NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA

DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN AFRICA: DES 417

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

COURSE GUIDE

Course Developers:

Department of Development Studies, National Open University, Abuja.

Dr. Akujobi, Chiedoziem Theophilus

Department of Sociology, Kingsley Ozumba Mbadiwe University, Ogboko Imo State.

Course Editor:

National Open University of Nigeria, Jabi, Abuja FCT

CONTENT

Introduction

Welcome to DES: 417. Development Trends in Africa

DES: 417 Development trends in Africa is a 2-credit and one-semester undergraduate course for developments and Sociology students. The course is sixteen units spread across fourteen lectures week. This course guide provides you with an insight into the study of Development trends in Africa, and all that it will take you to complete and walk through your way in understating issues in the study of Development trends in Africa. Some general guidelines are suggested for the amount of time required of you on each unit in order to achieve the course aims and objectives successfully. Answers to your tutor marked assignments (TMAs) are therein already.

Course Content

The course is centred on the basic and broad issues in Africa's transitions, including demographic, economic, technological, urban and socio-political. These transitions are all connected, and together they will shape the future of the continent. Yet this trend is neither stable nor even. Your application of the knowledge derived herein will provide you a wider view of issues in development. The areas covered in this guide include; Concepts and Principles of Development; Trends and Development; Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism; The Nature of Economic Relations between African States and the rest of the world; Appraisal of Development Strategies and Performance in Africa; Comparative Analysis of Development Experiences in selected African Countries; Key Drivers of Development in Africa, Leadership, Institutions and Governance of

Infrastructures in Africa, Burden of Loan/Debt on Africa; Recent trends in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Africa's export Portfolio; African Countries and Development Partners; Challenges of Development in Africa.

Course Aims

The aim of this course is to give you in-depth understanding of the study of Development trends in Africa. It will also guide the study on the definition and scope of demographic, economic, technological, urban and socio-political processes and theories of African's development.

Course Objectives

To achieve the aims of this course, there are overall objectives which the course is out to achieve, though, there are set out objectives for each unit. The unit objectives are included at the beginning of a unit; you should read them before you start working through the unit. You may want to refer to them during your study of the unit to check on your progress. You should always look at the unit objectives after completing a unit. This is to assist the students in accomplishing the tasks entailed in this course. In this way, you can be sure you have done what was required of you by the unit. The objectives serves as study guides, such that student could know if he is able to grab the knowledge of each unit through the sets of objectives in each one. At the end of the course period, the students are expected to be able to:

- Have a clear understanding of the concepts and principles of Development trends in

Africa

- Understand the scope and trends of Development in Africa
- Describe the development trend of Africa from Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism era
- Understand the Nature of Economic Relations between African States and the rest of the world
- Appraise the Development Strategies and Performance of African States
- Have a Comparative Analysis of Development Experiences of selected African Countries
- Examine Key Drivers of Development in Africa
- Analyze the Leadership, Institutions and Governance of Infrastructures in Africa
- Assess the Burden of Loan/Debt on Africa
- Understand the recent trends in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Africa's export Portfolio
- Describe African Countries and Development Partners; Challenges of Development in Africa

Working through the Course

To successfully complete this course, you are required to read the study units, referenced books and other materials on the course.

Each unit contains self-assessment exercises called Student Assessment Exercises (SAE). At some points in the course, you will be required to submit assignments for assessment purposes. At the end of the course there is a final examination. This course should take about 15 weeks to complete and some components of the course are outlined under the course material subsection.

Course Material

The major component of the course, what you have to do and how you should allocate your time to each unit in order to complete the course successfully on time are listed follows:

1. Course guide
2. Study unit
3. Textbook
4. Assignment file
5. Presentation schedule

Study Unit

There are 12 units in this course which should be studied carefully and diligently.

MODULE ONE: Contemporary Transformations and Development in Africa

UNIT 1 Concept and Principles of Development in Africa

UNIT 2 Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism

UNIT 3 The Nature of Economic Relations between African States and the rest of the world

UNIT 4 African Theories of Development

MODULE TWO: Global Trends: Paradox of Progress in Africa

UNIT 1 Appraisal of Development Strategies and Performance in Africa

UNIT 2 Comparative Analysis of Development Experiences in selected African Countries

UNIT 3 Key Drivers of Development in Africa

UNIT 4 Leadership Institutions and Governance of Infrastructures in Africa

MODULE THREE: Trends in Development Finance and Organizations for Regional Cooperation in Africa

UNIT 1 Trade, Imperialism and its implications on development crisis in Africa

UNIT 2 Burden of Loan/Debt on Africa

UNIT3African financial institutions, corruption, conflict and Regional economic development

UNIT 4 Recent trends in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Africa's export Portfolio

Each study unit will take at least two hours, and it include the introduction, objective, main content, self-assessment exercise, conclusion, summary and reference. Other areas border on the Tutor-Marked Assessment (TMA) questions. Some of the self-assessment exercise will necessitate discussion, brainstorming and argument with some of your colleges. You are advised to do so in order to understand and get acquainted with historical economic event as well as notable periods. There are also textbooks under the reference and other (on-line and off-line) resources for further reading. They are meant to give you additional information if only you can lay your hands on any of them. You are required to study the materials; practice the self- assessment exercise and tutor-marked assignment (TMA) questions for greater and in- depth understanding of the course. By doing so, the stated learning objectives of the course would have been achieved.

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Assignment File

Assignment files and marking scheme will be made available to you. This file presents you with details of the work you must submit to your tutor for marking. The marks you obtain from these assignments shall form part of your final mark for this course. Additional information on assignments will be found in the assignment file and later in this Course Guide in the section on assessment.

There are four assignments in this course. The four course assignments will cover:

Assignment 1 - All TMAs' question in Units 1 – 4 (Module 1 and 2)

Assignment 2 - All TMAs' question in Units 5 – 8 (Module 2 and 3)

Assignment 3 - All TMAs' question in Units 9 – 13 (Module 3 and 4)

Presentation Schedule

The presentation schedule included in your course materials gives you the important dates for this year for the completion of tutor-marking assignments and attending tutorials.

Remember, you are required to submit all your assignments by due date. You should guide against falling behind in your work.

Assessment

There are two types of the assessment of the course. First are the tutor-marked assignments; second, there is a written examination.

In attempting the assignments, you are expected to apply information, knowledge and techniques gathered during the course. The assignments must be submitted to your tutor for formal Assessment in accordance with the deadlines stated in the Presentation Schedule and the Assignments File. The work you submit to your tutor for assessment will count for 30 % of your total course mark.

At the end of the course, you will need to sit for a final written examination of three hours' duration. This examination will also count for 70% of your total course mark.

Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMAs)

There are four tutor-marked assignments in this course. You will submit all the assignments. You are encouraged to work all the questions thoroughly. The TMAs constitute 30% of the total score.

Assignment questions for the units in this course are contained in the Assignment File. You will be able to complete your assignments from the information and materials contained in your set books, reading and study units. However, it is desirable that you demonstrate that you have read and researched more widely than the required minimum. You should use other references to have a broad viewpoint of the subject and also to give you a deeper understanding of the subject.

When you have completed each assignment, send it, together with a TMA form, to your tutor. Make sure that each assignment reaches your tutor on or before the deadline given in the Presentation File. If for any reason, you cannot complete your work on time, contact your tutor before the assignment is due to discuss the possibility of an extension. Extensions will not be granted after the due date unless there are exceptional circumstances.

Final Examination and Grading

The final examination will be of three hours' duration and have a value of 70% of the total course grade. The examination will consist of questions which reflect the types of self-assessment practice exercises and tutor-marked problems you have previously encountered. All areas of the course will be assessed

Revise the entire course material using the time between finishing the last unit in the module and that of sitting for the final examination to. You might find it useful to review your self-assessment exercises, tutor-marked assignments and comments on them before the examination. The final examination covers information from all parts of the course.

Course Marking Scheme

The Table presented below indicates the total marks (100%) allocation.

Assignment	Marks
Assignments (Best three assignments out of four that is marked)	30%
Final Examination	70%
Total	100%

Course Overview

The Table presented below indicates the units, number of weeks and assignments to be taken by you to successfully complete the course, Development Trends in Africa (DES 417).

Units	Title of Work	Week's Activities	Assessment (end of unit)
	Course Guide		
Module 1 DEFINITION AND SCOPE OF MIGRATION			
1	Concepts and Principles of Development in Africa	Week 1& 2	Assignment 1
2	Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism	Week 3 & 4	Assignment 2
3	The Nature of Economic	Week 5	Assignment 3

	Relations between African States and the rest of the world		
4	African Theories of Development	Week 6	Assignment 4
Module 2 Global Trends: Paradox of Progress in Africa			
1	Appraisal of Development Strategies and Performance in Africa	Week 7	Assignment 1

2	Comparative Analysis of Development Experiences in selected African Countries	Week 8	Assignment 2
3	Key Drivers of Development in Africa	Week 9	Assignment 3
4	Leadership, Institutions and Governance of Infrastructures in Africa	Week 10	Assignment 4
Module 3 TRENDS IN DEVELOPMENT FINANCE AND ORGANIZATIONS FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION IN AFRICA			
1	Trade, Imperialism and its implications on development crisis in Africa	Week 11	Assignment 1
2	Burden of Loan/Debt on Africa	Week 12	Assignment 2
3	African financial institutions, corruption, conflict and Regional economic development	Week 13	Assignment 4
4	Recent trends in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Africa's export Portfolio	Week 14	Assignment 5

How to Get the Most from this Course

In distance learning the study units replace the university lecturer. This is one of the great advantages of distance learning; you can read and work through specially designed study materials at your own pace and at a time and place that suit you best.

Think of it as reading the lecture instead of listening to a lecturer. In the same way that a lecturer might set you some reading to do, the study units tell you when to read your books or other material, and when to embark on discussion with your colleagues. Just as a lecturer might give you an in-class exercise, your study units provides exercises for you to do at appropriate points.

Each of the study units follows a common format. The first item is an introduction to the subject matter of the unit and how a particular unit is integrated with the other units and the course as a whole. Next is a set of learning objectives. These objectives let you know what you should be able to do by the time you have completed the unit.

You should use these objectives to guide your study. When you have finished the unit you must go back and check whether you have achieved the objectives. If you make a habit of doing this you will significantly improve your chances of passing the course and getting the best grade.

The main body of the unit guides you through the required reading from other sources. This will usually be either from your set books or from a readings section. Some units require you to undertake practical overview of historical events. You will be directed when you need to embark on discussion and guided through the tasks you must do.

The purpose of the practical overview of some certain historical economic issues are in twofold. First, it will enhance your understanding of the material in the unit. Second, it will give you practical experience and skills to evaluate economic arguments, and understand the roles of history in guiding current economic policies and debates outside your studies. In any event, most of the critical thinking skills you will develop during studying are applicable in normal working practice, so it is important that you encounter them during your studies.

Self-assessments are interspersed throughout the units, and answers are given at the ends of the units. Working through these tests will help you to achieve the objectives of the unit and prepare you for the assignments and the examination. You should do each self- assessment exercises as you come to it in the study unit. Also, ensure to master some major historical dates and events during the course of studying the material.

The following is a practical strategy for working through the course. If you run into any trouble, consult your tutor. Remember that your tutor's job is to help you. When you need help, don't hesitate to call and ask your tutor to provide it.

1. Read this Course Guide thoroughly.
2. Organize a study schedule. Refer to the `Course overview' for more details. Note the time you are expected to spend on each unit and how the assignments relate to the units. Important information, e.g. details of your tutorials, and the date of the first day of the semester is available from study centre. You need to gather together all this information in one place, such as your dairy or a wall calendar. Whatever method you choose to use, you should decide on and write in your own dates for

working breach unit.

3. Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything you can to stick to it. The major reason that students fail is that they get behind with their course work. If you get into difficulties with your schedule, please let your tutor know before it is too late for help.
4. Turn to Unit 1 and read the introduction and the objectives for the unit.
5. Assemble the study materials. Information about what you need for a unit is given in the `Overview' at the beginning of each unit. You will also need both the study unit you are working on and one of your set books on your desk at the same time.
6. Work through the unit. The content of the unit itself has been arranged to provide a sequence for you to follow. As you work through the unit you will be instructed to read sections from your set books or other articles. Use the unit to guide your reading.
7. Up-to-date course information will be continuously delivered to you at the study centre.
8. Work before the relevant due date (about 4 weeks before due dates), get the Assignment File for the next required assignment. Keep in mind that you will learn a lot by doing the assignments carefully. They have been designed to help you meet the objectives of the course and, therefore, will help you pass the exam. Submit all assignments no later than the due date.
9. Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that you have achieved them. If you feel unsure about any of the objectives, review the study material or consult

your tutor.

