seen in the preceding sections that the intellectual motivation of the emergence of operations research was the recognition that scientific methods could be used to improve the ability of management to control the parts of organisations for which they are responsible.

Operations research is distinguished by its ability to look at and improve an entire system, rather than concentrating only on specific elements (though this is often done as well). When an Operational Researcher is faced with a new problem, he/she is expected to determine which techniques are most appropriate given the nature of the system, the goals for improvement, and constraints on time and computing power. For this and other reasons, the human element (the decision-maker) of operational research is vital. Like any other tools, operations research techniques cannot solve problems by themselves.
Examples of applications in which operations research is currently used include:

i. Blending of raw materials in oil refineries
ii. Efficient messaging and customer response tactics
iii. Managing the flow of raw materials and products in a supply chain based on certain demand for the finished products
iv. Designing the layout of a computer chip to reduce malfunctioning time (therefore reduce lost)
v. Road traffic management and 'one way' street allocations, i.e. allocation problems
vi. Management freight transportation and delivery system
vii. Roboticising or automating human-driven operations process
viii. Designing the layout of a factory or efficient flow of materials
ix. Scheduling: (a) personnel staffing; (b) network data traffic; (c) manufacturing steps; (d) project tasks etc.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

The field of Operations Research concerns itself with problem solving and decision-making. Thus, emphasis is placed on the methodology and processes of Operational Research rather than upon the mathematical modelling techniques, which have been developed within it.

To enable decision makers make better and informed decisions, Operational Research draws upon three analytical technologies, including:

| | |
|---|---|
| **Simulation:** | Giving you the ability to try out approaches and test ideas for improvement |
| **Optimisation:** | Narrowing your choices to the very best when there are virtually innumerable feasible options and comparing them is difficult |
| **Probability/Statistics:** | Helping you measure risk, mine data to find valuable connections and insights, test conclusions, and make reliable forecast. |

## 5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned that the field of "Operational Research" applies advanced analytical methods to help make better decisions in organisations. You have also learned that the term, which emerged during the Second World War in the British Army, has been taken over in the post-Second World War peace by industrial establishments trying to optimise decision-making. It however remains to add that operations research technique cannot solve problem itself but requires the human factor, which in the first place employs it to analyse complex situations.

## 6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

How true is it that the field of Operations Research seeks to optimise decision-making?

## 7.0 REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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## UNIT 2      GAME THEORY

## CONTENTS

1.0     Introduction
2.0     Objectives
3.0     Main Content
    3.1     What is Game Theory?

## 1.0   INTRODUCTION

This unit will introduce you to Game theory and its application in strategic studies. Game theory is a distinct and interdisciplinary approach to the study of human behaviour. The disciplines most involved in game theory are mathematics, economics, political science and other social and behavioural sciences. Game theory was founded by the great mathematician, John von Neumann. The first important book on the subject was *The Theory of Game and Economic Behaviour*, which Neumann wrote in collaboration with the great mathematical economist, Oskar Morgenstern. The concern of this unit is to look at game theory, types of game and its application in strategic studies.

## 2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain what is meant by Game Theory
- identify various examples of Game Theory
- identify the elements of games
- describe the application of Game Theory in Strategic Studies.

## 3.0   MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1   What is Game Theory?

Game theory provides analytical tools for examining strategic interactions among two or more participants. By using simple, often numerical models to study complex social relations, game theory can

illustrate the potential for, and risks associated with, cooperative behaviour among distrustful participants.

According to Rapoport (1974:1), games used to simulate real-life situations typically include five elements:

**i.Players** or decision makers;
**ii.Strategies** available to each player;
**iii.Rules** governing players behaviour;
**iv.Outcomes,** each of which is a result of particular choices made by players at any given point in the game; and
**v.Payoffs** accrued by each player as a result of each possible outcome.

These games assume that each player will pursue strategies that help him or her achieve the most profitable outcome in every situation.

Real life is full of situations in which people intentionally or unintentionally pursue their own interests at the expense of others, leading to conflict or competition. Games used to illustrate these relationships often place the interests of two players in direct opposition: the greater the payoff (benefit) for one player, the less for the other. In other to achieve a mutually productive outcome, the players must coordinate their strategies, because if each player pursues his or her greatest potential payoffs, the shared outcome is unproductive.

Games therefore illustrate the potential for cooperation to produce mutually beneficial outcomes. However, you must note that games also highlight the difficulties of obtaining cooperation among distrustful participants, because each player is tempted to pursue his or her individual interest. Cooperation requires that both players compromise, and forgo their maximum payoffs. Yet, in compromising, each player risks complete loss if the opponent decides to seek his or her own maximum payoff. Rather than risking total loss, players tend to prefer the less productive outcome.

## 3.2    Rationality and Game Theory

Since the work of John Neumann, "games" have been a scientific metaphor for a wide range of human interactions in which the outcome depend on the interactive strategies of two or more persons, who have opposed or at best mixed motives. Among the issues discussed in game theory are:

i.What does it mean to choose strategies "rationally" when outcomes depend on the strategies chosen by others and when information is complete?

ii.In "games" that allow mutual gain (or mutual loss), is it "rational" to cooperate to realise the mutual gain (or avoid the mutual loss) or is it "rational" to act aggressively in seeking the individual gain regardless of mutual loss?

iii.If the answer to (ii) is "some times", in what circumstances is aggression rational and in what circumstances is cooperation rational?

iv.In particular, do ongoing relationships differ from one-off encounters in this connection?

v.Can moral rules of cooperation emerge spontaneously from the interactions of rational egoists?

vi.How does real human behaviour correspond to "rational" behaviour in these cases?

vii.If it differs, in what direction? Are people more cooperative than would be "rational"? More aggressive? Both?

The above questions border on the crux of Game theory- the issue of rationality, an assumption that came from the discipline of economics. Rationality implies that the individual must choose the best option that maximises his/her utility or payoffs. The link between neoclassical economics and game theory was and is rationality. Neoclassical economics is based on the assumption that human beings are rational in their choices. Specifically, the assumption is that each person maximises his or her rewards- profits, incomes, or subjective benefits- in the circumstances that he or she faces. This hypothesis serves the double purpose in the study of the allocation of resources. First, it narrows the range of possibilities somewhat. Absolute rational behaviour is more predictable than irrational behaviour. Second, it provides a criterion for evaluation of the efficiency of an economic system.

Game theory advanced by economists was a theory of economic and strategic behaviour when people interact directly, rather than "through the market". Game theory is about serious interactions as market competition, arms races, environmental pollution etc., are addressed using the metaphor of a game. In these serious interactions, the individual's choice is essentially a choice of strategy, and the outcome of the interaction depends on the strategies chosen by each participant.

In neoclassical economic theory, to choose rationally is to maximise one's rewards. From one point of view, this is a problem in mathematics: choose the activity that maximises rewards in given circumstances. Thus, we may talk of rational economic choices as the "solution" to a problem of mathematics. In game theory, the case is more complex, since the outcome depends not only on your strategies

and on the "market conditions", but also directly on the strategies chosen by others.

Recent developments in game theory, especially the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in 1994 to three theorists and the death of A. W. Tucker, in January 1995, at 89, have renewed the memory of its beginnings. Although the history of game theory can be traced back earlier, the key period of emergence of game theory was the decade of 1940s. The publication of *The Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour* was particularly an important step. However, in some ways, Tucker's invention of the Prisoner's Dilemma came to influence social sciences.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

Game theory is hinged on the concept of Rationality. Discuss

## 3.3    Examples of Game Theory

There are several examples of Game theory. Game theory can roughly be divided into two broad areas: non-cooperative (or strategic) games and cooperative (coalitional) games. The meaning of these terms are self-evident, although John Nash claimed that one should be able to reduce all cooperative games to non-cooperative form. In this section, you will be introduced into the Prisoner's dilemma, the zero-sum game, and the n-person game.

### 3.3.1  The Prisoner's Dilemma

The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the best-known models in game theory. It illustrates the paradoxical nature of interaction between mutually suspicious participants with opposing interests.

In a general hypothetical situation as shown in Figure 1, two accomplices to a crime are imprisoned and they forge a pact not to betray one another and not to confess to the crime. The severity of the punishment that each receives is determined not only by his or her behaviour, but also by the behaviour of his or her accomplice. The two prisoners are separated and cannot communicate with each other. Each is told that there are four possible outcomes.

i.If one confesses to the crime and turns in the accomplice (defecting from a pact with the accomplice), his sentence will be reduced.
ii.If one confesses while the accomplice does not (i.e. the accomplice cooperates with the pact not to betray each other), the first can strike a deal with the police, and will be set free. But the information he provides will be

used to incriminate his accomplice, who will receive the maximum sentence.

iii.If both prisoners confess to the crime (i.e. both defect from their pact), then each receives a reduced sentence, but neither is set free.

iv.If neither confesses to the crime (i.e. they cooperate), then each receives the maximum sentence for lack of evidence. The option may not be as attractive to either individual as the option of striking a deal with the police and being set free at the expense of one's partner. Since the prisoners cannot communicate with each other, the question of whether to "trust" the other not to confess is the critical aspect of this game.

**Figure 1**

|       |         | Nom     |        |
|-------|---------|---------|--------|
|       |         | confess | do not |
|       | confess | 10, 10  | 0, 20  |
| Sam   | do not  | 20, 0   | 1, 1   |

The table is read like this: Each prisoner chooses one of the two strategies. In effect, **Nom** chooses a column and **Sam** chooses a row. The two numbers in each cell tell the outcomes for the two prisoners when the corresponding pair of strategies is chosen. The number to the left of the comma tells the payoff to the person who chooses the row (Sam) while the number to the right of the column tells the payoff to the person who chooses the columns (Nom). Thus (reading down the first column), if both confess, each gets 10 years, but if **Nom** confesses and **Sam** does not, **Sam** gets 20 and **Nom** goes free.

So: how can you solve this game? What strategies are "rational" if both men want to minimise the time they spend in jail. **Nom** might reason as follows: "Two things will happen: **Sam** can confess or **Nom** can keep quite. Suppose **Sam** confesses, then I get 20 years if I do not confess, 10 years if I do, so in that case it is better to confess. On the other hand, if Sam does not confess, and I do not either, I get a year; but in that case, if I confess I can go free. Either way, it is best to confess. Therefore, I will confess".

However, **Sam** can and presumably will reason in the same way, so that they both confess and go to prison for 10 years each. Yet, if they had acted "irrationally", and kept quite, they each would have gotten off with one year each.

The Prisoner's Dilemma presented above is an example of a non-cooperative game. A number of issues can be raised with the Prisoner's Dilemma, and each of these issues is intended to broaden your mind on the heuristic nature of "games".

a) The Prisoner's Dilemma is a two-person game, but many of the applications of the idea are really many-persons interactions.
b) We have assumed that there is no connection between the two prisoners. If they could communicate and commit themselves to coordinated strategies, we would expect a different outcome.
c) In the Prisoner's Dilemma, the two prisoners interact only once. Repetition of the interactions might lead to quite different results.
d) Compelling as the reasoning that leads to the dominant strategy equilibrium may be, it is not the only way this problem might be reasoned out. Perhaps it is not really the most rational answer after all.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

How true is it that, in real world situations, the assumptions of the Prisoner's Dilemma can easily be faulted?

### 3.3.2  Zero-Sum Game

A zero-sum game is a game in which one player's winnings equal the other player's losses. You would notice that the definition requires a zero sum for every set of strategies. If there is even one strategy set for which the sum differs from zero, then the game is not zero-sum. If we add up the wins and losses in a game, treating losses as negatives, and we find that the sum is zero for each set of strategies chosen, then the game is a "zero-sum game".

For example, consider the Children's game of "Marching Pennies". In this game, the two players agree that one will be "even" and the other will be "odd". Each one then shows a penny. The pennies are shown either as head or as a tail. If both show the same side, the "even" wins the penny from "odd"; or if they show different sides, "odd" wins the penny from "even". Figure 2 is the payoff table of the game.

**Figure 2**

|  |  | **Odd** |  |
|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | Head | Tail |
|  | Head | 1, -1 | -1, 1 |
| **Even** | Tail | -1, 1 | 1, -1 |

If we add up the payoffs in each cell, we find 1-1=0. This is a "zero-sum game".

Let us consider another example of a zero-sum game. Let us think of two companies that sell sachet water. Each company has a fixed cost of

₦5000 per period, regardless whether they sell anything or not. We will call the companies **Amusan** and **Dot**, just to take two names at random. The companies are competing for the same market and each firm must choose a high price (₦ 2 per sachet) or a low price (₦ 1 per sachet). Here are the rules of the game.

i.At a price of ₦2, 5000 sachets can be sold for a total revenue of ₦10,000;

ii.At a price of ₦1, 10000 sachets can be sold for a total revenue of ₦10,000;

iii.If both companies charge the same price, they split the sales evenly between them;

iv.If one company charges a higher price, the company with the lower price sells the whole amount and the company with the higher price sells nothing;

v.Payoffs are profits- revenue minus the ₦5,000 fixed costs.

Figure 3 is the payoff table for the two companies.

**Figure 3**

| | | Amusan | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Price = ₦ 1 | Price = ₦2 |
| **Dot** | Price = ₦ 1 | 0, 0 | 5000, -5000 |
| | Price = ₦ 2 | -5000, 5000 | 0, 0 |

Verify for yourself that this is a zero-sum game. For two-person zero-sum game, there is a clear concept of the solution. The solution to the game is the maximum criterion; that is, each player chooses the strategy that maximises her minimum payoff. In this game, **Dot's** minimum payoff at a price of ₦1 is zero, and at the price of ₦2 is -5000, so the ₦1 price maximises the minimum payoff. The same reasoning applies to **Amusan**, so both will choose the ₦1 price. Here is the reasoning behind the maximum solution: **Dot** knows that whatever he losses, **Amusan** gains; so whatever strategy he chooses, **Amusan** will choose the strategy that gives the minimum payoff for the row. Again, **Amusan** reasons conversely.

Please, note that for the maximum criterion for a two-person, zero-sum game, it is rational for each player to choose the strategy that maximises the minimum payoff, and the pair of strategies and payoffs such that each player maximises her minimum payoff is the "solution to the game".

## 3.4     Limitations of Game Theory

Game theory is hinged on the assumption that humans are essentially rational beings, and self-interest motivated in their every day actions. The notion that individuals tend to behave as rational actors also include assumptions that their actions are predominantly intentional (not unconscious), as they have a stable and relatively consistent set of preferences. The emphasis on rationality however remains the main weakness of this theory.

First, by hinging its stand on rationality, intentionality and egoistic motives of actors, Game theory has been described as being tautological, as it leads to post-hoc type of reasoning. In other words, game theorists conceive their task as demonstrating the fact that all social actions are actually rational including practices that are apparently prima-facie irrational. The theory thus seems to rationalise events in expo facto manner and is therefore deficient.

Second, by overstretching the notion of rationality, game theory ends up with findings with little explanatory variable relevance or with all but identifiable explanations for all social phenomena.

Third, game theory often ignores the cultural aspect of individual choices. Rationale as well as actors choices are always far from being culturally free.

Fourth and lastly, game theorists not only neglect culture, values and ideology but also politics. In other words, game theory analysis reduces political actors to the economic levels. Perceiving social actions only in terms of individualism or individual maximisation or optimisation, game theorists are unable to account for non-economic and non-material sources of individual motives, but for collective actions.

## 3.5    Applications of Game Theory in Strategic Studies

Game theory can be used to examine both simple and complex strategic issues such as ethnic conflicts and arm races. If two antagonistic countries uncontrollably build up their armaments, they increase the potential of mutual loss and destruction. For each country, the value or arming itself is decreased because of the costs of not doing so- financial costs, heightened security tensions, greater mutual destructive capabilities etc provides few advantages over the opponent, resulting in an unproductive outcome (1 to 1 in Figure 1). Each country has a choice: cooperate to control arms development, with the goal of achieving mutual benefits, or defect from the pact, and develop armaments.

The dilemma stems from the realisation that if one side arms itself (defects) and the other does not (cooperates), the participant who develops armaments will be considered stronger and will win the game (the 20 to 0) outcome. If both cooperate, the possible outcome is a tie (10 to 10). This is better than the payoff from mutual defection and an arms race (1 to 1), but is not as attractive as winning, and so the temptation to out-arm one's opponent is always present. The fear that one's opponent will give in to such temptations often drives both players to arm; not doing so risks total loss, and the benefits of not can only be realised if one's opponent overcomes his or her temptation to win. Such trusts is often lacking in the international environment.

During the Cold War, the United States-Soviet relations were a good example of this dynamic. For a long time, the two countries did not trust each other at all. Each armed itself to the hilt, fearing that the other was doing so, and not wanting to risk being vulnerable. Yet the cost of the arms race was so high that it eventually bankrupted the Soviet Union. Had the Soviets being willing to trust the US, more, and vice versa, much of the arms race could have been prevented, as tremendous financial and security savings for both nations, and indeed the rest of the world.

Another application of game theory could be the one-shot game of international conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon. Let there be just two strategies **c** and **d**:

**c:**      try a solution by negotiating a compromise without resorting to military threat (cooperation) or

**d:**      mobilise the use of military forces to extort a solution to the one's advantage from the opponent by aggression (defection).

Given these two strategic options available for the Bakassi Peninsula, it is not difficult to identify the well-known prisoners' dilemma in this game. If both countries choose the cooperative strategy, **c**, both can realise a payoff R (reward) which is higher than the payoff P (punishment) obtained in the armed conflict when both choose the defective strategy **d**. If however, only one country is cooperative while the other defects and prepares for a military solution, the country relying on **c** becomes vulnerable to blackmailing politics or even to open aggression and faces the worst possible outcome **S** (Sucker's Pay-off). The other country, having chosen **d** with the opponent not mobilised, gains a position of strength, which it can use to squeeze out the highest possible pay-off **T** (temptation) from its opponent. Thus **T>R>P>S.**

As you must have learned, in the prisoner's dilemma game, defection is the dominant strategy. Rationality dictates that both countries choose this strategy so that conflicts, whenever they occur, would be settled in one, and only one way, namely by military confrontation. Even though each country would actually prefer conflicts to be solved peacefully by the opponents, international relations would always remain in a state of anarchy.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

In this unit, you have learned that Game theory is an approach that will help us understand social, political and strategic interactions between individuals, groups and countries. It also helps us to explain the nature of choices made by strategic interactions among two or more participants. The theory also models the potential for, and risks associated with cooperative behaviour.

A key assumption of Game theory is the concept of rationality, introduced by neoclassical economists which regard each participant as being a rational being and egoistic in the pursuit of strategic goals. This incidentally forms the Achilles heel of the theory.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

This unit has focused on the Game theory as a theoretical concept in strategic studies. You have learned about the elements of games; types of games; and the major thrust of game theory- rationality. You have also learned about the weaknesses of the theory, which largely derive from the fact that a significant proportion of political behaviour is not rational. Apart from the few applications of the theory identified in the unit, you may wish to consider real world situations in the application of Game theory to international politics.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

How can you place American War in Iran in a game theoretical framework?

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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**UNIT 3      THEORIES OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

**CONTENTS**

## 1.0   INTRODUCTION

In this unit, you will be introduced to major theories of conflict. Emphasis will be placed on the need for these theories to inform your ability to resolve conflicts. This unit therefore weaves ideas from conventional disciplines with new approaches especially to causes of deep-rooted conflicts. The focus here is on analyses as a tool.

Conflict, has from time immemorial, been a part of human existence and a natural part of our daily lives. For this reason, works of classical social theorists like **Karl Marx** and **Augustus Comte**, have sought explanations for social conflict, be they small or large. However, Faleti (Forthcoming) has shown that it is difficult to point to a single explanation for the emergence, escalation or protraction of conflict in the society.

What we intend to undertake in this unit, is to do an exegesis of theories of conflict and conflict resolution and to look at the contributions of individuals to the development of theory and practice of conflict resolution.

## 2.0   OBJECTIVES

At the completion of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain why a study of theories of conflict and conflict resolution is necessary
- describe different theories of conflict
- critique the various theories of conflict
- identify the contributions of individuals to conflict resolution.

## 3.0   MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1   Why Study Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution?

The concept of conflict is one of the concepts in the social sciences whose definition has remained elusive. The concept is always presented as if it is totally negative. This misconception should be avoided in this course as conflict can either be constructive (positive) or destructive (negative).

Since there are different approaches to the study of conflict and conflict resolution, it would be most appropriate for you to understand the theoretical approaches and how these theories have also affected the practice of conflict resolution. Sandole (1992:7x) captured this imperative: "Practitioners… work at different levels, operate in different domains… and derive their ideas from a variety of sources… (and) the domains in which they operate influence their goals, methods and overall approach". There is thus a relationship of causality between theory and practice in conflict and conflict resolution.

Let us start with the definition of a theory. One of the most authoritative definitions of a theory presents it as a set of interrelated constructs (concepts), and propositions that present a systematic view of phenomena by specifying relations among variables, with the purpose of explaining and predicting the phenomena (Kerlinger, 1977). Encarta (2004), which sees a "theory" as an idea, shares a similar view or a belief about something arrived through assumption and in some cases, a set of facts, propositions, or principles analysed in their relation to one another and used, especially in science to explain phenomenon. To have any value, a theory ought to explain or suggest ways of explaining why a subject matter has certain characteristics.

In the context of conflict and conflict resolution, the imperative of a theory would be to understand why a conflict occurred and to map up a path for resolving further conflict. As observed by Cohen (1968:2), "the goal of any theory is to explain something which occurred with a view of dealing with problems which arose or may arise as a result. Explanations usually require the use of models or constructs. Therefore, theories and models are developed because they provide logical explanations that become necessary from the moment problems are identified".

Scholars are in general agreement that there are four types of theories. Available literature, especially the submission from Faleti (Forthcoming) has identified them as analytical, normative, metaphysical and scientific theories.

**Analytical Theories:** examples are theories in logic and mathematical sciences. Though they do not address issues relating to daily existence,

they nevertheless provide clear statements which are true and from which other statements leading towards other theories are derived.

**Normative Theories:** are universal, practical statements that explain the relationship between two or more types of events and therefore believed to have universal application.

**Scientific Theories:** are universal, practical statements that explain the relationship between two or more types of events and therefore believed to have universal application. Scientific theories thus explain the conditions under which the same events or types of events occur. As argued elsewhere, (Popper, 1959:40), in order to provide useful explanations, scientific theories will need to be empirical statements, which can be checked by observations.

**Metaphysical Theories:** are not strictly testable and even though they may be subject to rational judgement, they have little to do with science. An example that comes to mind is the theory of natural selection. These are theories that are difficult to test, nonetheless useful, when combined with other theories for directing the enquiry of researchers in the human and biological sciences.

Conflict theories, which are the main concern for this unit, are grouped under the category of analytical theories, which are logical in their approach and seek to link relationship between variables, but because of their focus, are constrained by the issue of testability. Testing these theories is difficult because they do not have universal applicability. In addition, since these theories deal with human behaviour, they are generally unpredictable. This makes generalisation difficult. However, the theories generally provide a pathway for the study, analysis, and resolution of conflict.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

Why do you think the study of conflict and conflict resolution is important?

## 3.2    What is Conflict?

Conflict is as old as humankind and a general phenomenon to be encountered at all levels of human relationships. While the existence of conflict does not necessarily, threaten peace, ways of settling conflicts, which promote violence, cheat individual parties, involve power struggles and establish interests advantageous to one party threaten peace. Such ideas are known to lead to ways of thinking and acting

similar to zero-sum games: one side's loss is equal to the other side's gain.

Conflict can be defined simply as a social condition, in which at least two parties (individuals, groups, and states) are involved who:

a) pursue different, incompatible aims, in relation to the originating point, or who pursue the same aim, but which can only be achieved by a single party.

b) attempt to use different, incompatible means, in relation to the originating point, in order to achieve a specific aim.

Conflict resolution or conflictology on the other hand is the process of attempting to resolve a dispute or a conflict. Successful conflict resolution occurs by listening to and providing opportunities to meet each other's needs, and adequately addressing their interests so that each individual, group or states are satisfied with the outcome. Conflict resolution attempts to end conflicts before they start or lead to verbal, physical, or legal fighting. It involves two or more groups with opposing views regarding specific issues, and another group or individual who is considered to be neutral in their opinion on the subject. Resolution methods can include conciliation, mediation, arbitration or litigation.

In general, conflict theory seeks to scientifically explain the general contours of conflict in society: how conflict starts and varies, and the effects it brings. The central concerns of conflict theory are the unequal distribution of scare resources and power. What these resources are might be different to each theorist, but conflict theorists usually work with Max Weber's three systems of stratification- class, status and power. Conflict theorists generally see power as the central feature of society; rather than thinking of society as being held together by collective agreement concerning a cohesive set of cultural standards as functionalists do. Where power is located and who uses it (and who does not) are thus fundamental to conflict theory.

## 3.3　Theories of Conflict

This sub-section will briefly consider various theories relating to conflict. It is important to note that most of these theories somewhat overlap each other. Our typology is based on Faleti's (Forthcoming) work on Theories of Social Conflict (See Introduction to Peace and Conflict Studies in West Africa).

### 3.3.1 Structural Conflict Theory

This theory has two main sub-orientations. The first is the radical structural theory represented by the Marxist dialectical materialism originating from Karl Marx, Friederich Engels, and V.I. Lenin. The second is the liberal structuralism. The famous work of Johan Galtung (1990) on structural violence also falls under the second orientation. Theories like Marxism, in its thesis on historical materialism argue that conflict is hinged on the economic structures and social institutions.

The main argument of the structural conflict theory is that conflict is built into the particular ways societies are structured and organised. The theory looks at social problems like political and economic exclusion, injustice, poverty, disease, exploitation, inequity etc. as the root causes of conflict. It also believes that conflicts occur because of the exploitative and unjust nature of human societies and the domination of one class by another. To radical structural theorists like Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao Tse-Tsung, who blame capitalism for being an exploitative system (the domination of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie), this conflict can only be resolved through a revolution where the bourgeois class will be overthrown.

Other scholars, especially Marxists and underdevelopment theorists (Andre Gunder Frank, Walter Rodney, Samir Amin, as well as Emmanuel Wallesterstein) have used the theory to explain the reasons for development and underdevelopment; and why Third World Countries are not developing. They have situated their analyses in the world capitalist system, and have accused it of being exploitative and retarding the development of Third World Countries.

The theories assume that material interest in a society is skewed *ab initio* in favour of a group to the detriment of another reinforced by political and institutional factors; as well as ethnic factors. Conflict therefore becomes inevitable.

