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FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

CRIMINOLOGY AND SECURITY STUDIES DEPARTMENT (CSS)

COURSE CODE: CSS 807
COURSE TITLE: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERSHIP
COURSE UNIT: 3

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INTRODUCTION

CSS 807: Public and Private Security Partnership is a 3-credit unit course. It is a compulsory course for Postgraduate students in the Department of Criminology and Security Studies who enrolled for the Master's Degree in Security and Law Enforcement (MSLE). The course is also recommended for postgraduate students in the Faculty of Arts, especially those who are studying for advanced degree in Crisis and Emergency Management. The course can also be taken as elective by other students whose main field(s) of discipline is Criminology and Security Studies because of the values that security studies have for all aspects of lives.

The entire Course has 6 Modules of 4 units each, thus comprising 24 units. The modules range from conceptual clarifications to liberalization of security, collaborations between public and private security, inclusive and national security, global standard and best practices in security and trends and practices in public and private security collaborations. Under each of the modules, related topics are treated in detail as well as explanations of the concepts of security, public and private security, goals of security and structure and functions of public and private security partnerships. In module, two theories and approaches to the study of public and private security partnerships are treated. Other topics include private security and democratic values, globalization and public-private partnerships for security in Nigeria.

Module three treated cooperation in security service delivery, public-private security partnerships and trust-building, enhancing private security and strengthening public security as well as issues and challenges of security cooperation. Inclusive and national security, values of security, and the practices of community security and social cohesion are the focus in module four.. In module five, the discourses on security partnerships in practice and security collaborations around the world are presented. Other topics handled in the moduleinclude public- private security partnerships for cyber and financial crimes as well as terrorism prevention. In module six, the final module, emphasis was on key trends in public and private security practices, critical security targets and the 4-C's of public-private security partnerships. The module concludes with contemporary debates on managing the boundaries between private and public security for security collaborations.

The course material draws its major case studies from Europe, Asia, the United States of America (USA) and Nigeria. This is for the purpose of expanding your understanding of security discourses, and particularly, on the emerging field of public-private security partnerships. Current key trends on private security and security collaborations are cited with emphasis on the protection of critical infrastructures, commercial businesses, residents and the citizens.

COURSE OBJECTIVES

This course has both general and specific objectives. The general objective is to enable you to understand the development of public and private security partnerships, it's practices, and how to initiate public-security collaborations in the face of increased security challenges in Nigeria, in particular, and the world in general. Each unit has specific objectives that together will enhance the realization of the general objective. At the beginning of each module, the specific objectives are stated, and at the end of each unit, self-assessment question(s) is (are) raised to test the minimum realization of the specific objectives. The general objective, therefore, is expected to be achieved at the completion of the course.

At the completion of the course therefore, you should be able to:

- describe the concept of security with its components;
- explain the difference between public and private security;
- understand why public and private security may have different objectives, and why a marriage of such objectives is needed for effective national security delivery;
- appreciate the structure and functions of public and private security partnerships;

- comprehend the different theories and approaches that influence the emergence of public-private security partnerships, and how to apply them in discussions and analysis;
- recognize the relationship between private security practices, democratic values as well as public good;
- explain public-private security partnerships in the context of globalization;
- examine the necessity for public-private partnerships for security (PPPS) in Nigeria;
- realize the importance of trust in public-private security partnerships; how to enhance private security and strengthen public security;
- scrutinize issues and challenges that confront security cooperation
- elucidate the emerging concept of inclusive security and its importance for national security;
- discern the values of security, community security and the necessity for social cohesion;
- identify and explain the different security partnerships around the world with respect to cyber and financial crimes and terrorism prevention
- ascertain key trends in public and private security practices;
- explicate emerging and expanding markets of private security; and
- recognize current debates on the boundaries between private and public security.

WORKING THROUGH THIS COURSE

In order to benefit maximally from this course, you areexpected to study all the six modules of the 24 units or a substantial number of them. There are other text books, journals and reading materials in the internet that are recommended at the end of each unitfor you. Each unit also contains self-assessment test(s). are required, at the end, to submit assignments for the purpose of assessments. Finally, an examination will be conducted at the end of the course and the time and location will be communicated as at when due.

STUDY UNITS

In this course, there are twenty four units,brokendown in modules, as shown below:

Module one: Conceptual Clarifications

Unit 1: The concept of Security
Unit 2: Public Security and Private security
Unit 3: Public-Private Security: A marriage of Goals
Unit 4: The structure and functions of public and private security partnerships

Module Two: Liberalization of Security
Unit 1: Theory and Approaches
Unit 2: Private Security, Democratic Values, and the Public Good
Unit 3: Globalization
Unit 4: Public-Private Partnerships for Security (PPPS) in Nigeria

Module Three: Collaborations Between Public and Private Security
Unit 1: Cooperation in Security Delivery
Unit 2: Public - Private Security Partnershipsand Trust Building
Unit 3: Enhancing private security and strengthening public security
Unit 4: Issues and challenges of Security cooperation

Module Four: Inclusive Security and National Security
Unit 1: Inclusive Security
Unit 2: National Security
Unit 3: The Value of Security
Unit 4: Community Security and Social Cohesion

Module Five: Global Standardsand Best Practices in Security
Unit 1: Security partnerships in practice.
Unit 2: Security collaborations around the world.
Unit 3: Public – private security partnerships for cyber and financial crimes.
Unit 4: Public-private security partnerships for terrorism prevention.

Module Six: Trends and Practices in Public and Private Security Collaborations
Unit 1: Key trends in public and private security practices.
Unit 2: Critical Security Targets.
Unit 3: The 4-C's of public-private security partnerships.
Unit 4: Managing the boundaries between private and public security.

The units are organised around key discourses that make a module. The organization ofthe course into modules helps you to understand, not only the subject matter of the course, but also the security challenges and the context of the time, that makes public and private security collaborations necessary. For instance, while the first module places emphasis on conceptual clarifications, a necessity for you to acquire the rudiments of the course, the second module concentrates on the emergence of liberalization discourses that tend to shape and shade security profession as a public and private concern. It, therefore, exposes you to different approaches and theories that influence the discourses on security collaborations. The third module examines the practices of security collaborations and the challenges involved.In this context, it helps you to assess the extent to which security collaborations exist between public and private security spheres in Nigeria and other developed countries.

In the fourth module, the relationship between inclusive security and national security is introduced. The introduction of inclusiveness bring along with it the understanding of gender issues in security planning and practices; and thus re-emphasize the importance of collaboration, and the fact that security, in contemporary times, has become everybody's business. At the end of it, the discourses avails youthe opportunity to assess, whether inclusive security has any relevance in our national security architecture, and/or elsewhere. In module five security collaborations between public and private security personnel elsewhereand the different security challenges that the collaborations had helped to solve are presented and explained.Examples focusedon crimes that ranged from cyber criminality to current challenges on terrorism. The expectation here is that you should be able to learn how the different collaborative initiatives were put together, and acquire from the global standards due process and best practices that are expected in security partnerships.

In the sixth module , the focus is on current trends and practices in public and private security collaborations. Each unit, therefore, tries to assess how security reality has matched the expectations in the security sector and how the strength in the private security can augment the weakness in public security. This is amidst the several debates on the superiority and/or inferiority of the partnerships. This is discussed under "managing the boundaries between private and public security".