10. When you are confident that you have achieved a unit's objectives, you can then start on the next unit. Proceed unit by unit through the course and try to pace your study so that you keep yourself on schedule.

11. When you have submitted an assignment to your tutor for marking do not wait for it return `before starting on the next units. Keep to your schedule. When the assignment is returned, pay particular attention to your tutor's comments, both on the tutor-marked assignment form and also written on the assignment. Consult your tutor as soon as possible if you have any questions or problems.

12. After completing the last unit, review the course and prepare yourself for the final examination. Check that you have achieved the unit objectives (listed at the beginning of each unit) and the course objectives (listed in this Course Guide).

Tutors and Tutorials

There are some hours of tutorials (2-hours sessions) provided in support of this course. You will be notified of the dates, times and location of these tutorials. Together with the name and phone number of your tutor, as soon as you are allocated a tutorial group.

Your tutor will mark and comment on your assignments, keep a close watch on your progress and on any difficulties you might encounter, and provide assistance to you during the course. You must mail your tutor-marked assignments to your tutor well before the due date (at least two working days are required). They will be marked by your tutor and returned to you as soon as possible.

Do not hesitate to contact your tutor by telephone, e-mail, or discussion board if you need help. The following might be circumstances in which you would find help necessary. Contact your tutor if.

• You do not understand any part of the study units or the assigned readings

• You have difficulty with the self-assessment exercises

• You have a question or problem with an assignment, with your tutor's comments on an assignment or with the grading of an assignment.

You should try your best to attend the tutorials. This is the only chance to have face to face contact with your tutor and to ask questions which are answered instantly. You can raise any problem encountered in the course of your study. To gain the maximum benefit from course tutorials, prepare a question list before attending them. You will learn a lot from participating in discussions actively.

Summary

Development trends in Africa (DES 417), as a course, exposes you to critical thinking in the areas of conceptualizing the meaning and principles of Development trends in Africa and how the complex demographic, economic, technological, urban and socio-political relationship of Africa interacts with its presents status to reflect the realities of Africa’s transitions, and development questions or gaps when placed on a balance with other continents of the world. You will be vast in development theories, demographic theories, dependency theories, modernization theories and African political economic thoughts.. You will also be exposed to the various definitions, meaning and indicators of development inclinations within the African setting, a clear understanding of Key Concepts in development Analysis and socioeconomic growth Theories.

Other areas this study guide will expose you, is in the area of Trends and Development in Africa; Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism; The Nature of Economic relations between African States and the rest of the world; Appraisal of Development Strategies and Performance in Africa; Comparative Analysis of Development Experiences in selected African Countries; Key Drivers of Development in Africa, Leadership, Institutions and Governance of Infrastructures in Africa, Burden of Loan/Debt on Africa; Recent trends in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Africa's export Portfolio; African Countries and Development Partners; Challenges of Development in Africa.

MODULE ONE: Contemporary Transformations and Development in Africa

UNIT 1 Concept and Principles of Development in Africa

UNIT 2 Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism

UNIT 3 The Nature of Economic Relations between African States and the rest of the world

UNIT 4 African Theories of Development

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5.0 Summary

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignment

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UNIT 1: BASIC CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN AFRICA

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The first unit of the study guide provides an understanding of the basic concept and principles of development in Africa. Development has *been defined by various authors* as universal history. Karl Marx (writing in the last century) described development as progression through a series of socioeconomic stages - culminating in socialism - through which a society must inevitably pass during the course of its history. Each stage represents a different 'mode of production', in other words, a different type of relationship between people and resources in the production process. The agent of change is class conflict which eventually leads to the end of one stage and the start of another - such as the shift from capitalist to socialist modes of production. This model of change is often called 'historical' or 'evolutionary'. Analysis of how development, in the past centuries has happened and impacted viable development trends and domains in Africa (VDDs), within specific countries and regions, as a basis for strategic investments and best-bet development options. The module is set to diagnose social-economic trends in Africa, such as, economic growth, agricultural and food systems, poverty reduction, public and private investments, foreign direct investments, political systems, regional and international trade, regional and continental integration, and cultural systems over the past centuries, in order to respond to key policy questions such as:

- What are the challenges and opportunities identifiable in these trends?
- How can these trends be used to define the "present" Africa and to envision a future Africa?
- How can African countries build on the opportunities to overcome the challenges?
- What are the optimal regional integration paths for the different regions?
- What new innovations, based on current trends, can trigger new rates of development?
- What new research needs to be undertaken to expedite the proposed innovations?
- What new policy incentives are required to accompany the envisioned change?
- Who are the actors that influence development in Africa?
- How can these findings be packaged to stimulate local and international financial support?

It is also an introduction into Pre-colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial Africa, the Nature of Economic Relations between African States and the rest of the world, African Theories of Development.

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to;

1. Define development trends from the positions of various thinkers or authors

2. Have an understanding of the historical background of Africa’s development

3. List and discuss the major enablers of colonialism in Africa

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Definition of Trends

The definition of trends could vary considering what it might mean to different people and scholars. Trends could be defined as Trend management. Since trends are very multidimensional, a high degree of attention is paid to them. Multidimensional means that many trends that one does not see in one's own country-specific narratives at first glance but nevertheless are often relevant due to chain and interaction effects. The second reason is that a trend in one's country can have very different effects in another. On the basis of these facts, great attention must be paid to dealing with trends. The management of trends includes:

- Identification of development trends- "Which trends are there or will there be in the future Africa to develop? And which of these are relevant to us?"

- Analysis of the effects and possible projections and scenarios of the development trends - "In which directions can Africa develop? What impact can a development trend have in general?"

- Analysis of the implications for country-specific development plans and innovation fields - "What does the development trend mean for our Africans’ continent?

Trend research and identification of relevant trends

You can't travel to the future to know how it will turn out. You can't read in any book what the world looks like in 15 years. You can only guess the future. A solid foundation of expertise and facts is important. The best source for the predictions and characteristics of trends is therefore to bring together as many expert opinions as possible. In order to obtain a good foundation from future information, with which you can continue to work in innovation management, a systematic approach, process and methodology is required.

Systematics for identifying trends

Systematics in trend research is not a high science. This involves many and intensive analyses of:

1. Megatrends: There are many public publications about megatrends. Megatrends are long-term developments over several decades that have a formative effect on all areas of society and the economy worldwide. Examples, the long-term effects of colonialism and post colonialism on Africans and Africa’s economy.

2. Setting: Unequal Changes in the trade relations and economic positions that also have an indirect and immediate impact on Africa’s economy.

Important questions to be asked and answered in trend research are the following:

- What impact do development trends have on our country?

- What impact do development trends have on our environment (e. g. deforestation and extractive resources)?
- What major changes will there be?
- What does this mean for development in Africa?

Methodology for Identifying Trends

The basis for identifying trends is the right questions as shown above. Answering them is nothing less than a creative process that requires a lot of knowledge, experience, analytical and creative thinking. Methods that provide information on trends and their effects are divided into primary and secondary research.

3.2 Concept of Colonialism

Because of enduring legacies and realities of enslavement, colonialism, imperialism, apartheid, neocolonialism, underdevelopment and structural adjustment programmes, as well as the new scramble for African natural resources, African conceptions of development continue to be a struggle for what Ngugi wa Thiong'o (2009a, 2009b) understood as 're-membering,' that is 'a quest for wholeness after over five hundred years of "dismemberment".' Development as understood from a decolonial 're-membering' perspective is basically a restorative and recovery project (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2015a, 2015b). After 1945, Africans and other (ex)-colonized peoples increasingly demanded that development be made one of the important human rights – the right to development. This made sense in a global terrain within which it was known that a combination of enslavement, colonization, apartheid and neocolonialism actively denied development to those regions of the world that experienced colonial difference.



Source: The mindful world: creating a culture of engaged living.Kony 2012 Be aware of the message. 2012. Available at <http://www.themindfulword.org/2012/kony-2012-be-aware-message/

A. Pictures of Partitioned Africa (source: Agenzia Fides, 2019)

The scramble for territories in Africa and the partition of the continent among the various European powers of late nineteenth century was triggered off mainly by the activities of one individual: King Leopold II of Belgium in the Congo Basin. King Leopold hired explorers led by Henry Morton Stanley to explore and navigate the Congo and arrange trade with the local leaders of the area. Publicly, King Leopold of a civilizing mission to carry the light "for millions of men still plunged in barbarism will be dawn of a better era". Privately, Leopold had the idea of exploitation and profit making at the expense of the Africans. Other European countries such as Britain, France and Portugal became alarmed and as conflict over the Congo Basin seemed eminent, Otto Von Bismarck, the then German chancellor who was a pacifist called for conference in Berlin to discuss issue regarding the annexation of territories in Africa and other issues such as the slave trade in

December 1884-1885(January). This conference is famously known as the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. The causes for the scramble and partition of Africa as discussed below. One impact of colonialism was the political centralization of territories having no central government or, where centralization already existed, the foreign take-over or domination of pre-colonial central government (Bockstette, Chanda, and Putterman 2002: 352). The extent of political control varied from colony to colony, and often within colony from region to region (Bergesen and Schoenberg 1980: 232). Many authors differentiate between an allegedly British style of indirect rule and an allegedly French style of direct administration. According to Herbst, British adherence to indirect rule is overstated and "the notion of a single-minded colonial approach to ruling Africa is therefore unsupported by the evidence" (2000: 82). Coleman draws the se styles as polar extremes of a continuum rather than as dichotomy and puts them in perspective: "in practice these forms have not been applied consistently either over time or to the different traditional authority systems within single territories" (1960: 265). Where there was the most effective indirect rule, the political integration was more difficult, and the tension between old and new elites more evident. In contrary, where direct rule was most effective, the political integration has been easier and less obstructed by old elites.

Lange (2004), analyzing the variation in British colonialism, argues that direct rule provided an administrative structure based on formal rules and had a centralized legal-administrative structure with a formal chain of command that linked the diverse state actors throughout the colony to the central colonial administration in the metropole; indirect rule promoted local despotism by allowing traditional rulers to be "rent-seekers extraordinaire." As a result, "the colonial state in indirectly ruled colonies lacked the capabilities to implement policy outside of the capital city and often had no option for pursuing policy other than coercion " (Lange 2004: 907). For a sample of 33 former British colonies, he constructed a variable measuring the extent to which British colonial rule depended on customary legal institutions for the regulation of social relations, by dividing the number of colonially recognized customary court cases by the total number of court cases in 1955.4

3.3 Major Enablers of Colonialism in Africa

Causes of the Partition of Africa

The twin revolution in Europe (France and Britain) changed the economic landscape of then European industrial outlook. The burgeoning impact of population increase, urbanization and the need to create a market system for the sales of their manufactured goods been produced by the industrial Europe placed a huge pressure for the exploration. This help boost the economy of the European nations and the surplus goods had a ready market system in Africa to purchase the products. The Europeans therefore saw the need to acquire territories outside Europe to serve as a market for their surplus goods and Africa was their answer since it was a newly found continent by the Europeans. In the Gold Coast and Nigeria for example, the Europeans supplied manufactured products such as gin, tobacco, hardware, gun, gun powder, iron, glassware, European blankets and cotton and silk products. These goods found a ready market since they were new and comfortable for the large African population. The British occupied the Gold Coast and Lagos Colony as their territory and the occupation of these cities benefitted their trade as they also obtained products such as gold, ivory, animal skin in exchange etc. This new economic enterprise therefore boosted the economy of Britain and they were therefore ready to do whatever is possible to prevent any other European country from benefiting from this trade in their territories.