The structural conflict theory has been criticised for being shallow and being narrowly focused on material interests. Sometimes, material interests only explain a part of the story. In most situations, material interests may also be as a result of certain psychological needs, which would better explain the intensity and protraction of a conflict.

### 3.3.2  Biological Theories

The theories by assumption believe that humankind is evil by nature. The thinking is that, since our ancestors were inherently violent beings, we have evolved from them and our genes carry violent traits. Classical theorists like Thomas Hobbes, St. Augustine, Malthus, and Freud expressed the belief that human beings were driven by natural instinct of

self-preservation. Because of this tendency, Hobbes described life in the "state of nature" as solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short; Neibuhr, a theologian argued, "man's claim to goodness is nothing but absurdity if not blasphemy".

These theories have given rise to what is now referred to as the innate theory of conflict, which argues that conflict is innate in all social interaction, and among animals including human beings.

### 3.3.3  Realists Theories

This theory is based on the assumption that man is essentially selfish and engaged in the pursuit of personalised self-interest defined as power. The theory itself originates from classical political theory, and has both biological and theological doctrines about an apparent weakness and individualism inherent in human conflict.

Realism believes that "competitive processes" between actors, primarily defined as states, is the natural expression of conflict by parties engaged in the pursuit of scarce and competitive interests. One of the earliest books to espouse Realist theory is Machiavelli's *The Prince,* which was written for the de Medici family as a guide to uniting Italy. A later, more comprehensive book that helped build the foundation of Realist theory was from the renowned  realist theorist, Hans Morgenthau in his thesis on "power politics" in ***Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace***.

Realist theory advocates the use of power to fulfill the interests of a nation. Power here is defined as the ability of A to cause B to do what he would otherwise not have done. "National power" is composed of geography economy and natural resources, population, military preparedness, national character and moral, and the competency of the national government.
Realism is a departure from idealism.  Realism faults idealism for believing that human nature is malleable and good. Realist theories argue that conflict and antagonism in the world have their roots in forces that are inherent in human nature: self, individualistic and naturally conflictive; that states would pursue their national interests defined as power. The theory has thus rationalized the militarisation of international relations.

The realist theorists have been accused of elevating power and states to the status of ideology. However, this theory has a very tremendous impact on the international level to the extent that it cannot be easily whished away.

### 3.3.4 Psychological Theories

Theorists of this school, apart from sharing the biological and hormonal origins of aggression and conflict in individuals with realists, theologians and others, also introduce the conditions under which conflict happens. According to this school, even though humans have the capability for aggression, their capability remains idle until stimulated by necessity or encouraged by success. To them, the psychological sources of aggression are a function of several factors including human nature and the environment. In summary, this theory believes that humans are naturally capable of being aggressive but do not display violent behaviour as an instinct. When violence occurs, there is a tendency that it is being manipulated by a combination of factors within and outside the individual's control.

### 3.3.5 Economic Theories

Economists have also theorized about the roots of conflict. The basic assumption of their thought is that people in conflict are assumed to be fighting over material things. Faleti (Forthcoming) has advanced a question about what the theory strives to address: "is the conflict as a result of greed (intention to grab something) or grievances (anger arising over feelings of injustice)?

Several examples exist to show that some people ("conflict entrepreneurs") actually benefit from conflict; while the overwhelming majority of the population are affected by negative impacts of conflict; conflict therefore has a *functional utility* and is embedded in economic structures.

### 3.3.6 Psycho-Cultural Theories

This theory emphasises the rule of cultural induced conflict: it shows how enemy images are created from deep-seated attitudes about human interaction that are learned from early stages of growth, in the explanation of conflict. The theory also assumes that even though there are different forms of identities, the one that is based on people's ethnic origin and the culture that is learned on the basis of what ethnic origin is, is one of the most important ways of explaining violent conflict.

Another argument of psycho-cultural theorists is that social conflicts take long to resolve because some groups are discriminated against or

deprived of satisfaction of their basic (material) and non psychological (non material) needs on the basis of their identity.

## 3.3.7 Human Needs Theories

The theoretical view of this theory is that all humans have basic needs, which they seek to fulfill, and that the denial and frustration of these needs by other groups or individuals could affect them immediately or later, thereby resulting to conflict. "Basic human needs" comprise of physical, psychological, social and spiritual needs. In essence, to provide access to one (e.g. food) and deny or hinder access to another (e.g. freedom of worship) will amount to denial and could make people resort to violence in an effort to protect these needs.

Abraham Maslow, in his ***Motivation and Personality,*** has identified such needs to include physiological needs, safety needs, belongingness and love, esteem and self-actualisation. Burton (1990a) on the other hand has identified response, stimulation, security, recognition, distributive justice, meaning, need to appear rational and develop rationality, need for self-sense of control and the need for role defense. Edward Azar lists some basic needs like security, distinctive identity, social recognition of identity and affective participation in the process that shape such identities.

The frustration of the basic human needs hampers the realization of those higher order needs, and prevents individuals and groups from realizing their potentials. This leads to conflict. To resolve conflict or prevent it from occurring, the needs have to be met with appropriate satisfiers.

## 3.3.8 Systemic Theories

The main assumption of these theories is that the underlying causes of social conflicts are to be located in the vortex of the social context within which they occur. The theories shift our focus to the social, political and economic processes that would usually guide against instability.

Faleti (Forthcoming) has identified such factors to include environmental degradation, uncontrolled population growth, resources scarcity and their allocation through lopsided political processes and competition, the negative effect of colonial and Cold War legacies, domination and marginalization of minority groups by those in the majority, ethnicity etc. These invisible factors that affect the material comfort of the people result to conflict.

### 3.3.9  Relational Theories

These theories attempt to provide explanations for violent conflicts between groups by exploring the sociological, political restore economy, and historical relationships between such groups. Here, the belief is that cultural and value differences as well as group interests all influence individuals and groups in different ways. At the sociological level, differences between cultural values are a challenge to individual or group identity formation processes as they create a tendency to see others as intruders who have to be prevented from encroaching upon established cultural boundaries.

The political economy model of the theory identifies power and the advantages it confers as a key source of tension between different interest groups within a political system. In a situation where multiple groups share a common resource that is fixed in nature, the chances that each will attempt to eliminate, neutralise or injure the "other" or monopolise such a resource is a high tendency for conflict.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

Identify a theory or theories that best capture the nature and character of conflict in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

### 3.4     Theorists of Conflict Resolution

As conflicts continue to increase in scope and magnitude, especially with the development of nuclear weapons, it dawned on strategic thinkers and academic institutions to expand their research and to include studies that might avoid future conflicts by examining on-going international crises, internal wars, and social conflicts. A number of individuals who have contributed to the development of the theory and practice of conflict resolution include Mahatma Gandhi, Kenneth and Elise Boulding, Johan Galtung and John Burton amongst others.
**Mahatma Gandhi**

Mahatma Gandhi was a well renowned peace theorist. Ghandi's model "contains in-built inhibitors of violence…the objective is not to win, but to achieve a higher level of social truth and a healthier relationships between antagonists". His quote "bring your opponent to his senses, not his needs", exemplified his strong stand for non-violence (Bondurant, 1971). The non-violence stand has greatly inspired the development of modern ideas about constructive conflict management and non-violent conflict.

**Kenneth and Elise Boulding**

Early in the development of conflict resolution, a Society of Friends (Quakers) economist, Kenneth Boulding and his wife Elise added their contribution. Boulding's book, ***Perspectives on the Economics of Peace*** (1961) looks at war as if it were an inherent characteristic in the sovereign state system. His theory, to defuse conflict, was to track community behaviours at "social data stations", forming a system analogous to a network of weather stations. Boulding felt that the pulse and heart of society could be monitored. He hoped these centres would gather a range of social, political and economic data and then intervene as conflict arose. To him therefore, human behaviour might be controlled and wars avoided.

However, a cursory look at the assumptions shows that the argument is too simplistic. Who would do the monitoring? By whose values would a conflict be determined?

Another submission from Burton (1990) also questions the assumption of the work of Boulding. Burton refers to deterring violence and conflict at the domestic level as "being the most difficult to anticipate". At this level, military and authoritative controls are ineffective. Burton maintains however, that if values were attached to relationships and institutions, some human behaviours might be controlled.

## Johan Galtung

Galtung's contributions were in the areas of peace research and conflict resolution. At the international level, Galtung (1975) is credited with distinguishing between the three tasks undertaken by the United Nations in response to conflict: peace keeping, peace making and peace building. He provided a distinction between direct violence (children are murdered), structural violence (children die through poverty) and cultural violence (whatever blinds us to this or seeks to justify) [1985]. Galtung's identification of structural violence included the many forms of deniable conceptual violence that reinforce attitudinal traps. When poverty is ignored, it is "out of sight" and consequently "out of mind". His theory was to end direct violence by changing conflict behaviour, structural violence by removing structural injustices and cultural violence by changing attitudes (Bondurant, 1971). Galtung is identified with the Conflict Triangle.

**Attitude [A]:** influenced by emotions, fear, anger, bitterness and hatred.

**Structures [S]:** processes and institutions that influence security, recognition and identity.

**Behaviour [B]:** include cooperation or coercion, conciliation or hostility; threats, and destructive attacks.

## John Burton

Burton begins with the questions, "are conflicts due to human aggressiveness or inappropriate social institutions and norms?" He explores both possibilities. If aggression is innate, "then conflicts just have to be lived with, while (being) controlled by… police and deterrent strategies". A reliance on social controls becomes necessary for the avoidance of the escalation of conflicts. When societies are small conflicts are sometimes ritualised. Population increase end face to face with decision-making. Competitive territorial and property acquisition becomes important. Disputes (over physical resources) arise and "conflicts" (over human needs and aspirations) become prevalent, if aggression is inherent.

Burton then turns his attention to the second premise of his question: "aggression and conflicts are a direct result of some institutions and social norms being incompatible with inherent human needs. Burton states, "If conflict resolution is to be taken seriously …societies need to adjust to the needs of the people, and not the other way round".

Burton also emphasised that human needs do not lead to conflict. Conflict emerges from the frustration caused by unfulfilled need. Conflict is the frustration of not being able to satisfy one's needs for security, participation, identity and recognition. Institutionally imposed values may separate individuals from their human values, which would be separating them from their true needs. He argues, that alienation occurs in any system, if in practice participation and identity are denied.

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When institutional values cause alienation, the result would be deviant behaviour and dysfunctional conflict.

## 4.0   CONCLUSION

All theories of conflict have their shortcomings. Despite their inherent weaknesses, they offer an explanation on the general contours of conflict in society: "how conflict starts and varies, and the effects it brings". In explaining the intensity of a particular conflict, it is important that you should consider not only the structural (objective) factors that lead to differences in access to power and threaten the ability of people to satisfy their basic needs; or cultural (subjective) factors which show that people and nations bring different values which determine how they interpret their daily interactions with each other. For each of these tells only a part of the story. It is also important for you not to fall into the fatalistic error of relying on mono-causal explanations, since they are often incomplete and to large extent misleading. Multi-causal and multidimensional explanations are therefore important if we want to analytically study the origin, growth, development, variation, consequences and resolution of conflict in the society.

## 5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, you have been presented with diverse theoretical approaches to the study, analysis and explanations of conflict. You have seen that conflict in the society is closely associated with the frustrations experienced by individuals or groups in enjoying their basic human needs. You have also seen that each theoretical approach is just one side of the same coin, and both multi-causal and multidimensional analyses of conflict would enable you not only to understand the origin of conflict, but its intensity, variation and mechanisms for its resolution.

## 6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Analyse the contributions of conflict theorists to conflictology.

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# UNIT 4        THEORIES OF WAR

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## 1.0     INTRODUCTION

We have already expended much energy in conceptualizing conflict, its theories and contribution of thinkers to conflict resolution.  You should draw upon the knowledge gained so far in understanding this unit.  However, the central concern here is on theories of war.

War remains the engine of international politics and relations particularly among the powerful nations, creating viable network of opportunities in the distribution of values without having implications on the boundary of their relations as well as their internal arrangements.
In the theoretical understanding of war, various scholars have attempted to explain the causes, origin and intensity of wars.  They have also attempted an explanation of the criteria of or when resort to war is morally justifiable (i.e., the issue of just ad bellum) and how war should be fought (jus in bello).  In this unit therefore, you would be introduced to both the theories for war and the Just War Theory.

## 2.0     OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define what is 'war'
- differentiate between the various theories of conflict
- state the basic assumptions of Just War Theory
- identify the weaknesses of the theories of war.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    Understanding War

The concept of "war" like most concepts in the social sciences has received varied theoretical interpretations as its scope permeates through various fields of human endeavour.  We would however identify a few definitions of the concept.

According to Adeniran (1982:123), war involves:

> A common agreement, that is distinct from peace, and is characterised by military activity, high social and political tension, and the breakdown of normal relations.  War could result from a deliberate and carefully calculated decision….It could also be a choice among alternative courses of action and could be the only course one is left with.  It is a phenomenon, which affects everybody and all nations, irrespective of ideologies, and irrespective of the level of economic and political development.

A glossary of Terms and Concepts in Peace and Conflict Studies however defines war as:

> A mutually recognised, hostile exchange of actions among two or more parties (such as between or within nation-states) conducted by conventional military forces, paramilitary forces, guerrillas, or             non-violent resisters to achieve respective policy objectives.  Warfare assumes a degree of continuity until such objectives are accomplished or a party concedes or is defeated.

A state of war carries legal parameters governed by internationally recognised rules of engagement and conduct.  For example, the initiation of war requires some form of official or unofficial declaration, and conclusions are usually facilitated by formal agreements among the belligerents.  Encounters in war may assume a range of forms and employ various types of weapons, depending on the capacities of the parties potentially able to participate in warfare.  Examples include nuclear, chemical, and conventional arsenals and non-violent methods, among others.

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Historical trends in war are changing: human, environmental, and economic costs are rising along with the number of civilian casualties. The geographic areas involved in actual battles are widening. The length of battles, the number of battles per year, and the number of battles per war are becoming shorter. The absolute size of armies is increasing, and an army's size relative to the general population can be documented. Lower proportions of combatants are injured. Wars now spread to additional belligerents more swiftly than in the past. Since World War II, the frequency of 'low-intensity' conflicts, revolutions, counter-revolutions, and proxy wars has risen.

## SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1

War is a protracted state of violent, large-scale conflict involving two or more parties. Discuss.

## 3.2    Theories of War

## 3.2.1  Malthusian Theory

In an Essay on the **Principles of Population** first published in 1798, Prof. T. O. Malthus made the famous prediction that population would outrun food supply, leading to a decrease in food per person. This view has been captured by Case and Fair (1999:790):

> The power of population is so superior to the power of the earth to produce subsistence for man, which the premature death must in some shape or other visit the human race. The vices of mankind are active and able to minister depopulation. They are the precursors in the great army of destruction, and often finish the dreadful work themselves. But should they fail in this war of extermination, sickly persons, epidemics, pestilence, and plague advance in terrific array, and sweep off their thousands and tens of thousands –should success be still incomplete, gigantic inevitable famine stalks in the rear, and with the one mighty blow levels the population with the food of the world.

Malthus's contribution to the theory of war focuses on the grand function of war rather than on the origin of war or the relationship between human nature and war or violence. The theory therefore holds that the essence of war is to decimate or reduce the rising population. This serves essentially to prevent available resources to be overstretched by available population. To Malthus, war is not intentionally articulated by man but ordained by God to check population outburst. He also

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argued that the situation of war is beyond human intentions, but a grand function designed by God to regulate human population. In this context, men become "puppets" manipulated by the transcendent laws of demography, which when a population has reached a certain point would pull on the strings of gain and safety, honour and glory.

### 3.2.2  Marxists Theory of War

The Marxist Theory of War is based upon the development and maturity of capitalism, which pushes it beyond its borders. Marxists believe that capitalism spreads from the wealthiest countries to the poorest as capitalists seek to expand their influence and raise their profits. War, threat of war, or the export of capital thus becomes a means through which the realization of these objectives is achieved. The capitalist's control over the state can thus play an essential role in the development of capitalism, to the extent that the state directs the warfare of other foreign intervention. This theory therefore considers wars as natural consequences of the free market and class system and will not disappear until a world revolution takes place.

### 3.2.3  Rational Theory

This theory is based on the rationales of both parties in war. It assumes that warring parties are rational actors, using war as a platform to achieve defined objectives. In their approach therefore, each party tends to do everything possible to minimize the loss of life and property in its own camp while trying hard to outsmart the other party in achieving the best outcome for itself. The rational theorists therefore view war as operating largely on the corridor of reciprocity. Let us explain what is meant here by reciprocity: While country A tries to attack country B, country A would at the same time try to defy country B's attack or control the offensive coming from it.

Rationalist explanations of war has been criticised on a number of issues. The assumptions of cost-benefit calculations become dubious in the most extreme genocide cases of World War II, where the only bargain offered in some cases was infinitely bad. Rationalist theories typically assume that the state act as a unitary individual, doing what is best for the state as a whole; this is problematic when, for example, a leader is a dictator. Rationalist theory also assumes that the actors are rational, able to accurately assess their likelihood of success or failure, but the proponents of the psychological theories would disagree.

### 3.2.4  Hobessian Theory

This theory of war is credited to Thomas Hobbes articulated in his social determinism, Hobbes believed that man by his nature is warlike and

capable of the worst evil. A theory that has also been reinforced by Neibur, a theologian that "man's claim to goodness is absurdity if not blasphemous". The theory notes that man is egoistic as he is controlled by an *animus dominandi* consisting of three passions. These three passions are responsible for the rivalry among men as each tries to gain relative advantage over the other, which often results in violent hostilities.

Hobbes drew his theoretical inspiration from Thucydides. As Hobbes notes, "In the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, *competition*; second, *diffidence*; thirdly, *glory*". (Slomp, 1990:565–587).

Thomas Hobbes theory of war is based on his account of his state of nature, where life was short, nasty and brutish–'this was a state of war'. The theory stresses the importance of war in the maintenance of peace and security of any state. It emphasises the need for every state to uphold the principle of defensive war such that before the enemy carries out its attack, the state should act fast to undermine the military capability of the enemy. The Hobbesian theory therefore advocates for "principle of first attack" as a war strategy.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

What are the main assumptions of the Hobbesian Theory of War?

### 3.2.5  Political Science Theory

There are varieties of international relations theory schools. One of such notable schools is ***political realism***, which assumes that war is a veritable mechanism in the actualisation of the prominence or superiority by any state in military and security power relations within the global environment. Proponents of this theory are of the view that military power determines the relevance of any state in international relations. They also believe that the most viable way of dealing with state deviance in international relations is through the use of force.

This school of thought became popular consequent upon the eruption of Second World War, which negated the importance of *democratic peace theory* and makes us to understand that democracies do not engage themselves in violent hostility or war while advancing for the promotion of democracy and its ethos of equality, rule of law (rather than rule of force), collectivism etc. *Political realism* argues that there is no way states will absolutely uphold the principle of collectivism due to the individualistic nature of state behaviour in international relations. Thus,

national interests condition the behaviour of states in the international environment.

Another proponent of this theory relating to power in international relations and Machpolitik is the **Power Transition Theory**, which distributes the world into a hierarchy and explains major wars as part of a cycle of hegemon's being destabilised by a great power which does not support the hegemon's control. The last school of thought under Political Science Theory of war is **Cyclical Theory of War**, which believes that war is not necessary but inevitable. Each century produces a world power, which monopolises military power and viable economic base to maintain its hegemony. No hegemonic power can retain its power status for more than four decades. The emergent challenger will come on stage, and in the process of well-articulated war policy, the delegitimization and redistribution of the existing power system will manifest. The challenger may eventually become the dominant power and cyclical process emerges again until its displacement. Thus, the school holds that there will always be an eruption of war despite the presence of any (long) period of peace due to the behaviour of states in international relations such that the weak would like to display to the strong in order to enjoy the status of hegemons.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3**

Identify the various schools of thought in Political Science Theory.

### 3.2.6  Rousseauen Theory

This theory is rooted in the writings and ideas of Jean Jacques Rousseau, whose social contract theory contradicts the 'state of nature' of Thomas Hobbes. According to Rousseau, man cannot be said to be naturally violent, as the state of nature was very peaceful. The affairs of the people were regulated by "golden rules" and there was peace among the people. However, the rise of (individual) property acquisition and inequality led to violent hostility and warfare in human social intercourse.

The theory therefore holds that the rise of property and inequality propelled the situation of war and violence among men against communal philosophy and absolute pacifism that characterised the golden age. Rousseau, therefore, concluded that war is not inherent in human nature. Man has only cultivated the habit of violence as a result of the emergence of modern state.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4**

Compare and contrast, the Hobessian and Rousseauen theories.

### 3.2.7 Historical Theories

Historians are generally reluctant to look for explanations for all wars. Historical theorists like A .J. P. Taylor often see wars as traffic accidents.  There are some circumstances and situations that make the occurrence of war more likely, but there can be no system for predicting where and when each one will occur.

This theoretical approach has received a dosage of criticism by social scientists because political leaders sometimes make careful decisions before adopting a war policy.  However, a contrary opinion is that war on occasional basis happen purely by accident.  War may sometimes erupt without any previous intention.

### 3.2.8 Youth Bulge Theory

Youth Bulge Theory is a variant of demographic theory, though different from the Malthusian theory.  Both theories believe that high birth rate is the major source of war but their views are slightly different from each other.  Malthusian theory sees inadequate supply of food to meet the challenge(s) of a population outburst as the main source of war– where war is used as a function to reduce the growing population so that food supply will be adequate to cater for the existing people who are able to survive the war.  On the other hand, Youth Bulge theory blame war situation on a disparity between the number of well-educated, well-fed, angry "fighting age" young males (2nd, 3rd and 5th sons) and the number of positions available to them in society as a primary source of war.  War is not basically a function of disproportion in population outburst and the available (scarce) food per se, but the inability of parents to provide for the children who are of fighting age.  As argued by Huntington (2001),  "Generally speaking, the people who go out and kill other people are males between the ages of 16 and 30".

Youth Bulge theory therefore holds that youth bulge is the main source of war.  Youthfulness of the people in this age bracket makes them to easily get angry and violent when they are unable to meet their expectations like access to medical care, employment, quality education among others, more than other age brackets.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 5**

Distinguish between Malthusian theory and Youth Bulge theory.

### 3.3    Just War Theory

The Just War theory is a derivative from the work of Augustine of Hippo after the collapse of the Roman Empire, a doctrine that provides criteria for the decision to go to war (jus ad bellum) – "justice on the way to war" and guidelines for conducting war (just in bello) – "justice in the midst of war".  The study of just war over the centuries has led to the development of several principles that have greatly influenced Western political thought and international law particularly.   These include:

(a)     That  war be a last resort, not to be entered into until all other means of resolution have been explored and found wanting; that is, unless all peaceful methods of conflict resolution have been exhausted (last resort);

(b)     that the decision to engage in war be made by a legitimate, duly constituted authority, not by aggrieved individuals (legitimate authority);

(c)     that there be right intention and just cause – neither aggression nor revenge being acceptable – and that the detrimental results of war be unlikely to outweigh the intended injustices targeted for amelioration (just case);

(d)     that success be reasonably attainable.  In going to war, there must exist the reasonable expectation of successfully obtaining peace and reconciliation between warring parties (reasonable hope of success);

(e)     that an end result of the envisaged peace be preferable to the situation that would obtain if the war were not fought (peace intention).

Conditions (a) through (e) are often referred to as the proportionality principles.  Once a war is underway, the jus in bello ("justice in the midst of war") principles ask that military means and the cost of war be proportional to a moral goal and the presumed benefits.

(f)     that the suffering and devastation of war must not outweigh whatever benefits may result from war (proportionality);

(g)     that the means of warfare must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants (discrimination or non-combatant immunity).

These are the seven principles of Christian just war doctrine.
Among ethicists and theologians, criticisms against the just war tradition have grown, especially since the Vietnam War and the debate over U.S. nuclear weapons policy in the 1980's.  Critics have argued that the just war tenets are too ambiguous to provide guidance.  Their case may be summarised as follows, "there exist no formal operational statement on

how the just war theory should work" (Yoder, 1983:46). It has not been translated into legal, political, or military form; its meaning is taken simply as ***self-evident.*** That a government is "legitimate", that a war is "defensive", that a military operation is a situation of "last resort", that one evil is "proportionate" to another, and so on are all judgements that the just war doctrine assumptions can be made with some confidence, consensus, and accuracy.

However, it is precisely because there is no agreement on these matters that wars are fought. For example, revolutionary wars may erupt because there is disagreement over legitimate authority. Or opinions on what constitutes "last resort" will differ depending on which party benefits from the status quo. In a pluralistic world composed of competing political groups, people will never agree on what constitutes a just government, a just cause, or a just war (Childress, 1980).

## 4.0　CONCLUSION

You have now learnt about the various theories that seek to explain the causes, origin and intensity of war in our society. The arguments of these theories are best appreciated when placed in the nature – nurture continuum of understanding human behaviour. While some of these theories have shown that man is by his nature a violent being, which explains war situations that dominates the affairs of man, nurture on the other hand, holds that man is not violent naturally but only learns violence in the course of socialisation and his experience about the world he lives in. It is expected that your knowledge of the concept of "war" has been advanced further in this unit. Remember however that the just war doctrine can easily be manipulated by the strong against the weak.

## 5.0　SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned about the various theoretical approaches to the study of war. You have seen that these theories can loosely be categorised as nature and nurture theories of wars, the former emphasising the inherent warlike nature of man, while the latter seeks violent behaviour as a learned process. You have also been introduced to the just war doctrine, with its theoretical assumptions. These assumptions in real life are actually difficult to apply.

## 6.0　TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

How does the just war doctrine aid your understanding of the United States invasion of Iraq?

**Guidelines:**

You will be expected to demonstrate the basic assumption of the just war theory and how the United States invasion of Iraq captures this dynamic.

You are encouraged to go beyond the materials in this unit, and cite original examples to illustrate your points.

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

Case, K. E. and Fair, R. C. (1999). *Principles of Economics.* (5th Edition). London: Prentice Hall.

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## MODULE 3 PROCESSES OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

So much has been said about strategic studies in modules 1 and 2. It is time to discuss the processes of strategic studies. These processes are theoretical constructs that describe key features that seek to explain the rationale for strategy planning, formulation, implementation, and evaluation.

This module is made up of four units. In each of these units, the relationship between the concepts and strategy is examined. These are done with the view of giving you an in-depth understanding of their usage in strategic studies.