REFERENCES AND FURTHER READINGS

The following resource materials are recommended for use:

BOOKS:

Bala, S. &Ouédraogo, É. (2018). Nigeria's national security strategy development : Case study. Addis Ababa: African centre for Strategic Studies.

Barry, B., Ole, W. & Jaap de, W. (1988). Security: A New Framework for Analysis Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bellamy, R. (1999) *Liberalism and pluralism:Towards a politics of compromise.* London Routledge .

Bruce, S. (2012). *Beyond fear: Thinking about Security in an uncertain world*. London: Copernicus Books.

Johnston, L. (1999). Private policing: Uniformity and diversity. In R. I. Mawby (Ed.). *Policing Across the World: Issues for theTwenty-first Century (pp. 34 – 58).* London,England: Routledge.

Kimani, M (2009). Security for the highest bidder. London: Free Press.

Rogers, P. (2010). Losing control : Global security in the twenty-first century (3rd ed.). London: Pluto Press. ISBN 9780745329376.

Sarre, R. & Prenzler, T. (2011). *Private security and public interest: Exploring private security trends and directions for reform in the new era of plural policing*. Brisbane: Australian Security Industry Association Ltd.

Strom, K., Berzofsky, M., Shook-Sa, B; Barrick, K., Daye, C., Horstmann, N. & Kinsey, S. (2010). *The private security industry: A review of the definitions. Cornwallis: Research* Triangle Park: free Press.

United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI, 2010). *Handbook to assist the establishment of public private partnership to protect vulnerable targets.* New York: Author.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2011). *Civilian private security services: their role, oversight andcontribution to crime prevention and community safety*. Vienna: Author.

JOURNALS:

Abrahamsen, R. & Williams, M.C. (2005). *The Globalisation of Private Security.* Country Report: Nigeria

Abubaker, M. B. (2017). *Private security andcrime prevention in Nigeria: Challenges and regulations.*A paper presented at the Conference on Corrections and Criminal Justice, organised by School of AppliedPsychology, Social Work and Policy, University Utara Malaysia, 17th, August 2017.

Bamidele, A. M., Akinbolade, O.O. & Nuhu, A.I., (2016). Private security outfits and internal security in Nigeria: An x-ray of Kings Guards Nigeria Ltd., Abuja. *Journal of Business and Management Review*, 6(2), 17 – 34.

Brook, D. J. (2010). *What is Security: Defining through knowledge categorization*. Security. *Security Journal,* 23 (1), 15 – 21.

Buzan, B. (1984). Peace, power and security: Contending concepts in the study of international relations. *Journal of Peace Research,* 21 (1984), pp. 109-25.

Cassidy, K., Brandes, R., & LaVegila, A. (1993). Finding common ground. *Security Management,* 37(12): 27.

Carter, J. G. (2008). The structure and function of public-private partnerships for homeland security. *Homeland Security Review*, 2(3), 235-251.

Jones, T. &Newbum, T. (2002). The transformation of policing: Understanding current trend in policing system. *British Journal of Criminology,* 42, 129-146.

Prenzler, T.,Earle, K. & Sarre, R. (2009). Private security in Australia: Trends and key characteristics. *Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice*, No. 374. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology.

The Ammerdown Group (2016). Rethinking security: A discussion paper. Available st: rethinkingsecurity.org.uk. Assessed: 12th December, 2019.

INTERNET SOURCES

ASIS International (2009). *International Glossary of Security Terms*. Accessed: 16 January, 2020. Available: https://www.asisonline.org/Membership/Library/Security-Glossary/Pages/Security-Glossary-P.aspx

Bedard, M. & J. Guenette (2015). Private reinforcement for public police forces? Available at: http://www.iedm.org/52244-private-reinforcements-for-public-police-forces.

Obama, B. (2015). *Remarks by the President in closing of the summit oncountering violent extremism.* Available at:
:https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/02/18/remarkspresident-closing-summit-countering-violent-extremism.

Umar, P. (2019, April, 16). IG's alarm on police strength, funding. Punch Newspaper. Available: https://:punchng.com.igs-alarm.

PRESENTATION SCHEDULE

The presentation schedule is included in the course materials. It provides you the important dates for the completion of tutor-marked assignments and the attendant tutorials. You are required to submit all assignments by the due date.

ASSESSMENT

Assessment for this course is in two parts, namely: the tutormarked assignments and a written examination. You arerequired to apply the information and knowledge gained from thiscourse in completing the assignments. Submission deadlines, stated in the assignment file, must be strictly followed in submitting assignments to the tutor.

COURSE OVERVIEW

Module /Unit	Title of Work	Weeks activity	Assessment (end of Unit
Module 1	**Conceptual Clarifications**		
1	The concept of Security	1	Assignment 1
2	Public Security and Private security	1	Assignment 2
3	Public-Private Security: A marriage of Goals	1	Assignment 3
4	The structure and functions of public and private security partnerships	1	Assignment 4

Module 2	**Liberalization of Security**		
5	Theory and Approaches	1	Assignment 5
6	Private Security, Democratic Values, and the Public Good	1	Assignment 6
7	Globalization	1	Assignment 7
8	Public-Private Partnerships for Security (PPPS) in Nigeria	1	Assignment 8
Module 3	**Collaborations Between Public and Private Security**		
9	Cooperation in Security Delivery	1	Assignment 9
10	Public - Private Security Partnerships and Trust Building	1	Assignment 10
11	Enhancing private security and strengthening public security	1	Assignment 11
12	Issues and challenges of Security cooperation	1	Assignment 12
Module 4	**Inclusive Security and National Security**		
13	Inclusive Security	1	Assignment 13
14	National Security	1	Assignment 14
15	The Value of Security	1	Assignment 15
16	Community Security and Social Cohesion	1	Assignment 16
Module 5	**Global Standardsand Best Practices in Security**		
17	Security partnership in practice	1	Assignment 17
18	Security collaborations around the world	1	Assignment 18
19	Public – private security partnerships for cyber and financial crimes	1	Assignment 19
20	Public-private security partnerships for terrorism prevention	1	Assignment 20
Module 6	**Trends and Practices in Public and Private Security Collaborations**		
21	Key trends in public and private security practices	1	Assignment 21
22	Critical Security Targets	1	Assignment 22
23	The 4-C's of public-private security partnerships	1	Assignment 23
24	Managing the boundaries between private and public security	1	Assignment 24
Total		**24**	

HOW TO GET THE MOST FROM THE COURSE

In distance learning, the study units replace the university lecture. Thisis one of the great advantages of distance learning as you can read andwork through specially designed study materials at your own pace,at any time and place and as reading thelecture instead of listening to the lecturer. In the same vein, a lecturermight assign you some readings to do, when toread, and which text materials or sets of books. You arealso provided Exercisesto be done at appropriate points.

Each of the study units follow a common format. The first item is anintroduction to the subject matter of the unit and how a particular unit isintegrated with the other units, and the course as a whole. Next to this isa set of learning objectives meant to guide your study. The following isa practical strategy for working through the course.

1. The first assignment, at this juncture is to read this Course Guide thoroughly.
2. Organizing the study. Refer to the 'course overview" as a guide andnote the time expected to be spent on each unit and how theassignment relates to the units. Importantly, gather all theinformation needed in one place, such as diary or a wall calendar.Whatever method chosen, decide andwrite down your won dates and schedule of work for each unit.
3. Once you have created your own study schedule, do everything tostay faithful to it. The major reason why students fail is that theyget behind with their course work.
4. Turn to unit 1 and read the introduction and the objectives for theunit.
5. Assemble the study materials. Information about what you need for a unit is given in the overview, at the beginning of each unit. The study unit, being workedupon, and one of the set books must be made available on the desk for use at same time.
6. Work through the unit: When working through a unit, sources to consult for further information will be identified.