Again the European territories in Africa served as a place where raw materials could be easily obtained at relatively low prices to feed European manufacturing industries. Raw materials that were in abundance and obtained by the Europeans in the Gold Coast are gold, ivory, timber, cotton etc. These products which were in great demand in Europe were converted into finished goods and were sold to both Europeans and Africans. This helped in the accumulation of more capital to establish other industries in Europe. So to the Europeans, Africa was very valuable at that time and no European country would allow another European country to establish trade links in the "occupied" territories for trade. In addition, unemployment in Europe due to population changes played important roles in motivating the partition of the continent by the Europeans.

During the industrial revolution, machines replaced human energy and this led to unemployment as the labor force required in the industries was reduced. This new situation displaced a lot of people in cities and there was high rate of unemployment in Europe. The European powers therefore started looking for territories where they can establish industries and employ their citizens to curb the issue of high unemployment rate in Europe. In the Gold Coast and other African countries all the European industries employed mostly Europeans while the local employees were few.

Another political reason for the scramble and the partition of Africa is some African ethnic groups were hostile to the early European explorers, merchants and traders. The European nations therefore saw the need to annex those territories where they have their explorers and merchants to protect their citizens. Socially, the Europeans wanted to spread Christianity into Africa in order to check the spread of Islam on the continent especially North Africa and some parts of West Africa. The Europeans saw the growing influence of Islam in North Africa and other parts of West Africa. The Europeans saw the growing influence of Islam in North Africa and other parts of West Africa as a threat to the spread of Christianity on the continent and must therefore be stopped with urgency. Even the African religion was considered as pagan so Africans must therefore be introduced to the light of Christianity. A good example is the Gold Coast whereby the Europeans (missionaries) established the Salem system for the African converts. Another social reason for the scramble and partition of Africa is that the Europeans wanted to extend western civilization, culture and education to Africa.

Unit 2: Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-colonialism in Africa

The slave trade is of course crucial to understanding the relationship between external trade and the emergence of capitalism in this period. Moreover, the question of labor coercion is crucial to the question of the emergence of capitalism, as it pertains to labor markets. However, goods were traded for external and domestic markets both before and alongside the slave trades – so although the issue of slavery remains central to the historiography of this period. According to most aggregate accounts Africa was stagnant, but recent scholarship shows that there was significant economic expansion in the pre-modern era. While growth occurred particularly on the extensive margin, driven by population increases, Africa also had recurring periods of intensive economic growth with increases in per capita income (Jones 1988, Jerven 2011). Market was an important institution in pre-colonial Africa. Karl Polanyi and others have argued that pre-colonial prices were set not by market forces but by custom or command (1966), but despite North's fear that the claims of substantivism were unfalsifiable (1977), Robin Law and others have documented that markets did exist according to formal definitions (Hopkins 1973, Law 1992, Austin 2005, Latham 1971, 1973). To demonstrate the existence and functions of markets in pre-colonial Africa is not the same as the question of factor markets. Markets for the factors of production: land, labor and capital were constrained in pre-colonial Africa. Such markets form as a response to scarcity (Austin 2009b). With some exceptions, pre-colonial Africa was typically characterized by a relative abundance of land and scarcity of labor. Thus, markets for land were limited, and labor was recruited with coercion – thus the importance of the institution of slavery in pre-colonial Africa.

Meanwhile, means of exchange that facilitated long distance trade and enabled savings did exist (Austin 2009b, 38), but a relative absence of intermediation meant that effective markets for credit and capital for third parties did not form. Thus, we discuss to what extent there were institutional constraints on economic development in pre-colonial Africa. Low population densities, high transport costs and scattered areas where cultivation of economic surpluses was possible were among the factors that constrained state formation and state centralization in pre-colonial Africa (Herbst 2000, Austin 2008 and Iliffe 1995).

Colonialism

Colonial legacy is the sum total of the political structure, culture and general polity handed over to the elite nationalist rulers or that which was left behind by the colonial administrators, "neocolonial" nationalist leadership, which affected post-independent Africa and still has an impact on contemporary African states and politics. The colonial ruling style of oppression of the colonial administration that was imposed on African states by the new African nationalist rulers was not based on the choice, consent, will and purpose of the African people. In other words, and considering the fact that some post-independent rulers run their states as if it were their personal property, colonial legacy is the inheritance of the state that belonged to the colonial administration from this administration by the post-colonial rulers in Africa. The DRC for instance was King Leopold's personal property (Shillington, 1989: 312; Meredith, 2005: 95). In like manner after the DRC gained independence in 1960, President Mobutu S. Seko ruled the state as if it were his personal property (see Young 1986). The selfish and exploitative character of the master-colony relationship that reigned in the colonialism time continued in different forms even after colonialism was long gone, and continues to impact contemporary African politics. One of the worst examples of colonialism founded ethnic rivalry and consequential conflicts is the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda which was characterized by the attempted extermination of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu races in the country (see Scherrer 2001): The death toll of this genocide is estimated at 937,000 people (Asiimwe, 04/04/2004). The colonizers created and stressed the difference amongst African people within the same nation even when these differences did not exist, only to facilitate their domination and exploitation of a divided people. According to a BBC report of April 2004 titled “Rwanda: How the Genocide happened”, it is claimed that the Belgians created differences between Tutsis and Hutus which did not exist before their arrival. These differences went as far as creating identity cards for Tutsi minorities illustrating their superiority over Hutus and giving them the leadership positions in the country. The result was hatred and the nurturing of feelings of revenge by the Hutu’s, which culminated in the 1994 genocide which saw the slaughtering of over 800,000 Rwandans within a period of four months (BBC News, 18/12/2008). Ethnic conflicts are not only rampant in contemporary Africa but are also very severe compared to those of other regions in the world.

Besides ethnic division and rivalry, another legacy which impacted African politics is the administrative style of the colonizers. The colonizers ruled without the consent of the people: they deposed and executed traditional rulers, when the latter failed to implement the instructions of colonial administrators or failed to serve the need of the colonial government (Shillington, 1989:354-357; Hochschild, 1998). During the independence struggle, Africans fought to recover their rights and the rule of law that “disappeared” with the advent of colonialism. During the fight for independence, Africans sought to be represented in political decisions, wanted to form their own parliament and vote for their representative as governors. This struggle and fight led to the change of laws and constitutional amendments in many colonies. In Nigeria, for example, the bill of rights was introduced into the country’s independence constitution and has remained a permanent component of the constitution surviving changes, truncating and breaches of the constitution, as has occurred in the past many decades after independence (Amadi, 2007). According to Amadi (2007), “whereas the constitution proclaimed citizenship rights for every Nigerian, the colonial laws that regionalized and ethnicized access to privileges and rights remained effective”, and remained a major problem during and after independence in most parts of Africa.

Neo-colonialism: European Patrons and Local Elite Clients

After Africans finally “won” the fight for their liberation from the alien dictatorship of colonialism, many nationalists were later upset to find that the economic, political and cultural exploitation of the continent actually continued in what became known as neo-colonialism (Mwaura, 2005: 5). Nkwame Nkrumah, a leading author and opponent of neo-colonialism was amongst one of the first Africans to decry the control of the colonizers in the newly independent states. Nkrumah (1975:415) observed that even though these states were independent, their economic system and eventually their political policy were indirectly formulated by the colonizers. Neo-colonialism operated in varying ways in post-colonial Africa: control over government in the neo-colonial state through foreign financial support for this state or through the presence of foreign consortium serving and upholding foreign financial interest. Whichever way one analyzes it; neo colonialism resulted in the exploitation of the African states such that the foreign capital entering the state to foster development instead “promoted” underdevelopment (Nkrumah, 1975: 415).

Nature of Economic Relations between African states and the rest of the world: Economic Interest, Conditioned Aid, Cold War and Its Consequences

Africa suffered great loss economically and politically under the exploitative and brutal colonial rule. This destruction was so intense that after colonial rule the continent was in no position to develop itself without foreign assistance. The raw materials and other natural resources which arouse European interest had been ruthlessly exploited without consideration for the local African population. In 1953, with formation of the European Community (EC) and the increasing unpopularity of the colonial rule, many European masters sought means of retaining their economic control and interest in Africa, following an eventual independence. Leading colonizing countries like France and Belgium did not want their oversea colonies to be left out of consideration in any European Community because of the economic advantages and resources that they provided the colonizers with.

According to the EC agreement, development politics had to promote sustainable economic and social development to the underdeveloped nations as well as foster democracy and the rule of law in these countries (Monar,2000: 119). In addition, Europe and the rest of the West (herewith after described as the Western nations) did not want to lose hold of Africa for fear that it could fall in the hands of the communist Eastern bloc that presented a political, economic and military threat to the capitalist West? With development aid, the EC hoped to reduce or stop the influence and spread of communism from the Eastern bloc to these new and underdeveloped countries. More than half a century after independence, with the supply of economic aid coupled with the resources in Africa, the continent is still the poorest on earth (UNDP, 2007/2008; World Bank, 1989; 1995).

What is wrong and what has been the role of foreign aid in promoting or hindering development of states on this continent?

According to William Easterly (2006: 133), foreign aid was simply transferred "from being spent by the best government in the world to being spent by the worst". Why then would the "best governments" in the world continue to finance the worst governments and allow this counter-productive effect which contradicted all the reasoning behind shifting their "tax-payers" money abroad? African leaders realized that failure to make a radical break with the past and implement “revolutionary” policies that would liberalize the state and their economies, were never responded to with any penalties. Thus, the purpose of the money transfer like its name “development aid” which was to foster development in the receiving countries instead produced the counter-effect and underdevelopment because of bad governments which were not confronted with sanctions in case of misuse of conditioned aid. In Kenya, for example, the government agreed to carry out the same reforms many times in the 1980s and failed to reduce its civil service and liberalize its economy, yet this government received grants which rose from one per cent of the gross domestic product in 1986 to three per cent in 1990 (Meredith 2005: 373).

Major theoretical issues in economic relations between Africa and the rest of the world

Modernization theory is used to explain the process of modernization within societies. Modernization theory originated from the ideas of German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920), which provided the basis for the modernization paradigm developed by Harvard sociologist Talcott Parsons (1902–1979). The theory looks at the internal factors of a country while assuming that with assistance, "traditional" countries can be brought to development in the same manner more developed countries have been. Modernization theory was a dominant paradigm in the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s, then went into a deep eclipse. It made a comeback after 1991 but remains a controversial model Wolfgang (2003). Modernization theory both attempts to identify the social variables that contribute to social progress and development of societies and seeks to explain the process of social evolution. Modernization theory is subject to criticism originating among socialist and free-market ideologies, world-systems theorists, globalization theorists and dependency theorists among others. Modernization theory stresses not only the process of change but also the responses to that change. It also looks at internal dynamics while referring to social and cultural structures and the adaptation of new technologies. Modernization refers to a model of a progressive transition from a 'pre-modern' or 'traditional' to a 'modern' society.

Modernization theory suggests that traditional societies will develop as they adopt more modern practices. Proponents of modernization theory claim that modern states are wealthier and more powerful and that their citizens are freer to enjoy a higher standard of living. Today, the concept of modernization is understood in three different meanings: 1) as the internal development of Western Europe and North America relating to the European New Era; 2) as a process by which countries that do not belong to the first group of countries, aim to catch up with them; 3) as processes of evolutionary development of the most modernized societies (Western Europe and North America), i.e. modernization as a permanent process, carried out through reform and innovation, which today means a transition to a postindustrial society *Gavrov, Sergey; Klyukanov, Igor (2015).*One alternative model is dependency theory. It emerged in the 1950s and argues that the underdevelopment of poor nations in the Third World derived from systematic imperial and neo-colonial exploitation of raw materials Abhijeet (2016). Its proponents argue that resources typically flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theorists such as Andre Gunder Frank that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the "world system" *Manning, Patrick; Gills, Barry K., eds. (2013).* Dependency models arose from a growing association of southern hemisphere nationalists (from Latin America and Africa) and Marxists *Smith, Tony (1979).* It was their reaction against modernization theory, which held that all societies progress through similar stages of development, that today's underdeveloped areas are thus in a similar situation to that of today's developed areas at some time in the past, and that, therefore, the task of helping the underdeveloped areas out of poverty is to accelerate them along this supposed common path of development, by various means such as investment, technology transfers, and closer integration into the world market. Dependency theory rejected this view, arguing that underdeveloped countries are not merely primitive versions of developed countries, but have unique features and structures of their own; and, importantly, are in the situation of being the weaker members in a world market economy.