The first unit examines the concept of deterrence and shows that it is a dissuasive means of preventing an impending or projected action of others through instilling fear of repercussions or by an understanding that the negative consequences of such actions will outweigh the benefits. The second unit considers the concept of strategy planning, and shows that it is a stepwise process that involves planning, evaluation and revision, in order to ensure continuous improvement of the system. The third unit examines the theories of foreign policy analysis and argues that the process as a field of systematic and scholarly inquiry involves the study of how a state makes foreign policy. The last unit examines the concept of defence policy and its relationship with foreign policy.

We now turn to an examination of the processes under the following units:

Unit 1      Deterrence
Unit 2      Strategic Planning
Unit 3      Foreign Policy Analysis
Unit 4      Defence Policy

## UNIT 1 DETERRENCE

### CONTENTS

1.0   Introduction
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## 1.0     INTRODUCTION

In this unit, you will be introduced to the concept of deterrence and its application in strategic studies. The concept of deterrence is a product of the Cold War. Though the underlying principles can be detected in the military writings of all historical periods, the concept has been developed over the past 50 years in the course of establishing a rationale for the deployment of nuclear weapons. This unit seeks to introduce you to the concept of deterrence, its theory, criticism and practice in the international system.

## 2.0     OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

• explain the Concept of Deterrence
• state the basic assumptions of deterrence theory
• identify the evolution of the concept of deterrence
• criticise deterrence theory.

## 3.0     MAIN CONTENT

### 3.1     What is Deterrence?

Deterrence is an active and dynamic process. This makes its definition elusive. However, it is widely agreed today that deterrence as a term of act means preventing war either through fear of punishment or fear of defeat, or sometimes even through fear of undefined negative consequences. This would have informed Sterling Haydon's definition of deterrence as the art of producing in the mind of the enemy, the fear to attack.

The word "deterrence" is derived from the Latin word de+terrene, literally, 'to frighten from' or 'frighten away'. Thus, fear is central to the original meaning of deterrence. The idea that vast, indiscriminate, and unacceptable damage would be inflicted in retaliation for aggression, as the employment of nuclear weapons since World War II, has long been central to the popular understanding of the term deterrence.

The concept of deterrence applied to international affairs is generally well understood. However, it can become extremely complex in application. In its simplest form, to deter means to inhibit or prevent someone from doing something. Military force used in some form and to some degree underpins all types of deterrence. In the context of an overall policy, however, military force is likely to be only one tool among many diplomatic, economic, political and military response or anticipatory actions designed to guide the development of an international interaction in direction that will prevent an outcome inimical to the interest of the state.

## 3.2    Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory is a military strategy developed after World War II and used throughout the Cold War era. It is especially relevant with regard to the use of nuclear weapons, and has featured prominently on current United States foreign policy regarding the development of nuclear technology in North Korea and Iran.

Beaufre (1965) defined nuclear deterrence as the only kind of deterrence that produces the effect – seeks to avoid or to end war – as the Cold War demonstrated. The following confirm Beaufre's assertion.

- The United States destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki with two atomic bombs, which led to Japan's surrender. Atomic weapons were outlawed, but the use of conventional arms continued.
- Nuclear proliferation has been slow, but the phenomenon of global terrorism and nuclear development in countries like North Korea could end this situation.
- Wars have continued throughout the world despite conventional deterrence.

Understanding the theory of deterrence is therefore, complicated. Deterrence is often confused with the desire to avoid aggression, which is the natural attitude of a country that feels equal or inferior to another. Not having experienced war for long time complicates the issue; these attitudes are themselves the consequences of deterrence. Nevertheless, deterrence as a methodology to achieve peace succeeds to the degree that a country has a sound strategic political model. Thus, deterrence is not random or causal; it is the result of concrete actions.

Some fundamental requirements of deterrence are the physical capability to inflict damage, the ability to demonstrate power, and credibility. A country only obtains credibility through the political will to employ force. The political will to use force is the breath of life of deterrence. If the will does not exist, a potential adversary will perceive

this and render the other two requirements – the ability to demonstrate power and the capability to inflict damage – inert. Deterrence is therefore an effect. Its result depends on the opinion the opponent has of his adversary's capability to win. This explains why it is difficult to deter those who have different culture or life styles, especially terrorists.

There are two forms of deterrence: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. The former is a strategy by which governments threaten an imminent retaliation if attacked. Aggressors are deterred if they do not wish to suffer such damage because of an aggressive action. This has informed the strategy adopted by the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War; both countries adopted the strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). On the other hand, deterrence by denial refers to a strategy whereby a government builds up or maintains defence and intelligence systems with the purported aim of neutralising or mitigating attacks. Aggressors are deterred if they choose not to act, perceiving the cost of their action to be too high in relation to its likely success.

Deterrence theory has its conceptual roots from a theory of human behaviour. Assuming that the primary danger is that of a war arising from deliberate calculation, the theory posits that a countervailing threat displayed with sufficient destructive potential can dominate any aggressive calculation that might be made, no matter how pervade or myopic it might be.

The existence of a threat causes a psychological result and prevents adversaries from taking up arms. An adversary must measure the risk he runs if he unleashes a crisis, because the response will produce political, economic, social, and moral damage from which recovery will not be easy; material damage and psychological factors play a deceive role in deterrence (Covarrubias, 2004).

## 3.3    Evolution of the Concept of Deterrence

As you have learned in the introductory part of this unit, although the concept of 'deterrence' is traceable to the military writings of the classical periods, it is however the Cold War that has developed the concept to puberty. This development as you would soon see was because of the United States effort to deter the Soviet Union. What this section proposes to do is to trace the development of the concept overtime.

The early stages of the Cold War were generally characterised by the ideology of containment, an aggressive posture on behalf of the United States especially regarding developing nations under their sphere of

influence. This period was characterised by numerous proxy wars throughout most of the world, particularly Africa, Asia, Central America, and South America. One of such conflict was the Korean War. With the US pullout from Vietnam after it suffered a great defeat, the normalization of US relations with China, and the Sino-Soviet split, the policy of containment was abandoned and a new policy of détente was established whereby peaceful coexistence was sought between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the afore mentioned factors contributed to the shift, the most prominent factor was the rough parity achieved in stockpiling nuclear weapons with the clear capability of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Fundamentally, therefore, the period of détente was characterised by a general reduction in the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States and a thawing of the Cold War, lasting from the late 1960s until the start of the 1980s. The doctrine of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence characterised relations between the US and the Soviet Union during this period, and present relations with Russia.

Another shift identified was the arms build-up by the American president, Ronald Reagan during the 1980s. Reagan attempted to justify his policy in part due to the concerns of growing Soviet influence in Latin America and the new Republic of Iran, established after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Similar to the old policy of containment, the US funded several proxy wars, including support for Saddam Hussein of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, support for the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, who were fighting for independence from the Soviet Union, and several anti-communist movements in Latin America such as the overthrow of Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

On another level, while the army was dealing with the break up of the Soviet Union and the spread of nuclear technology to other nations beyond the United States and Russia, the concept of deterrence took a broad multinational dimension. The US policy on Post-Cold War deterrence was outlined in 1995 in a document entitled, ***Essentials of post Cold War Deterrence.*** As noted by Jervis (1989), this document explains that while relations with Russia continue to follow the traditional characteristics of Mutual Nuclear Deterrence, due to both nations continuing mutually assured destruction, US policy of deterrence towards nations with minor nuclear capabilities should ensure through threats of immense retaliation (or even pre-emptive action) that they do not threaten the United States, its interests and allies. The document further extrapolates that such threats must also be used to ensure that nations without nuclear technology refrain from developing nuclear weapons and that a universal ban precludes any nation from maintaining chemical or biological weapons. The current tensions with

Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programmes are in part due to the continuation of this policy of deterrence.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Explain the reasons why the United States policy of deterrence has undergone significant variations.

## 3.4    The Changing Context of Deterrence

The familiar central doctrine of deterrence holds that nuclear weapons are maintained to prevent their use and, by extension, any large-scale form of warfare by threatening retaliation destructive enough to override any rational motive of aggression. The concept has been widely accepted as a summary statement of the most fundamental national security objectives and indeed as the central pillar of foreign policy.

In the United States, it is perhaps the most solidly established element of political consensus – the least disputed function that a national government should perform. Moreover, within the military establishments that deploy nuclear weapons, the conceptual elaboration of deterrence provides the main guidelines for practical decisions on the size and composition of forces and for the daily management of their operations.

The entrenched practice of deterrence has survived the declared ending of the Cold War essentially unaltered- a fact that is hardly surprising given the critical function that the concept has come to perform. However, the rhetoric or confrontation that originally accompanied this doctrine has been replaced with more polite forms of political discourse, and overall nuclear weapons deployment are being reduced to less than one-quarter of their peak levels. Nevertheless, the main forces still continuously preserve the ability to initiate deterrent retaliation within 30 minutes, being the nominal intercontinental flight time of ballistic missile. Moreover, even with their scheduled reductions fully accomplished, the residual capabilities of the United State and Russia will be virtually lethal to each other as they were at the height of mutual antagonism.

Deterrence theory therefore largely worked during the Cold War period as neither nuclear war nor major Soviet / US aggression took place. This may in part be based on what Schelling (1960:16) concluded that the "theory is based on the assumption that the participants coolly and 'rationally' calculate their advantages according to a consistent value system".

However, post September 11th conception or the 'war on terror' has changed the demands on deterrence, and its applicability, more radically in several ways: the notion that terrorists 'coolly' and 'rationally', calculate their advantages according to a consistent value system is an implausible one, additionally, Cold War nuclear deterrence was a two-player game (US-USSR). The French nuclear force de frappe, which president Charles de Gaulle insisted was necessary for strategic independence, and the Chinese nuclear force complicated matters but not very much.

You may however see by way of contrast that, extremist Muslim terrorism is diffused, with no central decision making locus like Moscow in the Cold War. Rhetoric frequently characterises Islamic terrorism as "al-Qaeda", or even personalises it down to Osama bin Laden and / or his supposed associate in Iraq, Abu Musad al-Zarkawi, but infact al-Qaeda is at most a loose network, not a command structure in which the central decision influenced by deterrence can be transmitted down to the branches. Capturing or killing bin Laden or al-Zarkawi would be a set back but far from a death knell for the organisation. Moreover, while al-Queda is probably the largest terrorist network, it is far from the only one. Deterrence of terrorists must therefore cope with the multitude of independent or autonomous centres. This is certainly the context of deterrence in the post-Cold War era.

Persuasion as a concept has therefore emerged as a new, post-Cold War interpretation of deterrence in a globalised world. Persuasion supersedes bilateralism or even the multilateralism of traditional deterrence in all azimuths (Covarrubias, 2004). Maisonneuve (1977:227) defines persuasion in *The Coming Violence? Essay on Modern Warfare,* thus:

> "persuasion is simultaneously the expression of a universal potentiality without the designation of an adversary, and a posture of neutrality that guarantees the absence of war between powers of the same level… Potentiality and neutrality that will lead nevertheless, to intervening in one way or another to prevent a disturbance provoked by third parties".

For Maisonneuve, the deterrence of persuasion is the foundation for a future strategy (and perhaps the context of deterrence in post-Cold War era) and the first argument for a renewal of collective security. The protection of security replaces the protection of force. Maisonneuve has therefore proclaimed a strategy of prevention.

## 3.5    Criticisms against Deterrence Theory

Deterrence theory has received a dosage of criticism. The theory has been criticised for its assumptions about opponent rationales. First, it is argued that either forms of deterrence may not deter suicidal or psychopathic opponents. The risk of irrational response, or the evolution of circumstance which even rational leadership cannot control, can never be ruled out.

Second, diplomatic misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and misinterpretation and/or opposing political ideologies may lead to exalting mutual perceptions of threat and a subsequent arms race, which elevates the risk of actual war. An arms race is inefficient in its optimal output as all countries involved expend resources on armaments and create a military industrial complex. This leads to misallocation and wastage of resources on armaments, which would not have been expended if others had not expended resources.

Third, the threat of nuclear terrorism by sub-national groups, with or without acknowledged encouragement by the leadership of the "rogue" nation, is another matter. A clear response against such threats may not be feasible – the home base of the potential attacker may not be known. The threat of nuclear weapons in the hands of suicidal fanatics, such as the Japanese cultists who released poisonous nerve gas in the Tokyo Subway, can clearly not be countered by deterrence in any form. Only worldwide vigilance and an unrelenting effort to prevent the possession of nuclear weapons by such groups can limit this risk.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

You now know the meaning of deterrence and the evolution of the concept. Even though the concept is difficult to define, the definition provided has given you the conceptual tool to understand why the concept has persisted in international studies. You have also been exposed to the tenets of the theory and its weaknesses. The evolution of the concept of deterrence has also been shown to be influenced by the United States policy and practice of national security. However, the post-Cold War deterrence with a focus on fighting terrorism necessarily demands a reconsideration of the theory of deterrence.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned that deterrence, though a concept frequently taken for granted, is very difficult to define. You have also been given the basic tenets of deterrence theory, which have persisted with the evolution of the concept. The unit has also considered the

changing context of deterrence, for you to know how the challenges of modern security threat in the international system, especially the fight against terrorism have impacted on policies and practices of deterrence. The unit concludes with an exploration of the major criticisms against deterrence theory.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Deterrence as practised during the Cold War has changed significantly. State the reasons for such changes.

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## UNIT 2        STRATEGIC PLANNING

**CONTENTS**

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

In unit 1 of this module, you were introduced to the concept of deterrence to facilitate your understanding of this course. You saw deterrence as the art of producing in the mind of the enemy, the fear to attack. You also learned that there have been significant changes to its practice since the declared end of the cold war, especially the emerging challenges of terrorism.

In this unit, you will focus on yet another concept in strategic studies that is the concept of strategic planning. You will discover that countries do not conduct war or deterrence, haphazardly or adopt uncoordinated responses. When countries do not strategically plan, they are unable to project their national interest. You will thus see the imperatives of strategic planning both for the individual, firms and for the state.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the concept of strategic planning
- explain the strategic planning process
- identify the benefits of strategic planning
- delineate the imperative of strategic leadership and war strategic plan.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    What is Strategic Planning?

There is a popular assertion that 'failure to plan is planning to fail'. If a General fails to plan for a war, the result would be defeat; and conversely is the case. According to Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, strategic planning is an organisation's process of defining its strategy or direction, and making decisions on allocating its resources to pursue this strategy, including its capital and people.

Strategic planning has also been defined as "a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions that shape and guide what an organisation (or other entity) is, what it does, and why it does it. Strategic planning requires broad-scale information gathering, an exploration of alternatives, and an emphasis on the future implications of present decisions. It can facilitate conversation and participation, accommodate divergent interests and values, and foster orderly decision-making and successful implementation.

Strategic planning is more than long-term planning. Compared to long-term planning where goals are made for a specific period of time, strategic planning:

a) is based on anticipated changes in the environment / international system
b) involves getting input from state and non-state actors and many levels of the international system – local, state, regional, international
c) provides the opportunity to incorporate new ideas and approaches.

The idea of strategic planning is to 'plan today for an uncertain tomorrow'. It can help organisations address problems, conflict, challenges etc. that they know will arise in the future, and problems that they cannot predict. It also helps countries to maximize their national interest in the international system.

A written strategic plan is a result of a planning process. It is usually a short document that summarises what states and non-states actors do, why they do it, what they are trying to accomplish, and how it will meet its goals and values.

## 3.2    The Strategic Planning Processes

Planning typically include several major activities or steps in the process. Whether the strategic planning is undertaken by a firm, state or country, a step-wise process ensures that specified objectives, goals, values etc. are achieved.

It has been argued that strategic planning saves time. Every minute spent in planning saves ten minutes in execution. The purpose of strategic planning therefore is to enable firms, states or countries to increase their return on material and human resources invested in achieving preconceived goals.

In today's highly competitive business environment and conflicting national interests at the international system, budget-oriented planning or forecast-based planning methods are insufficient for a large corporation to survive and prosper, or for a country to achieve its national interest. A country must engage in strategic planning that clearly defines objectives and assesses both the internal and external situation to formulate strategy, implement the strategy, evaluate the progress, and make adjustments when necessary to stay on track. The following diagram shows a simplified view of strategic planning process:

```
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│    Mission and Objectives   │
└─────────────────────────────┘
               │
               ▼
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│    Environmental Scanning    │
└─────────────────────────────┘
               │
               ▼
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│     Strategy Formulation     │
└─────────────────────────────┘
               │
               ▼
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│    Strategy Implementation   │
└─────────────────────────────┘
               │
               ▼
┌─────────────────────────────┐
│     Evaluation and Control   │
└─────────────────────────────┘
```

## 3.2.1  Mission and Objectives

The mission statement describes an organisational interest and vision, including the unchanging values and forward-looking visionary goals that guide the pursuit of future opportunities.

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**Vision:**      Defines where the country wants to be in the future. It reflects the optimistic view of a country's future. It defines the projection of a country's national interest.

**Mission:**    Defines where the country is going now, describing the purpose, why this entity exists.

**Values:**     Main values protected by a country during the progression, reflecting a country's culture and priorities.

Strategic planning requires a summary of goals and objectives into a mission statement and/or a vision statement. A mission statement tells you what an entity is now. It concentrates on present; define a country's national interest, critical processes and it informs you about a desired level of performance. A vision statement on the other hand, outlines what an entity wants to be. It concentrates on future; it is a source of inspiration; it provides clear decision-making criteria.

You should not mistake vision statement for mission statement. The vision describes a future identity and the mission describes why it will be achieved. A mission statement describes the purpose or broader goal for being in existence. It serves as an ongoing guide without time frame. The mission can remain the same for decades if crafted well. Vision is more specific in terms of objective and future state. Vision is related to some form of achievement if successful.

 Features of an effective vision statement may include:

i.Clarity and lack of ambiguity
ii.Paints a vivid and clear picture, not ambiguous
iii.Describing a brighter hope
iv.Memorable and engaging expression
v.Realistic aspiration, achievable
vi.Alignment with a country's values and culture, rational
vii.Time bound if it talks of achieving any goal or objectives.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

Differentiate between mission statements and vision statements.

### 3.2.2  Environmental Scan

The environmental scan includes the following components:

a)  Internal analysis of entity
b)  Task environment
c)  External macro-environment.

This activity can include conducting some sort of scan, or review, of an entity's environment (for example, local, national and international environment). Planners carefully consider various driving forces in the environment, for example, the proliferation of armaments, terrorism, changing demographics etc. Planners also look at the various strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (an acronym for this activity is SWOT – Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) regarding an entity.

The internal analysis can identify an entity's strengths and weaknesses and the external analysis reveals opportunities and threats. A profile of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats is generated by means of a SWOT analysis.

### 3.2.3  Strategy Formulation

Given the information from the environmental scan, an entity should match its strengths and the opportunities that it has identified, while addressing its weaknesses and external threats. This stage refers to the process we call data synthesis and SWOT analysis.

One goal of strategic planning is to fully consider the widest possible range of alternatives over a long-term frame and not just choose the "quick fix". This involves thinking about options that can be implemented with the system's current structures, and options that may require reorganising or fundamentally changing the system's structures.

To achieve the foreign policy objectives of a country, a country must develop a competitive advantage over other countries. A competitive advantage can be based on the identification of a country's strengths and opportunities, and the capacity to deal with its weaknesses and threats.

### 3.2.4  Strategy Implementation

Strategic planning takes time and effort. It is important to realise however, that implementing the options you have selected will involve additional ongoing commitments. You will need to gather additional technical, managerial, military, and financial resources, which may require additional planning. You also need to make sure that everyone involved in implementing the options, and everyone that may be affected by it, is committed to its success.

The selected strategy is implemented by means of programmes, budgets and procedures. Implementation involves organising an entity's resources and motivation of the staff to achieve desired objectives. It also involves identifying challenges that could arise during and after

implementation, and developing an action to address these challenges. The way in which the strategy is implemented can have a significant impact on whether it will be successful. In large entities, those who implement the strategy are likely to be different from those who formulated it. For this reason, care must be taken to communicate the strategy and the reasoning behind it. Otherwise, the implementation might not succeed if the strategy is misunderstood or if lower-level policy implementers resist its implementation because they do not understand why the particular policy was selected.

### 3.2.5  Evaluation and Control

Strategic planning helps you face an unpredictable future successfully. This does not mean that current plan will address every circumstance or provide a solution for every challenge. There may be elements that would not work, or problems that arise that need additional analysis and action. Alternatively, you may want to make changes if the results are not serving your systems.

Ongoing monitoring and evaluation will help you assess whether your system is operating the way you want it to. The implementation of the strategy must be monitored and adjustments made as needed.

Evaluation and control consists of the following steps:

i.Define parameters to be measured
ii.Define target values for those parameters
iii.Perform measurements
iv.Compare measured results to the pre-defined standard
v.Make necessary changes.

Remember, strategic planning is a continuous process that can result in continuous improvements. The planning process and the values and goals that define your system should allow you to respond more effectively, quickly, and creatively in the future.

PLAN

EVALUATE

REVISE

### 3.3    Benefits of Strategic Planning

While long-range planning typically involves developing a goal and series of milestones that will be met over a certain period, it does not prepare systems to successfully respond to unknown or changing conditions, nor does it involve improving operations and management. Strategic planning on the other hand, will not only guide improvements, but also will focus on the use of limited resources on previously defined priorities, improve decision-making and enhance responsiveness and performance of a system. Strategic planning not only provides a road map for accomplishing tasks, but also prepares systems to effectively respond to unexpected events, while accomplishing the overall goals and objectives of the system.

By carrying out strategic planning, an entity will be able to:

i.Influence rather than be influenced
ii.Clearly redefine its role and target group
iii.Deal positively with the inevitable …. Change
iv.Address critical issues facing it
v.Find innovative ways to achieve goals
vi.Decrease crises management
vii.Give continuity during changing times or when there is new leadership
viii.Use resources efficiently and effectively
ix.Anticipate issues and develop policies to meet future needs
x.Gain commitment and bring your group to work together on common goals.

### 3.4    Strategic Leadership and War Strategic Planning

Count Alfred Von Schlieffen, the famous German military leader of the period just before World War I, once said: "a man is born, and not made, a strategist". Nevertheless, it is obvious that even a born strategist, if there were such a natural genius, has much to learn. Such a man needs to strategically plan.

In the past, strategic leadership was "relatively", a simple affair. J. F. C. Fuller, the British student of warfare pointed out in ***The Foundations of the Science of War,*** that until relatively recent times, the death, capture, or wounding of either of two opposing generals normally decided a conflict, "for the general was the plan" (Fuller, 1926). He could personally devise the plans and direct his troops.

By the mid–20th century, this was rarely possible. As warfare has become complicated, strategic leadership has become more difficult. The art of strategic leadership has taken on more facets, and systematic training is required to master them. The strategist has retired from the scene of the battle, and large, specialised staff have grown up to help him. Although the responsibility for strategy remains the general's, many of his functions have been delegated to his planning staff. In modern states, corporate strategic planning has become the rule in the management of military strategy, as in the direction of large business enterprises.

Consider the example of an Alexander the Great completing his advance planning and leaping into battle at the head of his troops. This in modern warfare would be unusual. Napoleon was wont to make his plans and then retire with his retinue of trusted advisers to survey the battlefield on the horse back from the top of a hill. Generals in World War I were often pictured in their offices in large headquarters usually on a Chateau behind the lines, studying a map on the desk and dispatching orders via the telephone and motorcar at hand.

In World War II, the headquarters staff of commanders in the theatres of war grew even larger and more elaborate. Tri-dimensional warfare land, sea, and air had enlarged the field of operations far beyond individual battlefields, and most times, a high commander reached his decisions in a headquarters far removed from the field of battle and months before the battle itself took place.

Far from striking the classic pose of the officer on a well-schooled charger, some of the greatest generals issued their orders at conference tables. As strategic planning became a highly organised affair, planning committees and conferences in the capital cities of warring powers made the blueprints for victory in the global, coalition struggle. In their capital command posts, military leaders kept in touch with manifold places of the national governments war effort and dealt with the worldwide problems of transcending those of the individual theatres of war. With the aid of new devices for rapid communications, these leaders and their staff sought to set the patterns of strategy and keep abreast of the movement of armies as the Caesars and Napoleons had done in earlier eras.

As war has become more total, war planning became a significant peacetime function of governments. The manufacture of strategic plans has become a highly specialized industry in modern military establishments. At the same time, more and more governmental agencies have been drawn into a business of planning for national security. The plans they produce may vary from a simple design to shift

a small taskforce to a danger spot to an elaborate plan for the conduct of war in its entirety. However, for strategic planning to be effective and efficient, strategic plans and estimates must constantly be re-examined and brought into harmony. It is important to remember that the art of strategy has changed from age to age, just as war itself, and each is the product of its own society and time.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we can say that there has been an increasing need for entities to engage in strategic planning. Hitherto, there was emphasis on long-range planning which as you have learnt fails to respond to unknown and changing environment, and cannot help improve operations and management. Strategic planning helps us to discard the conventional thinking approach to planning which believes that "If it ain't broke, don't fix it". It therefore allows the system to adapt to changing circumstances.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have been introduced to the concept of strategic planning. You have learnt that strategic planning is a stepwise process that involves planning, evaluation and revision, in order to ensure continuous improvement of the system. The simplified view of strategic planning has also been presented; so also has the benefits accruable for an organisation engaged in strategic planning. You also learnt that the challenges of national security, especially modern warfare demands that countries must strategically plan if they want to be ahead of their adversaries.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1.    Failure to plan is planning to fail. How relevant is this statement in the light of contemporary security challenges facing Nigeria.
2.    Strategic planning is a stepwise process involving planning – evaluation – revises. Discuss.

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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## UNIT 3        FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

**CONTENTS**

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

The concept of foreign policy should be a familiar one to you, since you have studied it in the course, ***Introduction to Foreign Policy.*** What you would be introduced to in this unit are the ways foreign policy is made in different interpersonal, organizational, national and international contents within each of these 'contexts'. This unit focuses explicitly on the foreign policy making process. The main thrust of the unit therefore is to introduce you to a range of theories that seek to explain how decision makers formulate and implement their policy goals. The challenges of foreign policy making for developing countries are also included to enable you appreciate the structural constraints on policymaking.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

* explain what is meant by foreign policy analysis
* trace the emergence of foreign policy analysis as a field of inquiry
* identify theories of foreign policy
* critique theories of foreign policy
* describe the structural constraints of developing countries in foreign policy decision making.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    Foreign Policy Defined

Conventional thinking holds that foreign policies aim at enhancing a state's ability to achieve a specific goal or a set of objectives (Holsti, 1990:3). Thus, according to Hermann (1990:3), foreign policy is "a programme (plan) designed to address some problems or pursue some goals that entail action towards foreign entities". It represents a set of goals that seeks to outline how a particular country will interact with other countries of the world and, to a lesser extent, non-state actors. Foreign policies as you would have already learnt are designed to help protect a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals and economic prosperity.