7. Review the objectives for each study unit to confirm that theyhave been achieved . If unsure about any of the objectives,review the study materials or, better still, consult the tutorial facilitator.

8. Keep to the schedule when the assignment is to be submitted and payparticular attention to the tutorial facilitator's comments.

9. When an assignment had been submitted to the tutorialfacilitator(s) for marking, do not wait for its return before startingon the next unit. After completing the last unit, review the courseand prepare for the final examination.

FACILITATION

There are between 8 and 12 hours of tutorials provided to support this course. Tutorialsare for problem solving and it is very important in the event of studyingthis course material. The date and time of the tutorial shall be communicated as at when due.

The tutor will mark and comment on the assignments submitted.Do not hesitateto contact him or her on telephone, e-mail or discussion board if problems are encounteredin:

i. understanding any part of the study unit,

ii. solving the assignment given,

Participating in discussions will be of immense assistance and that is why the issue of tutorials must be taken seriously.

MODULE 1: CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The need for security has a long and diverse history that several scholars have found difficult to connect to a single event. In an apparent reference to the importance of security, Thomas Hobbes (1588 - 1679) had observed that life in the State of Nature was "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short" (Leviathan, Chapters XIII–XIV). In that context, the "State of Nature" was regarded as the historical past, but later on in the same Leviathan (Chapters XIII, XXX end), Hobbes explained further that the "State of Nature" exists at all times even among independent countries, especially where there is no law except for those same precepts or laws of nature. It appears Hobbes' observation still holds today, and makes contemporary security scholars to continue to ponder on Georg Simmel's (1858 – 1918) earlier question on: How is society possible? In whatever way we look at it, the absence or presence of security determines to a large extent the "possibility of modern society".

Security is operationalized to mean the quality or state of being secure, such as "freedom from danger, safety, freedom from fear or anxiety, freedom from the prospect of being laid off from job, or job security", etc (Barry, Ole, &Jaap de, 1988 p. 29). Freedom from or resilience against potential harm (or other unwanted coercive change) caused by others (Rogers, 2010). The beneficiaries of (technically referents) security may be of persons and social groups, objects and institutions, ecosystems or any other entity or phenomenon vulnerable to unwanted change. These may include, internally displaced persons fleeing from Boko Haram in North Eastern Nigeria, refugees fleeing internal crisis in Cameroun, etc. Security, therefore, would refer to "protection from hostile forces" (Bruce, 2012), with a wide range of other associated attributes like the absence of harm, freedom from want (e.g. food security), resilience against potential damage or harm, secrecy (as a secure telephone line), containment (e.g. a secure room or neighbourhood), and as a state of mind (e.g. emotional security)[Rogers, 2010].

Given the above explanation, it is implied that the subject of security is not only wide and complex but also are the approaches to the discussion of its subject matter. In this section, therefore, attempts are made to understand the concept of security in four thematic headings including the meaning, necessity and values of security in contemporary society.

Unit 1: The concept of Security
Unit 2: Public Security and Private security
Unit 3: Public-Private Security: A marriage of Goals
Unit 4: The structure and functions of public and private security partnerships

Unit 1THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY

CONTENTS

3.6 Security at what cost?

3.7 Security in what time period?

4.0 Self-assessment exercise

5.0 Conclusion

6.0 Summary

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Defining “security as a concept” is indeed necessary given the present canopy of confusion that surrounds security discourses in the twenty first century. Security is becoming something akin to a cottage industry, with effort channeled to redefining the policy agendas of nation-states and security architecture other than the concept of security itself. In many of the literature analysed by Rogers (2010), there appears to exist dominantnarratives about what security means, whom it should benefit and how it is achieved. Such definition tend to take the form of proposals for giving high priority to such issues as human rights, economics (Brook, 2010), the environment (Cassidy, Brandes, & LaVegila,1993), drug traffic, epidemics, crime, and social injustice (The Ammerdown Group, 2016), in addition to the traditional concern with security from external military threats (Obama, 2015). There is, therefore, the mixture of normative arguments about which values or which people or groups of people should be protected, and empirical arguments as to the nature and magnitude of threats to those values. In the contestation of these arguments, very little attention has been devoted to conceptual issues. Such observation may have influenced the call by the United Nations Secretary-General (cited in Baldwin, 1997) for a 'conceptual breakthrough' which will go 'beyond armed territorial security' to include 'the security of people in their homes, jobs and communities'.

In the explanation offered by Gallie (1952, cited in Richard, Roy& Ted, 1993),the concept of securitymust be *'appraisive* in the sense that it signifies or accredits some kind of valued achievement. Linking the concept of ‘champion' in sports to illustrate his point, Gallie (1952) argued that the label of championship is given to a team that plays the game better than other teams. In this context, the concept of security is similar to the concept of a champion, because security is the most important goal a state can have in the same way that winning a championship is presumably the goal of all teams. Just as teams compete to be champions, so states compete for security for her citizens. And just as the champion is better at playing the

game than other teams, so states with more security than other states arebetter at protecting their citizens all round. There are contrary opinions to this argument, such as the one provided by Wolfers (1952, cited in Barry,1991,pp.3-5), who contended that states vary widely in the value they place on security; and that some states may be so dissatisfied with the *status quo* that they become interested in acquiring new values than in securing the values they have. For many scholars (Rogers, 2010; Bruce, 2012), security has remained a contested concept that needs no further definition.

In Buzan (1984) argument, which has been thoroughly debunked, he suggested five possible explanations for the neglect of security conceptualization. First, is the difficulty of the concept. As Buzan admitted, however, this concept is no more difficult than other concepts. Second, is the apparent overlap between the concepts of security and power. Since these are easily distinguishable concepts, however, one would have expected such confusion to motivate scholars to clarify the differences. Third, is the lack of interest in security by various critics of realism. This, however, does not explain why security specialists themselves neglected the concept. Fourth, is that security scholars are too busy keeping up with new developments in technology and policy. This, however, is more an indication that such scholars give low priority to conceptual issues than an explanation for this lack of interest. And the fifth explanation considered by Buzan is that policy-makers find the ambiguity of 'national security' useful, which does not explain why scholars have neglected the concept.

During the Cold War, security studies were composed mostly of scholars interested in military statecraft. If military force was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not relevant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics. Security has been a banner to be flown, a label to be applied, but not a concept to be used by most security studies specialists. Buzan (1984), thus,puzzled as to how a central concept like security could be so ignored and disappears with the realization that military force, not security, has been the central concern of security studies.

As Baldwin (1997) observed, the essential contestedness of the concept of security represents a challenge to the kind of conceptual analysis it should be given. In order to clear these challenges, Buzan (1984) pointed out that a concept of security that fails to specify a 'referent object' will make little sense. Many scholars have agreed that security, in its most general sense, can be defined in terms of two specifications: Security for whom? and security for which values? (Buzan, 1991; Baldwin, 1997;Rogers, 2010).