Classifications of Theoretical Perspectives of African Development

The theoretical basis of integration strategies is mainly associated with the modernization perspective or paradigm. According to this paradigm the present and past state of LDCs is an original stage of development, i.e. the stage of traditional society, through which the now advanced capitalist countries (ACCs) had also passed. Consequently the process of development in LDCs is viewed as essentially consisting of moving from traditional society through several stages of development mainly derived from the history of Europe and North America. To put it differently, the goal of development is regarded to be the achievement of modern society which supposedly has the following typical features: social patterns of demography, urbanization, and literacy; economic patterns of production and consumption, investment, trade and government finance; and, psychological attributes of nationality/calculability, ascriptive identity and achievement motivation (Toye, 1987). Given the above assumptions, the state of underdevelopment was defined in terms of observable differences between rich and poor countries. Development implied the bridging of these gaps by means of an imitative process (Blomstrom and Hettne,(1987). The internal obstacles to this process were seen as being, inter alia, the following: (a) capital shortage, (b) prevalency of crude technology, (c) high birth rates and hence high proportion of dependants per adult, (d) high rates of illiteracy, (e) insistence on traditions, and the attitude of the population towards necessary changes, (f) lack of modern industries and low capitalization on land.

On the basis of the above and other internal obstacles, the following, at one time or another, have been regarded as solutions to the problem of underdevelopment, according to Ghai (1977: 1): capital accumulation; availability of foreign exchange; industrialization (first of the import substitution variety and then of export oriented character); population control; human resources development; employment oriented strategies; redistribution with growth - to mention only the star contenders.

The implications for strategy of such solutions were, for example, foreign investment, foreign aid, export led growth, and removal of factor price biases. Methodologically, Skocpol (1977) has listed the following objections associated with theories based on the modernization paradigm: reification of the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis; the erroneous assumption that all countries follow a similar path of development from traditional to modern (capitalist) society; disregard of the transnational structures that affect change in LDCs; and the employment of historical ideal types in their explanations. Empirically, Blomstrom and Hettne (1987: 24) have observed that efforts to classify societies using indications of transition and modernity have not been successful. However, the most devastating critique came from the dependency/world-system perspective to which we shall turn shortly. Although the dependency/world-system perspective aspires to replace modernization theories and actually, `in the academic world ... modernization theory became outdated in the early 1970s' (p. 24), such theories have also, as we shall see, been criticized by Marxist The Development Debates & the Crisis of Development Theories oriented social science theorists. Hyden's (1980 and 1983) works, although based on the assumption that (i) a paradigmatic shift is urgently needed in African studies and, (ii) that Africa is so much different from other LDCs of Asia and Latin America that recent theoretical advances in the understanding of development processes there are of limited value when applied to Africa, is, in our view, still based on the modernization perspective. But it is modernization theory clothed with Marxist political economy. Thus, the Marxist central concept of `mode of production' is employed as well as the insistence on internal factors as primary and external ones as secondary.

A brief summary of Hyden's (1980 and 1983) his major argument can be presented as follows: First, the roots of Africa's underdevelopment are not found in the international capitalist system but rather they are found in the resilience or persistence of the pre-modern and pre-capitalist structures of the continent's rural areas (1980: 3, 4). Second, although the peasantry in Africa is the creation of the colonizing powers, African peasants are more integrated into the cash economy than peasants elsewhere. The PMP is still the predominant mode in African societies (1980: 10-12; 1983: 6-8). Third, the PMP is characterized by a rudimentary division of labour and small independent units of production with no structurally enforced co-operation. Consequently, nature plays a central role in peasant production and there is also very little exchange between the various units of production (1980: 13; 1983: 6). Fourth, the use of rudimentary technology, i.e. crude techniques of production, and the lack of variety of production among the units has the following implications: production of basic necessities is both a full-time occupation and a primary concern of every peasant household - hence the domestic orientation of each unit of production; the peasants invest so much time and effort in producing the basic necessities that they become reluctant to take any chances including that of adopting new innovations even if this holds out the promise of financial gains. Herein lies the conservation and the so-called anti-modern behaviour of the peasants. This is also the reason offered as to why the peasantry should be viewed as a fetter to development efforts. In other words, the peasantry operates according to the law of subsistence rather than the law of value.

Challenges of African Development

i. Demography

Today, most developing countries have achieved quite low levels of mortality and fertility and much lower rates of population growth than in the 1960s. The situation is quite different in Africa, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In several SSA countries, mortality declines have stalled, or even been reversed in the 1980s and 1990s because of the impact of HIV/AIDS and civil unrest. Because of these trends, most African countries are confronted with two major population-related challenges. First, most countries in the region will need to tackle *the doubling or the tripling of their working age population*. This exceptional increase of the labor force could be called a demographic “heritage of the past”. It is the direct result of high fertility levels since the 1960s, a consequence of the lack of interest and a neglect of the demographic trends on the part of public authorities, the civil society, and international donors. Providing jobs to all new job seekers will be a daunting challenge. Today, in all but three African countries, the age group 15-29 represents more than 40% of the adult population (above age 15), a phenomenon known as the “youth bulge”. By 2030, 40 of the 53 countries studied are likely to continue to have more than 40% of their adult population in the 15-29 age group, and by 2050, 27 countries (half of them) will still be in that position of fertility decline remains as slow as it has been in the past. These young people will be more and more concentrated in urban areas and mega-cities (there might be 15 cities of more than 10 million in 2050, compared to only two in 2010). This could pose a significant challenge and, unless addressed satisfactorily, might translate into major social disruptions similar to those that have been observed recently in several Northern African countries during the “Arab Spring”. The second challenge facing African countries is related to the creation of the conditions needed to bring a better future for the African young generations of tomorrow. Future development and prosperity require a rapid decline in the presently high dependency ratios, as has been the case in today’s emerging countries.

This can only be achieved through a steady decline of the proportion of youth aged less than 15 or 20 years. Such a decline will allow reallocating parts of the important resources devoted to the health and education of large numbers of children below age 15, to the secondary and tertiary education of young adults and to the creation of jobs. In fact, the corresponding changes in the age structure fulfill one of the conditions needed to benefit from a demographic dividend. To sum up, the dual challenge of most African countries will be to deal with the demographic situation inherited from the past whilst preparing at the same time for a better future for the upcoming generations. This can be managed through the design and implementation of sound population, health, education, and economic policies. However, these policies must be put in place as soon as possible for these countries to be able to capture the benefits of a demographic dividend, trigger inclusive growth, reduce poverty levels, and eventually achieve economic convergence.

Mortality Levels and Trends since 1960

Life expectancy at birth, or the average number of years that a newborn would live under the mortality conditions prevailing at a given time, has increased in most African countries since the 1960s. But the progress has been slow, and thwarted in several countries by the deterioration of health services, the impact of HIV/AIDS, and occasionally civil strife and social unrest. In the early 1960s, mortality levels were high in most African countries, and therefore life expectancies were low: below 50 years (and in many cases below 40 years), compared to life expectancies in the selected non-African countries, which were generally above 50 years.

Fertility Determinants

Fertility outcomes are shaped by two sets of determinants. The intermediate determinants of fertility are essentially socio-economic in nature, and influence fertility *indirectly*. The proximate determinants of fertility which are mostly biological and behavioral influence fertility *directly*.

In most sub-Saharan African countries, the intermediate determinants--levels of education, health status, employment in the formal sector, income levels, urban residence--are still low. Policy interventions in these fields generally bear fruit with a lag, and their impacts on fertility vary from one country to the next depending on other variables, noticeably family norms, social networks, and cultural values. Total fertility rates of the wealthiest households are low and range from 1.9 to less than 2.5 children per women in only 5 countries out of the 40 countries considered here, i.e., Morocco, South Africa, Lesotho, Ghana, and Namibia. But in 10 other countries, total fertility rates of the wealthiest households are still between 4 and 6.4 children per women, namely in Uganda, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Benin, Guinea, Central African Republic, Mali, Burundi, Chad, and Niger. By contrast, total fertility rates of the “poorest” households are above 5 children per woman in most countries (37 out of 40 countries), and they vary from 6 to more than 8 children per woman in 28 countries. Obviously, the family norms favouring large families (expressed by the ideal number of children in the DHS) are still dominant among the “poorest” households. But these norms explain also the relatively high levels of fertility among the wealthiest households in several countries.

D. Urbanization and Mega-Cities

Between 1960 and 2010, the urban population of Africa increased by a factor of 8, increasing from 53 to 401 million. Despite this spectacular increase, the levels of urbanization in Africa remain low compared to other regions of the world. In 2010, it was estimated that about 40% of Africans were residing in 62 urban areas, but this percentage was only 23% in Eastern Africa, 41% in Middle Africa, 44% in Western Africa. It was higher than average in Northern Africa (51%) and Southern Africa (59%).

Rapid urbanization in Africa has led to 50 cities with more than a million inhabitants in 2010. Two with an estimated population of more than 10 million inhabitants: Cairo (11 million) and Lagos (10.8 million).

4.0 CONCLUSION

In this module and unit we have been able to have an understanding of the concept and Principles of Development in Africa, Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism, The Nature of Economic Relations between African States and the rest of the world and African Theories of Development.

5.0 SUMMARY

In this unit of the study guide you have been taught and learnt;

1. The definition of concept and Principles of Development in Africa by various authors
2. Pre-colonialism, Colonialism and Post-Colonialism
3. The Nature of Economic Relations between African States and the rest of the world
4. African Theories of Development.

6.0 TUTOR-MARKED ASSIGNMENT

1. Provide a concise definition of the concept and principles of development in Africa
2. What is the link between pre-colonialism, colonialism, post-colonialism and the development questions of Africa?
3. List and discuss the nature of economic relations between African states and the

rest of the world?

4. Discuss the major drivers and barriers of development in Africa

5. List and discuss the contending theories of African development

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MODULE TWO: Global Trends: Paradox of Progress in Africa

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The module is designed to bring to your knowledge the identifiable global trends (a general development or change in a situation that affects many African states: The growth of the African's wealth and the question of its management is part of a global economic trend). The paradox of progress is the idea that the more Africa as a society moves forward, the more problems are created. We will assess the Development Strategies and Performance of selected Africa states, Comparative Analysis of Development Experiences in the selected African Countries, examine the Key Drivers of Development in Africa, and interrogate the link between Leadership Institutions and Governance of Infrastructures in

Africa.

2.0 OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to;

- Identify the country-specific development strategies or plans
- Assess the key drivers of development in the specific African states
- Examine the link between leadership, institutions and governance in Africa

UNIT I: Appraisal of Development Strategies and Performance in Africa

CONTENTS

- ❖ Promotion of Intra-African Trade and Subregional Integration
- ❖ Preservation of Acquired Positions and Conquest of New Positions in the International Market

4.0 Self-Assessment Exercise (SAEs)

5.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)

6.0 References/Further Readings

2.0 Introduction

Development Strategies or Plans in selected African states.

Basically development planning refers to the strategic measurable goals that a person, organization or community, country plans to meet within a certain amount of time. Usually the development plan includes time-based benchmarks. National medium-term development planning may be defined generally as the exercise of forethought in an attempt to select the best policies, to be implemented over a period of years, for the development of the national economy. Development planning has a long and chequered history in Africa, and the continent's development trajectory has been influenced by various approaches to development planning since the early stages of independence. The first phase of development planning in Africa spanned the 1960s and was characterized by centralized planning with three to five year planning phases.

During this period, at least 32 African countries had a national development plan. This first generation of development plans continued to the 1980s. These plans promoted state-engineered economies with resources allocated by governments. It was notably the time of state-owned enterprises operating in most of the productive sectors. The second phase in the evolution of planning in Africa was marked by a wholesale abandonment of planning under neoliberal Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which emerged in the 1980s-1990s with the support of the Bretton Woods Institutions. SAPs aimed to reduce the role of the State in production and service delivery and placed emphasis on macroeconomic stability, downsizing of public sector institutions, privatization and reducing government spending and budget deficits. The social cost of SAPs is a sad story. The downsizing of the public sector institutions and massive privatizations led to net job losses; the budget restrictions compromised social service delivery and human capital development; and most importantly SAPs failed to yield the envisaged growth outcomes as the annual economic growth for Africa over the 1990s averaged only 2.1 per cent. In the early 2000s, SAPs were replaced by Poverty Reduction Strategies, which aimed at reversing the negative effects of a decade of Structural Adjustment on welfare and social conditions. PRSPs placed strong emphasis on poverty reduction and constituted conditionality for debt relief. Many African countries embarked on at least two generations of PRSPs, mostly to ensure eligibility for debt relief. Notwithstanding the principle of ownership and consultations that underpinned PRSPs, they lacked credibility because of the externally driven nature of the process.