Foreign policy analysis as a field of systematic and scholarly inquiry involves the study of how a state makes foreign policy. Because foreign policy analysis involves the study of both international and domestic politics, the academic discipline is located at the intersection of international relations theory and public policy.

## 3.2    The Development of the Field of Foreign Policy Analysis

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as a field of inquiry dates from the 1950s. Its emergence was principally influenced by the Realists paradigm's singular emphasis on power to explain international relations and the development of new tools in decision theory and cognitive psychology. From the onset, FPA has preoccupied itself with how foreign policy decisions are made. Foreign policy and the decision making process that produces it have been defined as "the goals that officials representing states seek abroad, the values that underlie those goals, and the instruments used to pursue them (Kegley & Wittkoff, 1997:40). One reason why an examination of foreign policy decision-making is of interest to scholars and policy analysts is that it provides insight into the intentions and strategies of governments and how definitions of the situation are translated into action. This reflects its emphasis on the role of human beings, acting individually and collectively as a major influence on behaviour and change in international policies.

Neack, Hey and Haney (1995:2-3) have distinguished between first and second generation scholarship on foreign policy analysis. In the first generation between the 1950s – 1970s research effort focused on explaining state behaviour by reference to "scientific" data intensive models of theory building and cooperative analysis of 'events'. Work in this period has been labeled comparative foreign policy. The disappointing results of first generation work, especially the failure to

develop an overall theory of foreign policy and uniform methodology, resulted in disillusionment with this approach in the late 1970s. Subsequently, beginning from the early 1980s, second generation foreign policy scholarship has embraced eclecticism through contextualised, multi-sourced and multi-levelled studies. Labelled as foreign policy analysis, this next generation work concentrates more on the context behind a state's foreign policy behaviour, informed by empirical analysis based on a range of qualitative and quantitative methods.

Foreign policy analysis has therefore come on the stage to challenge the basic assumption of the Realist paradigm. First, it opens the 'black box' of the state, focusing attention of the role of, and relationship among, the different domestic actors shaping foreign policy. Second, it contests the notion of the state as a rational actor. Third, it challenges the view that the "national interest is a homogenous concept'.

The roots of FPA are traced to the United States, where it has been used extensively to examine actors and processes involved in that country's foreign and defence policy decision making. Outside this context the approach has been applied to examine foreign behaviour of democracies, authoritarian regime developing countries and economies in transaction. In addition, FPA has been used to structure examination of specific events (such as the Cuban missile crises) and policy decisions (such as the United States decision to invade Iraq).

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

The emergence of foreign policy as a field of inquiry is related to the failure of the Realist paradigm. Discuss.

## 3.3    Analysing Foreign Policy Decision Making

A number of theories, events approaches have been adapted to the analysis of the policy making process. A preliminary point of observation is that none of these theories was developed for the study of foreign policy, "yet each offers a separate way of thinking about policy and even suggests some of the general causes and consequences of foreign policy".

A more significant point, however, is the intended role of theory in policy analysis. First, theories of the policy process are intended as descriptive models for understanding the causes and consequences of a country's action. Second, these theories are also intendedly prescriptive, that is why they are normative specifications of what and how policies ought to be. Third and last, there is need to distinguish between theories

of policy-making and theories of decision. This distinction is necessary in view of the conceptual confusion that comes from the overlapping usage of the words 'policy' and 'decision'. Decision making is a component of policy making while decision making involves the choice of an alternative from a series of competing alternatives, policy making typically involves a pattern of action, extending over time and involving many decisions, some routine, some not so routine. Theories of decision making are concerned with how choices among competing alternatives are made while theories of policy making help to clarify and simplify our thinking and suggest possible explanation for foreign policy.

In what follows, you will be introduced to a skeletal examination of the dominant theoretical approaches to foreign policy analysis. First, the decision-making framework developed in 1954 by Richard Snyder, H. B. Bruck and Burton Sapin. Second, James Rosenau's pre-theory of foreign policy and finally, Graham Allison's models developed to explain the Cuban missile crisis.

### 3.3.1 Synder, Bruck and Sapin's Decision Making Framework

This model considers decision-makers as participants in a system of action. Accordingly, "the key to explaining why the state behaves the way it does lies in the way its decision makers as actors define their situation".

Synder, Bruck and Sapin (1962:86) define situation as:

> An analytical concept pointing to a pattern of relationships among events, objects, conditions, and other actors organised around a focus, which is the centre of interest for the decision-makers… In turn, the situation is related to a larger setting from which it has been abstracted by the actors, including other situations and the broader relationships surrounding them too.

In their view, the foreign policy decision-making process could be conceptualised in terms of linkages among the action, reaction and interactions of variables categorised under headings of internal and external setting and societal structure and behaviour. Their approach views decision-making in an organizational context, focusing on the objectives of the decisional unit and its members. The emphasis on the decisional unit reflects their view that answering the question "who becomes involved in a decision, how, and why is essential to an explanation of why the decision-makers decided the way they did". In order to analyse the actions of decision makers, the behaviour of the state should be considered against three factors:

**Sphere of competence:** i.e. actors' role or patterns of action that contribute to the attainment of organisation's goals.

**Communication and information:** both inform and provide feedback on decision-making.

**Motivation:** provides insight into why states behaviour as they do.

While the Synder, Bruck and Sapin model provides a framework for analysing the foreign policy of a country, it does not specify how the variables relate to each other and their relative importance. Therein lies the weakness of this theoretical framework.

### 3.3.2  Rosenau's pre-Theory of Foreign Policy

The next major influence on theorising about foreign policy decision making was a 1966 article by James Rosenau in which he articulated a pre-theory of foreign policy. By pre-theory, Rosenau meant "the need to develop an explicit conception of where causation is located in international affairs" and as "both an early step toward explanation of specific empirical events and a general orientation toward all events". An important stimulus was his observation that the largely historical and single-country case study orientation then prevalent in foreign policy research, reflected the absence of both cross-national testable generalisations and a general theory of foreign policy. In this context, Rosenau urged the development of "if – then" propositions with which to conduct meaningful comparisons of the behaviour of countries.

Two pillars buttress Rosenau's pre-theory. First, a set of key variables to explain the external behaviour of societies which he labelled **idiosyncratic**, **role**, **governmental**, **societal** and **systemic**. The idiosyncratic variable refers to aspects unique to the foreign policy decision maker such as their values, skills and prior experiences that distinguish their foreign policy choices or behaviour from counterparts. The second variable concerns the external behaviour of officials associated with their role, while those aspects of a government's structure that constrain or expand the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers fall within the third variable, governmental. Non-governmental aspects of a society that influence its external behaviour constitute the fourth variable, labelled societal. They include factors such as societal values, degree of national unity and cohesion and the extent of industrialization. Finally, systemic variable encompasses any non-human aspects of a society's external environment or any actions occurring abroad that influence the decisions

and actions of foreign policy officials. Geopolitical considerations and ideological challenges from potential aggressors are two examples cited by Rosenau (1966:43).

The second pillar is ranking the different variables in terms of their relative contribution to external behaviour. The objective is to provide a comparative estimate of the principal sources of behaviour rather than a precise accounting of the share of each variable. Integrating the two pillars produces a crude pre-theory of foreign policy. Specifically, the ranked five variables, are examined in terms of distinctions between large and small countries (reflecting a country's size), between developed and underdeveloped economies (indicating level of economic development), and between open and closed political system (reflecting political structure and accountability).

Rosenau's pre-theory has also been criticised. The pre-theory is data intensive and focuses on the extremes of each pole: large and small countries, developed and under-developed economies, open and closed political systems. Time series data are not always available for countries of interest, nor may it have been collected initially for the purposes, which the foreign policy analyst uses it. The pre-theory does not capture the spectrum of possible cases, for example, newly industrializing economies such as Taiwan, semi-democracies such as Malaysia and Middle-sized countries. More broadly by labeling it a "pre-theory", the implication was that a comprehensive theory would follow. By the 1980s it was clear this was not to be the case.

### 3.3.3  Allison's Model of Decision Making

In 1971, Graham Allison published a seminal book on **Essence of Decision**.  The book outlined three models to explain America's foreign policy decision making during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.  He termed them the rational actor (Model I), organizational behaviour (Model II) and governmental (bureaucratic) politics (Model III).

In the Rational Actor model, the basic unit of analysis is the actions chosen by the national government to maximize its strategic goals and objectives.  The nation or government is considered a rational, unitary decision maker with "one set of preferences", one set of perceived choices and a single estimate of the consequences that follow from each alternative.   As Allison and Zelikow (1999) note, two of the assumptions of classical realism, namely that unitary states are the main actors in international affairs, and that states act rationally in selecting the course of action that is value maximising informs the rational actor model.

The model assumes that a nation's actions are in response to strategic threats and opportunities in the international environment. In selecting a response, a process of rational choice is employed based on identifying objectives and goals, usually expressed in terms of national security and national interests; proposing options for the attainment of the objectives; evaluating the cost and benefit of each option against the defined objectives; and selecting the option that ranks highest in achieving desired outcomes.

The second model, Organizational Behaviour, considers the basic unit of analysis as governmental action. The focus is on the "outputs of large organisation's functioning according to standard pattern of behaviour". Alison and Zelikow (1999) identified seven characteristics of this model. First, the actor is not a monolithic nation or government but rather a collective or bureaucratic organisation, atop of which sit government leaders. They may also be sub-units within large organisations with their own set of procedures and rules. Second, parts of a foreign policy issue may be distributed among different bureaucratic organisations in accordance with their respective specialization, while specialist attention is devoted to particular aspects of an issue; the trade-off is that there is little control over "what an organisation attends to, and how organizational responses are programmed".

The fourth is the set of beliefs about how a mission should be carried out and the requirement necessary to do so. Action as organizational output is the fifth characteristics, based on the view that organizational activity is reflective or pre-set routines. The sixth characteristic is central coordination and control. The last characteristic is related to the political arena, where leaders may change governmental behaviour by deciding "what organisations will play out which programmes where".

The organizational model emphasises the coherence of organisations. It sees an organisation as a place where all the constituent parts work towards a common objective. Consequently, in spite of competition between the units and the existence of hierarchy, an ultimate authority moderates the competition and enforces relative conformity to the goals or objectives of the organisation.

Governmental (bureaucratic) politics is the final model. Here, an organisation's leaders are themselves players in a competitive game. The model also assumes that decisions/policies are made in an organizational context. However, whereas the organizational model emphasises the element of coalition and coherence in the creation and choice of policy options, the bureaucratic politics model emphasise the role of competition. It assumes that organisations are by virtue of their

segmentation and functional differentiations, places where people hold diverse opinions, have competing perceptions as well as incompatible strategies and objectives. Decision making in such a context is, therefore, not the process of agreeing to a common objective but the process of competing for primacy in the choice of policy objectives.

In other words, decision makers in an organisation are hardly a monolithic group, rather, a desperate group of game players, each concerned with achieving specific objectives, or as aptly captured by Otubanjo (2001) "rival combatants". The players in such games focus not just on a single strategic objective but on many diverse international problems. As they have their own various conceptions of rational, organizational goals, the tendency is that government decisions and actions emerge as a synthesis of individual preferences and objectives. In other words, decisions are put together as in a college, the various interest/perceptions and objectives of the game players. Thus, the organizational content, rather than making policy necessarily rational has a tendency of imposing irrationality on policy decisions.

Allison's models have been widely criticized although they continue to structure analysis of foreign, defence and other public policy decision-making processes. Kegley and Wittklof (1997) have argued that the "rational actor model is deficient in recognizing an impending problem because of neglect about or denial of its existence until direct evidence or a crisis precipitate a response". In addition, it implies that decisions are based on no, partial or obsolete information or, conversely, too much information or contradictory information. Other weaknesses include trade-offs in prioritizing different national interests; time constraints that restrict the identification and analyses of alternative courses of action; and psychological restraints related to the decision maker's personality or emotional needs or passions that may blur the distinction between advancing personal goals and the national good. The organizational behaviour model has been criticized for its ability to promote "organizational capture", a process in which an agency's support of or opposition to an issue or policy is associated with perceptions of whether its influence will be enhanced or reduced. It can also not be assumed that an organisation's mission and capabilities are coherently defined.

The governmental (bureaucratic) politics model has been criticised for ignoring hierarchy in decision-making and for being imprecise. Its assumption that policy making necessarily proceeds by a process of bargaining has also been criticised.

## 3.4    The Decision's Unit Approach

A deficiency and common thread that runs through all the approaches reviewed so far is their inability to differentiate core actors in the foreign policy decision making process from peripheral ones. The decision unit's approach places emphasis on those actors 'at the apex of foreign policy decision making in all governments or ruling parties'. This narrows the field of inquiry to those in all governments who exercise ultimate decision-making power and authority on a specific foreign policy issue.

Decision unit's approach enables a cross-national analysis of foreign policy, is applicable to different types of political regimes and by implication dissimilar foreign policy decision making process; provides a means for focusing on the key actors within a government involved in foreign policy making, and facilitates the comparison and contrast between different types of decision units. These strengths make the approach a more accessible unit of analysis in the study of comparative foreign policy.

There are three types of decision unit: the predominant leader, the single and multiple autonomous actors. What follows is a description of each.

### 3.4.1  Predominant Leader

There are basically two different conceptions about the role of individuals in international relations. The first conception believes that individuals do not matter, or are largely inconsequential in politics because of the greater importance of the international system, domestic politics and institutional interactions. Adherents to this view suggest it is too difficult to generalize from the actions of individuals, so that analysis of this unit yields little theoretical value. Accordingly, the analyst does not need to know anything about the leaders of a state; they will behave the same no matter who they are.

A diametrically opposed view believes that leaders do matter in foreign affairs. Not only do their personalities differ, making an assumption of homogeneity in behaviour problematic, but also their motivations and interest in international affairs varies. In addition, leaders serve as bridge between officials and the public.

A decision unit based on a predominant leader is a single individual who exercises:

> The authority to commit the resources of a nation in response to a particular problem and others cannot reverse his or her decision… In effect, the leader has the power to make the

choice concerning how the government is going to respond to the problem (Hermann, 1993:79).

Personal characteristics of the predominant leader assume high importance because they shape his instincts about an issue and his 'style' in evaluating advisors, inputs, reacting to information from the external environment and assessing the political risks of different actions. The extent to which a predominant leader's personality is important in a nation's foreign policy behaviour relates to their sensitivity to information from the political environment.

### 3.4.2 Single Group

Even when one person has the authority to commit a government's resources to a foreign policy issue, he or she may nonetheless seek to involve others in the decision-making process. The reason for doing so relates to three factors:

(i)     Help strengthen a decision's legitimacy
(ii)    Help lower the psychological strain of decision making
(iii)   Empirical evidence suggests that foreign policy decision-making is frequently a group activity.

In a decision unit based on a single group, "all the individuals necessary for allocation decisions participate in the group and the group makes decisions through an interactive process among its members. The promptness with which the group can reach consensus on a foreign policy problem is the cornerstone to understanding a government's behaviour under this type of decision unit. Factors that facilitate consensus include information derived from a single source, its sharing among the group and its common interpretation by members. In addition, the group's membership should be small, the overriding loyalty of members should be to the group and there should be a strong but not predominant leader.

Groupthink or cohesive groups in decision-making however may suffer from the following:

(i)     limited search by the group of alternative courses;
(ii)    failure to re-examine the costs and benefits of courses of action previously rejected;
(iii)   making little effort to elicit expert advice about the alternatives identified;
(iv)    selective bias in reacting to information;
(v)     lack of contingency plan.

### 3.4.3 Multiple Autonomous Actors

Under this decision unit type, individuals, groups or coalitions can act for the government only if some or all of the actors agree. Each individually lacks the authority to decide and to ensure compliance by the others. An actor can neutralize the actions of another by invoking a formal veto power, by threatening to withdraw from a coalition, by withholding resources necessary for action or denying approval for their use or by launching response measures that can damage the other actors or their objectives. In order for multiple autonomous actors to be labelled the decision unit, no other group or individual can independently resolve disputes among the members or reverse a decision reached collectively. Examples of this decision unit exist in parliamentary, presidential and authoritarian regimes.

Foreign policy behaviour is the outcome of agreement among the actors. In addition, these actors are also open to external influences in shaping their action.

## 3.5    Foreign Policy process in Developing Countries

Most of the foreign policy decision-making approaches are largely derived from the experience of western policy process. This often leads to the assumption of a given number of stable and predictable variables. These include the existence of a stable democratic political system, of stable policy-making procedure and the existence of a tradition of adherence to norms. While this reflects the reality in developed democracies, it hardly conforms to the experience of less developed countries.

First, less developed countries have a problem with their political system. Most of these countries are either unstable or undemocratic. This has major consequences for policy tradition. In the first instance, the instability of government undermines the growth of institutions and the opportunities for developing resilience. Also, the undemocratic nature of government in less developed countries opens decision making to the unpredictable elements deriving from the interest, character and goals of the different regimes which in some cases succeed themselves rapidly; thereby undermining the ability of the system to develop a tradition of predictable procedure.

Second, less developed countries have a problem with the nature and character of their societies. Most of these countries have a high level of illiteracy. When this is translated into the ability to understand policy issues and participation in the policy-making process, it is obvious that most of the populations in such countries are excluded from decision

process. The ability to create viable pressure groups and to mobilize substantial opinion to influence policymaking is greatly scuttled.

Third, incoherent nature of these societies: Most of these less developed countries have multiethnic states with high degree of primordial attachments and loyalties. This makes them to be preoccupied with problems of domestic nature, particularly of national integration at the expense of foreign policy issues, except in situations where foreign policy issues have consequences for domestic conflict or issues.

## 4.0   CONCLUSION

The conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion is that the failure of Realist theories with its state-centric assumptions and its failure to develop an overall theory of foreign policy and uniform methodology led to the emergence of foreign policy analysis as a systematic field of inquiry. However, most of these theoretical approaches are western-laden and fail to capture the reality of foreign policy decision making in less developed countries. In less developed countries, with myriads of problems, it is possible to question the relevance or veracity of these approaches.

## 5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned about the development of the field of foreign policy analysis. You have been told that the failure of the comparative foreign policy approach in the first generation (1950-1970) to develop a holistic theory of foreign policy and to develop a uniform methodology became its Achilles heel. In its place, second generation foreign policy approaches emphasising eclecticism – foreign policy analysis emerged. You have also learnt the theoretical approaches in foreign policy decision making. You know by now the foreign policy process in less developed countries. How relevant these theories can help in understanding foreign policy decision making in less developed countries is largely yours to decide.

## 6.0   TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

How do you think theories of foreign policy decision making are relevant in understanding the nature and character of foreign policy decision in less developed countries? Do not write more than 10 typewritten pages.

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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**UNIT 4      DEFENCE POLICY**

**CONTENTS**

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**1.0    INTRODUCTION**

Defence can be defined as the protection of the security of a nation's interests, goals and values against threat. Time immemorial, states have identified defence as an important component of their foreign policy. The industrial revolution brought tremendous changes resulting in the improvement in science and technology, the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the impact of terrorism has spurred countries to develop elaborate and watertight defence policies. Likewise, recent developments in the international scene have called to question the basis of articulating national interests, threats perception to those interests, and the amount of resources committed for their security. There is the collapse of the Soviet Union, the existence of which had divided the world into two mutually antagonistic ideological groups. The existence of ideological rivalry had increased both the threats to the national interests of many countries. Recently, this has been compounded by the omnipresence nature of terrorism.

Generally, countries in the world base their defence policy on what they perceive to be their national interest. For example, in 1823, the President of the United States of America publicly declared in the famous Monroe Doctrine that the US 'will tolerate no European intervention in the Western Hemisphere" (Irish and Frank, 1975:319), and this declaration has become fundamental and has formed the crucial yardstick for measuring American behaviour in the world system. And her defence policy and military forces have been used a number of times trying to effect that basic stance.

In this unit, the relationship between defence policy and foreign policy is examined with a view to demonstrating core values, and primary interests that a country's defence policy takes its roots. The issue of threat to a country's security would also be elaborated upon. The need for a reliable security organisation and internal security system in the formulation and sustenance of an acceptable defence policy is also considered. The unit will also focus on armed forces as instruments of defence; and the public support for defence.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- define defence policy
- establish the linkage between foreign policy and defence policy
- explain the role of intelligence in defence policy
- analyse the role of armed forces in defence policy
- identify the imperative of public support for defence policy.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    Defence Policy Defined

According to Akinyeye (1991), defence policy is a dialogue between what a nation perceives as its interests, goals and values to be at one time or another, the threat to these interests as well as the resources available to counter the threat in the face of competing demands.

Okolo (1987) earlier defined defence policy as that aspect of the foreign policy which deals with the nation's security. Because, it deals with the survival of the nation, it is in fact, the most important aspect of foreign policy. Besides, all the other foreign policies adopted by states derive their strengths from the credibility of the defence policy.

The defence policy of any country sets out the principal strategies to be employed in exercising the right and responsibility to ensure the protection of the state and its people against external military threats. These strategies are: political, economic and military cooperation with other states. The prevention, management of resolution of conflict through non-violent means; the development of deterrence force as measure of last resort.

In essence, defence policy has two main tasks:

i.To plan and ensure the repulsion of actual or potential physical external aggression on the territory, and

ii.To serve as the backbone from which the other 'foreign policies' derive their strengths.

However, it is important for you to note at this moment that certain features inform a country's adoption of a defence policy:

a) the world system is made up of nation – states which must of necessity interact with one another; and

b) that the vital resources of the world system are either finite or scarce.

Thus, Okolo (1987:161) has argued that these basic features inject certain dimension of cooperation and antagonism in the relationship of world states.  On one hand, the cooperation and understanding are deemed necessary for harmonious existence and for the solution of the problems arising from the interacting and interdependent world.  On the other hand, conflict is the direct result of the struggle for the zero-sum nature of the world's resources. Defence policy is the branch of national policy, which not only anticipates antagonistic dimensions of inter-state relations, but rationalizes and prepares the national resources, especially the military components to pursue the national objectives.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Attempt a definition of defence policy.  Compare your definition to foreign policy.

## 3.2    The Intimacy of Foreign Policy and Defence Policy

Your previous knowledge about foreign policy would have made you to already sketch a mental picture about the relationship between foreign policy and defence policy.  What we try to do here is to identify the concepts that would enhance your understanding of the tenuous relationship between these two concepts.

Because of the nature of the international system especially it's state-centric system and the consequent interacting nature, states necessarily have relations with one another; and foreign policy is the attempt to deliberate on the content, nature and strategy for those relations.  States must interact over a wide range of areas and issues, such as economic, cultural, and military.  It is the duty of foreign policy to consider and delineate these areas and to set a policy as to how the nation will behave towards others in those respects.

A nation's foreign policy posture can be viewed as having three analytical phases of conception, content and implementation. According to Hartman (1973:69), conception involves the strategic appraisal of what goals are desirable and possible. Content is the result and reflection of that appraisal while implementation looks to both the coordinating mechanisms with a state and the means by which it conveys those views and wishes to other states.

The most important of these is the conception phase because this is where the parameters of foreign policy are set. At this stage, it is important that foreign policy decision makers do not overstretch their objectives, and do not aspire beyond available resources, for in the final analysis, it is the material resources of the country that guarantees its foreign policy. It is at this formation stage that the first contact with defence policy is set, and subsequently determines its future effectiveness.

Careful conception and formulation of foreign policy also enables a country to choose the appropriate, relevant and feasible policy content. However, since a country faces a multitude of desirable goals with a corresponding scare, definite and limited resources, there is need for it to identify which of these goals are actually vital and needed for the country's survival, as distinct from others that are useful but even when forfeited will not jeopardize the national security. The total list of desirable and useful interests maintained by a nation is called the national interest (the essential goals).

Moreover, these needed goals must be rank ordered according to their degree of importance and the national resources allocated according to their effects. Not all national interests, however, would be pursued with the same vigour. The military forces and the defence policy as the highest instruments of a nation's foreign policy should be primarily designed to cater for the highest valued national interest, which is the preservation of the physical integrity of the country. National independence and the preservation of politico-cultural identity are the irreducible fixed obligations which nations do not willingly compromise.

In summarising the review so far, you have learnt that:

(a)     the essence of foreign policy is to articulate the national interest of a nation;
(b)     organise them in a hierarchical order and apportion the available national resources accordingly for their realization; and

(c)     the role of the defence policy is primarily to ensure that the highest valued goal, that is, the preservation of the territorial integrity of the nation is maintained.

## 3.3    Intelligence and Defence Policy

Central to the formulation and conception of defence policy is intelligence.  This is because; security intelligence involves an element of advance formation or foreknowledge.  In the year 5 B.C, for example, a Chinese sage and strategist whom you have already been introduced to, Sun Tzu, wrote that foreknowledge was the reason that the enlightened prince and wise General conquered the enemy when they move.  In 1955, the significance of foreknowledge was re-echoed in the report of the American Presidential Task Force on intelligence work in the United States in which it was said, "Intelligence deals with all the things which should be known in advance of initiating a course of action".

Thus, in modern times, the object of intelligence, among others, is to 'provide the defence policy decision makers with as close to a truthful depiction of a given situation as is humanly possible.  In other words, to produce the least assailable version of a given situation and its probable consequences for the future course of events (Imobighe, 1987).

In addition, central to forging a link between intelligence and defence policy is the concept of threat.  The inherent desire of nations to wield power has always led to struggle for supremacy among them.  In the course of this struggle for power, stronger nations have always posed threats to weaker ones.

What then do we mean by "threat"? This concept has ordinarily been defined as a feeling, whether real or imaginary, by one being that another being has hostile intentions against him.  It may also be an action occasioning danger, harm or evil.  Threat can thus be perceived as well as manifested by action (Danmadimi, 1983:106) or both.  In the context of state interaction however, threat may be a situation in which one country undermines the security of another; jeopardizing its territorial integrity, political and economic order and above all, its sovereignty.  On the other hand, it may also be any action, such as a declaration of hostility verbally or by act of espionage by one country against another, for the purpose of subverting its people and forcing it to abandon or change its policies and practices along dictated lines, which serve the interests of the aggressor country.
Therefore, in formulating a defence policy, it is customarily necessary for countries to first identify a country's national interests or objectives

and obstacles to their achievement.    These obstacles in essence constitute threats, which may be externally or internally motivated.