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES

Given the contestation in security definition, the objective of this unit is to try anddisentangle the concept of security from these normative and empirical concerns and expose you to identify common conceptual distinctions underlying various conceptions of security; so that you can explain the common elements in the various conceptions of security. This is not to say that normative and empirical discourses are not in order, but as Baldwin (1997) rightly observed, cloaking normative and empirical debates in conceptual rhetoric exaggerates the conceptual differences between proponents of various security policies and, in so doing, impedes scholarly communication.

Without a clear conceptual explanation,scholars are apt to talk past each other, and policy-makers would find it difficult to distinguish between alternative policies. For the purpose of quantitative analysis, conceptual explanation helps to bring out related variables that can help in the test of hypotheses as well as the construction of theories. At the end of this unit, therefore, you will be able to:

1. identify common conceptual distinctions underlying various conceptions of security;
2. explain the common elements in the various conceptions of security,
3. know and explain the meaning of security ; and
4. ascertain the importance of security beyond the taking for granted phenomenon.

Equipped with this knowledge, therefore, you can be able to:

(a) promote rational policy analysis by facilitating comparison of one type of security policy with another;

(b) facilitate scholarly understanding of the different schools of discourses in the theorizing of security and appreciate the common ground between those with divergentviews.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Security for Whom?

In his conceptualization of security with respect to “referent object”, Buzan (1984) had argued that simple specification such as, 'the state' or 'the individual', does not suffice. Since there are many states and individuals, and their security interdependent, Buzan (1984) argued, that the 'search for a referent object of security' must go 'hand-in-hand with that for its necessary conditions'. In this context, therefore, specifying the concept of security requires a wide range of answers to the question: ‘Security for whom?' . The range

includesthe individual (some, most, or all individuals), the state (some, most, or all states), the international system (some, most, or all international systems), etc. The choice depends on the particular research question to be addressed (Baldwin, 1997).

3.2. Security for Which Values?

Depending on the "referent object': individuals, states, and other social actors have many values. These may include physical safety, economic welfare, autonomy, safety of lives and property, psychological well-being, and so on. The concept of national security, for instance, has traditionally included political independence and territorial integrity as values to be protected; but other values are sometimes added. For instance, the Nigerian National Security strategy development includesterritorial integrity, peace, democracy, economic growth and social justice. It also includes sub-regional security and economic cooperation, with the promotion of peace, and international cooperation in Africa and the world, as focal points (Bala, 2018).

The most potent threats to Nigerian national security include global challenges, terrorism, transnational organized crimes, crude oil theft or illegal bunkering, Nigeria's borders, climate change, communal and ethno-religious conflicts, pastoralists and farmers conflicts, politics and federalism in Nigeria, governance, poverty, kidnaping, proliferations of small arms, light weapons and weapons of mass destructions,; illegal migration, economic challenges, financial crimes, information technology and cyber security, natural, man-made and medical related threats,and environmental security. These threats are by no means the only threat to Nigeria's security, but they are cited as the potential sources of disaffection, discontent and instability that could adversely affect the country's quest for national stability, unity and development (Obasanjo, 2000).

Conceptualizing security in terms of "referent beneficiaries and values" may help to reveal the scope but it provides very little guidance for its pursuit. As Walt(1991:215) would argue, security is a value 'of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure'. Given this development, security scholars came up with more questions that have expanded the concept of security. These include: "how much security?", "from what threat?", "by what means?, "at what cost?" and "in what time period?" These are what the next section will briefly clarify.

3.3. How much Security?

The idea of security as a matter of degree cannot be taken for granted. For instance, when confronted with national security threats, a country is either secured, or unsecured. In this context, there is nothing like partial security, because a country that is half secured is not secured. In the idea of Lawrence (1977), security does not lend itself to a graded spectrum which fills the space between hot and cold. Inspite of this, there is room to speak about varying degrees of security (Brown, 1983; Baldwin, 1997). The important thing to acknowledge here is that absolute security is unattainable. The attainable level is always a matter of degree. In a world where scarce resources must be allocated among competing objectives, none of which is completely attainable, one cannot escape from the question 'How much is enough?

3.4. From What Threats?

Whenever the word "security" is mentioned, a particular kind of threat seems to be in the offing. A threatening phenomenon seems to be lurking around. For instance, Nigerian national security strategy seems to pay more attention to warding off Boko Haram terrorists and the Islamic states of West Africa (ISWA) threats of destabilizing the country. When Estate owners in Abuja talk about security, they are more likely concerned with potential burglars and armed robbers than car snatchers. This is because car snatching will be easier on the highways than in the estate. In ordinary language, threats can have reference to epidemics, floods, earthquakes, droughts, religious riots and or protests. Threats to acquired values can therefore come from many sources.

3.5. Security by What Means?

Like wealth, the goal of security can be pursued by a wide variety of means (Walt, 1991). Many different policies may plausibly be adopted in the pursuit of security. In this context, the specification of the dimension of security becomes important and crucial, especially in the discussion of national and international security. The tendency of some security scholars to define security in terms of 'the threat, use, and control of military force' (Lawrence, 1977) can, therefore lead to confusion as to the means by which security may be pursued. It can also tilt security discourse in favour of military solutions to security problems.

3.6 Security at What Cost?

The pursuit of security always involves costs. The cost implications here may be understood in terms of what the economist would call "opportunity cost" and real cost in terms of monetary and human sacrifice:the sacrifice of other socio-economic development goals that

could have been pursued in place ofsecurity. For instance, the increase in Military spending in Nigeria, in the uprising of Boko Haram insurgency explains the "opportunity cost" of protecting the territorial sovereignty of the country as it becomes a matter of national importance that must be executed by driving away the insurgents and terrorists.

In the conceptualization of security, therefore, specification of the dimension of security policy is important because some scholars often suggests that costs do not matter (Baldwin, 1997). For instance, Leffler(1990) once defined national security in terms of the protection of core values, which he described as 'interests that are pursued notwithstanding the costs incurred'. From the standpoint of a rational policy-maker, however, there are no such interests. In fact, Baldwin (1997) concluded the argument by saying that there is no such thing as "free lunch". Costs will always matter in the acquisition of security. It is also instructive to note that the sacrifice of other costs for the sake of security inevitably makes security policy a subject for moral judgment, and in many instances, a national sacrifice.

3.7 Security in What Time Period?

Security may have either "short" of "long" term plans. The most rational policies for security in the long run may differ greatly from those in the short run. For instance, a short run security plan against burglar and theft in an urban estate may include a high fence and a fierce dog as a way of protecting oneself from the neighbours. Nevertheless, in the long run, it may be preferable to befriend them.Short-run security policies may also be in conflict with long-run security policies.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 1

a) Why is the definition of security a contested issue?
b) Given your understanding of security as a concept, outline and discuss the causes of failure of security strategy in Africa.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Conceptualizing security in response to the seven questions raised above: "security for whom?,"security for which values?","how much security?", "from what threat?", "by what means?, "at what cost?", and "in what time period?" suggests that security discourse will need to become more reflexive and inclusive if it is to do more than merely talking about military might. It has also helped to indicate four cardinal principles of security as a practice. These are carefully summarized in the recent work done by the Ammerdown Group (2016, p.3):

a). **Security as a freedom.** Security may be understood as a shared freedom from fear and want, andthe freedom to live in dignity. It implies social and ecological health rather than the absence of risk.

b).**Security as a common right.** A commitment to commonality is imperative; security should not,and usually cannot, be gained for one group of people at others' expense. Accordingly, securityrests on solidarity rather than dominance – in standing with others, not over them.

c).**Security as a patient practice.** Security grows or withers according to how inclusive and justsociety is, and how socially and ecologically responsible we are. It cannot be coerced into being.

d).**Security as a shared responsibility.** Security is a common responsibility; its challenges belong toall of us. The continuing deterioration of security worldwide testifies against entrusting ourcommon wellbeing to a self-selected group of powerful states.