Furthermore, PRSPs tended to place disproportionate emphasis on the social sector at the expense of the productive sector thereby raising questions about the sustainability of the poverty reduction agenda. This brings us to the present day, where there has been an emergence of a new era of Development Planning in Africa. Many African countries have developed Long Term Visions to guide their steps towards these ambitious objectives. These long-term visions are characterized by stronger ownership from African actors and a more consultative and participatory process involving a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including Civil Society, the private sector, decentralized constituencies and development partners. These broader national development plans often take into consideration various global and continental development goals and frameworks such as NEPAD. In summary, we will examine the impact of African economic development programs through the lens of the following;

i. Economic Models adopted in Africa

ii. African Economic Policies Post-Independence to Present,

iii. *Post-Adjustment Era: Neo-liberalism, IMF and the World Bank,*

iv. The Millennium Declaration in 2000

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to;

1. Identify and explain economic models adopted by Africa
2. Have an understanding of the historical background of Africa's economic development policies from post-independence to present
3. Assess the post adjustment era of Africa with the introduction of neo-liberalism, IMF and World Bank
4. Probe on African state and key drivers and barriers of the Millennium Development goals

Main content

2.1 African Economic Performance, Africa's Experience Of Development

The growth performance of African countries can be described as among the least encouraging economic performances of the twentieth century because of its dismal nature and disastrous socio-economic implications for its approximately one billion people. After gaining independence from the colonial powers in the late 1950s and early 1960s, African countries had high hopes for development; but most of them are substantially poorer now than they were when their nations gained political independence. Prior to the 1974 international oil shock, the growth rates were positive. For example, Artadi and Sala-i-Martin (2003) observe that for the whole continent, growth was around three per cent in the early 60s, close to two per cent in the late 60s, and slightly below 1.5 per cent between 1970 and 1974. Things changed dramatically in the second half of the 1970s.

The growth rate for the countries became negative 0.5 per cent in the late 70s, negative 1.2 per cent in the second half of the decade, and zero between 1980 and 1985. Growth dropped dramatically to a record negative 1.5 per cent per annum in the first half of the 1990s. The continent seems to have recovered a bit since then with positive, albeit small, growth rates for the second half of the 1990s and the first two years of the new millennium. There were exceptions, of course, with the oil-producing nations such as Nigeria, Libya, Gabon and Algeria; but in all these cases, though growth was positive, it did not trickle down. One only has to look at the Gini coefficient numbers for countries like Nigeria and Gabon to appreciate the fact that even when there was growth, it was very uneven; great individual wealth was generated but only for those in command of the post-colonial state. One should also note that from the 1960s to the 1990s, there was much political instability on the African continent taking the form of the Cold War competition between the West and the Communist bloc, the ideological struggle between Third World socialism (Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana) and neo-colonial capitalism (Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast), and the military anti-colonial conflicts in Southern Africa. These political events should be factored into any comprehensive analysis of post-colonial Africa. Taking the above into consideration, we note that the African growth performance has been very weak in absolute terms, but appeared worse if we take into account that, during this same period the rest of the world has been growing at an annual rate of close to two per cent. The biggest contrast in terms of development has been between Africa and the Asian continent. In the 1960s, most African countries were richer than their Asian counterparts, and their stronger natural resource base led many to believe that Africa's economic potential was superior to overpopulated Asia's. In 1965, for example, incomes and exports per capita were higher in Ghana than in South Korea.

2.2 Trade and Development Strategy

Where the Problem Lies

Empirical observations in African countries over the period 1971—87 show a relatively weak but positive correlation between exports and general economic performance. It would be a little hasty, however, to draw the conclusion that the link of causality between exports and economic performance is a one-way phenomenon. The availability and allocation of foreign means of payment constitute one of the key elements of this link, to the extent that all the sectors of the African economies, including the export sector, need to import products necessary for their activity. It so happens that the African countries' ability to import was sharply curtailed after the drop in their export earnings and their subsequent difficulty in gaining access to external sources of capital. The African countries were therefore dragged into a recessionary spiral in which the decline in their export earnings had a negative effect on the level of investment and consequently on the general performance of the economy, which, in turn, contributed to weakening their export potential. Given the economic crisis the African countries have undergone since the end of the 1970s, opinions vary as to the economic options for reviving growth, and the proponents of an export-oriented strategy contend, in an intricate theoretical debate, with those favoring a domestic-market-oriented strategy.

Initiatives for Solution

Beyond the purely academic approaches that establish the theoretical foundations of the theories proposed, we will be addressing the debate that has arisen among economic policy decision makers.

The Lagos Plan

The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its second Extraordinary Session, held in Lagos in April 1980, adopted a document entitled the “Lagos Plan of Action,” with a view to implementing the Monrovia Strategy for the economic development of Africa. The preamble of this document states, “Faced with this situation (the failure of earlier policies), and determined to undertake measures for the basic restructuring of the economic base of our continent, we resolved to adopt a far-reaching regional approach based primarily on collective self-reliance.” It is thus clear that the Lagos Plan’s approach is one based on a domestic market-oriented strategy, which, however, goes far beyond the limited framework of the national economies of the states concerned.

The basis of this approach is an explicit rebuttal of the development models used in Africa during the first two decades after the surge of independence, which tended to be, in many ways, a continuation of the prevailing economic system during the colonial era. In this connection, the Lagos Plan clearly indicates that “rather than result in an improvement in the economic situation of the continent, successive strategies have made it stagnate and become more susceptible to the economic and social crises suffered by the industrialized countries." The Lagos Plan of Action thus proposes a progressive reduction in the economic dependence of the continent on the industrial nations and the expansion of regional economic cooperation. But the question we may then ask is the following: What form should this reduction of dependence take? As the most striking aspect of this situation is the dependence of African economies on one or a few primary commodities, the main buyers of which happen to be the developed countries, does this mean that these exports have to be halted?

The World Bank Plan

Just a few months after the appearance of the Lagos Plan, the World Bank published a report entitled "Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa." The aim of this report was also to define a strategy for the 1980s in Africa. In the preamble, the President of the World Bank states, "The report accepts the long-term objectives of African development as expressed by the Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity in the Lagos Plan of Action." The report falls within the range of neoclassical analysis. Without neglecting the impact of the postcolonial situation and the weight of external factors, it covers factors that are inherent in the problems of the continent and, as a result, the solutions it proposes are appropriate.

Although the Lagos Plan has not been broadly implemented, the World Bank report, because of the Bank's significant financial resources, has, on the contrary, had a considerable impact on African economies during the period under review. The World Bank report may, in fact, be considered as the basic document for the structural adjustment policies implemented in Africa and one can, without risk of error, assert that the 1980s have proved to be the years of structural adjustment for African countries.

At the end of the 1980s, it is possible to offer, with hindsight, a tentative assessment of structural adjustment in Africa. While it is generally agreed that structural adjustment has achieved little, there is considerable disagreement as to what the reasons were. For some, the reasons lie in errors in the design or external constraints; others emphasize the way programs were misapplied. So should structural adjustment and its corollaries, liberalization and economic openness, be rejected? Certainly not!

Lessons of Foreign Experience

Because the conditions under which the development of the industrial nations of Western Europe and North America took place were somewhat special, it is very unlikely that any developing country will be able to make use of similar conditions for its industrialization. It would, therefore, be interesting to examine the experience of developing countries or countries that have attained industrialization more recently. In this respect, the experience of a number of countries that, thanks to their remarkable performance and, above all, to the rapidity of the process by which they have moved up through the ranks of the underdeveloped to those of the industrial nations, is pertinent in more ways than one.

About a dozen economies in Europe, America, and Asia are usually known by the generic name of newly industrializing economies. They are those of Brazil, Greece, Hong Kong, Mexico, Portugal, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan Province of China, and Yugoslavia. The newly industrializing economies of Asia are the ones in this group that have shown the most remarkable economic performances. Since 1960, they have had sustained gross domestic product (GDP) growth, made the demographic transition, and have become industrialized at an outstanding rate. At the same time, the growth of their exports has been coupled with a sharp redistribution of the structure of exports in favor of manufactures. Today, these four Asian economies, the largest of which supports a population of about 42 million on a territory no greater than 99,000 square kilométers accounts for over 50 percent of manufactured exports from developing countries. What is the explanation for the exceptional success of the economic policies implemented by these four? The reasons given are linked to both external and domestic factors, and it is their simultaneous appearance and combination that explain why the four have performed so well. Like all other economies at the lift-off stage, the Asian four had to face the problem of investment. In the lift-off initial phase, they had to call on domestic saving, encouraged by government incentives, especially those involving high nominal interest rates.

However, it was foreign aid, the availability of an abundant supply of manpower, low wages, and, last, foreign investment that enabled them to start up and then to consolidate their industrialization process. Significantly, American aid provided a total financial input of between 5 percent and 10 percent of GDP. The success of industrial policy in Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan Province of China can to a large extent be attributed to government policy in directing investment and in defining the stages and priorities in the process of industrialization. The initial phase in the development strategy implemented by the Asian four aimed at satisfying domestic demand by diversification and the creation of an integrated heavy industry. This strategy, labeled as one of import substitution, was followed by what was called an export promotion policy, which was started as soon as the two following conditions were met: the rationalization of industrial enterprises with highly labor-intensive innovations and the modernization of agriculture that sharply increased productivity. The performance of these economies underscores the fact that the promotion of exports produced more satisfactory results than those obtained during the import substitution phase and at a lower cost. There are three main reasons for this: (1) with the export promotion strategy, the costs are borne by the general government budget; whereas with import substitution, it is the entrepreneur and the consumer who pay. (2) Faced with international competition, export enterprises have to innovate and offer products at international prices and of international quality. (3)With a mainly inward-looking strategy, the economy is liable to severe inflationary pressure, the usual sign of which is an overvalued exchange rate. It can be seen from this analysis that the Asian four—outstanding examples of economies that are highly integrated into the international market—are in the vanguard of those that have achieved industrialization and development in the second half of the twentieth century. Is this sufficient, however, to allow us to conclude that an outward-looking policy would have the greatest development potential? A World Bank study using data from 41 developing countries over the period 1963—85 yields the following conclusions: After classifying the countries in four categories according to their trade orientation, it found that the links between trade strategy and economic performance are not absolutely clear. This uncertainty is related to the question of the direction of the causality link: Does an open policy lead to better economic performance or does excellent economic performance favor greater openness to the outside? The figures show that the economic performance of outward-looking strategies has, on the whole, proved better than that of inward-looking strategies, in almost every respect.

The Outlook

To overcome the economic difficulties the African countries are facing and to pave the way for lasting sustained growth in Africa, the solutions being considered should restore the conditions for running the economic infrastructure more efficiently; progressively expand the scope of sub-regional relations so as to optimize the distribution of factors; and progressively merge into the international market channels. To do this, policies will have to focus mainly on pursuing reforms in the African economies; promoting intra-African trade and sub-regional integration; and continuing efforts to preserve acquired positions and to conquer new positions in the international market.

Pursuit of Reforms in the African Economies

The results of economic reforms in Africa over the past decade have been very moderate. For the coming years, these reforms should, above all, try to improve the effectiveness of development policies. With this in mind, the most important element to be urged is political will. The need and the will to implement reforms should be felt by and emanate from Africans themselves. Consequently, they should play the main role in designing and implementing them.

Once defined and felt by all economic agents, the need for reform should lead to concrete, practical, and easily valuable measures. Such measures should be directed, inter alia, at putting in place an administration inspired by the need to undertake reforms and to back up economic agents; rehabilitating the macroeconomic framework; removing all domestic trade barriers; directing the economic incentive infrastructure at reducing the remaining distortions in the African economies; and placing special emphasis on making the best use of human resources and improving the physical infrastructure, so as to provide private sector producers with the necessary conditions for success. In implementing these reforms, the African countries should, as far as they can, avoid being lured into the tempting expedient of reducing the education and health budgets. The fact is, most growth theories put the development of human resources among the priorities in any viable and lasting development process.