**Internal Threats**

i.Political immaturity
ii.Insatiable lust for political power
iii.Corruption
iv.Ethnic / cultural heterogeneity and political intolerance
v.Educational imbalance / inequitable resource allocation
vi.Industrial unrest
vii.Politicization of census and rigging of election process.

**External Threats**

xi.Usually, external enemies exploit the internal contradiction
xii.Military
xiii.Economic
xiv.Cultural
xv.Political.

## 3.4    **Armed Forces as Instrument of Defence Policy**

Armed forces distinctively reflect an instrument a country employs in achieving its defence policy. In fact, armed forces are an important component of foreign policy. Modern armed forces possess special organs that must react with speed, accuracy and tremendous firepower whenever required. An ideal military organisation must be exceptionally strong and flexible.   It must be capable of reacting constantly and rapidly to changes in political, economic, social and technological circumstances of defence; especially the traumatic transition from peace to war.   Preparation for war must conceive situations, which can be predicted through careful and elaborate emphasis of vast experience. Equally, the armed forces must be motivated more by social responsibility and professional dedication than by material reward, this demands a cohesive tightly knit system.   It is such an armed force, well equipped, and trained that serves as an instrument of defence policy.

Usually, the role of the armed forces is theoretically defined to reflect the general strategic conditions under which they might operate.   A well-equipped armed force does not only have the power to deter the aggressor but first-strike capability.   For a country like Nigeria, such instrument finds its expression in the military strategic objectives set by the military, encapsulating the role and functions of armed forces as contained in the constitution. These are: (self) defence against aggression, promotion of security (regional, continental and global),

supporting the people of Nigeria (in practice, primarily through support to other government departments).

## 3.5    Public Support for Defence Policy

The central questions you need to ponder on here are: Why does defence need public support?  Who is the relevant public we are talking about? What are the various forms which public support can assume? What implication has the presence or absence of support, using what social scientists refer to as operational indicators of support?  Let us briefly attempt an answer to the above questions.

Political scientists have used the concept of public support in two ways. In one sense, they say support means the development or existence of a favourable attitude disposition towards an object and in this case, towards national defence.  This underlying favourable disposition is the basis for developing some sort of moral support for or emotional attachment to defence.    This type of support is more of socio-psychological.  However, support can also take a material form, in this case, the physical resources the public extends or allocates to defence.

Although the two forms of support identified do not always go together, there is usually some symmetry between the two senses of support.  For instance, the presence of psychological support increases the likelihood that material support will follow, though this is not necessarily always the case.

As to the question of the relevant public being discussed, it is important to note that the word 'public' does not mean the same thing to everybody at every occasion.  Sometimes when people talk about the public, they mean the elite, or literate or the enlightened members of the society – this most times is the usage in journalism.  However, the public under reference here is the mass – public.  This is because it refers to every citizen of a country, whether poor or rich, whether literate or illiterate, or whether enlightened or unenlightened.  Although you must not forget that some sections of the public are more important than others, implying that support from those more important segments of the public will be needed more than support from other segments.

Let us briefly turn to the reasons why the defence establishment needs support. The purpose for which defence is established is to serve the public good. Both defence involvement in external security and the internal one of guaranteeing law and order are indivisible public goods. It is thus important for the defence establishment to feel it has the support of the public; otherwise it will degenerate into a self-serving

organisation.   This is the case for a defence that is performing its traditional functions.   Adekanye and Onyeoziri (1987:183) have noted that the assurance of the public support becomes even more needed when and where the defence establishment goes beyond its traditional functions to assume the overall director of the general society.

Equally noteworthy, an effective defence force necessarily demands a lot from society to be able to discharge its obligations at a high level of effectiveness.   Therefore, defence cannot get enough of what it requires from its society if it does not command public support in that society.

A number of indicators readily come to mind when we consider public support for defence.   These can logically range from 'very high', 'fairly high', or 'high' to 'low', 'fairly low', or 'very low'.   What indicators do you look for in affirming that there exists positive and negative support for defence policy?

(a)     Actual expressions, by word of mouth or through prints: such expressions can be found on the pages of newspapers, made on television screens, in letters, etc. to defence establishment.
(b)     Actual demonstration of support through solidarity rallies, demonstrating and pro-military marches for invariably, the flags, banners, and placards carried by such demonstrating groups do speak for themselves.
(c)     Public debates on issues related to national defence, especially debates in national assemblies or parliaments.
(d)     Defence appropriation budget, say per year and over a period of time especially when this is compared to fiscal allocation.
(e)     Attitudes to recruitment, call-up service and general mobilization and demobilization. Such attitudes can be measured either in time of war or peace, by the number of citizens volunteering service, or the extent of draft resistance.
(f)     Increase interest or disinterest by civilians in being associated with, if not actually sharing in, defence related activities, functions and facilities.
(g)     Relative harmony or violence of military-civilian relations.

All these indices of public support for defence policy are empirical indicators that you should look for in affirming that there exists positive or negative public support for defence policy.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

In conclusion, we can say that countries that have credible defence policies that serve the common good of its citizens are bound to enjoy a higher support for their defence establishment, and conversely is the case. However, the ability of a country to advance in defence policy is also a function of the total buoyancy of her political economy. This is where most African countries are unable to exercise a flamboyant and visible defence policy.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned that there is a tenuous relationship between a country's foreign policy and its defence policy. In fact, you have seen that the military forces and the defence policy are the highest goals of a country's defence policy. It has been suggested that an exuberant defence policy is predicated on the level of intelligence available to a country, the quality of armed forces and the public support available to the defence establishment. However, all these instruments can only be effective, in so far as the country has a flamboyant and virile political economy.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

What do you understand by the concept "defence policy"? Explain with concrete examples the indicators used in measuring public support for defence policy.

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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**MODULE 4        CONTRIBUTION OF GRAND**

## STRATEGISTS TO STRATEGIC STUDIES

The first three modules of this course have dealt with general issues that are of major concern to strategic studies. In this module, specific focus will be brought to bear on the contribution of classical strategists to strategic studies. The module is preparatory to your understanding of the contribution of modern thinkers to 20th century.

The general aim of this module is to provide you with an in-depth understanding of strategy as seen through the eyes of classic writers on the topic. Key issues include the question of whether it is possible to identify principles of military and political success in the abstract, and the question of what these principles are and the larger political questions concerning the way people ought to organise their societies.

The learning outcomes of the module for you include:

- Knowing the essential teachings of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz , Jomini and Mahan
- Understanding how these thinkers fit into  military history, and how their experiences influenced their thoughts
- Been able to advance informed opinion on the merit of their ideas, and the relevance of the thinkers today
- Having a sophisticated understanding of the relationship between war and politics, and the demands each makes upon the other.

We now turn to an elucidation of the concept under the following units:

Unit 1        Sun Tzu
Unit 2        Carl von Clausewitz
Unit 3        Baron Antoine-Henri De Jomini
Unit 4        Alfred Thayer Mahan

## UNIT 1        SUN TZU

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1.0    Introduction
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## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

Sun Tzu's theories on strategy are timeless in their utility to both military and civilian theorists. His theories, especially his concept of an indirect approach, are as relevant today as they were in C. 500 B. C, more so in the context of the renowned interest on terrorism. For one, conflicts such as terrorism require the innovative development of theories, which go beyond the past conventional strategies. As the emerging literature on combating terrorism points (Rice, 2006:1) "we must force ourselves to ways of defeating a new enemy, one that is generally unseen, is driven ideologically, does not seek a set battle, and is like no other faced before".

This unit will introduce you to the strategic thought of Sun Tzu. At the onset, you must understand that, even though Sun Tzu belongs to classical strategists, the relevance of his ideas to 20th century remain ever omnipotent.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

•describe the Background to Sun Tzu's Thought
•explain Sun Tzu's Strategic Thoughts
•Give a critique of Sun Tzu's Strategic Thought
•identify the Contributions of Sun Tzu to 20th Century Strategy.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

### 3.1    A Background to Sun Tzu's Strategic Thought

Little is known about Sun Tzu personally, but historians generally agree he lived around 500 B.C. in the kingdom of Wu (modern day China) and served as an advisor or general to the King of Wu. Historians call this period the *Warring States period* due to the continuous fighting among rival feudal states as they strived to control their land and impose their rule over others. Feudal rulers were challenged to wage war while maintaining the wealth in an agrarian society. As a result, there was great focus on better understanding of how to more efficiently prosecute war without depleting one's resources (Sawyer, 1996:8–10).

The environment created the stimulus for Sun Tzu to develop and test his ideas, which later became his thirteen principles known as his *Art of War*. These principles cover a broad spectrum from the tactical to the strategic realm. They were written in what many scholars consider a rambling prose that challenge the reader to discern key points from often vague statements, but once understood provide the reader with very precise statements on tactics and strategies. In order to understand these thirteen principles, you must first understand the importance Sun Tzu placed on warfare. His writings emphasised that 'the art of war is of vital importance to the state'. It is a matter of life and death, a road to safety or ruin. Hence, under no circumstance can it be neglected (Clavell, 1983:3). With this in mind, Sun Tzu also understood that there was a cost attributed to war that could threaten the survival of a kingdom if not undertaken with care. In his chapter 'waging war', Sun Tzu focuses on explaining why a protracted war is not only costly to the state in men and material, but it also may weaken the state to a degree that third parties not directly involved in the conflict may benefit. With this framework of war as both vital and costly, a closer look at his main concepts and thought is useful.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

How true is it that, Sun Tzu's thoughts are a product of the cultural, political and economic situation of 500 B.C.?

## 3.2    Sun Tzu's Strategic Thought

Sun Tzu's core concepts are most easily described by organizing them into main themes: Fundamentals; Command and Control; Important Strategies and Methods of Warfare; and Tactical Principles. These four themes address both a direct and an indirect method to warfare, but Sun Tzu stressed that defeating your enemy indirectly was the greatest virtue because it husbanded your resources while attacking your foes' central strengths.

Three key fundamentals underlie Sun Tzu: one was that warfare was the greatest affair of state; the second stressed the criticality of accurate intelligence, analysis and planning; and the last focused on correctly setting strategic objectives and the methods to attain them. He believed "the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's plans; and the lowest is to attack their fortified cities". Whenever possible, victory should be achieved through diplomatic coercion, disrupting the enemy's alliances, thwarting plans, and frustrating its strategy.

Command and control, the second theme, is focused on three elements: the commander; selecting, training and controlling the troops and the

psychology of Ch'i, or spirit. He stresses the commander must be well versed in the execution of war and must have the utmost trust and freedom of the ruler. The soldiers must be well-trained and motivated thus forming a unified element. To motivate and most effectively use his force, Sun Tzu emphasised the concept of Chi'i, or spirit. Essentially, this involves ensuring a balance between multiple factors that make soldiers perform on an individual basis and motivate the army as a whole. Key to establishing a good command is understanding when your army is in "balance" and when "it is not".

The development of strategies and the methods of warfare comprise the third theme. Here, the ideas of deception, terrain, strategic power, and the use of indirect tactics stand out. Sun Tzu stressed that by selecting the most advantageous terrain, or conversely avoiding the poorest terrain, in conjunction with deceiving the enemy of your true intentions will cause the enemy to make fatal errors thus giving a commander the strategic and tactical advantage. The ideas of strategic and indirect power relate to the effective use of all elements of power that a state controls; including military, economic and diplomatic power, to influence the person's will and build alliances. Use of these powers alone or together in creative ways will give the commander the decisive advantage.

The final theme can be described in terms of the tactical principles the commander must understand. These include manipulating the enemy to your advantage, understanding your army's strength compared to that of your enemy, and choosing the correct formation of your army.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

Briefly analyse the four themes that underpin Sun Tzu's strategic thought.

## 3.3    A Critique of Sun Tzu's Strategic Thought

Sun Tzu's assertion that a skilful strategist should be able to subdue the enemy's army without engaging it is confusing if taken out of context. Sun Tzu was likely referring to deterrence followed by some brilliant manoeuvring on any of the political, moral or economic fronts to prevent unnecessary military conflict. An example of the North – South Vietnamese conflict suffices: The communists could possibly have achieved the same ultimate objective by other means. One obvious example might be to sustain time-consuming guerrilla tactics, while using perceived diplomatic ties with China as negotiating leverage with the United States.

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Secondly, Sun Tzu's statements are often filled with limitations and certainly open for interpretation. Some of this is a function of Sun Tzu's principles being offered in a lengthy list of short maxims. This list, in an attempt to be all-inclusive, tends to contradict itself. It certainly does not clearly categorise principles at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Thus, a certain principle intended for the tactical commander may be taken out of context if applied to the strategic level of decision making.

Third, Sun Tzu sometimes did incomplete analyses and thus provided advice that might be wrong depending on the circumstances. For example, Sun Tzu said, "To be certain to take what you attack is to attack a place the enemy does not protect". It is easy to use that quote as an advocacy for Liddell Hart's indirect approach…. That is, attack where the enemy does not expect. The problem is that there is almost always a reason why the enemy does not defend a place, and it usually has to do with the limited value of that place.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3**

Identify the main weaknesses of Sun Tzu's strategic thinking.

## 3.4    Contribution of Sun Tzu's Strategic thinking to 20ᵗʰ Century Strategy

Sun Tzu's contribution to modern strategy with his advocacy of deception and winning without fighting is the acme of skill. Sun Tzu has become the intellectual father of a school of warfare that advocates winning by manoeuvre or by psychologically dislocating the opponent. For example, Sun Tzu advocates attacking portions of the enemy with your whole force: "If I am able to determine the enemy's dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his".

Sun Tzu's war fighting maxims span a wide range of strategic, operational, and tactical theories. From this list emerge several strategic underlying themes – attacking the enemy's strategy, knowledge of indirect approach, shaping the enemy, man's role as the decisive factor in war, and the application of intelligence gathering activities. All these submissions have been adopted in 20th century warfare, and elaborated upon by modern thinkers in strategy decision making.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

Sun Tzu advocated a kaleidoscope of tactical themes all operating within a context of a strategy embodying four central thrusts:

a) Continuous probing of the adversary's organisation and dispositions to unmask his strengths, weaknesses, patterns of movement, and intentions;
b) Continuous efforts to shape an adversary's perceptions of the world to manipulate his plans and actions;
c) A strategic value system that focuses one's own attack on his adversary's plans as best policy, attacks his alliances as second best policy, attacks his adversary's military forces as third best, and only attacks fortified cities when there is no alternative;
d) Always employs Cheng and Ch'i manoeuvres to create unexpected changing conditions (i.e. combinations of direct and indirect, obvious and hidden, ordinary and extraordinary manoeuvres, always together in the sense that one does not exist without the other, with each turning into the other as conditions change) to quickly and unexpectedly hurl strength and weakness.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned about the contribution of Sun Tzu to 20th century strategic studies. Sun Tzu's theories have influenced both military and civilian strategies. The unit highlights Sun Tzu's emphasis on the indirect approach to coerce or defeat one's enemy. You have also learned that the core of what constitute Sun Tzu's strategic thought can be described by organising them into four themes: Fundamentals; Command and Control; Important Strategies and Methods of Warfare; and Tactical Principles.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Explain how Sun Tzu's strategic ideas have impacted on 20th century strategy.

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# UNIT 2     CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ

**CONTENTS**

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

Having familiarised yourself with the concept of strategy, and strategic processes, and the contribution of Sun Tzu to modern strategy, this unit will further your understanding on contributions of classical thinkers to 20<sup>th</sup> century strategy.

This unit therefore introduces you to the strategic thought of Carl von Clausewitz, including his contribution to 20<sup>th</sup> century strategic studies. Attention would be paid to his military career and how it influenced his strategic thought. Equally important, the weaknesses of his thought would be highlighted in this unit.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain how Clausewitz military career influenced his strategic thought
- describe Clausewitz strategic thought
- critique Clausewitz strategic thought
- evaluate the contribution of Clausewitz to 20<sup>th</sup> century strategic thought.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

### 3.1    A Background to Clausewitz Strategic Thought

Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz was born on June 1, 1780, and died on November 16, 1831. He was a Prussian soldier, military historian and influential military theorist. His publication on military treatise **Vom Kriege,** translated into English as 'On War' made him a famous military strategist.

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Carl was born to a poor but middle-class family. His grandfather, himself the son of a Lutheran pastor, had been a professor of theology. Clausewitz's father was a lieutenant in the Prussian army and held a minor post in the Prussian internal revenue service. Carl entered the Prussian military service at the age of twelve years as a Lance Corporal, and he rose to the rank of Major General.

He served in the Rhine Campaign (1793-1794), when the Prussian army invaded France during the French Revolution, and later served in the Napoleonic wars from 1806 to 1815. Clausewitz entered the German War School in 1801 when he was 21 years, studied the philosophy of Kant and won the regard of General Gerhardvon Scharnhorst, who later became the first Chief of Staff of the Prussian army in 1809. He along with three others were Scharnhorst's primary allies in his effort to reform the Prussian army, between 1807 and 1814.

Clausewitz also served during the Jena Campaign, where he served as Aide-de-Camp to Prince August, and was captured in October of 1806 when Napoleon invaded Prussia and defeated the massed Prussian-Saxon army. Carl, at the age of twenty-six years became one of the 25,000 prisoners captured that day as the Prussian army disintegrated.

He was held prisoner in France from 1807 to 1808. Returning to Prussia, he assisted the reform of the Prussian army and state. He married the socially prominent Countess Marie von Bruhl and socialised with the Berlin's literary and intellectual elites. Opposed to Prussia's enforced alliance to Napoleon, he left the Prussian army from 1812 to 1813 during the Russian Campaign. Clausewitz serving the Russian Empire helped negotiate the Convention of Tauroggen in 1812, which prepared the way for the coalition of Prussia, Russia, and the United Kingdom that ultimately defeated Napoleon I of France and his allies.

In 1815, the Russo-German Legion was integrated into the Prussian Army and Clausewitz thus re-entered Prussian service. He was appointed Chief of Staff to Johann von Thielmann's III Corps. In that capacity, he served at the Battle of Wavre during the Waterloo Campaign in 1815. Clausewitz was promoted to Major General in 1818 and appointed director of the *Kriegsakademie,* where he served until 1830. He was appointed chief-of-staff to the only army Prussia was able to mobilise, which was sent to the Polish border. Carl subsequently died in a cholera outbreak in 1831. His magnus opus on the *philosophy of war* was written during this period, and was published posthumously by his widow in 1832.

## 3.2    Clausewitz's Strategic Thought

Carl's **On War** remains a classical text containing his investigations and observations based on his own experiences in the wars of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars and on considerable historical research. Although the General participated in many military campaigns, he was primarily a military theorist interested in the examination of war.

Clausewitz's strategic thought border more about philosophical assertions than his 'how to' strategic advice. Best known for his treatise, "On War", Shy notes, "[t]o devise effective strategic schemes and tactical measures mattered far less to Carl than to identify the permanent elements of war and come to understand how they function. He believed leaders must be thoroughly schooled in the theoretical study of war and that such theory must be highly flexible".

It was Clausewitz's idea that war is an extreme but natural extension of political policy- the ultimate tool of diplomacy. In his words, "war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means". He firmly believed that war had a dual nature and that warfare could be either absolute or limited depending on what modern writers term the objectives of the political grand strategy. He saw war as a great trinity composed of **violence and passion**; **uncertainty, chance and probability**; **political purpose and effect**. Friction, in conjunction with individual genius, in his view, could make the difference in the outcome of an engagement between two forces otherwise equal in raw strength. He also agreed that total victory could only be achieved through the attack. Nevertheless, as Luttwak points out, Clausewitz's concept of the "culminating point of victory' is still valid and the strategists should take care not to overextend during the attack (e.g., initial French and German successes in the Napoleonic wars and World War II, respectively while attacking Russia).

Clausewitz's advocacy of seeking battle sets him aside from strategic theorists. He is also quite specific about his expectations of decisive battle. He wrote,

> …the importance of victory is chiefly determined by vigour with which the immediate pursuit is carried out. In order words, pursuing makes up the second act of victory and in many cases is more important than the first. Strategy at this point draws near to tactics in order to receive the completed assignment from it; and its exercise of authority is to demand that the victory should be complete (Clausewitz, 1976:269).

Next, Clausewitz originated the concept of attacking what he called the enemy's centre of gravity (COG), that is, the 'hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends'. He offered several

possibilities but decided that attacking the enemy's army is usually the best way to start a campaign, followed by seizing the capital and attacking his alliances. A COG is therefore that part of an enemy, which, if destroyed, will cause his collapse, since it is the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. As Clausewitz advocated,

> …aim for the great object to achieve the utmost concentration of force …in order to annihilate the enemy in a major decisive battle and to destroy the ability of the enemy to resist (Gat, 1989:211).

In the Clausewitzian perspective, the character of war as you have already learned is shaped by the "trinity" of the primordial violence, hatred and enmity; political violence and effect; as well as the play of chance and probability (or otherwise termed the irrational and non-rational forces). How each leg of the trinity interacts with another or both of the other would shape the outcome of war, implying that any disequilibrium in the Trinitarian balance will be adverse.

Lastly, Clausewitz suggested the need for political and military leaders to work cooperatively; for public opinion to be managed; for military commanders, because of the need to overcome friction and chance in war, to display 'genius'; and for the army to possess a strong will because while combat test moral and physical forces, "the physical (is but only) the wooden hilt, whereas the moral factor is the… finely-honed blade" (Howard, 1983:34).

From the foregoing, you can infer that both moral and psychological factors were central to Clausewitz's analysis of war.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Briefly summarise Clausewitz's thought on strategy.

## 3.3    Criticisms against Clausewitz's Strategic Thought

Clausewitz's strategic thought has been criticised by so many scholars on different fronts.

Corbett has criticised Carl for his preoccupation with big-battle fixation. This was a major component of the Napoleonic style of war, which consisted of a "strenuous and persistent effort – resting to secure each minor advantage, but pressing the enemy without pause or rest till he is utterly overthrown" (Handel, 2000). Corbett believes that the origin of what he terms Clausewitz's fetish for decisive battle could be traced back to Oliver Cromwell (Some Principles, p.22, 157, 176). The search

for the decisive battle is closely related to Clausewitz's principle of destruction and achievement of victory through the greatest possible concentration of forces at the decisive point. Clausewitz presents his ideas thus,

> Combat is the only offensive force in war; its aim is to destroy the enemy's forces as a means to further end…It follows that the destruction of the enemy's forces underlies the military actions; all plans are ultimately based on it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment…The decision by arms is for all major and minor operations in war what cash payment is in commerce…Thus it is evident that destruction of enemy forces is always the superior, more effective means, with which others cannot compete (On War, 1.2, p. 97).

Second, it was Clausewitz's great goal to bridge the gap between theory and practice. Unfortunately, his work has often fallen into the crack it sought to span, perceived as being too concrete and pragmatic for the intellectual, too complex and ambiguous for the active politician, and too ethereal for the practical soldier. More fundamentally, the gap represents a real dichotomy between the values and perceptions of soldiers and scholars.

Third, Clausewitz has been criticised for his seeming failure to address the ethical consideration of war. He saw ethics as a political question; not an issue of concern for pure theory. Also, he failed entirely to consider sea power, although a persuasive argument can be made that his theories are certainly adaptable to a total force concept (sea, air and land).

After summarising Clausewitz's discussion of limited war, Corbett asserts that Clausewitz never apprehended the full significance of his (own) brilliant theory. His outlook was still purely continental, and the limitations of continental warfare tend to veil the fuller meaning of the principles he had framed.

## 3.4    Clausewitz and 20th Century Strategic Thought

Clausewitz's thoughts have come to play an important role in the national security of Western countries, especially in the American security community. "On War", gave shape to the most important formulations of the final "lessons learned" from the Vietnam experience. The impressive "joint-ness" with which the American armed forces and connected agencies waged the Persian Gulf War in 1990-1991 is traceable to very significant, if unquantifiable, extent to common conceptual bases advanced by Clausewitz. He has provided the

intellectual common ground that formal doctrine has always sought but- because of its unavoidable narrow focus, usually single-service orientation, and perspective intent- failed to provide. The value of that common ground lies in the very flexibility of Clausewitzian theory that many have found so frustrating. It provides a common set of concepts and intellectual tools, greatly facilitating analysis and discussion while leaving the conclusions to be reached as open as ever to creativity and to differing goals and points of view.

The ideals in "On War" continue to have validity. The concepts of purpose (why is it politically expedient to fight); objectives (what goals- pure destruction of an enemy, acquisition of territory, or economical or ideological advantage); and, the means employed (spectrum of limited to total war) are as important today as in Clausewitz's time. Indeed, the Persian Gulf War is a classic example of force used as ultimate diplomacy. The strategy was set at the national level and decisive action ensued, resulting in overwhelming victory.

Clausewitz's strategic thought also has an immeasurable influence on strategy. He provided a theory on war, asserting that war is a social phenomenon, being neither a science nor an art with its compound of "rational, irrational and non-rational forces". His theory thus formulated serves not as a model, but a guide, for strategy formulation, which suggests not what, but how, to think about strategy.

Clausewitz's theory also exerted strong intellectual influence on Prussian, French and British military thought before World War I (Bassford, 1994). Moltke and Schlieffen adopted *On War* being the 'Bible' for the German Officers Corps; the French reeling from their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) turned to Clausewitz for intellectual guidance; and the British underwent a 'renaissance of Clausewitz studies' after the Boer war with his ideas strongly influencing military teaching at Camberley.

Clausewitz's influence has extended wider to naval and air warfare. Naval strategists like **Corbett** and airpower theorists like **Douhet** owed their theorising to Clausewitz. As for his direct impact, Carl's point about seeking out the enemy's centre of gravity resulted in these armies 'idolising the decisive battle and developing the cult of offence'.

More recently, as earlier mentioned, the rediscovery of Clausewitz in the United States following the Vietnam War defeat inspired a strategic rethinking 'on the highest levels of military and political leadership; with it came a codification of lessons learnt into the *Weinberger Doctrine of 1984*. Indeed, so dominant was Clausewitz on the US military-strategic scene from the 1970s to the 1980s that, "On War" was

adopted by the Naval War College in 1976; the Air War College in 1978; and the Army Military College in 1981. Clausewitzian thinking also found its way into the Army's Manual FM 100-5: Operations (1982) and the Marine Corps FmFm 1: War fighting (1989).