Security has remained a multidimensional phenomenon, with more systematic drivers being added (climate change, militarisation, economic inequality, and the increasing scarcityof resources) as the Cold war came to an end. Economic security, environmental security, identity security, social security and military security are different forms of security, not fundamentally different concepts. Each can be specified in terms of which values to protect, from which threats, by what means, and at what cost. The changing world circumstances and new issues of security do not necessarily require new concepts. This is just as "voting power", "military power", "economic power", and "persuasive power" are different forms of the same social phenomenon, i.e., power. The adjectives indicate the differences, while the noun draws attention to the similarities.

6.0 SUMMARY

The focus of this unit was to clarify the concept of security taking cognizance of the different strands and the different questions in the security literature. Defining security beyond military power suggests an all-inclusive consideration that will see security as freedom from fear and want, andthe freedom to live in dignity. It means security will rest on solidarity rather than dominance. In this context, security will remain a common responsibility of all.

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UNIT 2 PUBLIC SECURITY AND PRIVATE SECURITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

It is common for Countries to affirm their state security strategies by way of outlining a list of values that ostensibly guide security policymaking. For instance, the National Security Strategy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria developed and published by the Office of the National Security Adviser (in ONSA, 2014, p. 32), outlined the Country's National Security Strategy to include "creating a peaceful, self-reliant, prosperous, strong nation; to ensure physical security; build individual and collective prosperity; cause national development and promote Nigeria influence in regional, continental and global affairs". It addressestwo critical threat areas: the national security interest and threats to national security. While national security was defined to include the security and welfare of its people; sovereignty and defence of its territorial integrity; peace; democracy; economic growth and social justice.Sub-regional security and economic cooperation (regarded as *strategic* interests) include the promotion of peace, security, development, democracy and international cooperation in Africa and the world that are peripheral to Nigeria national interests.

The threats to National Security is defined in the instrument to include global challenges; terrorism; transnational organized crimes; crude oil theft or illegal bunkering; Nigeria's porous borders; climate change; communal and ethno-religious conflicts; pastoralists and farmers conflicts; politics and federalism in Nigeria; governance; poverty; kidnapping, proliferations of small arms, light weapons and weapons of mass destruction; illegal migration; economic challenges; financial crimes; information technology and cyber security; natural, man-made and medical related threats and environmental security (Bala &Ouédraogo, 2018, p.16).

Although the threats enumerated may not be the only ones that could threaten Nigeria national security, they remain the most potent and are adjudged potential sources of disaffection, discontent and instability that could adversely affect the country's quest for national stability, unity and development (Alemika, 2013). Given such understanding, the National Security Strategy paper was well received by Nigerians and international security watchers. However, nothing was said about what it would mean in practice. How would it shapegovernment's response to competing theatre of violent conflicts and insecurity in the country? How would these strategies alter Nigeria's historic security changes emanating from ethnic and religious differences? These aspects were not taken care of by the National Security Strategy Paper. However, when the Boko Haram insurgents increased their tempo in

the destruction of lives and property in Nigeria, it was the Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF) that joined forces with the security personnel to engage them. For the first time, it became very clear what a nexus between private and public security institutions can accomplish.

Security team work involving public and private security outfits may not be new, but the renewed effort demands some close study as to what could motivate it. The InternationalAssociation of Chiefs of Police (IACP, 2004) have observed that prior to the terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11, a national effort, known asOperation Cooperation, had existed in the United Statesbetween private security organizations and thestate and local law enforcement agencies. The collaborative effortsbetween them helped in crime detection, prevention and control. The argument among Security scholars is that a synergy between public and private security organizations is necessary to effectively protect the nation's infrastructure. This is because neither of them possesses thenecessary resources to do so alone.At this juncture, it is important to look at the objective of this unit.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES

At the end of this unit you will be able to:

1. explore more definitions of security;
2. understand the difference between private and public security;
3. explain why a nexus between public and private security will help in effective security delivery.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1Private Security: A Definitional Attempt

Historically, "private security" referred to security guards and private investigators. In the last two decades, especially after the Cold War era, private security companies in many countries have expanded the scope of their activities to include many tasks traditionally performed by the public police; and are becoming increasingly popular. The popularity and increased use of private security seem to reflect an adaptive strategy in mixed market economies where government provision of services has not kept pace with public perceptions of an increased crime threat.As the role of private security become very popular, many scholars have come up with different definitions of what Private security means and entails. Some scholars have referred to Private

Security as Private Police (Johnston,1999; Cunningham, 2003), while the UNODC (2011) refer to it as Civilian Private Security Service (CPSS). Across the security literature, therefore, various definitions have been used; some definitions are indeed very narrow. Definitional differences tend to include the focus of job tasks, the influence of profit and the client, and the inclusion of products, such as the manufacturing, distribution, and installation of equipment and technology (Cunningham, 2003).

In a report authored by Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971, p. 3), Private security is defined as "all types of private organizations and individuals providing all types of security-related services, including investigation, guard, patrol, lie detection, alarm, and armoured transportation". In another definition, Prenzler, Earle, and Sarre (2009, p, 12 referred to Private security as "persons who are employed or sponsored by a commercial enterprise on a contract or "in-house" basis, using public or private funds, to engage in tasks (other than vigilante action) where the principal component is a security or regulatory function" . The American Society for Industrial Security (ASIS, 2009,p, 17) defined private security as "the nongovernmental, private-sector practice of protecting people, property, and information, conducting investigations, and otherwise safeguarding an organization's assets". The understanding here is that, private security industry is not homogenous, but rather "a multitude of industries, large and small, all related to the provision of security services, investigations, crime prevention, order maintenance and security design" (Sarre, & Prenzler, 2011,p. 32).

When the definition offered by Kakalik and Wildhorn (1971) was criticized by the Private Security Task Force (PSTF), a group established by the Law Enforcement Alliance of America (LEAA), they pointed out that (1) the definition excluded quasi-public police (e.g., park and recreation police) and (2) did not include the client relationship or profit nature of the industry. Thus, the PSTF adopted a definition that includes ―those self-employed individuals and privately funded business entities and organizations providing security-related services to specific clientele for a fee, for the individual or entity that retains or employs them, or for themselves, in order to protect their persons, private property, or interests from various hazards (Cunningham, 2003). The PSTF also restricted its definition to organizations with a profit-oriented delivery system and excluded quasi-public police organizations unless they were paid by private fund. However, Green (1981, cited in Strom, Berzofsky,&Shook-Sa, et al (2010) argued that distinctions based on profit orientation or sources of funds are not useful because non-profit institutions, such as hospitals, airports, and schools, often hire private security. He,therefore, defined private security as "those

individuals, organizations, and services other than public law enforcement agencies, which are engaged primarily in the prevention of crime, loss, or harm to specific individuals, organizations, or facilities(p. 18).