Promotion of Intra-African Trade and Sub-regional Integration

In the area of intra-African economic cooperation, neither the will nor the initiatives are lacking, for there are more than 200 regional cooperation organizations, of which more than three fourths are intergovernmental. A glance at the current situation, however, reveals how far below their potential they are performing. The fact is that the ratio of intraregional trade to the whole has not grown for at least twenty years and accounts for only 5 percent of the trading of African countries. A study by the International Trade Center has estimated that potential intra-African trade is on the order of ten times its present size.

The inescapable reality is that most African countries are sparsely populated and possess limited economic resources. As a result, their development options, taken individually, are particularly fragile. Balanced development and, especially, any strategy based on significant structural changes, will require both access to larger markets for agricultural and industrial products and international policy coordination for a whole range of areas of activity. The Lagos Plan of Action is the most ambitious and complex initiative for economic integration ever undertaken in Africa. Its approach consists of dividing sub-Saharan Africa into three sub-regional groupings (Western Africa, Central Africa, and Eastern and Southern Africa), which each would pass through three stages: free trade, customs union, and economic community. Three sets of obstacles will have to be removed for integration to be attained in this manner: the reduction of transport costs; the liberalization of trade; and the resolution of problems related to money and finance.

Another approach is to forget about integration through trade and adopt a new approach emphasizing the promotion of regional means of production. This approach would focus on regional investment in heavy industries and transport and communications. Whatever ways are chosen for the march toward economic integration in Africa in the coming years, they will have to be allowed for in any reform programs designed and implemented jointly with the international financing agencies.

Preservation of Acquired Positions and Conquest of New Positions in the International Market

The strategy to be implemented to preserve acquired positions and conquer new positions in the international market depends to a large extent on the success of reforms and of economic integration. To preserve such acquired positions, support will have to be given to commodity price stabilization agreements, such as the commodity fund put in place by the United Nations Committee on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in order to consolidate and initiate sufficient financial assistance to facilitate commodity price stabilization through the implementation of such international agreements. Other financing mechanisms, such as the IMF's compensatory and contingency financing facility and STABEX will also have to be promoted. These mechanisms should only be considered, however, as temporary and complementary to the other measures taken to adapt to international market conditions.

The export revenue stabilization process is all the more important for the African countries in that it is virtually a prerequisite for the overall success of the recovery strategies in Africa, to the extent that commodity exports will, for some time into the future, constitute the most important source of foreign exchange for the region. Last, as for the conquest of new shares of the export market, the main prior condition to be met is a quality product at a competitive price. This objective will not be met without greater efficiency in the economies of the African countries and maximum coordination of action by the public and private sectors. Once the internal conditions have been met, the strategy to be implemented should concentrate on three main points: (1) targeting the promising market openings in which the countries concerned possess unquestionable comparative advantages; (2) focusing efforts on occupying these openings by developing the necessary skills and, subsequently, conquering ever growing markets; and (3) once these openings are occupied, seeking to dominate the whole economic branch through a policy of expanding both up and down it Patel (1992).

5.0 Self-Assessment Exercise (SAEs)

With reference to your understanding of the theme of critically analyze African economic performance using the stages of development plan

Attempt a concise explanation of the social relations of Africa and the West in terms of trade imbalance.

6.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)

1. Provide a concise definition of African Economic Performance, and Africa's Experience of Development
2. How has development plans impacted on Africa's history of economic independence?
3. What is SAP and how has it impacted on the sad story of Africa's development?
4. How would you describe Lagos Plan of Action as a policy necessary to leap-frog Africa's development and what factors were responsible for its non-succession?
5. Describe Africa and its place n the trade relations as factor militating against its development?
6. Discuss the major drivers and barriers of development in Africa
7. Critically analyze the role of NEPAD in Africa's economic performance using any state of your choice in Africa

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UNIT 2 Comparative Analysis of Development Experiences in selected African Countries

2.0 Introduction

What is a comparative analysis?

The transformation of the structure of production is at the heart of the economic and social changes that characterizes economic development. The need for critical assessments of the industrial development of specific African countries and the level of per capital income is relevant to understand their specific progressive rates. Comparative analysis refers to the comparison of two or more processes, documents, data sets or other objects. Pattern analysis, filtering and decision-tree analytics are forms of comparative analysis. With the above definition a synopsis of scholarly studies will help elucidate the country-specific experiences of development in Africa. Thus, Gumede (2016) the study examine the level of development in South Africa from a Fanonian perspective. One of the most significant changes in the global economy over the last forty years is the shift of industry from high income to developing countries. Between 1992 and 2012, the share of world manufacturing output produced by developing countries nearly doubled, rising to more than a third of global production. Growth of manufactured exports has greatly exceeded the growth of manufacturing output, and developing countries have gained world market shares in both simple and complex manufactured products. Africa's state-led push for industrial development had considerable success in the 1960s. Manufacturing grew substantially faster than overall output between 1960 and 1970 and the share of manufacturing in total output increased. Between 1965 and 1970 industrial growth averaged more than 7 per cent per year in all of the African case study countries (except Mozambique which was still in a fierce liberation war).

By 1970, however, the industrialization drive was beginning to lose steam, and by 1975 growth of the manufacturing sector had begun to lag GDP growth. The growth deceleration was particularly sharp in Ethiopia, Ghana, Senegal, and Tanzania. Mbao and Osinibi (2014) the study investigates the confronting problems of colonialism, ethnicity and the Nigerian legal system: the need for a paradigm shift. The findings from the content analysis reveal that since independence over fifty years ago, it has being enshrouded with socio-political turmoil and economic woes, which are attributed to colonialism and the forced amalgamation of the diverse ethnic units constituting Nigeria. However, ethnic discontent and intolerance still pervades Nigeria while the ‘oil curse’ has led to Nigeria’s categorization as a rentier state. The authors identified that there are still element of British laws in Nigeria statutes and legal practice. Adeyeri and Adejuwon (2012) both examined the implications of British colonial economic policies on Nigeria’s development. Theirs findings shows that, the balance sheet of colonial rule in Nigeria left more negative heritages than positive ones. It left behind a functional bureaucracy, a rudimentary educational system, albeit externally oriented. The colonial economic policies in Nigeria discouraged indigenous industrialization, but promoted export crop and mineral production to feed the British factories. Ocheni and Nwankwo (2012) on analysis of colonialism and its impact in Africa revealed that the present primary role of African states in the international world economy as the dominant sources of raw materials and major consumers of manufactured products are the results of long years of colonial dominance, exploitation and imperialism. This was made possible from the systematic disarticulation in the indigenous economy and the intrinsic tying of same with the external economy of the colonizers.

The study further revealed that pervasive corruption among African states is attributable to the effects of colonialism and imperialism. Farah, Kiamba and Mazongo (2011) examine how colonization distorted and retarded the pace and tempo of cultural growth and the trend of civilization in Africa. The consequences of colonization have resulted in political of the colonies, which led to an unbridgeable cultural gap between the beneficiary nations and victims of the practice. The economic effects of colonialism also caused Africa countries concentrating on producing more of what was needed less and produced less of what was needed most. Gbenga, (2006) examine the normative impediments to African development: internalist and externalist interpretations. The study revealed that Africa countries have been weaker and fragile by low exports prices and significant terms of trade decline as well as the heavy burden of external debt. This is in addition to the issue of dictatorial regimes and poor governance characterized by abuse of power and economic mismanagement, all of which undermined the development process. The point of departure from empirical literatures is the comparative analysis of the development indicators namely income inequality, poverty and unemployment champion by Dudley Seers on economic development using GDP per capita as the proxy. According to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), after Nigeria rebased its GDP in 2014, Nigeria's GDP was hovering around US$560 billion (see figure 2).20 However, Nigeria has been a shining example of growth without development as it has not been able to address poverty, provide social services and improve human capital

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to;

1. Identify and explain economic development models adopted by specific Africa countries
2. Have an understanding of factors that affected development of the specific countries
3. Assess the fiscal, political and climate challenges that affected the development of Africa

7.0 Self-Assessment Exercise (SAEs)

With reference to your understanding of the impact of SAP on the economies of most African states how would you describe the impact on development experience of specific African state?

Attempt a concise explanation of how the fiscal, political and climate challenges has affected the development of Africa states.

8.0 Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)

1. Critically analyze the trend of success and barriers in terms of trade relations between a country-specific experience of any African state with Europe and Asia?
2. How has the unequal trade relations affected the development plans of Africa?
3. What are the specific enablers and barriers of fiscal policies on regional development of industries among African states?
4. To what extent has the effect of economic development impacted on poverty, income inequality in Nigeria?

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UNIT 3 Key Drivers of Development in Africa

In most economic models, the basic factors of production are land, labor and capital. A common measure of productivity is the output that can be produced by an hour of labor, or labor productivity. Earlier developmental efforts were concentrated on raising physical wealth and capital stock within an economy. Sustainable Development paradigm investigates the nature of development from the environmental, economic and social perspectives Oladeji (2014). According to OECD (2001) sustainable development is the development path along which the maximization of wellbeing of human wellbeing does not compromise perpetual use by future generations. Therefore, Sustainable Development is a paradigm shift from the economic growth hinged on depletion of resources and environmental degradation.

There are several sustainable development strategies in Africa. The strategies include the National Environmental Policy in Ghana, National Development Vision (NDV) 2025 in Tanzania, National Strategy for Solid Waste Management in Egypt UNECA (2011). Collectively, 28 African countries under the umbrella of African Union established New

Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Regional Economic Council (RECs) in the sub-region UNECA 2011, Ahenkan and Kojo-Osei (2014). According to the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), after Nigeria rebased its GDP in 2014, Nigeria's GDP was hovering around US$560 billion (Mafusire, Anyanwu, Brixiova and Mubila (2010). However, Nigeria has been a shining example of growth without development as it has not been able to address poverty, provide social services and improve human capital. The most cited definition of Sustainable development is provided in the 1987 Brundtland Commission's Report Oladeji (2014). It defines sustainable development as the kind of development which satisfies the current needs without endangering the future generations to satisfy their own. Whether dualistic approach or the three pillars of sustainable development are taken into consideration, there is a common denominator. The central message of sustainable development is economic, environmental and social sustainability achievable through rational management of physical, natural and human capital Oladeji (2014).

This implies also that we can assess the Key Drivers of Development in Africa through the lens of identifying the intricate themes such as expressed by the definition of sustainable development to imply satisfaction of the current needs without endangering the future generations to satisfy their own. This should take into account the economic, environmental and social dimensions of rational management of physical, natural and human capital. Africa's growth is driven by agriculture, extractive industries, construction and services and manufacturing (however little) AFDB, OECD and UNDP (2015). However, the performance of Africa in human development indices is very disturbing. About 230 million Africans are chronically malnourished Oluwatayo and Ojo (2016)] and 40 percent of under 5 children have stunted physical and mental development Ajibefun, (2015). Again, an estimated 380 million people live on less than USD 1.25 in sub-Saharan

Africa. Poverty is more severe in Africa than any other developing regions. The fact that economic growth, poverty, inequality and youth unemployment co-move in Africa is an economist's nightmare Ajibefun (2015), Collier (1997). Socioeconomic indicators like per capita income, life expectancy at birth, access to health care, access to education and access to sanitation facilities further reveal the high level of poverty in Africa Addae-Korankaye (2014). In terms of expenditure in the health sector, African countries spend an average of 5 percent of GDP which is less than USD 10 per person annually compared to the required USD 27 Kaseje (2006). Again, more than 50 percent of African population does not have access to modern health care facilities while 40 percent do not have access to safe drinking water and sanitation Kaseje (2006). In fact, per capita income of Africa is 50 percent less than that of the next poorest region (South Asia) Mills (2010). Africa and developing Oceania were noted for lowest life expectancies at birth since 1950-1955 UNDESA (2012).