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

In conclusion, you should note that the ideas expounded by Carl von Clausewitz have come to permeate military writing, doctrinal, theoretical and historical. Carl premised his work on answering the twin questions of the nature of war, and how war should be studied. His magnum opus, ***vom Kriege*** (On war), which crystallises the philosophical nature of war and its universal dynamics, is a reflective study on Napoleonic warfare. Clausewitz defined war as "an act of violence to compel our opponent to fulfil our will". Yet war is not senseless violence, its essence lies in its being "the continuation of policy with the admixture of other means". War thus rationalised, becomes an instrument of policy; politics then exerts a primacy over its conduct since war is but the means to achieve predetermined (political) end. As the 'guiding intelligence', politics should shape the nature of war and the preferred strategy in terms of deterring the focus and proportions of force to be employed.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned that Clausewitz strategic theory was not conceived in a vacuum, but owed something to his experience and expertise as a military officer. Clausewitz was an early student of strategy and relied on similar empirical experience to develop and nurture his theories. It was Clausewitz's idea that war is an extreme but natural extension of political policy – the ultimate tool of diplomacy.

The major position that has been pushed in this unit, especially in its concluding parts, is that Clausewitz has left an indelible mark on the sand of time in his contribution to strategic studies. However, his impact on strategy was not revolutionary. "On War" primarily describes and analyses the war; it does not essentially prescribe or proscribe; therefore, whatever the interpretation, something of enduring value persists.

Yet Clausewitz's impact on strategy has been principally "influencing" rather than "direct". To the extent that it is "influencing", his ideas have been adopted, adapted and propagated by strategists dealing in nearly all spheres of warfare.
However, is Clausewitz still relevant in the nuclear age? Nuclear weapons have both invalidated and reaffirmed Clausewitz's thinking. The absolute war that Clausewitz considered an abstraction has become

real with nuclear weapons. Consequently, no nuclear war may be fought for any meaningful ends, if war is the continuation of policy by other means.

Nevertheless, Clausewitz's theory has provided a framework for evaluating strategy for the nuclear age. The concepts of nuclear deterrence and limited war are grounded in Clausewitzian theorising about the rationality of war.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Identify and critically discuss Clausewitz and his contribution to strategic studies.

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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## UNIT 3      BARON ANTOINE-HENRI DE JOMINI

## CONTENTS

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

The French revolution and the rise of Napoleon heralded the largest change in warfare since gunpowder. The old formalised warfare of the past had been banished. Accompanying Napoleon's armies for many of their key battles was the Swiss-born Jomini, who eventually rose to be a brigadier-general and chief of staff of Ney's corps. After falling out with a superior, Jomini defected to the Russians, and served as an adviser to successive tsars. Throughout his career, Jomini punctuated his career with writing, mostly historical studies. Thus, by the time he wrote his best-known work, **Summary of the Art of War** (Précis de l'art de la guerre), he was already a well known and respected thinker.

Jomini treated war as a field of scientific study. He sought general principles that could be applied universally, today, may seem trite but at the time were revolutionary. Thus, Jomini condensed the Napoleonic method of mass and manoeuvre into a principle that the bulk of the army should be employed against the enemy's decisive points.

Today, Clausewitz is far better known and respected, but Jomini's thought dominated the 19th century, and is still with us today in much military doctrine, which finds its roots in sets of principles.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the background to Jomini's strategic thought
- identify Jomini's strategic thought
- critique Jomini's thought
- analyse Jomini's contribution to 20th century strategy.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1     A Background to Jomini's Strategic Thought

Antoine-Henri, baron Jomini (born on March 6, 1779 and died on March 24, 1869) is regarded as one of the classical strategic thinkers. He served in the French and afterwards in the Russian service, and became one of the most distinguished writers on the Napoleonic art of war. He was born in Switzerland.

Jomini, in his youth, had a preference for a military life, but was disappointed by the dissolution of the Swiss regiments of France at the start of the ***Revolution.*** For some time he was a clerk in a Paris banking-house, until the outbreak of the Swiss Revolution. At the age of nineteen he was appointed to a post on the Swiss headquarters staff, and when scarcely twenty-one to the command of a battalion. At the peace of Lunéville, 1801 he returned to business life in Paris, but devoted himself chiefly to preparing the celebrated Traité des grandes operations militaires, which was published in 1804-1805.

Jomini served in the campaign of Austerlitz as a volunteer aide-de-camp on Ney's personal staff. In December 1805, Napoleon, being much impressed by a chapter in Jomini's treatise, made him a colonel in the French service. Ney thereupon made Jomini his principal aide-de-camp.

In 1806, Jomini published his views as to the conduct of the impending war with Prussia. This, along with his knowledge of Frederick the Great's campaigns, which Jomini had described in the Traité, led Napoleon to attach him to his own headquarters. Jomini was present with Napoleon at the Jena, and at Eylau, and won the cross of the Legion of Honour.

After the peace of Tilsit, Jomini was made chief of the staff to Ney, and created a baron. In the Spanish campaign of 1808, his advice was often of the highest value to the marshal, but Jomini quarrelled with his chief, and was left almost at the mercy of his numerous enemies, especially Louis Alexandre Berthier, the emperor's chief of staff.

He left   the French service, to join the Russian Army but Napoleon, hearing of his intention to leave the French army, compelled him to remain in the service with the rank of Brigadier General. Therefore, Jomini held both French and Russian commission, with the consent of both sovereigns. However, when war between France and Russia broke out, he was in a difficult position, which he dealt with by taking a non-combat command on the line of communication.

Jomini was thus engaged when the retreat from Moscow and the uprising of Prussia transferred the seat of war to central Germany. He

promptly rejoined Ney, took part in the battle of Lützen. As chief of the staff of Ney's group of corps, he rendered distinguished services before and at the battle of Bautzen, and was recommended for the rank of general of division. Berthier, however, not only erased Jomini's name from the list but put him under arrest and censured him in army orders for failing to supply certain staff reports that had been called for.

Jomini's patriotism for Switzerland was so strong that he withdrew from the Allied Army in 1814 when he found that he could not prevent the allies' violation of Swiss neutrality. Apart from love of his own country, the desire to study, to teach and to practise the *art of war* was his ruling motive. At the critical moment of the battle of Eylau he had exclaimed, "If I were the Russian commander for two hours!" On joining the allies he received the rank of lieutenant-general and the appointment of aide-de-camp from the tsar, and rendered important assistance during the German campaign: an accusation that he had betrayed the numbers, positions and intentions of the French to the enemy was later acknowledged by Napoleon to be without foundation. As a Swiss patriot and as a French officer, he declined to take part in the passage of the Rhine at Basel and the subsequent invasion of France.

After several years of retirement and literary work, Jomini resumed his post in the Russian army, and in about 1823, was made a full general. Thenceforward until his retirement in 1829, he was principally employed in the military education of the tsarevich Nicholas (afterwards emperor) and in the organization of the Russian staff college, which was opened in 1832, and bore its original name of the Nicholas Academy up to the October Revolution of 1917. In 1828, he was employed in the field in the Russo-Turkish War, and at the Siege of Varna, he was awarded the grand cordon of the Alexander Order.

## 3.2    Jomini's Strategic Thought

Jomini's military writings are frequently and unfairly caricatured: he took a didactic, prescriptive approach, reflected in a detailed vocabulary of geometric terms such as bases, strategic lines, and key points. His operational prescription was fundamentally simple: put superior combat power at the decisive point. In the famous theoretical Chapter 25 of the Traité de grande tactique, he stressed the exclusive superiority of interior lines.

As one writer, rather partial to Carl von Clausewitz – Jomini's great competitor in the field of military theory – puts it:
> Jomini was no fool, however. His intelligence, facile pen, and actual experience of war made his writings a great deal more credible and useful than so brief a description can imply.

>Once he left Napoleon's service, he maintained himself and his reputation primarily through prose. His writing style – unlike Clausewitz's – reflected his constant search for an audience. He dealt at length with a number of practical subjects (logistics, sea power) that Clausewitz had largely ignored. Elements of his discussion (his remarks on Great Britain and seapower, for instance, and his sycophantic treatment of Austria's Archduke Charles) are clearly aimed at protecting his political position or expanding his readership. And, one might add, at minimizing Clausewitz's, for he clearly perceived the Prussian writer as his chief competitor. For Jomini, Clausewitz's death thirty-eight years prior to his own came as a piece of rare good fortune.

Jomini believed that strategy was the key to warfare; that all strategy is controlled by invariable scientific principles; and that these principles prescribe offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemy forces at some decisive point if strategy is to lead to victory.

On his thought on war, Jomini argued, "in all military operations there is always some imperfection or weak point; but in judging operations we must apply principles with the objective in mind, and ask whether a given operation offers the best chance for victory".

Jomini is best known for his **Treatise on Grand Military Operations** and **Precis of the Art of War**, essentially interpretations of the Napoleonic experience. Most writers agree his intent was to publish a "handbook" or "field manual" which would summarize the principles he believed were responsible for Napoleon's unprecedented successes. Colonel Swain notes that "... for Jomini it was the principles of strategy which were timeless [and] ... the end of theory was a set of principles to serve as a guide for action."

Jomini sought simplicity and clarity and was quick to extol the Napoleonic model of massing, attacking, and quickly winning decisive victories. In keeping with the "principles," these attacks should be conducted against weak points in enemy formations and fortifications (or undefended territory) relying on the doctrine of "lines of operation." The key, according to Jomini, was to identify the "decisive point" and strike. Jomini separated military activity into three categories – **strategy, grand tactics**, and **logistics**. He provided early definitions for modern concepts such as the "theater of operation".

Significantly, in contrast with Clausewitz, Jomini had little concern with political implications. For Jomini, it was necessary for a government to choose its ablest military commander, and leave him free to wage war

according to scientific principles. He also argued that governments should not neglect their armed forces, but they must not meddle in matters that only educated and experienced officers understand.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

Briefly describe the basic assumptions of Jomini's Strategy.

## 3.3    Criticisms against Jomini's Strategic Thought

Jomini's critics accuse him of engaging in over simplification and lack of flexibility. If empirical evidence did not support his theory, he ignored it. Unlike Clausewitz, he was vague and contradicted himself on the importance of genius. Liddell Hart has accused Clausewitz of being obsessed by the great battle, a criticism that applies equally to Jomini.

Other criticisms levelled against Jomini's strategic thought include

1) His inability to discuss the historical cases when his "principles" of war do not work;
2) To reduce relevant factors for his analysis, he assumed that military forces of the same size were essentially equal.  Only differences among their commanders and the choices they made were of interest;
3) Jomini stated that the political realm and tactical levels of war are not susceptible to scientific analysis, then blurred the levels of military operations by applying his "timeless principles" to battlefield applications;
4) He has been vague about when the principles of war do and do not apply.

## 3.4    Contributions of Jomini's Strategic Thought to 20th Century Strategy

 Jomini's *Art of War* and Von Clausewitz's *On War* are the two manuals which guided military thinkers up to and including World War I. Jomini did not see air power as a force during his time but what he said of land war (and war at sea) is still relevant even in today's military.  Before the Napoleonic era of warfare we had great generals from the classical civilizations like Alexander and Caesar to the renaissance Generals of Prince Eugene of Savoy and the Duke of Marlborough and ending with Frederick II of Prussia who's campaigns, politics and tactics were on the cusp of the new era in war.  However, war after Napoleon would be different.  Jomini's book showed how the new wars will be fought and how to fight them.  Jomini's book is like a manual on what war is about and how best to conduct it.  Von Clausewitz's is more of a philosophical treatise mixed with technical matters like strategy and tactics. *'On War'*

was published in 1831 and Jomini had time to study it before publishing his own book. Both books agree on many matters but a few differences do exist, such as, Von Clausewitz thought the defensive was more powerful while Jomini the offensive. Jomini's was the text book for study by military minds in the 1800s including many US Civil war generals, until the Prussian victory over France in 1872 and Von Moltke's admonition that '*the Bible, Homer and* (Von Clausewitz's) *On War*' were the three books worth reading.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

Jomini was grateful for the French for their support during the anti-French uprising in Switzerland. This came to the attention of General Ney who subsidised his first book on military strategy. Prior to 1803, he studied the campaigns of Napoleon in Italy. Obsessed with military glory, Jomini wanted to imitate the incredible rise of Napoleon. He however owed his greatest intellectual debt to General Henry Lloyd and Welsham who served in several armies. Welsham wrote a history of the German Campaigns of the Seven Years' War, and argued that war was founded on "certain and fixed principles which are by their nature invariable". However, Welsham does not discuss these "invariable principles".

Jomini did not like the conclusion of Lloyd's thought that "army conducting single line of operations; short and safe enemy divides forces and over extends supply lines". While Napoleon's victories in Italy did not support this theory, Jomini liked Lloyd's approach, not his conclusions and therefore built on these submissions to develop his *Art of War.*

## 5.0    SUMMARY

This unit has provided an outlet for you to understand the contributions of Jomini to strategic studies. You have learned that his strategy emphasised the need to bring "superior force to bear on the point where the enemy is both weaker and liable to crippling damage".

The unit has shown that Jomini's book is like a manual on what war is about and how best to conduct it. Von Clausewitz's is more of a philosophical treatise mixed with technical matters like strategy and tactics.

What needs to be added is that Jomini was greatly influenced by the French revolutionized warfare, where Command was decentralized, the force was largely conscripted, and power, political and military was vested in one leader. Napoleon, less concerned about individual

victories or defeats, was convinced that it was important to destroy the enemy through massed concentration of forces. Acquisition of territory was often a secondary consideration. It was this experience, gained first hand through observation, which was most instrumental in Jomini's formation of theoretical ideas and which provided the underpinnings for his work.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Was the Vietnam War, the kind of war that Jomini's principles could be applied to?

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## UNIT 4        ALFRED THAYER MAHAN

**CONTENTS**

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## 1.0     INTRODUCTION

Alfred Thayer Mahan belongs to the school of single service strategies devoted to sea power or air power. He is one of the most famous strategic theorists. American naval officer, Mahan wrote several books and articles around the turn of the twentieth century advocating sea power. Perhaps the most famous was **The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660 – 1783**. Mahan developed a set of criteria that he believed facilitated sea power, but his major contribution was in the realm of the exercise of that capability through what he called command of the sea. To Mahan, oceans were highways of commerce. Navies existed to protect their nation's commerce and interrupt their enemy. The way to do both was to gain command of the sea (Mahan, 1970). His study of history convinced Mahan that the powerful maritime nations had dominated history, and specifically that England had utilised its command of the sea into world dominance.

At the grand strategic level, Mahan believed that countries with the proper prerequisites should pursue sea power (and especially naval power) as the key to prosperity. For Mahan, the essence of naval strategy was to mass one's navy, seek out the enemy navy, and destroy it in a decisive naval battle.

Although Mahan's theories actively supported his political agenda of navalism and imperialism, they contained enough pure and original thought to survive both the author and his age.

## 2.0     OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the theory of maritime strategy
- identify Mahan's strategic thought
- critique Mahan's strategic thought
- analyse Mahan's contribution to 20th century strategy.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    The Theory of Maritime Strategy

Before we get to the theoretical assumptions of Mahan on strategy, let us briefly look at what we mean by the theory of maritime strategy.

The fundamental focus of maritime strategy centres on the control of human activity at sea. There are two parts to this (Hattendorf, 1994), on one hand, there is the effort to establish control for oneself or to deny it to an enemy. On the other hand, there is the effort to use the control that one has in order to achieve specific ends. The effort to achieve control, by itself, means nothing unless that control has an effect. Most important, in the wide spectrum of activity that this category involves, is the use of control at sea to influence and, ultimately, to assist in controlling events on land.

The fundamental characteristics of these two broad parts to maritime strategy stress their sequential and cumulative relationships; the need to obtain some degree of control before being able to use it to obtain the important ends that one seeks.

In wartime, fleet battles and blockade of war fleets have been the two traditional means by which the opponent has achieved control over another, preventing an enemy from interring in its own use of the sea. We tend to focus on this initial aspect of maritime strategy, particularly on battles, ignoring the less glamorous, but far more important ways in which the sea is used in maintaining control. In wartime, there are many essential military uses of the sea for this purpose. Among the most important wartime functions, Uhlig (1994:416 – 417) has identified six uses:

- protecting and facilitating one's own and allied merchant shipping and military supplies at sea;
- denying commercial shipping to an enemy;
- protecting the coast and offshore resources;
- acquiring advanced bases;
- moving and supporting troops;

•gaining and maintaining local air and sea control in support of air and land operations.

From a narrowly defined perspective, these seem to be uniquely maritime functions, but in a wider context of a wider understanding, all of these broad functions are closely related to other aspects of national power.

In peacetime, in operations short of open warfare, and in the non-war functions of naval power, many of which continue even during wartime; maritime strategy involves a wide variety of other considerations. According to Booth (1977:15 – 25), these may be categorised under three headings:

•the diplomatic and international role;
•the policing role; and
•the military role.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Briefly explain the theory of maritime strategy.

## 3.2    Background to Mahan's Strategic Thought

American naval officer and historian who was a highly influential exponent of sea power in the late 19ᵗʰ and early 20ᵗʰ centuries, Alfred Thayer Mahan was born on September 27, 1840 at West Point, New York. A son of a professor at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York, he graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, in 1859 and went on to serve nearly 40 years of active duty in the U.S. Navy. He fought in the civil war, later served on the staff of Admiral J. A. B. Dahlgren, and progressed steadily in rank. In 1884, he was invited by Stephen Luce, President of the newly established Naval War College at New port, to lecture on naval history and tactics there. Mahan became the College's President in 1886 and held that post until 1889.

In 1870, Mahan published his college lectures as ***The Influence of Sea power upon History, 1660 -1783.*** In this book, he argued for the paramount importance of sea power in national historical supremacy. The book, which came at a time of great technological improvements in warships, won immediate recognition abroad. In his second book, ***The Influence of Sea power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793 – 1812*** (Mahan, 1892), stressed the interdependence of the military and commercial control of the sea and asserted that the control of seaborne commerce can determine the outcome of wars. Both books were avidly read in Great Britain and Germany, where they greatly

influenced the build-up of naval forces in the years prior to World War I.

Mahan retired from the U.S. Navy in 1896, but was subsequently recalled to serve. In *The Interest of America in Sea power, Present and Future* (1897), he sought to arouse his fellow Americans to the realisation of their maritime responsibilities. Mahan served as President of the American Historical Association in 1902. His other major books include *The Life of Nelson* (1897) and *The Major Operation of the Navies in the War of American Independence* (1913). Before his death in December 1914, Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan correctly foretold the defeat of the Central powers and of the German navy in the World War I.

## 3.3    Mahan's Strategic Thought

Mahan's book on sea power included his observations on naval issues and his deductions, conclusions, and theories, all of which were so remarkable as to be astonishing. Mahan wrote of sea power as a basis for a nation's fitness to play a great role in world affairs. He came up with compelling, navalist-oriented insights on matters of geography and territory, population and national character, and the soundness of a nation's government.

Mahan demonstrated convincingly that the use of America's Navy during most of the 19th century, as a dispersed, coastal defence force was obsolescent and a dangerous pathway upon which to predicate the defense of the nation in the 20th century. Thus, Mahan drafted an intellectual basis for an entirely new national security strategy, built on and around a Navy structured for projecting force, and not holding to a policy based on a relatively static defense against attack from the sea or upon the nation's overseas commerce.

Mahan, using a concept central to Clausewitz viewed the sea as a "centre of gravity", a vital strategic interest of the United States. Any limitation of, or challenge to, U.S. military power, particularly if it came from the sea, would constrain the nation and harm its national interests. Any victory of U.S. arms upon the sea would give the nation the luxury of independent action in pursuing its interests.

Mahan prompted deep, critical thinking about the ability of any given nation to protect itself from attack from the sea, and how to fight upon and command the oceans, when necessary, distant from home shores. Mahan's theory called for nations to construct and maintain large fleets, composed of big ships armed with big guns. His theories further called for concentrating fleets into powerful, ocean going combat forces. Thus,

armed and ready, a concentrated fleet would be in a position to project a nation's combat power and seize control of the oceans from an adversary where and when necessary, in furtherance of a nation's international political interests and military goals. The doctrine calls for a fleet to move forward to meet the opponent, and when circumstances dictate, to use defensive naval operations as the basis for offence.

By placing the need for a powerful Navy at the centre of national interests, Mahan merged naval operations and political and economic destiny. He looked at what was required within a nation, its economy, its politics, and its people to support naval power. In his book, Mahan identified specific social and industrial policies that a nation required in order to be successful at sea and, by extension, to earn and keep its place in the world.

That is, Mahan does not simply set forth a theory of naval warfare, but uses a nation's distinctive and circumstantial requirement for naval power to lay out the plan for what we might call today a national industrial policy.

Mahan illustrated his central point by explaining what happened to Portugal and Spain. Both nations rose to prominence by virtue of their explorations of the seas and were powerful naval states in the 16th and 17th centuries with significant military capabilities. However, according to Mahan, the treasure that these nation's explorers and conquerors plundered and returned to Europe from the New World only encouraged Portugal and Spain to buy manufactured goods from other countries, including their rivals Britain and Holland. This was the seed of their eventual decline and downfall.

Mahan stated the following, "The mines of Brazil were the ruin of Portugal, as those of Mexico and Peru had been of Spain. All manufactures fell into insane contempt".

So according to Mahan, sea power goes hand in hand with commerce and trade:

> Commerce and trade should provide, and must support, a nation and its economy with the ability to produce goods and make things that others in the world want to obtain. With the ability to produce goods for trade comes the ability to produce the vessels necessary to carry that trade. Finally, comes the national ability to create naval sea power to protect that trade and export a nation's influence to the far corners of the world.

But Mahan also provides a cautionary note:

> Where the revenues and industries of a country can be
> concentrated into a few treasure ships, like the float of
> Spanish galleons, the sinew of war may perhaps be cut at a
> stroke; but when its wealth is scattered in thousands of going
> and coming ships, when the roots of the system spread wide
> and far, and strike deep, it can stand many a cruel shock and
> lose many a goodly bough without the life being touched
> (King, 2005:7–8).

Here, then, is the essence of what drew presidents, prime ministers and kings to the famous book by then, Captain Mahan. By the 1890s, the Industrial Revolution was in full swing in North America, Europe, Russia, and Japan. Within each nation, industrialists constructed their empires of business. Mahan and his theories impacted on the governing classes of these emerging industrial nations with a national security requirement to justify harnessing these empires of business.

## 3.4    A Critique of Alfred Thayer Mahan's Strategy

The theories of Mahan are credited (or blamed) for providing intellectual and political impetus for a naval armaments race among European powers that contributed, almost a quarter century later, to the outbreak of the Great War. On the far side of the planet, starting in the early 1890s, the Japanese were then in the process of developing rapidly from a feudal society into a first-rank industrial power. The Japanese modelled their entire naval strategy and order of battle upon the theories of Mahan.

Mahan's theory of economy and industry has also been criticised. Critics note that Mahan lived in "an era of gold standard, when international accounts were settled in gold". Hence, goes the arguments, the demise of gold as a form of backing for a nation's currency in this modern era diminishes to some extent, Mahan's theories as they pertain to trade between nations.

Mahan's doctrine of a decisive battle fought between fleets of battleships became obsolete by the development of submarines and air carriers. Equally, Mahan's premise that a reserve force being incapable to recover after an initial overwhelming defeat was refuted by the U.S. Navy's own recovery after Pear Harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy pursuit of the "decisive battle" was carried out to such an extent that it contributed to Japan's defeat in 1945.

## 3.5    Contribution of Mahan's Strategic Thought to 20th Century Strategy

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Mahan has contributed immensely to the concept of using a Navy structured for projecting force. This can best be understood in the light of the fact that the inner frontier of the United States was coming to a distinct end. Mahan's book came at just the right time in history for the nation midwifed into existence by George Washington, who had cautioned against "foreign entanglements", to begin to revise and form new policy and strategy concerning matters far beyond its shores. This is the root concept of modern U.S. political policy and strategic doctrine of power projection abroad. It is no accident that only eight years after the publication of Mahan's book, the United States embarked on a war with Spain that staked a claim for U.S. military power and political-economic interests on the far side of the planet.

Mahan and his theories also provided the governing classes of emerging industrial nations with a security requirement to justify harnessing empires of business. Coal, steel, railroads, refining, heavy machinery, chemicals, food processing, and more became distinct industrial features of emerging modern economies. Here was a modern justification, rooted in the principles of state security, for bringing these empires of business into a politically controlled, military – industrial system that would support the business of empire.

Mahan also published an influential article in *National Review,* an important British Imperialist Journal. Thus he came to an appreciation of the Middle East's strategic importance in the coming world conflict that would pit Britain (and, by implication the United States) against the increasingly aggressive naval power of imperial Germany and the threat by land posed by imperial Russia. What is so astonishing is that someone so ignorant of what was happening in a geographical area to which he helped to give a name – the Middle East – could in his time so influence European and American understanding of that area.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

Mahan's views were shaped by the contests between France and England in the 18th century, where British naval superiority had eventually won out over France, consistently preventing a French invasion or a successful blockage. To a student of strategic studies, Mahan's emphasis on sea-borne commerce may seem commonplace, but the notion was much more radical during Mahan's time, especially in a nation entirely obsessed with landward expansion to the west. On the other hand, Mahan's focus on sea power as the crucial factor behind the rise of Britain neglected the well-documented role of other means (diplomacy and land armies) and Mahan's theories could not explain success of non-maritime empires such as Bismarck's Germany.

## 5.0   SUMMARY

In this unit, attempt has been made to define the concept of maritime theory of strategy and Mahan's contribution to this theory. It was pointed out that Mahan belongs to the schools of single service strategies concerned with sea power and air power. You learned about Mahan's concern that control of seaborne commerce was critical to domination in war. This required countries to develop big fleets and well equipped battleships. You learned that his theory was able to merge naval operations and political and economic objectives of a country. Despite the weaknesses of Mahan's theory, his contribution to 21st century cannot be denied.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Mahan's theories contained enough pure and original thought to survive both the author and his age. Discuss.

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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**MODULE 5      CONTRIBUTION      OF      MODERN STRATEGISTS   TO   20ᵀᴴ   CENTURY STRATEGY**

This module concludes the course by introducing you to the contribution of modern thinkers to 20ᵗʰ century. Key theorists identified in this course include Adolph Hitler, Thomas Schelling, Robert McNamara and John Boyd. You are to note that there are other numerous thinkers that have not been included in this course. As a serious student, you would be expected to go ahead on your own to do an exposition of the contribution of such thinkers to 20ᵗʰ century strategic studies.

It is also pertinent that you should be able to identify the impact of classical thinkers on the strategic thought of modern thinkers. Equally important, attention needs to be paid to the background of these thinkers, and how their backgrounds shaped their thinking.