Under abroad definition offered by Strom, Berzofsky, and Shook-Sa, et al (2010), the termprivate security can represent a wide range of organizations, including corporate security, security guard companies, armoured car businesses, investigative services, and many others. Personnel hired by these companies can be armed or unarmed, and can be employed as either in-house or contract. Sarre and Prenzler (2012), therefore, described private security industry by distinctions based on the proprietary or contractual nature of security departments, type of security provided (physical, information, or employment-related), services provided (e.g., guarding, armoured transport), and markets (e.g., critical infrastructure, commercial venues). The ASIS International (2009) developed a definition of private security field based on 18 core elements, thus:

1. Physical security,
2. Personal security,
3. Information systems security,
4. Investigations,
5. Loss prevention,
6. Risk management,
7. Legal aspects,
8. Emergency and contingency planning,
9. Fire protection,
10. Crisis management,
11. Disaster management,
12. Counterterrorism,
13. Competitive intelligence,
14. Executive protection,
15. Violence in the workplace,
16. Crime prevention,
17. Crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED), and
18. Security architecture and engineering.

These 18 core elements can influence the classification of private security into three general types viz:

a). **Physical security**: these are the physical measures designed to safeguard people; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, facilities, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against a security incident;

b). **Information security**: this includes protecting information systems, databases, and guarding against cyber-crime; and

c). **Employment related**: that focuses on the performance and the potential threat or risks of personnel in an organization.

Generally, from the different definitions, what stands out is the fact that private security is not a monolithic entity. Even when they can be classified broadly into (1) proprietary or *corporate* security;and (2) *contract* or private security firms, they perform different functions that can differ considerably. *Corporate*security generally refers to the security departmentsthat exist within businesses or corporations. *Contract*security firms by contrast sell their services to thepublic, including businesses, homeowners, and banks

3.2Public Security: A Definitional Attempt

Unlike the debate on what Private security represents, scholars seemed to have agreed on what constitute public security. In the explanation offered by the ASIS (2009), public security is government owned service, which are provided at local, state and federal levels. Public security officers received strict training, and certification. Politics, government establishments, and laws also control them. Their main concern is the welfare and safety of the public. In Nigeria, members of the security organizations like the Police, Civil Defence corpse, DSS, and other paramilitary organizations are said to constitute the outfit for public security. Given this understanding public security can be defined as security institutions, funded from tax payers' money, whose duties are not for pecuniary gain, but for the maintenance of peace and order, as well as detection, prevention, and control of crime.

The functions of public security areprimarily for the maintenance of public order, prevention, and detection of crimes in the state. It also protects the life, liberty and property of the people. As the crime level increased by the day with changing pattern, the role of pubic security has become more important and more demanding than before. In this context, Sarre, and Prenzler (2011)observed that without public security, there would be chaos in the society; and a direct invitation to the Hobbesian state of nature where life was not only solitary, but also nasty, brutish and short. Since public security is set up by government with specific functions to perform; the criminal law remained their watch word. Public security enforces

the criminal law, maintains law and order and investigates crime. It provides the necessary' check against the ambivalence of the human nature. They therefore, remained the recognized law enforcers in the society. Thus, the role of public security in the society is of paramount importance at ensuring public safety.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 2

1. Differentiate between private and public security.
2. What do you think will continue to sustain the disagreement among scholars in the definition of private security?
3. Differentiate between Proprietary and Contract security. Based on your understanding of the terms (proprietary and contract), discuss the argument that "private security is not a monolithic entity"

5.0 CONCLUSION

Private security is an important component of security industry. Its role in the protection and safety of property is widely acknowledged. In Nigeria, for example, private security is responsible not only for the protection of many homes, companies and critical infrastructure, but also for protecting sensitive corporate information. Many public institutions in Nigeria, including colleges and Universities,rely on private security for a wide range of functions, including protecting employees and property, conducting investigations, performing guard functions, screening, providing information technology security and many other functions.

Private security guards are limited by law to observing, reporting and deterring crime. They are not funded by government, and so are not accountable to society but to whomever pays them. This is as opposed to public security which is set up by governments to ensure the protection of citizens, organizations, and institutions against threats to their well-being; and to the prosperity of their communities.From the literature available on private and public security (Kakalik & Wildhorn, 1971; Cunningham, 2003), emerging security challenges in the world suggest that the role of both private and public security institutions on security provision will be on increasing demand. More and more people will be looking into security options for their homes, neighbourhoods and businesses.

6.0 SUMMARY

In this module, you were exposed to the definitions of private and public security. In exploring the different scholarly definitions, attempts were made to examine the different functions provided by two organizations and how a nexus between them in security delivery is necessary in contemporary times given the challenges posed by increase in crime and terrorism .

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UNIT3: PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECURITY: A MARRIAGE OF GOALS

CONTENTS

3.1 Strengthening and Realizing the Goals of Security

3.2 A Marriage of Goals

3.3 Removing Obstacles to Cooperation

4.0 Self-assessment exercise

5.0 Conclusion

6.0 Summary

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

One of the key requirements of the social contract was the creation of a Sovereign that can provide security for the people. It suggests that in the state of nature, security of lives and property was paramount; and it is the preoccupation of modern society. Modern government and security governance, therefore, decide to focus on the provision of security, not only for the purpose of safeguarding lives and property, but also for the multiplier effects that security has on socio-economic investment, peace and prosperity. As the 20th century ran it course, it becomes clear that the notion of a single sovereign power,meeting the security expectations of its citizens through the agency of a strong state apparatus,as provided by a public security force, was fast waning. As Garland (1996) would observe, the state monopoly over crime control was becoming unsustainable and the limitations of the state's ability to govern social life became more and more apparent. The emergence of the 21st Century revealed new strategies of fighting crime as well as maintaining peace and order through activating indirectly non-state agencies. Within the security circle, phrases like 'private-public-partnership' (PPP), 'community partnership', 'citizenship-partnership' and 'community policing' started to emerge as new approaches of security strategies.

Three fundamental developments that emerged with the 21st Century - globalization, marketing and pluralism - exerted significant effect on security. At the international level, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI, 2010)observed that the threats to peace and security that the world were facing was interconnected and thus,required response actions that should be unified. Given this observation, the UNICRI developed a guideline with emphasis on ensuring effective private public partnerships on security (PPPS). In the explanation of the importance of the PPPS, the UNICRI advised that the State should retain primary responsibility for the implementation of security policies and measures to prevent and respond to security attacks and other major threats to security while

involving private security sector. Based on the UNICRI, a paradigm shift began to emerge at the domestic level from the traditional public security as shown by the Police, Immigration, Civil Defence, etc, to Private-Public Securitycollaborations. Nowadays, the terms, "private security" and "private policing" are being used synonymously, especially in the United States of America and in the European countries. In whatever name private security is known, their functioning have clear similarities in the provision of a range of services that may include but not limited to the protection of banks, public buildings, private homes, and shopping malls to the safeguarding of extractive industries' operations. These services are fast increasing given the expansion in commercial firms, industrial operations, and infrastructures. In the United States and Europe, private security industry has grown to become one of the largest employers of labour (Jones&Newbum, 2002; Sklansky, 2006). The development and use of Private security organizations in Africa are also receiving wide scholarly attention (Abubaker, 2017; Bamidele, Akinbolade& Nuhu, 2016).

Many scholars (Jones&Newbum, 2002; Sarre & Prenzler, 2012) have identified key tendencies that explain the proliferation of private security industry. These include the limited number of the public security to respond to corporate demands; availability of a wide range of specialist security requirements and knowledge, and availability of security duties that do not require the skills, training and authority of public security officers (Bedard &Guenette, 2015). In all, it appears that the growth of private security has been boosted by adoptive strategy in mixed market economies where government provision of services has not kept pace with public perception ofan increased crime threats.