The average age length of life in developing Oceania has since increased to 64years while it remained low at 54 years in Africa KPMG (2012). Africa has the lowest number of physician per 1000 people in the world estimated at 2.3. This is compared to 14.0 in the world, 11.0 in Eastern Mediterranean and 33.3 in Europe. The under 5 mortality per 1000 live births and maternal mortality are the highest in the world at 107 in 2011 and 620 in 2008 respectively KPMG (2012). At independence, Nigeria's per capita income was at $92. The oil boom of the 70s saw Nigeria's per capita rise to $800 by 1980.The oil prices fall of the early 80s saw Nigeria's per capita diminishing terribly to $321 by 1990. Between 1990 and 2014, the annual real per capita growth rate of Nigeria was at 3.3%. Nigeria's growth rate rose in the 2000s (2000-2014) and peaked at 4.6%, which is about double the average growth rate of most other African developing countries for the same period. This was through macroeconomic stability and economic reforms from 1999. As at 2015, Nigeria's per capita income is at $2,758 as against Singapore's which is at $56,319. Consequently, 15% of the Nigerian population was living below poverty line in 1960. This percentage shockingly increased to 43% in 1990, because of Nigeria's economic recession in the 80s. This subsequently increased to 70% by 1999 because of slow economic growth, autarkic policies, economic mismanagement, high debt to GDP ratio from the early 80's economic downturn, and widespread corruption. Nigeria's population living below poverty line currently stands at 33.1% (one third of the population). This means that there are more poor Nigerians currently than there were at the country's independence. However, this reduction by more than half from 70% was because of sustained economic growth and political stability in the 2000s. On employment and in 2015, Nigeria's unemployment rate was at 9%, and by the first quarter of 2016, it has increased to 12.1% by 3.1%. This increment was as a result of the country's FOREX crisis, overdependence on oil which made the country vulnerable to fluctuations in international oil prices, weak manufacturing sector and lack of comprehensible policies to address unemployment. On education, after the 1970s oil boom, primary, secondary and tertiary education were improved in Nigeria to boost literacy level.

Despite this, literacy rate has dropped from 68% in the 70s to 59.6% (69.2 for males and 49.7 for females) as of 2015. This could be credited to "later" poor governmental maintenance culture of educational institutions, lack of quality facilities in them, governmental neglects, corruption, examination malpractices and falling standards. Examining health as another key driver of development, it would suffice to note that life expectancy in Nigeria increased from 37.18 years in 1960 to 47 years in 1990 and 53 years as at 2013. This shows that Nigeria is currently having deep challenges in the health sector. On economic diversification, it should be noted that though oil constitutes large percentage of Nigeria's export earnings and sources of government revenue, Nigeria's economy tends to be a little bit more diversified than previously thought. As at 2015, after the 2014 rebasing of the economy, it was found out that agriculture, industry, and services were leading GDP contribution by 17.8%, 25.7%, and 54.6%47 respectively. Post-independence Nigeria was an agrarian economy with 61% of the GDP on peasant farming while modern agriculture accounted for 75% exports. Between 1960 and 1964, industry at was 7.6% and services was at 13.6%. From 1965 to 1969, agriculture reduced to 53.1% partly because of the civil war, industry increased to 12.1% based on oil exploration activities that began and services grew by 16.4%. From 1970 to 2013, the agriculture share was further reduced from 27.1% to 21.0%. Industry grew from 19.3% to 26.0%, making it the second largest sector in the country. However, this was hugely attributed to the oil sector: with mining and utilities accounting for 13.7%, and manufacturing having 9.0%. Services have been hovering around 53% since then. Industrialization boomed in the 1970s, despite assorted infrastructural constraints.

Growth was particularly pronounced in the production and assembly of consumer goods, including vehicle assembly, and the manufacture of soap and detergents, paint, soft drinks, beer, pharmaceuticals and building materials. Heavy investment was later planned in steel production. With Soviet assistance, a steel mill was developed at Ajaokuta in Kogi State. However, the reliance of the economy on crude oil exports, led to a shift away from industrial activities of a productive nature, leading to over-dependence on a single commodity. Nigeria currently has an indigenous auto manufacturing company, Innoson Vehicle Manufacturing located at Enugu producing buses and SUVs, and cars. Nigeria's number one policy challenge remains diversifying government sources of revenue and export earnings (90% of export earnings are from oil as at 201350). The country has failed to do this since 1970. Successive Nigerian governments have all sang the diversification song. They have all come up with plans to diversify away from oil but only few of them have worked. Lack of governmental incentives and basic infrastructures have further frustrated industrial activities in Nigeria. Diversification remains the surest way of the country to fight poverty, create jobs and develop. On Infrastructure as key driver of development, Nigeria has been facing a huge infrastructural gap. The whole nation is marred by dilapidated infrastructures following decades of government's neglect. Nigeria currently lacks steady electricity. This alone has crippled businesses through increasing the cost of doing business, created capital flight and prevented adequate attraction of foreign investments. There is no business in Nigeria that runs without a generating set. Nigeria's publicly owned transportation infrastructure has also been a major constraint to economic development. Of the 80,500 kilometers (50,000 mi.) of roads, more than 15,000 kilometers (10,000 mi.) are officially paved, 50 and many remain in poor shape.54 However, extensive road repairs and new construction activities are gradually being implemented as state governments, in particular, spend their portions of government revenue allocations on such. Five of Nigeria's airports-Abuja, Enugu, Kano, Lagos, and Port Harcourt, currently receive international flights but are still below international standards. The railway has been in crisis and relinquished by the government. Just until lately, the construction of Standard Gauge Railways is being pursued through partnerships with China and the private sector

Lastly, an assessment of the contribution of policy processes that has hugely contributed to the differing economic development levels of Nigeria and Singapore in many ways. Firstly is differing development models – Since independence, Nigeria has experimented a wide range of development models including nationalisation, indigenization, self-reliance, import-substitution, and free market strategy etc. Amongst them are the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th National Development Plans (NDP); Indigenization Decree; Economic Stabilisation Program; Structural Adjustment Program; the Rolling Plan (1991 - 1993); Guided Deregulation; Vision 2010; National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS); Transformation Agenda and Vision 2020. These plans and policies all included economic growth targets, policies toward socio-economic development & wealth distribution, infrastructure expansion, industrialization efforts and agriculture expansion. Although most of them could not achieve most of their expected goals, the 1986 introduction of SAP lifted a flag of economic prosperity for Nigeria. With it came the reduction of governmental role and distortions in the economy; deregulation of the agricultural sector; extermination of price controls; the privatization of public enterprises; the devaluation of the Naira to aid the competitiveness of the export sector; removal of import licenses; reduction of tariffs; opening of the economy to foreign trade, promotion of non-oil exports through incentives; and the relaxation of restraints on foreign investments put in place by previous governments.

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to;

1. Identify and explain key drivers of development in Africa countries
2. Have an understanding of key drivers of development
3. Understand the interaction between fiscal, political and climatic factors impacting development of Africa

Self-Assessment Exercise (SAEs)

With reference to your understanding of the impact of SAP on the economies of most African states how would you describe the key drivers of development based on nation-states experience in African?

Attempt a concise appraisal of how the development drivers have impacted Africa

Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)

1. How has foreign direct investment affected development in Africa ?
2. How has human capital formation influenced development in Africa?
3. To what extent has foreign debt, development assistance influenced Africa's

propensity to develop?

4. How would you describe Africa's integration in global consumption patterns with regards to technological advancement?

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UNIT 4 Leadership Institutions and Governance of Infrastructures in Africa

Leadership is at the heart of public sector governance, and it is vital to the overall development of a nation as well as the welfare of the citizens. According to Lawal and Tobi (2006), the quality of leadership affects the pace of development in any country. Baets (2011) opined that there is a dearth of leadership skills required for effective public governance in Africa, and Ojo (2012) highlighted the leadership crisis and political instability in Nigeria. Ngowi (2009) studied the effect of political leadership on economic development in Tanzania and concluded that leadership is the defining factor that shaped the nature and path of economic development in that country. Poor leadership, and the endemic bureaucratic corruption that has characterized public sector governance since independence in 1960, have been blamed for the slow pace of development in key sectors of the Nigerian economy, especially in the infrastructure sector (Lawal & Tobi, 2006; Ogbeide, 2012).

The period spanning from 1960 to the present christened the post-colonial/neo-colonial era witnessed an upsurge of development failure in developing countries especially Africa. In Liberia Samuel Doe, Prince Yormie Johnson, and Charles Taylor were the night mares of Liberian as they struggled for seizure of state power consecutively or simultaneously and thereby inflicted economic hardship on the people of Liberia and the sub-Saharan region at large (Echezona, 1993:99). This was not an exception as it was the case across Africa. In Sierra Leone, Paul Koroma, Ahmed Tejan kabbah, John Karafa Smart etc. were interlocked in intensive crisis for the capture of the state (Hassan, 2002). In Somalia, Hussen Mohammed Aideed, Hassan Mohammed Nur Shatigudud, Abdiaji Yusuf Ahmed and Sallad Hanssan were rivals (Hassan, 2002). In Burundi, and Rwanda, the Tutsi and Hutu were engaged in a frontal blood bizarre. Conflict looks every part of Africa as political leaderships fail to manage economic production justly. The states therefore do not appear as the bank of interest of the generality of the people. A monopolistic capitalism, crises drives away the few foreign investors in sub-Saharan Africa to more stable third world countries in Asia, Latin America, North and South Africa. About five decades after political independent in sub-Saharan Africa, the impact of political leadership on economic development in sub- Saharan Africa is adverse as the full scope of the danger becomes clear. In Sub-Saharan Africa, what appeared as mere ethnic cleansing has turned into a long and brutal civil war in most cases. The consequences of violent conflict on the African continent have been devastating. Similarly, there appears an intensifying economic hardship in the region which seems to account for the declining legitimacy to make authoritative decision for the majority of the citizenry at all levels of governance. In the absence of peace and stability, government legitimacy, and economic growth and development, most states in the region under study are described as failed or failing states.

Study by Ezeibe (2010) did not dispute the supra argument that is mainly associated with *Chinua Achebe (1983)* and many other sub Saharan scholars rather explored the interlinks between the style of leadership and the intensifying crises of economic development in the sub-Saharan Africa with a view to deciphering brighter prospects for African economic development of countries like Zimbabwe, Sudan, Somali, Liberia, Rwanda, Burundi, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Niger, Chad, Nigeria and Tanzania. Liberal. First he argued that democracy proposed by the West as the political model for economic development appears to have proven incongruent with African experiences especially the Sub-Saharan region that continue to be listed by UN, her agencies and other international organizations ‘bad books' as the poorest, diseases-ridden and home to most ignorant people in the world. Nonetheless, the US first black President Barrack Obama, in his speech in Ghana reiterated that Africa has remained backward on account of the corrupt leadership since their various independents. He urged Africans to evolve strong institutions and not strong men. Obama also restated that America would no longer dictate to nations the path to political and economic development. The implication is that the US had done so in the past probably through the activities of IMF and World Bank whose conditionalities for loan to the poor regions of the world are at worst described as harsh on the economies of the recipient countries (Echezona, 1993:99).

It is abundantly clear that due to differences in culture, geography, political and socio-economic factors that there are no manuals or handouts on political leadership that a nation should apply to achieve their economic end. We have countless prognosis of action that unwittingly did not work in other places but generated internal upheaval here and there. For example, to a large extent, while Western style democracy has worked perfectly well in North America and Western Europe, it is yet to produce the desired results in Nigeria, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Liberia and many other countries that have so far experimented with it. On the socio-economic front, the story is worse as the economies of most sub-Saharan African states are mono-cultural. Governments of these states underpay and over-tax citizens. Not only that, the region has one of the highest unemployment rates in the world, the manufacturing and other allied industries are either dead or performing below capacity.

In addition, social infrastructures and services that would have helped to promote socio-economic development are in deplorable conditions. Sustainable economic opportunity in the region is at an average of 58% and human development at about 50%. This is in contrast with the 80% and 92% rate 85% and 90 % rate found in North America and in Europe respectively (www.moibrahimfoundation .org). The roads are death traps, while electricity supply is erratic and people in urban areas often live in crowded squalor from Abidjan to Abuja. In the light of the above, we understand why the environment of lawlessness and its consequences are fertile seedbeds for the flourishing of area boys, ethnic militias, child labour, industrial disputes, religious crisis and many other socio-economic predicaments across Africa. It is in connection with these political, economic and social crises that various ethnic groups and civil society organizations in Africa are calling for either National Conference or Constitutional Conference to address what they have tagged the "Nigerian question, Somalia question, Sudanese question, Gabonese question, Zimbabwean question Congolese question etc". It is also against this background that the recent US intelligent report on sub- Saharan Africa ranks it as one of the most unsafe places to do business in the world. The leadership problem connects with building core state institutions like the police, civil service, the legislature, the judiciary and the executives. Without a good and committed leadership, these institutions cannot function properly. For instance, if you have leaders who have no respect for the rule of law, human rights, minority rights and other values that help to tie and make society stable, you cannot expect the judiciary to function properly. In other words, if leaders desecrate their core institutions, those institutions cannot work creditably.