The fifth module is made up of four units which are arranged as follows:

Unit 1      Adoph Hitler
Unit 2      Thomas Schelling
Unit 3      Robert McNamara
Unit 4      John Boyd

**UNIT 1      ADOLPH HITLER**

**CONTENTS**

1.0   Introduction
2.0   Objectives
3.0   Main Content
        3.1   A Background to Hitler's Strategic Thought
        3.2    Hitler's Political Decision-making Process
        3.3   Hitler's Strategic Thought
        3.4   Criticism against Hitler's Strategic Thought
        3.5   Contribution of Hitler to 20ᵗʰ Century Strategic Studies.
4.0   Conclusion
5.0   Summary
6.0   Tutor-Marked Assignment
7.0   References/Further Readings

**1.0   INTRODUCTION**

Many scholars have questioned whether Adolph Hitler has contributed to 20ᵗʰ century strategic studies. They try to establish whether Hitler was

indeed a military 'genius' or a military 'failure'. Most of them conclude in favour of the latter, especially because of his involvement in the infamous 'stop order' issued at Dunkirk and his "no retreat' policy issued at Stalingrad.

However, the concern of this unit is not to investigate the genius/failure nature of Hitler, but to asses his contribution to strategic studies. The unit enables us to gain insights from history on the strengths and weaknesses of Hitler's strategic decisions.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- analyse Hitler's political decision making process
- describe Hitler strategic thought
- identify Hitler's military mistakes/blunders
- explain Hitler's contribution to 20th century strategy.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    A Background to Hitler's Thought

Adolph Hitler was born on April 20, 1889, at Braunau in Upper Austria, the son of a minor customs official, originally called Schicklgruber, was educated at the secondary schools at Linz and Steyr and destined by his father for the civil service. The young Adolph, however, fashioned himself as a great artist and perhaps purposely disgraced himself in his school leaving examinations. After his father's death, he attended a private art school in Munich, but failed twice to pass into the Vienna Academy. Advised to try architecture, he was debarred for lack of a school certificate. His fanatical hatred of all intellectuals and his later sneers at "gentlemen with diplomas", no doubt originated at this early period of his life.

He lived as a tramp in Vienna (1904-1913), making a living by selling bad post card sketches, beating carpets and doing odd jobs with his companions. He worked only fitfully and spent the majority of his time in heated political arguments directed at money lending Jews and the trade unions. The Nazi philosophy candidly expressed in *Mein Kampf*, with its brutality, opportunism, contempt for the masses, distrust of even his closest friends, fanatical strength of will and advocacy of 'big lie" was all born in the gutters of Vienna.

He escaped military services and in 1913 emigrated to Munich, where he found employment as a draftsman. In 1914, he volunteered for war

services in a Bavarian regiment, rose to the rank of corporal and was recommended for the award of the Iron Cross of service as a runner on the Western Front. When Germany surrendered in 1918, Hitler was lying wounded and temporarily blinded by gas.

In 1919, Hitler became the seventh member of one group, the name of which he himself changed from the German Workers Party to the National Socialist German Workers Party (N.S.D.A.P.) in 1920. Its programme was a convenient admixture of mild radicalism, but bitter hatred of the politicians who had shamed Germany by signing the Versailles Treaty, and exploitation of provincial grievances against the weak federal government. By 1923, Hitler was strong enough to attempt with General Ludendorffs and other extreme right wing factions the overthrow of the Bavarian government. On November 9, the Nazis marched through the street of Munich. The police machine-gunned the Nazi column. Hitler narrowly escaped serious injury. After nine months imprisonment in a Landberg jail, during which he dictated his autobiography and political testament, **Mein Kampf** (1925) to Rudolf Hess, he began to woo Krupp and other Ruhr industrialists. Although unsuccessful in the presidential elections of 1932, Hitler was made Chancellor in January 1933. Krupp and others believed that they could control Hitler's aspiration inside the government. Hitler however, quickly disposed with all constitutional restraints placed upon the Chancellor.

He silenced all opposition, and engineering successfully the burning of the Reichstag building in February 1933, advertising it as a communist plot, called for a general election in which the police allowed the Nazis full play to break up the meeting of other political opponents. When Hitler came to power, he arrogated to himself absolute power through the enabling acts. He ruthlessly crushed opposition within the party and murdered hundreds of influential Nazis.

## 3.2    Hitler's Political Decision-making Process

In order to understand Hitler's strategic thought, one must understand the compelling aspects of his personality. First and foremost, Hitler saw himself as "an agent of providence, a man of destiny, whose vision of the future was infallible" (de Luca, 1983:94). Hitler was convinced beyond any doubt that it was he, and he alone, who possessed the vision, the will power, and the political and military insight to restore Germany to her rightful place among the other nations of the world. This made him not to accept criticisms from those who may not have agreed with his enlightened options, views, or decisions.

Hitler also had enormous power over the people, partly due to his extraordinary talent as an orator. As summed by De Luca (1983:96-97): his speeches were an instrument of political intoxication that inspired a degree of fervour in his listeners that seems to defy definition and explanation. Hitler was a master at the use of the spoken word and a genius at the act of manipulating mass propaganda for his political figure. It was not uncommon for women to faint or for the crowd's emotions to range from tears to an overwhelming frenzy to the point they were ready and willing to believe anything he told them.

Time and again, he bombarded the German people with the same message; the crucial moment was at hand for Germany to face her destiny, that her problems were unique, and they required new and demanding solutions, and above all it was he and he alone who could provide Germany with the leadership she needed to achieve her destiny (de Luca, 1983:96,107).

This is what informed Hitler's strategy. Hitler was convinced Germany's destiny necessitated the need for more living space or **lebensraum** to the east in order to maintain their living standards and support Germany's ever-increasing population. He believed Germany was no longer capable of providing the food supply necessary to sustain the masses within her own border and could not afford to purchase what was needed from foreign countries (thereby making Germany vulnerable during war periods). This and the belief that Britain would allow him free hand in Eastern Europe to pursue his desire for **lebensraum** was all he needed to proceed eastward. It was a very natural conclusion. Hitler was convinced that with the controlled will of his people and the 'green light' from Britain, nothing could prevent his dream of **lebensraum** from becoming a reality.

## 3.3    Hitler's Strategic Thought

Hitler's political makeover has been described as a grand strategy. Without doubt, Hitler wanted to dismantle the Treaty of Versailles, "every power-seeking politician in the country, including Adolph Hitler, spokesman of the upstart N.S.D.A.P (Nazi Party), attacked the treaty (Duffy, 1991:5-6). This platform with Hitler's almost hypnotic talent as an orator, facilitated his rise to power and control over Germany's destiny which he felt he, and he alone should control". Trevor-Roper (1965 xv-xvi) best captures Hitler's belief in himself as the only one with the capability to restore the lost German empire to her greatness when he states:

Hitler distrusted his successors, as he distrusted his predecessors, who had been too soft. Only he believed, "the hardest man in centuries", had the qualities for such a 'cyclopean task'; the vision, the will-power, the combination of military and political, and political and 'world-historical' insight. Therefore, the whole programme of conquest, from beginning to end, must be carried through him personally. Nor could it be left to his subordinates, the generals. He distributed his generals too like all professional soldiers, they disliked the prospect of great wars. Military parades, quick victories in limited campaigns- these were part of their business- but a major war of revenge against the west, or a major war of conquest against the east, was a prospect that alarmed them. It alarmed them as soldiers; it also alarmed them as conservatives. To envisage such a war with confidence one had to be, not a conservative Prussian staff-general but a revolutionary nationalist, able to command obedient, if reluctant, generals: in fact, a Hitler.

Hitler was thus committed and driven by his obsession for power and his pursuit of *lebensraum* to the point of resorting to war if his objectives could not be achieved by political means. Hitler openly rearmed the nation (1935), sent troops to occupy the Rhineland, established the Rome-Berlin 'axis' with Mussolini (October 1936), created a greater Germany by annexing Austria (1939), and systematic infiltration and engineered incidents engendered a more favourable situation for an easy absorption of the Sudetenland, to which France and Britain responded with their policy of appeasement at Munich in 1938. When Hitler informed his staff of his plans to take the Sudetenland, from Czechoslovakia, General Ludwig Beck, the chief of the general staff, was convinced this action would lead to Germany's ruin and resigned from office. Hitler inspired by his own confidence threatened to use force against the Czech government if they refuse to recognise the Sudetens Germans for independence.

Within a matter of days after Hitler's occupation of Czechoslovakia on March 13, 1939, Britain and France publicly announced their move against her. Yet Hitler remained confident they would not interfere with his plans. However, Hitler's preoccupation with the ***Final Solution*** was the last straw that broke the camel's back in his quest for acquiring more land. This was Nazi Germany's plan and execution of its systematic genocide against European Jews during World War II, resulting in the final, most deadly phase of the Holocaust (Shoah). Hitler termed it: "the solution of the Jewish question in Europe". Mass killings of about one million Jews occurred before the plans of the Final Solution were fully implemented in 1942, but it was only with the decision to eradicate the

entire Jewish population that the extermination camps were built and industrialised mass slaughter of Jews began in earnest. This decision to systematically kill the Jews of Europe was made by the time of, or at the Wannsee conference, which took place in Berlin, in the Wannsee Villa on January 20, 1942.

On his strategy as a military leader, he had the uncanny ability to commit precise details to memory, particularly historical information, technical facts, economic statistics, and past personal experiences. It enabled him to retain inessentials exactly and to store away everything he ever saw: his teachers and classmates; the figures in the Wild West stories of Karl May; the authors of books he had once read; even the brand name of the bicycle he had used as a courier in 1915. To compensate for Hitler's lack of education in the technical field, he would read everything that was put in front of him. Irving (1977:87) is unsure if Hitler had a secret method, which enhanced his power of memory but does offer the following as an example of Hitler's retentive ability:

> When the red book of arms production reached him each month, he would take a scrap of paper and using a coloured pencil selected from the tray on his desk, scribble down a few random figures as he ran his eyes over the columns. Then he would throw away the paper-but the figures remained indelibly in his memory-column by column, year after year-to confound his bureaucratic but more fallible aides with the proof of their own shortcomings. One month he pounded on a printing error in the current red book: an '8' instead of a '3'. He remembered the right figure from the previous month's edition.

Hitler had an amazing memory, and this served him well to comprehend technical matters and problems with armaments. He relied heavily on civilian professionals to run his armament programme hence he felt military technologists were lazy, bureaucratic and backward. Hitler also credited his military strategy to the experience he gained as a common soldier in WWI where he received the coveted Iron Cross Second Class and First Class which was Germany's highest decorations during the period.

Hitler also possessed the ability to adjust his conversation to the mentality of his advance. He could discuss highly technical issues with industrialists, engage in political conversation with diplomats, or simplify complex problems to a level easily understood by the common working class. He used this to build self-confidence by not allowing himself to be intimidated when surrounded by those of a higher

educational or cultural background and could comfortably discuss any topic. He always knew why a person wanted to see him before they arrived and had his counter-arguments so well proposed that the individual would leave convinced that Hitler's logic was sound and reasonable.

In summary, the main point of Hitler's strategy was the accumulation of **lebensraum** for the German race. The intended strategy to achieve these goals was a series of relatively short wars, employing 'blitzkrieg' tactics, to defeat the opponent at a time, and thus securing more land step by step. These were to be intertwined with periods of peace, or stalement, when the German army could re-supply and accumulate force for the next war. The initial success of this strategy (the re-militarization of the Saarland, and the Austrian Anschluss, and the occupation in two stages of Czechoslovakia) stifled critique and gave Hitler great prestige. Hitler did not realise the turning point had come with the invasion of Poland. Both France and Britain had frowned at his expansion and declared war on Germany. In the later years of the war, Hitler's strategy became more and more based on intuition, flawed logic, and unrealistic assumptions. However, the strength of his hold on domestic foreign policy remained so strong, that his brilliance was not questioned, or quickly suppressed. In the final stage of the war, his actions and orders had turned into the rambling of a madman rather than any attempt to conduct a coherent strategy.

## 3.4    Criticism against Hitler's Strategic Thought

An analysis of Hitler's strategic thought reveals the very foundation of his weaknesses. His exacting memory enabled him to recall specific details from earlier briefings presented by his officers, and they had to be careful that what they told him in the future completely agreed with what they had told him in the past. If Hitler detected any deviation from what he was previously briefed, he immediately assumed his officers were intentionally trying to deceive him. This assumption continued to convince Hitler that his officers could not be trusted. By not trusting them, Hitler took the essence of leadership –allowing subordinate commanders the freedom to make decision based on their experience and knowledge of the battlefield.

Of course, this may be based on what Trevor-Roper (1956: xvii) suggested:

> He did not, like the men of 1914 'blunder into war' he went into it with his eyes wide open. And since his eyes were open, and other's half shut, or smarting from the dust which he himself had thrown in them, he was determined that he alone

should control his war. He alone understood his whole policy, he alone could vary its details to meet circumstance and yet keep its ultimate aims and essential course constant; and war, which was but policy continued by other means, was far too serious a business to be left to generals, or indeed to anyone else.

Hitler's distrust for his generals was based upon the success he had achieved in the early war years, which more often than not, was against the advice of his military experts. He thus began to view himself as a great military strategist, and coupled with the distrust of his generals, became the driving force behind Hitler's intricate involvement in military matters down to the minute detail.

Hitler's confidence in his military leadership ability, however, was filled with flaws. His military experience during the First World War, to which he was so fond of referring, was very limited. He lacked the experience of commanding troops in the field and never served as a staff officer, which severely handicapped his ability to assess and analyse a military situation logically from the viewpoint of a seasoned military officer.

Hitler consistently deployed troops into combat with complete disregard for such matters as supply, logistics or sustainment. Once new weapon systems were developed, Hitler's only concern was seeing that they were dispatched to the front as soon as possible without considering whether the men responsible for the equipment had been fully trained or if the weapon had been tested under combat conditions prior to use.

A major fault in Hitler's strategy was his belief that victory on the battlefield could be attained merely through the power of his own will. This erroneous conception was based on his belief that his success in the political arena and rise to power was directly attributed to the power of his will.

Hitler's decision-making process was also faulted; when faced with a difficult situation. Hitler procrastinated for days and sometimes weeks before he would resolve the situation and announce his decision.

Another blunder in Hitler's strategy during the history of WWII surrounds the infamous 'stop order' issued in the last days of May 1940 which allowed the British Expeditionary Force (over 338,226 men including 26,176 French) to escape from Dunkirk. The true reasons for Hitler's historic decision to issue the 'stop order' will never be known, just as this account is nothing more than a speculation, the fact remains

that over 336,226 men survived to fight another day. Telford Taylor best summaries the events as they occurred at Dunkirk:

> And so, while the British were preparing and commencing the greatest naval rescue operation in recorded history, Hitler and the generals wrangled about the 'stop order' and busied themselves with plans for the approaching offensive on the Somme-Aisne front. The 'stop order' would not have been issued but for the failure to grasp the urgency of getting the Allies off the coast before the resourceful might of British sea power could be brought to bear in huge salvage operation. The reprieve of the stop-order was a prelude to 'the deliverance of Dunkirk' (Taylor, 1958:255).

The next blunder was Stalingrad's "No Retreat Policy". Hitler's unrelenting policy of no retreat at Stalingrad cost thousands of German soldiers' lives. According to Duffy (1991), it was a policy of fanatical resistance. On October 14, 1942, Hitler issued this order to his troops: "Every leader, down to squad leader must be convinced of his sacred duty to stand fast come what may even if the enemy outflanks him on the right and left, even if his part of the line is cut off, encircled, overrun by tanks, enveloped in smoke or gassed".

Hitler's generals did not agree with his decision. He even promoted General Paulus to the rank of Field Marshal on January 30, 1943 to ensure his loyalty as the commander. However, on January 31, the final message from Paulus headquarters stated that Soviet army was at the door. Hitler learned the following morning that Paulus had surrendered and over 90,000 German soldiers had been taken prisoners.

This signalled a retreat of German forces across Eastern Europe until the German army was forced back to where it began in 1939: German itself.

## 3.4    Contribution of Hitler to 20th Century Strategic Thought

Hitler's strength as a military leader and the contributions he made to Germany's war efforts can not be overlooked. His phenomenal memory and keen eye for detail enhanced his ability to comprehend technical matters and problems with armaments. His extraordinary ability to assess the advantages and flaws of military weaponry resulted in major improvements in German tanks and warship designs. Hitler was not only an avid reader of military history, he also kept himself well-informed of his enemy's capabilities such as current weapon system development and war production figures- admirable  characteristics of good military leadership.

However, Hitler's mistrust of his military leaders, which made him suspect their recommendation, worked against him. In modern day strategy, a political leader must trust his military leaders and allow them a freehand to conduct strategy. Equally too, a political leader must not be involved in military matters down to minute details. He should allow his commanders in the field the freedom to make decision based on their experience and knowledge of the battlefield.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Briefly critique Hitler's strategic thought.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

The analysis of Adolph Hitler as a strategist has revealed a very complicated man who placed his own self-interests above his country, its people, and the rest of the world. Millions of people would die from his quest for **lebensraum** and the world would go to war. Hitler was convinced that he, and he alone, was capable of restoring Germany to her rightful place among other nations throughout the world. Hitler's early success in war against the advice of his generals, served only to verify his belief that his strategy was infallible. As the war lingered on, however, his leadership began to falter.

Let us conclude with a quote from Hart (1948:3):

> Before the war, and still more during the conquest of the West, Hitler came to appear as a gigantic figure, combining the strategy of Napoleon with the cunning of a Machiavelli and the fanatical fervour of Mahomet. After his first check in Russia, his figure began to shrink, and towards the end he was regarded as a blundering amateur in the military field, whose crazy orders and crass ignorance had been the Allies greatest asset. All the disasters of the German Army were attributed to Hitler; all its successes were credited to the German General staff.

## 5.0    SUMMARY

The unit has provided an interesting brief of Adolph Hitler's strategic thought. You have learned that Hitler saw himself as "an agent of providence, a man of destiny, whose vision of the future was infallible". This had informed his decision making process - his inability to accept criticisms from those who would not have agreed with his opinions, views, or decisions. You have also learned that Hitler did not trust his subordinates, and this to a greater extent was responsible for his

undoing. As an orator, he also used his speeches as instruments of political intoxication that inspired varying degrees of fervour in his listeners. His virile domestic policy however enabled him to project his strategy of **lebensraum**, towards the east.

However, Hitler's faulty decision-making process, especially of procrastination has been noted. You have also learned that his policy of 'No-Retreat' at Stalingrad, in Russia, and his 'Stop-Order' policy at Dunkirk were his greatest undoing.

In spite of these, you have also learned that Hitler has contributed to 20th century strategic thought. His emphasis on a virile domestic policy; public support for his domestic policy; his memory for keen eye for details; his emphasis on the political will in fighting a war are his contribution's to modern strategy.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Hitler's contributions to 20th century strategy can not be overlooked. Discuss.

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## UNIT 2     THOMAS SCHELLING

**CONTENTS**

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2.0     Objectives
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## 1.0     INTRODUCTION

In the previous unit, you learnt about the contributions of Adolph Hitler to strategic thought.  You learnt that Hitler's strategy was the accumulation of 'Lebensraum', achieved through a series of relatively short wars, employing 'blitzkneg'.  His military strategy however was questioned because of his distrust of his generals, hence the failure to allow them a free hand in strategy planning.  His decision making process was also uncoordinated.

In this unit, you will shift your focus to Thomas C. Schelling and his contributions to strategy in the 20th century.  Professor Schelling, whose ideas about strategy have largely been underpinned by his economic background, has made major contributions to strategy in the area of "enhancing our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis".  Schelling showed that many social interactions could be viewed as non-cooperative games that involve both common and conflicting interests.

## 2.0     OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the background to Schelling's strategic thought
- identify Thomas Schelling's strategic thought
- critique Schelling's strategic thought
- analyse Schelling's contribution to 20th century strategy.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1    A Background to Schelling's Strategic Thought

Thomas Combie Schelling (born 14 April 1921) is an American economist and professor of foreign affairs, national security, nuclear strategy, and arms control at the School of Public Policy at University of Maryland College, Park.  He was awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in economics (shared with Robert Aumann) for "having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis".

Thomas Schelling studied economics first at Berkeley and then at Harvard, where he did his PhD on the mathematical analysis of national income behaviour.  He undertook the latter all the while working for the administration of the Marshal plan in Europe and Washington.  In 1953, he became a professor of economics at Yale University, where he remained until 1958, the year he joined Harvard Faculty.  He taught economics and public policy at Harvard until 1991, and was instrumental in the founding of the Kennedy School of Government.

An economist by training, Schelling has made major contributions to the study of bargaining and the dynamics of collective action.  In his first book, *The Strategy of Conflict* (1960), he heuristically uses game-theoretical reasoning to elaborate a general conceptual framework for thinking about the dynamics of strategic interdependence between actors, as well as about the management of the resulting problems of coordination and bargaining (tacit or explicit).  He has used this framework to reflect upon the problems of nuclear arms strategy and proliferation, terrorism, organised crime and international bargaining.

In *Micromotives and Macrobehaviour* (1978), he goes a step further by proposing aggregation models in which individually rational behaviour produces anticipated collective outcomes that run counter to individual preferences.  He shows, for instance, that an individual's relatively modest preference for not being in a minority situation can lead to rather striking patterns of segregation that go way beyond the individual's initial preferences.  Collective outcomes, therefore, cannot and should not be explained in terms of individual preferences.

Schelling's economic theories about war were extended in *Arms and Influence* (1966).  In 1971, he published a widely cited article dealing with racial dynamics called *Dynamic Models of Segregation*.  In this paper he showed that a small preference for one's neighbour to be of the same colour could lead to total segregation.

Schelling began in 'traditional economist fashion' (Zeckhauser, 1989:156), focusing on central problems, advancing simple formulations, and describing his results in lucid and vivid language. Indeed, his academic career began in the area of international economics, and especially trade and tariffs. Yet "[o]nce the vital game of survival in a nuclear age challenged Schelling's attention, mere economics could no longer contain him" (Samuelson in Zeckhuaser, 1989:157). Along the way, he developed novel insights on a dazzling range of topics, stressing the applicability of his analysis to a broad set of actors and problems including military strategy and arms control, energy and environmental policy, climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism, organised crimes, foreign aid and international trade, the military draft, conflict and bargaining theory etc.

## 3.2    Schelling's Strategic Thought

Sharing in the post-war glory of rational theory, Schelling became a key contributor to rational defense strategy. Indeed, post-war international economic policy and military questions were intertwined. Schelling had learned about bargaining as a trade negotiator in international conferences dealing with U.S. foreign aid. This inspired him to see war as an especially violent form of bargaining. According to Schelling (1960:8), strategy's theoretical development had been retarded because "the military services, in contrast to almost any other sizeable and respectable profession, have no identifiable academic counterpart". This changed in large part due to Schelling's efforts. As a result, he played a defining role in shaping the ideas underpinning the "golden age" of security studies, stretching from 1955 until 1965(Ayson, 2004; Baldwin, 1996). Nuclear weaponry and related concerns, such as arms control and limited war dominated this period. The central question was how states could use weapons of mass destruction as an instrument of policy making, given the risk of any nuclear exchange.

The foundations for a general theory of strategy developed by Schelling, consisted of nuclear deterrence, crisis management, limited war, arms control, and coercion and compellence. His unique contribution involved viewing strategic situations as bargaining processes. Let us explain:

Focusing on the standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, Schelling observed that the two super-powers had both shared and opposing interests. Their shared interests involved avoiding a nuclear war, while their opposing interests concerned dominating the other. As a result, conflict and cooperation became inseparable. While the essence of crisis is its unpredictability, Schelling's theory of "salience" explained that settlements would tend to occur at certain

prominent points that focus the expectations of both parties, known as focal points.  In game theory, these are used as a device for equilibrium selection.

Schelling focused in particular on how the United States and Soviet Union could arrive at and stick to bargains by means of deterrence and compellence. The former involved dissuading the other from doing something, while the latter referred to persuading the other to do something.  With deterrence, the opponent must be persuaded that the costs outweigh the benefits of an action, while with compellence; the opponent must be convinced of the reverse. Deterrence and compellence are supported by means of threats and promises.  Threats are costly when they fail and successful when they are not carried out.  Promises are costly when they succeed and successful when they are carried out. Since the exploitation of potential forces is better than the application of force, it is key to use threats and promises while avoiding to act upon these.

The challenge is to communicate threats and promises in a credible manner. Indeed, the credibility of threats, and promises, Schelling argued, is central to nuclear deterrence and arms race. Here, he developed some counter-intuitive results. For instance, he showed that apparent irrationality, recklessness, or unreliability sometimes turn out to be a good way to achieve credibility and can therefore be strategically rational. Consider the following example, when a country makes a threat that would be irrational to carry out, Schelling argued, its credibility could be enhanced if the country appears to be irrational.  In addition, a country may be better off by limiting its choices in advance, known as pre-commitment. Moreover, a country needs credible second-strike capacity to deter a pre-emptive first strike.  In other words, a country needs its missiles to survive such an attack. Hence, populations are better protected by protecting missiles.  By extension, the ability to hurt people is conducive to peace, while the ability to destroy weapons increases the risk of war.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE**

Briefly describe the basic assumptions of Thomas Schelling's Strategy.

## 3.3    Criticisms against Schelling's Strategic Thought

Thomas Schelling has been criticised for developing ideas that were perilously lacking in the mud, blood, and local political determinants of real history.   As Sent (2006:8) has mentioned, Schelling rarely considered specific weapons or historical battles.

These criticisms bother on at least four points (Williams, 1991). First, he appears insensitive to ethical considerations. Second, he lacked deep historical knowledge. Third, he was more concerned with maximising coercive impact than with minimizing risk. Finally, the assumptions of artificial "strategic man" have not been found to be problematic. Let us now turn to concrete examples to buttress these criticisms.

Schelling's role in the Vietnam War casts a dark shadow over his strategic thought. In fact, some hold him responsible for plunging the United States into war with Vietnam (Ayson, 2002; Kaplan, 1983). The story starts with the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August, 1964, during the first year of Lyndon Johnson's administration. The Tokin incident was an alleged pair of attacks by North Vietnamese gunboats on two American destroyers (war ships). It resulted in the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which granted the President authority to assist any Southeast Asian country whose governments were in jeopardy. This defined the beginning of large-scale involvement of U.S. armed forces in Vietnam.