However, the increase in private security is not without risks and challenges. These risks and challenges are becoming more pronounced as the private security firms are not well equipped to tackle surging crime rate; due mainly to their limitations of operation set by public law and the training that security officers in the private companies are given. On the other hand, public security is also being confronted with several challenges. Public security officers tended to operate within their commands arrangement (local, state, and federal) thus having operational jurisdictions, that rely solely on resources within their usual networks. As a result of such command structure, opportunities to share information,technology and other resources are often overlooked or even ignored. In many instances, researchers have reported disrespectfulattitudes toward private security, as well as a general lack of interest by public

security officers about what happensto private security operatives, except when official complaints were received (Sklansky, 2006; Soltar, 2009).

Inspite of the above listed challenges, a number of specific benefits is expected from PPPS some of which arelower cost,higher levels of service, and reduced risk. Ensuring the security of people and their property is one of the most fundamental responsibilities of a well-functioning state. It is traditionally the job of the national police forces. However, Africa's public security, especially the police, are woefully understaffed. The United Nations recommends one police officer for every 450 citizens. Kenya has one for every 1,150, Tanzania one for every 1,298, Ghana one for every 1,200, Egypt, 1:187 and South Africa, 1:366 (Umar, 2019). In Nigeria, the geometrical increase in the population has increased beyond the hitherto ratio of 1:400 (Kimani, 2009) to an all-time height of 1:662 citizen given a population of close to 200 million Nigerians, and a police population of 301,737 police personnel. Besides, close to 200,000 police personnel are deployed to secure VIPs and politicians, and others who can afforda private security. Most police forces are also underfunded and poorly equipped. Officers are often short on vehicles and fuel, making them routinely late or unable to respond to crimes. Inadequate funds also translate into poor pay, low morale and rampant corruption, all of which hamper the ability to provide adequate public security (Abrahamsen& Williams, 2005).

Increasingly, private security companies are plugging the gap. Given the state of Africa's official police forces, the growth of private firms appears to be a timely and viable solution. The majority of private security personnel are engaged in preventive activities, compared to police officers, whose tasks include prevention, investigation, making arrests and providing information for prosecution (Prenzler, 2013). While the public security has a democratic role to provide protection and preserve law unconditionally, private security providers, focus on providing selective risk protection to their clients based on financial incentives.Other areas of divergence include differences in training, ownership of successes and failures in case of joint operations and information sharing. Inspite of these differences, the relationship between private and public security companies has to be fostered since both shared in the objectives of achieving a crime free society, and the maintenance of peace and order. There is, therefore, a glaring need for a total symbiotic relationship if the two are to provide complementary services to the public.

In the argument of Rogers(2010), the relationship between the private and public security organizations may experience conflicts at some points; and after some time, the two may work together. But the most potent, cost-effective means of neutralizing criminal and even terrorist threats require closepartnerships between public and private security companies. Only through such partnerships can the public and other law enforcement agencies leverage,increasingly, scarce resources to combat existing and emerging threats to public safety.Private security,therefore, is an important supplementary contribution to state security by protecting businesses, individuals, embassies and foreign missions, thus enabling prosperity. Private security companies (PSC) also represent a significant employer, particularly for individuals not qualified for state security work, as well as retired ex-service men and women.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

As shown in the elaborate introduction, the expected learning outcomes of this unit are to introduce you to the:

a) several phrases used in the security circle to indicate public-private security partnerships;
b) goals that private and public security partnerships seek to achieve in the larger context of security sector reform;
c) key tendencies that explain the proliferation of private security industry; and
d) obstacles that may constrain the achievement of the common goals of security and how to remove them.

3.0 MAIN CONTENTS

3.1Strengthening and Realizing the Goals of Security

It is a recognized fact, acknowledged by security experts, (Sarre& Prenzler, 2011) and political scientists (Sklansky, 2006) that socio-economic development and peace in any country have positive and significant links with the national security. Criminal attacks directed at the country's wealth-creating sectors suchas industries, infrastructures, etc, constitute mainstream nationalsecurity risks. This recognition has brought security concern to priority point in governance much more than before. As noted in the introduction section, international and domestic responses seem to key into the United Nations Interregional Crime

and Justice Research Institute's(UNICRI, 2010) argument that public–private cooperation should be an essential component of the response to security threats.

Several factors have been cited for the paradigm shift in security partnerships. Each factor rely on the opinion of the scholar, some with elaborate empirical backing, while some has no empirical backing. For instance, in the United States of America, the appreciation of the benefits of private/public-sector partnershipswas born out of harsh economic necessity, which included budget constraints, and the new mandates which required law enforcement agencies to do more with little financial provision. In the analysis provided by Gainer (2018), he demonstrated the declining public security strength of some major cities in the country and the impact of the economic depression. In a comparison drawn across some states and cities in the United States, the author observed that the strength of the New York City Police Department had dropped from 35,500 in 2004 to 34,450 in 2012. Similarly, the Chicago Police Department which had 13,326 officers in 2004 dropped to 11,944 in 2012. In Camden, New Jersey, the number of uniformed police, which was 408 officers in 2007, had declined to less than 280 in 2012. Following the drop was also budget cut; and remarkable increase in violent crimes: 1.9 percent during the first six months of 2012, whileproperty crimes had risen to 1.5 percent.

In contrast to the dwindling statistics of public security personnel, the statistics of private security has been increasing. In spite of controversies onhow accurate statistics and data are and what should be counted as private securityindustry, the substantial growth in most countries of the private security industry isnot contested. For instance, the data from UNODC (2011) revealed a growth in private security industry from100,000 personnel in 1982 to 160,000 in 2010; in Japan, from 70,000 guards in1975 to 460,000 in 2003; in South Africa, from 115,000 in 1997 to 390,000 in 2010.

In India there are 7 million private security personnel, outnumbering police officers with a ratio of 4.98 to 1.In Guatemala the ratio is 6.01, in Honduras 4.88, in South Africa 2.57, in the UnitedStates of America 2.26, and in Australia 2.19. Some large transnational companiesemploy more than 500,000 staff worldwide. In Nigeria, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC, 2018), which regulate private security companies in the country put the number of licensed private guards in the country at 1086, with a personnel number of 828,502 (NBS, 2019).

Across the world, the international terrorism, insurgency, cybercrime, organised crime in human trafficking, drugs, adulterated and counterfeit pharmaceutical products, armed robbery and smuggling have reached a level which requires more comprehensive andmore innovative approaches to effectively prevent and tackle them. For instance, terrorists attacks against transportation systems in Madrid (2004),London (2005) and Moscow (2010); against hotels and restaurants in Bali (2002),Mumbai (2008) and Kampala (2010) and against the United Nations Building in Abuja, Nigeria (2011) have shown that places where a high number ofpeople reside or gather are particularly vulnerable and are increasingly becomingterrorists targets. Considering the nature and the scale of today's terrorist threat, a combinedeffort involving governments, civil society and the private sector becomes essential indeveloping effective and coordinated countermeasures. According to the UNICRI (2010), state action alone will oftennot be sufficient to curb the increase in crime. Joint problems require joint solutions. In view of this, security collaborations, in the manner of private-public security partnerships, becomes a necessity.