This is the situation in most states in Africa. However, inquiries on relationship between problems of leadership and economic developments either concentrate in one country especially Nigeria, Liberia and Zimbabwe or are carried out with the immediate post-colonial Africa in mind (Echezona, 1993:99; Hassan, 2002; Hazeley, 2002 and Achebe, 1983). This does not help us to understand the contemporary link between leadership problems and development crises hence this forms the lacuna in literature that we seek to bridge. Furthermore, the period from 1960-2009 with emphasis on the major sub-Saharan African states; most states in the region are characterized by immanent crises of development; the tendency for the US failed States Index to rank states in the region among the first 20 – 30 states at the risk of violent internal conflict that can erupt like a volcano any moment; and the tendency for apparent shabby scholarly articulation of interlinks of leadership problems and development crises in the region. Echezona (1998) quoting Claude Ake examined the state in capitalist society and related it to the states in Africa. According to him, what distinguishes a capitalist society from other societies is the pervasiveness of commoditization and autonomization. Inherent in this assessment of state in capitalist societies in relation of capitalist states in Africa is the fact that the way capitalism or capitalist state operates in Africa is different from the way it operates in the Western world that hoisted it on Africa. Thus, it was observed that in Africa, there has been willfully wrong placement of emphasis (pervasiveness) on the acquisition of material wealth i.e. (commoditization) and the result of which there emerged the autonomy of dominance by the wealthy ones over the poor ones i.e. autonomization of domination. These were the flaws of capitalist states in Africa and these flaws are invisible in the western capitalist states. To complicate and worsen the situation Anene and Brown (1981:47) noted that the colonialist did not stop at merging of incompatible ethnic nations but also went on to sensitizing and fuelling of ethnic division and differences so as to forestall any possible integration and unity of the people in the state-colonies.

Consequently, Anene and Brown stressed on the excess ethnic awareness as one of the complex legacies of colonial administration in Africa. Moron-Browne rightly observed that one of the injurious legacies of colonial era in Africa was the intensification of ethnic awareness either by altering the demographic balance or by introducing a new political system. Similarly, Vicker (1993) observes that ethnic conflicts occur as a result of colonial power's arbitrarily drawn frontiers following the 1884/1885 Berlin colonial partition of

Africa. This stems from the fact that most African states are but amalgamation of different ethnic/national groups who have differences in their historical background, cultural language, ideology and religion. Nonetheless, Ake (1985) viewed leadership in Africa as one of the injurious imports of the capitalist system of production in Africa. He argued that the capitalist system of production brought into Africa a very serious antagonism between and among leaders in different states of Africa, and consequent upon which there ensued crises among them. Hence, Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere and Claude Ake etc had argued that these conflicts are squarely the products of the emergence of capitalism in Africa. They contended that the dynamic interplay of issues in capitalist system of production created antagonistic tendencies among the people since the relations of production are mostly the relations of conflict and crises among different competing interest struggling over the surplus that accrue in the production of goods and services. Ezema (2001:51) cited some other case illustrations on where the schemes of deprivation or alienation cause leadership crises especially in the period of post-cold war years in Africa.

These include: the Liberian crises of twentieth century and beyond, the Sierra Leone crises of twentieth century and beyond, also the crises in former Zaire now Democratic Republic of Congo and the several years of apartheid crises in South African etc. In fact, virtually all the leadership crises that have occurred in many Africa states possess the traces of one deprivation or the other. While, this position of relative deprivation may appear attractive it fails to tell us why deprivation leads to aggression in some areas and not the other. It did not account for the leaders influence in the crises of development and why it has persisted. Igwe (1997) states that inter-state relations in Africa in the post-cold war years were relations characterized by crisis management and resolution especially within the political systems of different states. He insisted that leaders in many African states shattered their political systems with series of crises that in most cases resulted into bloody civil wars. Thus, many African relations with the outside world were hinged on negotiation for acquisition and distribution of arms with which the rebels and those in government fought themselves. Although, Igwe captured, the point here vividly he did not narrow his study down to sub-Saharan Africa. Nwachukwu (1998) observes that leadership and war going on in Africa aid the western countries of the world that manufacture weapons of war to channel their relations with these Africans towards selling and disposing of their manufactured war hardwares. This led to the proliferation of arms in Africa and also the intensity of crises in the continent.

Given the rampant cases of crises situations in Africa, he observed that the African interaction with the world in the period of post-colonial years had also been marked with the request for the resolution of crises between or among the warring factional leaders in many warring states in Africa. Okunola (1995:1251) noted that there have been several calls for peace negotiations and agreements to resolve crisis in the political leaderships of many states in Africa. Then there emerged many peace accords for instance the Abuja accord on Liberian crises, Nairobi accord on crises in Democratic Republic of Congo etc. But on these and more other instances, it should be noted that while some of these peace accords failed to restore peace and hence the search and negotiation for peace continued as the crises lingered on. Nnoli (1989) argued that the Nigeria politics presents an image of deprivation struggle among leaders of various ethnic groups for the sharing of national resources. He further emphasized that most Nigerian have come to attach credence to the fact that unless their own leaders were in government, they would not have an easy access to the fair share of the national resources. Although his point was cogent, he did not extend this to sun – Saharan Africa. Achebe (1988) stated that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the Nigerian character except the persistent leadership failures. Burns (1978) pointed out that leadership is a moral necessity, and its expression and achievements are best measured by such virtues as liberty, equality, justice, opportunity, and the pursuit of happiness. In my opinion, these are good reasons for developing infrastructure in Nigeria. Government exists to serve the needs of the public, and good governance exists to ensure that those needs are served efficiently, effectively, and fairly (Deloitte Global 2 Series, 2012). This means that governance has a lot to do with how authority is exercised in institutions and the traditions of government, which includes the process of bringing government into being and holding it accountable (Davis, 2011).

The United Nations (2007) defined governance as the way society sets and manages the rules that guide policymaking and policy implementation. Toikka (2011) stated that public governance is concerned with the conduct of governments at all levels to bring about the best possible benefits to their citizens. Therefore, governance can be good or bad depending on the manner and mode of governing (Rotberg, 2005). Lawal and Tobi (2006) pointed out that good governance should focus on the welfare of the people, and should be geared toward the provision of good infrastructure that will promote the happiness of the citizenry. Oyedele (2012) posited that the success or failure of a leader or government is measured by the level and nature of infrastructure development embarked upon by the leader or government and how well it meets the aspirations of the people in democratic governance. Good and effective public governance helps to strengthen democracy, promote economic prosperity and social cohesion, and reduce poverty (United Nations, 2007). Good governance must be perceived to solve social problems. Rotberg (2005) observed that governance is good when it allocates and manages resources to respond to collective socioeconomic and political problems. Cheema (2005) argued that good governance should promote gender equality, sustain the environment, enable citizens to exercise personal freedom, and provide tools to reduce poverty, deprivation, fear, and violence. Arguably, two key elements should be added to the list of things good governance should address that are vital to the Nigerian circumstances namely: infrastructure development and reduction of corruption .While Akinwale (2010) argued that the development of a society depends on the availability of infrastructure, Zuofa and Ochieng (2014) found out that corruption was among the key issues responsible for infrastructure project failures in Nigeria. Researchers have mentioned different aspects of governance. Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) identified three main types of governance. They are political or public governance, economic governance, and social governance. The three types of governance are inseparable and interrelated, particularly in the Nigerian context. It is difficult (a) to distinguish between the impact leadership has on each of the type of governance, and (b) to isolate its effects. In fact, leadership should affect all the aspects of governance simultaneously, and the results should be seen in all spheres of development (Kemp, Parto, & Gibson, 2005).

In fact, most constituted governments in Africa have been undergoing serious and deepening politico-economic crisis. These problems generated by political, social and economic instability and the prevalence of ethnic, communal and religious crises have bedeviled Africa to a point that more attention should be geared to the problems of leadership and governance in the continent. In other words, the staggering wave of violence, insecurity, increasing crime wave, economic recession, coupled with the break in law and order are the attributes to the problem of leadership and governance in Africa. Therefore, the quest for good leadership is a *sine-qua-non* for governance and sustainable development. A governance approach highlights issues of state responsiveness and accountability, and the impact of these factors on political stability and economic development. For too long, social scientists dealing with Africa's development have concentrated on economic issues, overlooking the highly important political dimension of the process (Bratton and Rothchild, 1992:263). The use by African state elites of arbitrary and repressive measures and their inability to apply governmental regulations throughout the national territory is a sign of state weakness or “softness”. Paradoxically, the independent African states consolidates power at the political center and extracts considerable economic resources from society; yet it spends much of it obtains on itself and lack the capacity to spur the country’s development as a whole. It is in light of this, that Conrnwell (1995:15) summarizes the African leadership and governance crises as follows:

“the driving force behind Africa’s experiment with democracy came both from ideology conviction and the growing impatience of an ever bolder public consciousness, and from the related manner of the continent’s prevailing economic woes. On the other hand, the politically conscious urbanized, professional and studies bodies began to rail against the continue failure of their rulers to match rhetoric and promises to economic progress, for much of Africa had experienced a steady decline in living standards through the 1970’s and 1980’s. On their part, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other bilateral aid donors also made it quite clear that if further financial assistance was to be forthcoming. Africa’s governments had to give urgent attention to their human right’s records. More specifically, they had to become politically more accountable to their people, and curb corruption”.

The implication of the above sends a strong instructive note that no nation has achieved meaningful development socially, politically or economically without the input of or effective leadership (Obasola, 2002:10). Thus, in contemporary discourse, the concept of leadership and governance has attracted a wider spread interest as they serves as the pivot on which social, political and economic structures rest. The numerous problems which have been bedeviling African states vis-à-vis ethnic and communal clashes, increasing crime wave, drug trafficking, advanced fee fraud etc have been blamed on ineffective leadership. While it is true that there have been apparent leadership and governance crises in Africa, the last two decades has witnessed struggle to engender effective leadership and governance in Africa.

OBJECTIVES

At the end of this unit, you should be able to;

*Understand the interplay of political leadership on economic development of Africa

*Grasp the conception of Leadership to include institutional governance

*Understand the leadership as the heartbeat of public sector governance, and its vital role to the overall development of a nation as well as the welfare of the citizens

Self-Assessment Exercise (SAEs)

1. Discuss the relevance of leadership to infrastructural development in Africa
2. Demonstrate a reasonable understanding of how bad governance of resources in Africa has impacted institutional development

Tutor-Marked Assignments (TMA)

1. Of what relevance is the study of development trends to understand the connections between leadership and failed states in Africa?

2. The problem of development in Africa is the problem of leadership, critically elucidate with concrete and logical assessment leadership successions in an African state of your choice?

3. The dearth of leadership skills has impacted on effective public governance in Africa and escalated the index of political instability on economic development in most African states. Justify the above with logical examples of public governance of elections and insecurity in Nigeria?

4. The endemic bureaucratic corruption has characterized public sector governance since independence of most African states how would you justify the above using a current analysis of anti-corruption agencies and public trustees (officials) and judiciary in Nigeria?

4. Write an essay on how the knowledge of development trend has helped you understand the intricacies in leadership and underdevelopment of Africa?

5. Attempt a clear and concise discourse on the nexus among political or public governance, economic governance, and social governance?

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MODULE THREE: Trends in Development Finance and Organizations for Regional Cooperation in Africa

UNIT 1 Trade, Imperialism and its implications on development crisis in Africa

UNIT 2 Burden of Loan/Debt on Africa

UNIT3African financial institutions, corruption, conflict and Regional economic development

UNIT 4 Recent trends in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Africa's export Portfolio