Planning to step up military action against North Vietnam in response to the Tonkin incident, Schelling's concept of coercive warfare shaped the resulting strategy of "controlled escalation" and "punitive bombing". In an effort to avoid a repetition of North Korean errors in Vietnam, national security advisor Mc George Bundy asked Mc Naughton and Schelling to develop a gradual strategy. However, he struggled with the question as to what kind of bombing campaign would best ensure that North Vietnamese picked up the proper signals and respond accordingly. Schelling reasoned that a bombing campaign should not last more than a few weeks. Yet, in the end, he had difficulty coming up with a single plausible answer to the most basic of which he was confronted. In Robert Kalpan's (1983:335) opinion: "Thomas Schelling, when faced with a real-life 'limited war' was stumped, had no idea where to begin". Hence, in addition to the limitations of the theory, he misconceived the factual substance of the affair in the Tonkin Gulf and the intricacies involved in the subsequent Operation Rolling Thunder. This made the U.S. to lose the Vietnam war.

## 3.4    Contributions of Schelling to 20th Century Strategy

As you have learnt in the preceding sections, Schelling's efforts played a defining role in shaping the ideas underpinning the "golden age" of security studies (1955–1965). This period spanned nuclear weaponry and related concerns, such as arms control and limited warfare. At the time, inspired by a need to address the nuclear challenge and concern about the erosion of the advantage of the United States, a replacement was needed for the Eisenhower administration's strategy of "massive

retaliation", and this was found in Schelling's focus on "limited war". President Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert Mc Namara later adopted this concept during the early years of the Vietnam War.

Schelling has been applauded for developing a general theory of strategy, consisting of nuclear deterrence, crisis management, limited war, arms control, coercion, and compellence.

Schelling is one of the main players in the effort to use game theory to tackle real world problems. Although, we may say that Schelling struggled with the fact that the fit between theory and practice was not as good as it may at first have seemed. The responses to the problems associated with game theory have led Schelling's fellow Nobel Laureate Robert Aumann (1987:8) to note, "You must be super-rational to deal with irrationalities… Thus, a more refined concept of rationality cannot feed on itself only; it can only be defined in the context of irrationality".

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

The twentieth century (cold) wars have influenced not only the context of science but also the content research. For instance, the emergence of military-university and military-industry complex may be observed in the aftermath of World War II. In the context of this so-called Cold War regime, the goals of scientific research included the winning of the Cold War and the administration of high profits to defense and defense related industries.

It was within this context that Schelling rose to prominence as one of the leading strategy experts. In developing his insights, he relied heavily on game theory. As a result, he became one of the main players in efforts to use game theory to tackle real world problems. Whereas Schelling laid bare the inherent logic of coercive bargaining, he discovered that the real world cannot be expected to conform closely to deductive logic. And as noted by Fred Kaplan (2005): "The dark side of Thomas Schelling is also the dark side of social science – the brash assumption that neat theories not only reflect the real world but can change it as well, and in ways that can be precisely measured".

## 5.0    SUMMARY

This unit has provided an outlet for you to understand the contributions of Thomas Schelling to strategic studies. You have learnt that Schelling is a product of the Cold War and this undoubtedly informed his contribution to strategy; a similar thing can be said of his traditional economic background. You also learnt that Schelling developed a general theory of strategy: Nuclear deterrence, crisis management,

limited war, arms control, and coercion and compellence. However, Schelling's thoughts have been criticised for appearing insensitive to ethical considerations, lacking deep historical knowledge; an erroneous assumption of the artificial "strategic man" and his preoccupation with maximising coercive impact than with maximising risks. Conclusively, despite these weaknesses, Thomas Schelling has played a defining role in shaping the ideas underpinning the golden age of security studies.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

Describe Thomas Schelling's contribution to 20th century strategic studies.

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## UNIT 3	ROBERT MCNAMARA

**CONTENTS**

## 1.0	INTRODUCTION

Deborah Shapley has written a highly readable and comprehensive study of the life of Robert McNamara, who rose to the presidency of the Ford Motor Company in the 1950s, ran the Pentagon (in the United States of America) from 1961-1968, and headed the World Bank until 1981, when he retired to private life. One interesting contribution of McNamara to strategy is his controversial role in nuclear deterrence during the 1980s (See Shapley, 1993).

McNamara has been involved in many important and controversial issues. For example, he helped escalate the arms race after the Kennedy administration assumed office in the US, even though it was clear that the famous 'missile gap' favoured the Americans, not the Russians. He was also a key figure in the Cuban Missile Crises, and was father of the controversial F-111 aircraft. Later, as president of the World Bank, he liberally provided developing countries with large loans in the 1970s, which eventually contributed to the Third World debt crises. One could point to many other issues that bear his handprints.

There was one issue, however, that overshadowed all the others, and that was Vietnam. Robert McNamara was the principal architect of the Vietnam War, arguably the greatest foreign policy disaster in American history. His legacy will forever be bound up with the war he fathered. More than 58,000 Americans died and many more were wounded, both physically and psychologically, in a losing cause.

With such an introduction, what are McNamara's strategic thoughts and how have they influenced the discipline in the 20th century?

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- describe the background to McNamara's Strategic Thought
- identify McNamara's Strategic Thought
- critique McNamara Strategic Thought
- analyse McNamara's Contribution to 20th Century Strategy.

## 3.0    MAIN CONTENT

### 3.1    A Background to McNamara's Strategic Thought

Robert Strange McNamara was born in Oakland, California in 1916. He attended University of California at Berkeley, majoring in economics and excelling in his studies. His personal experience during the Great Depression and liberal outlook at Berkeley combined to shape his liberal and social outlook. He enrolled in the Harvard Business School in 1937 and it was here that he acquired the management techniques that became characteristics of his leadership style. The concept of management based on the accumulation and analysis of quantitative data appealed to his disciplined mind and provided him with a tool for exercising control in uncertain conditions. After earning an MBA, McNamara worked a year for the accounting firm Price Waterhouse in San Francisco. In August 1940, he returned to Harvard to teach in the Business School and became the highest paid and youngest Assistant Professor at the time. Following his involvement there in a programme to teach the analytical approaches used in business to officers of Army Air forces (AAF), he entered the Army as a Captain in early 1943, serving most of the war with the AAF's Office of Statistical Control. One major responsibility was the analysis of US bomber's efficiency and effectiveness, especially the B-29 forces. He left active service duty with the rank of a lieutenant colonel and with a Legion Merit.

McNamara applied his management style in the military during World War II and in private industry (Ford Motor Company) after the war. The aggressive new management techniques earned McNamara and his colleagues the nickname "whiz kids". In November 1960, McNamara was named president of Ford Motor Company. But after one year in that position, McNamara was called to the new Kennedy administration to serve as Secretary of Defense, with a mandate to bring the military under control through the application of efficient management.

Although not especially knowledgeable about defense matters, McNamara immersed himself in the subject, learned quickly, and soon began to apply an "active role" management philosophy in his own

words "Providing leadership questioning, suggesting alternatives, proposing objectives and stimulating progress". He rejected radical organisational changes, such as those proposed by a group Kennedy had appointed, which would have abolished military departments, replaced the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) with a single Chief of Staff, and established three functional unified commands. McNamara accepted the need for separate services but argued, "at the end we must have one defense policy, not three conflicting defense policies. And it is the job of the Secretary and his staff to make sure that this is the case".

McNamara became involved in the substance and politics of government administration, and Presidents Kennedy and Johnson sought his advice on defense, foreign policy and international relations. The Vietnam War claimed much of McNamara's time and energy at the Defense Department, and over the years, he began to feel that victory in this war was impossible. His thinking on the war was gradually diverged from that of President Johnson, and Johnson abruptly nominated McNamara as the next World Bank president.

## 3.2    McNamara's Strategic Thought

When he served as the Secretary of Defense, McNamara's strategic goal of deterrence was to convince Moscow that a nuclear attack against the West would trigger US retaliation against Russia, thereby eliminating further Soviet military pursuits. McNamara also wanted to give Soviets reasons to refrain from attacking cities. In his "No Cities Doctrine" (1962), McNamara argued that:

> In particular, relatively weak or national nuclear forces with enemy cities as their targets are not likely to be sufficient to perform even the function of deterrence. If they are small and perhaps vulnerable on the ground or in the air, or inaccurate, a major antagonist can take a variety of measures to counter them. Indeed, if a major antagonist came to believe there was a substantial likelihood of its being independent, this force would be inviting a pre-emptive first strike against it. In the event of war, the use of such a force against the cities of a major nuclear power would be tantamount to suicide, whereas its employment against significant military targets would have a negligible effect on the outcome of the conflict. Meanwhile the creation of a single additional force encourages the proliferation of nuclear power with all its attendant dangers.

During the Ann Arbor Speech, McNamara equally argued that: "the very strength and nature of Alliance forces make it possible for us to retain, even in the face of massive surprise attack, sufficient reserve striking power to destroy an enemy society if driven to do it".

Soon, McNamara deemphasised the no-cities approach, for several reasons. First, was the public fear that planning limited use of nuclear weapons would render nuclear war feasible. After identifying additional targets in the no-cities strategy, the US Air force requested more nuclear weapons; second, the assumption that such a policy would require major air and missile defense, necessitating a vast, expanded budget; and third, negative Soviet and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) reactions. McNamara turned to "assured destruction", which he characterised as the capacity "to deter deliberate attack upon the US and its allies by maintaining the ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any aggressor or aggressors after absorbing a surprise first strike". As defined, assured destruction meant that, the US would be able to retaliate and destroy 20 to 25 percent of the Soviet Union's population and 50 percent of its industry. Later, the term Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) meant each side's capacity to inflict sufficient damage on the other to constitute effective deterrence.

In conjunction with assured destruction, he stressed the importance of damage limitation, which is the use of strategic forces to limit the death of the population and damage its industrial capacity, by damaging and diminishing the enemy's strategic and offensive forces.

McNamara's strategy was informed by the need for the Defense Department to plan, prepare and make policies against the possibility of a thermonuclear war. As he notes:

> No citizen, political leader or nation wants thermonuclear war. But merely not wanting it is not enough. We must understand the differences among the actions, which increases its risks, those that reduce them and those, which, while costly, have little influence one way or the other (McNamara, 1967).

McNamara was therefore concerned with the possession of actual destruction capability, that compels the aggressor to accept that the capability is credible, factual and there is a will to utilise it when the occasion demands.

Lastly, McNamara's strategic thought came to revolve around the concept of "first-strike capability". This meant that the US must not and will not permit itself ever to get into a position in which another nation, or a combination of nations, would posses a first-strike capability

against it. For such a position would not only constitute an intolerable threat to the security of the United States, but it would obviously remove her ability to deter nuclear aggression.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

Identify the main assumptions of McNamara's strategic thought.

## 3.3    A Critique of McNamara's Strategic Thought

Most of the criticisms levelled against McNamara's strategic thought border on his personality and style of decision-making. However, before we consider the defects of his policies, let us briefly identify his strengths as a decision maker.

McNamara was good with numbers, he had a terrific memory and possessed excellent analytical skills. Moreover, when engaged in intellectual combat, he was agile and quick. He also had considerable managerial experience before he began making the fateful decisions in Vietnam.

Nevertheless, he was a man with fatal flaws that were apparent before he became defense secretary, which ultimately did him and his country terrible harm. Shapely (1993) has identified such flaws: First, like Hitler, McNamara made snap judgements about important issues largely by himself. He was supremely self-confident about his ability to analyse a problem quickly and come up with a correct solution. He was not a contemplative or thoughtful man who carefully weighed his options before key decisions. He came from the "shoot first and ask later" school of management.

This point is illustrated by McNamara's controversial decision to adopt a counterforce nuclear strategy, which means the United States would avoid targeting cities in a nuclear war and try instead to fight nuclear war much like a conventional war.

Second, McNamara was not a strategist, which was probably the most important requirement for his job. He was remarkably ignorant about international security affairs when he became secretary of defense. Moreover, he had no training in the field of international politics. Simply put, he had no philosophy about war and politics in 1960 because he had rarely thought about these subjects.

Third, he made a mess of the weapons acquisition process. Among his notable failures were the C-5A transport aircraft, the F-111 fighter-bomber, and the MBT-70 main battle tank. He also made a mess

of civil-military relations. Vietnam was more of a strategic than a managerial problem, and therefore it is hardly surprising that McNamara was at sea when it came to strategic issues.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

Briefly critique McNamara's strategic thought.

## 3.4    Contribution of McNamara to 20th Century Strategy

The Kennedy administration placed particular emphasis on improving ability to counter communist "wars of national liberation", in which the enemy avoided head-on military confrontation and resorted to political subversion and guerrilla tactics. As McNamara said in his 1962 annual report, "The military tactics are those of the sniper, the ambush, and the raid. The political tactics are terror, extortion, and assassination". McNamara therefore identified the need to train and equip US military personnel, as well as such allies as South Vietnam, for counterinsurgency operation. Increased attention to conventional strength complemented these Special Forces preparations. In this instance, he called up reserves and proceeded to expand the regular armed forces.

McNamara's institution of systems analysis as a basis for making key decisions on force requirements, weapon systems, and other matters formed an important contribution to 20th century strategy. The most notable example of system analysis was the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) instituted by the United States Department of Defense Comptroller, Charles J. Hitch. McNamara directed Hitch to analyse defense requirements systematically and produce long-term, programme oriented defense budget. PPBS evolved to become McNamara's management programme.

## 4.0    CONCLUSION

The analysis of Robert McNamara has revealed a deterrence strategist rooted in the demand for the United States to build and maintain a highly reliable ability to inflict unacceptable damage upon any single aggressor or a combination of aggressors at any time during the course of a strategic nuclear exchange, even after absorbing a surprise first attack. Thus, assured destruction capability formed the vortex of McNamara's defense strategy.

When calculating the force required in countering the aggressor, McNamara maintained that the US must be conservative in all its estimate of both a potential aggressor's capability and its intentions. As he further argued:

> Security depends upon assuming a worst plausible case, and having the ability to cope with it. In that eventuality, we must be able to absorb the total weight of nuclear attack on our country - on our retaliatory forces, on our command and control apparatus, on our industrial capacity, on our cities, and our population, and still be capable of damaging the aggressor to the point that his society would be simply no longer viable in twentieth-century terms. That is what deterrence of nuclear aggressors' means. It means the certainty of suicide to the aggressor, not merely to his military forces, but his society as a whole (McNamara, 1967).

## 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, you have learned about the background of McNamara and how this has shaped his strategy. You have been informed that McNamara's strategic goal was to deter USSR that a nuclear war against the US, its allies and strategic interests abroad would trigger the US retaliation. However, McNamara's involvement in the controversial Vietnam War, especially his counterforce nuclear strategy has been questioned. It was concluded that despite his contribution in training and equipping military personnel, institutionalisation of a systems analysis, and cost reduction, McNamara's strategic decision-making was greatly flawed.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

To what extent did Robert McNamara make nuclear weapons the basis of his strategy?

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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## UNIT 4    JOHN BOYD

**CONTENTS**

## 1.0    INTRODUCTION

Since the advent of heavier–than–air flight in 1903, theorists have posited numerous schemes to best exploit the inherent ability of aircraft to rise above the fray of the battlefield and go straight to the heart of an enemy nation. From seeds sown by the Italian pioneers, Gianni Caproni and Guilio Douhet, strategic air power theory has steadily evolved throughout the twentieth century. Along the way, it has been fashioned by harsh lessons of war, remarkable advances in technology, and the visionary concepts of a few, select airmen.

In this unit, you would be introduced to Colonel John Boyd, who together with John Warden, have significantly contributed to the evolutionary process. While Boyd does not offer an air power theory per se, his thoughts on conflict have significant implications for the employment of air power at all levels of war. This unit summarises and critique Boyd's thought as they pertain to strategic conventional air power. It also highlights Boyd's contribution to the evolution of air power theory and 21st century strategy.

## 2.0    OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

- explain the notion of strategic paralysis
- identify Boyd's Strategic thought
- critique Boyd's Strategic thought
- analyse Boyd's Contributions to 20th Century Strategy.

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## 3.0     MAIN CONTENT

## 3.1     The Notion of Strategic Paralysis

It is the function of grand strategy to discover and exploit the Achilles' heel of the enemy nation (H. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy). Seven years after the "war to end all wars", Basil H. Liddell Hart published the first of his many books on military strategy and modern-day war. Its title, "Paris on the Future of War", recalled the mythical defeat of Achilles by his opponent, Paris via the surgical strike of a well-aimed arrow. As the title further suggested, attacking enemy vulnerabilities (vice strengths) could and should serve as the role model for the conduct of war in the years ahead. The killing fields of World War I had certainly made Paris' strategy preferable; the technologies of flight and mechanization seemed to make it possible as well. Thus, the search began for those key vulnerabilities of an enemy nation, which were crucial to its survival and protected by the sword and shield of its armed forces. Along the way, the notion of paralysis was reintroduced into the lexicon of military strategy.

Strategic paralysis is a military option with physical, mental, and moral dimensions, which intends to disable rather than destroy the enemy. It seeks maximum possible political effect or benefit with minimum necessary military effort or cost. It aims at rapid decision through a "maneuver battle" directed against an adversary's physical and mental capability to sustain and control its war effort to diminish its moral will to resist. With this working definition in place, we now examine the ideas of our first modern-day theorists of strategic paralysis, Col. John Boyd.

## 3.2     A Background to Boyd's Strategic Thought

Colonel John Boyd (January 23, 1927 to March 9, 1997) was a United States Air Force Pilot and military strategist of the late 20th century whose theories have been highly influential in the military and in business.

Boyd was born in Erie, Pennsylvania. He graduated from the University of Iowa with a Bachelor's degree in economics and from Georgia Tech with a Bachelor's degree in industrial engineering. Boyd enlisted in the U.S. Army and served in the Army Air Corps from 1945 to 1947. He subsequently served as a U.S. Air Force Officer from July 8, 1951 to August 31, 1975. He was known as the "Forty-Second Boyd" for his ability to beat any opposing pilot in aerial combat in less than forty seconds.

Boyd died of cancer in Florida on March 9, 1997 at 70. He was buried with full military honour at Arlington National Cemetery on March 20, 1997. Boyd's funeral was meant to have fly-over by F-155 from the USAF's 1st Fighter Wing, but it was cancelled at the last minute because of slight haze, vindicating Boyd's life-long insistence that it was impossible to build a true all-weather fighter.

## 3.3    Boyd's Theory of Strategic Thought

The tactical seeds of John Boyd's theory were sown throughout his Air Force career spanning nearly three decades.  During the Korean War, Boyd, a fighter pilot who flew the F–86 sabre up and down "Mig Alley", developed his first intuitive appreciation of the efficacy of what he would later refer to as "fast transient maneuvers".  However, before we leap into this theory, we are reminded to note the technical nature of Boyd's thought, especially his observation – orientation – decision – action (OODA) loop.

What then are the key assumptions of Boyd's Theory of Strategic Paralysis?  Let us begin by understanding that Boyd's theory of conflict advocates a form of manoeuvre warfare that is more ***psychological*** and ***temporal*** in its orientation than physical and spatial (Hammond, 1994).  Its military object is "to break the spirit and will of the enemy command by creating surprising and dangerous operational or strategic situations" (Lind, 1979:22).  To achieve this end, one must operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than one's adversaries.  Put differently, the aim of Boyd's manoeuvre warfare is to render the enemy powerless ***by denying him the time to mentally cope*** with the rapidly unfolding, and naturally uncertain circumstances of war.  One's military operations aim to:

a)  create and perpetuate a highly fluid (unpredictable) and menacing state of affairs for the enemy, and
b)  disrupt or incapacitate his ability to adapt to such an environment.

Based upon an analysis of ancient and modern military history, Boyd identifies four key qualities of successful operations:

- initiative
- harmony
- variety, and
- rapidity

Collectively, these characteristics allow one to adapt to and to shape the uncertain, friction-filled environment of war.  Boyd credits Clausewitz for recognising the need to improve one's adaptability in war by

minimizing one's own frictions. In addition, borrowing from Sun Tzu, Boyd insisted that friction can be used to shape the conflict in one's favour by creating and exploiting the friction faced by one's opponent. He then relates this idea of minimising friendly friction and maximising enemy friction to his key qualities of initiative, harmony, variety and rapidity.

To minimise friendly friction, one must act and react more quickly than one's opponent. This is best accomplished by the exercise of **initiative** at the lower levels within a chain-of-command. However, this decentralised control of how things are done must be guided by a centralised command of what and why things are done. This shared vision of a single commander's intent ensures strategic and operational **harmony** among the various tactical actions and reactions. Without a common aim and similar outlook on how best to satisfy the commander's intent, subordinate freedom-of-action risks disunity of efforts and an attendant increase in friction. Therefore, to maximize friction, one should plan to attack a **variety** of actions, which can be executed with the greatest possible **rapidity.**

While Boyd's theory of conflict addresses all levels of war (to include the grand strategy), his submission on the operational and strategic levels are more germane. At the operational level, Boyd speaks of severely disrupting the adversary's combat operation process used to develop and execute his initial and subsequent plans. The disruption occurs by rapidly and repeatedly presenting the enemy with a **combination of ambiguous, but threatening events and deceptive** but non-threatening ones. These multiple events, compressed in time, will quickly generate mismatches, or anomalies, between those actions the opponent believes to threaten his survival and those, which actually do. The enemy must eliminate these mismatches between perception and reality if his reactions are to remain relevant – that is, if he is to survive.

In what is perhaps the most well known feature of Boyd's theory, he contends that all rational human behaviour, individual or organizational, can be depicted as a continual cycling through four distinct tasks:

- observation
- orientation
- decision, and
- action

Boyd refers to these decision-making cycles as the "OODA loop" (Fig. 1). Using this construct, the crux of winning via loosing becomes the relational movement of opponents through their respective OODA loops. The winner will be he who repeatedly observes, orients, decides

and acts more rapidly (and accurately) than his enemy. By so doing, he "folds his opponent back inside himself" and eventually makes enemy reaction totally inappropriate to the situation at hand. The key to attaining a favourable edge in OODA loop speed and accuracy (and, hence, to winning instead of losing) is efficient and effective orientation.

For Boyd, to survive and grow within a complex, ever-changing world of conflict, we must effectively and efficiently orient ourselves; that is, we must quickly and accurately develop mental images, or schema, to help comprehend and cope with the vast array of threatening and non-threatening events we face.



Figure 1. Boyd's OODA Loop

Boyd proposes that success in conflict stems from getting inside an adversary's OODA loop and staying there. The military commander can do this in two supplementary ways:

**First,** he must minimise his own friction through initiative and harmony of response;

**Second,** he must maximize his opponents' friction through variety and rapidity of response.

Using an analytical model developed by political scientist Robert Pape, Boyd's theory of strategic paralysis can be depicted as follows in Figure 2.

**Figure 2:  Boyd's Theory of Conflict**
**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 1**

With the aid of a well-labelled diagram, describe Boyd's Theory of Strategic Paralysis.

## 3.4    A Critique of Boyd's Strategic Theory

Boyd's theory has been criticised on several grounds.

First, Boyd's theory yields only temporary advantage, because the Boyd environment is totally interactive until one side or the other ceases to challenge for the initiative.  Thus, the great strength of the Boyd concept is also its greatest weakness.  It is psychologically oriented in its focus and time-critical in execution.  Consequently, it is not subject to simple, quantifiable measures and, although it promises economical victory to the side that best uses it, the accompanying uncertainties encourages indecision and protracted debate, particularly at the strategic and grand strategic levels, both of which benefit the opponent's cycle time. Indeed, it may be in his interest to refuse to play by our rules.

Second, there is a great misconception of the "OODA loop" as a sequential step-model: first observe, then orient, then decide, then act. Boyd truly has himself to blame for this since he briefed it just this way many times.  The problem as Boyd came to realise, is that it cannot work.  Organisms do not stop observing while they make decisions, or at least those that survive do not.  It is not a good formula for winning against an intelligent and resourceful opponent.

Thirdly, Boyd readily acknowledges the influence of Maoism and other Eastern philosophies of war on his own thought, evident in his emphasis on the temporal dimension of war; specifically, in his incorporation of the notion of time as a weapon.  Yet, he failed to fully appreciate this weapon in the context of Taoisms yin and yang.  The "duality of opposites" suggests, and twentieth century revolutionary warfare supports, the conclusion that time can be the most potent force in either its contracted or its protracted forms.

Fourthly, more thought is necessary to place Boyd into a context that takes into account the precepts of such theorists as Clausewitz.  For example, current command and control initiatives rely heavily on computerization and communication nets and place decision-making authority at high levels.  What is the effect of the Clausewitzian "fog of war" on such a structure, and how would a Boyd analysis suggest we meet the problem?  Evidently, Boyd seemed to have largely ignored this issue.

### 3.5    Contributions of Boyd to 21st Century Strategy

Boyd, recognising the limitations of conventional analysis, which tends to contrite on the skill of the victor in the art of war introduced an unconventional approach to an analysis of conflict, i.e. the "fast transient" theory.  While not denying the truths apparent in using the principles of war, Boyd's approach came to integrate them into a more rigorous analytical framework.  It does this as a function of time and focuses attention specifically on the psychology of the enemy commander, rather than primarily on his forces.

John Boyd's thoughts which are process-oriented have also contributed to 21st century strategy in the area of *psychological* paralysis.  He speaks of folding an opponent back inside himself by operating inside his OODA loop.  This serves the adversary's external bounds with the environment and thereby forces an inward orientation upon him.  This was amply demonstrated during the Gulf War.  Boyd has also contributed to how strategic paralysis through control warfare, can control warfare, and the implications of how best to organise, equip and employ the air forces of tomorrow.

**SELF ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 2**

Boyd's greatest contribution to 21st century strategy is his OODA construct. Discuss.

### 4.0    CONCLUSION

Boyd's theory of conflict is Clausewitzian in the sense that it is philosophical, emphasises the mental and moral spheres of conflict, and considers it important to teach warriors how to think – that is to teach the genius of war.  The Boyd theory has both new elements of challenge and traditional approaches to thinking about conflict and elements of continuity with such concepts as the principles of war that may be very difficult to deal with.  Nevertheless, it offers a very useful analytical structure to those who seek to study conflict situations, particularly warfare.

### 5.0    SUMMARY

In this unit, attempt has been made to explain John Boyd's theory of conflict. You have learned that Boyd was an expert in both the tactical and aerial combat. His theory advocates a form of manoeuvre warfare that is more psychological and temporal in its orientation than physical and spatial. You have also learned that his theory focuses on operational

and strategic levels. Boyd has also been credited with the introduction of the decision making cycle referred to as the OODA loop. Boyd's theory however has received a dose of criticism, especially assumption that decision makers must necessarily observe, orient, decide, and then take action. Organisms do not stop observing while they make decisions, or at least those that survive do not.  It is not a good formula for winning against an intelligent and resourceful opponent.

## 6.0    TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

With the aid of a well-labelled diagram, briefly describe Boyd's OODA loop.

## 7.0    REFERENCES/FURTHER READINGS

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