In 2006, the United Nations developed a comprehensive counter-terrorism policy framework, which recognized theimportant role of public-private partnerships in security (PPPS). The strategy, in particular, encourages the identification and sharing of best practicesbetween different stakeholders to prevent criminal attacks on particularly vulnerabletargets, and highlights the importance of developing PPP initiatives in this area. The document emphasized that government stands to benefit from closer coordination with the private sector on security and, therefore, encouraged member states of the United Nations to increase partnerships with private security and intensify such partnerships with shared tactics and cooperation, especially in information sharing and implementations.

Two important factors are driving the private-public security partnership initiatives:economics and internal security needs (Bruce, 2012). Other important factors are a rise in mutual esteem (Brook, 2010) as private security gained sophisticated capabilities and increased credentialing and skills in the security field. Some corporate security departments maintain intelligence operations and forensic labs that surpass those of many law enforcement agencies. The security field has also seen gains in certification (more certifications, more certified practitioners), standards, academic programsand other measures of professionalism. At the same time, law enforcement has shown a greater willingness (often driven by necessity) to work with private security. The development in policing is recently placing emphasis on community policing, which calls on police to

collaborate with community members to prevent and solve crimes. These collaborations have implications that can only be understood by looking at the objectives of security and, thus, understanding the shared goals of both public and private security beyond pecuniary benefits.

The critical issues that underline private-public security collaborationsare that Private security addresses crimes and public safety issues that law enforcement cannot handle alone because it lacks the human resources, mandate, or technology. The most potent, cost-effective means of neutralizing criminal and terrorist threats require closepartnerships between law enforcement, private security companies and business and communitygroups. Only through such partnerships can police and other law enforcement agencies leverageincreasingly scarce resources to combat existing and emerging threats to public safety. In contemporary times, community policing philosophies and strategies have shown best practices and excellent models that law enforcement must explore and expand. Given this understanding:

(a) it is no longerpossible for public police to ignore the extent andpervasiveness of private policing arrangements; and

(b) being in some general sense "for" or"against" private security is not helpful, as both seek to solve security problems in the country. Yet, it must be understood that (a) theinterests of private parties will rarely, if ever, befully aligned with public interests; and (b) itis not sufficient for public police agencies simplyto deal with the private security arrangementsthat exist today; rather, public police have a roleto play in influencing future arrangements that can strengthen the collaboration for effective and efficient service delivery.

Increased pressures on public law enforcement have resulted in the privatizationof some police functions in many places in the world. The private security organizations are increasingly filling the gaps left by the overstretched policeand playing a growing role in crime prevention and community safety. Theprivatization of the police has occurred at a number of levels, especially in oil sector. There has also been loadshedding, where the police withdraw from providing certain functions and privatesecurity fills the gap; contracting out - where services are still provided by the policebut a contractor is used to supply that services; and the embracement of privatesector practices by the public police, such as charging for services and acceptingsponsorship.

Some of the sectors in which security collaborations between private and public security operate around the globe include:patrolling public streets, transporting valuables, protecting critical infrastructures,providing security at airports and other major public transport hubs, responding toalarm activations, conducting surveillance, securing order and dealing with crowdsat large public events and investigating crimes. In many states in Nigeria (for instance, in Lagos and Owerri), there are expansionsin mass private properties and gated communities and, in both, the civilianprivate security industry usually assumes the primary role in providing crimeprevention and community safety.

3.2A Marriage of Goals

Security goals are about safety. The safety of lives and property translates into the internal security of the country. Both security sectors (private and public) are created for safety reasons. The collaborative efforts of public- and private security exerts multiplier benefits that allow businesses, privatesecurity companies, community groups and law enforcement agencies to harness each other'sknowledge, experience and expertise. There are several security companies working in big and small cities. Their knowledge of the locality is better than that of public security operatives that do not work there. By forming ongoing partnerships, the public security operatives stand to share in their experiences; and can come to understand and monitor what happensin their jurisdictions. They can also alert each other of problemsand trends, partner with each other to help prevent and solve crimes and even team up to fosterquality-of-life improvements.

In order to achieve the goals of security partnership, a great deal of information and technology-sharing must be put in place so thatmistakes are avoided and public safety maximized. Such collaborative efforts also serve in the sharing, expertise and new technologies in law enforcement. It has the advantage of enhancing advanced planning, and in many instances, periodicdisaster preparedness exercises. Other benefits summarised in several literatures (see Cassidy, Brandes & LaVegila, 1993; Sarre. & Prenzler, 2012)include:

Crime control: Private security officers outnumber sworn public law enforcement officers by about three to one in some countries, and even more in others. Besides, the number of public security officers is not expected to grow significantly. Private security, therefore, provides "more eyes and ears" for law enforcement and is often described as a force multiplier.

Resources to address computer and high-tech: Public-private security collaborations will enable law enforcement officers benefit from private security's technical and financial

resources while private security gains access to law enforcement's legal authority and investigative skills.

Resources to address financial and intellectual property crimes: Collaboration isessential to resolve complex financial crimes and to prosecute egregious intellectual property crimes, which are difficult to solve, because of a lack of investigative resources and the complexity of tracing the money flow.

Advanced technologies: Through various partnerships, private security has provided technical expertise and resources, such as access to its digital forensics' capabilities. Private security also stands to benefit from law enforcement's own use of technologies, including today's crime analysis and mapping applications.

Critical incident planning and response: Public and private security collaborationshelp to develop joint response plans and produce training, including full-scale exercises, as well as improves the readiness of both law enforcement and private security to handle critical incidents.

Information and intelligence: Intelligence from private security sources, including sources overseas, has become increasingly important for internal security. Both private security and law enforcement are benefiting from secure radio, e-mail/text messaging and web-based crime and incident alert systems. "Intelligence-led policing"is also influencing how some law enforcement agencies obtain, analyze and share information from multiple sources.

More effective community policing.:Public-private security collaborations reflect the core partnership principle of community policing, and some partnerships have been recognized as exemplary community policing efforts, especially in America and Europe where community policing has established firmed roots.

Training opportunities: Industry-specific training for law enforcement (e.g., on crimes affecting the oil or pharmaceutical industries) addresses both safety and investigative issues. Training provided by law enforcement to private security has covered crime scene protection, terrorism-related topics and many others.

Career opportunities: The private security and law enforcement fields recruit qualified employees from each other. Personnel with background on private-public security partnershipsmay be at an advantage later if they want to make a career shift.

3.3Removing Obstacles to Cooperation

A number of obstacles have been identified by scholars that can hinder cooperation between public security organizations and the private ones as well as the larger community. Perhaps the biggest obstacle so identified includes apparent lack of understanding of, and familiarity with, the capabilities of some private security firms (Brook, 2010). In addition, public security agencies have been slower to adopt new security andlaw enforcement technologies than private security agencies. From electronic monitoring and surveillanceto internet security, the private sector has more of the type of IT experts needed bylaw enforcement.For example, many security companies have mounted security cameras for their operatives beside walkie talkie machines. Their periodic training on internet security and technology has given them expertise which tends to be of immense benefit to their clients. Availability of such expertise and equipment has helped to increase real-time monitoring abilitiesof the operatives and in identifying criminal suspects.

Other obstacles to private-public security cooperation identified by scholars (Rogers, 2010; Brook, 2010; Ammerdown Group, 2016) include:

Awareness: Public law enforcement officers still lacks awareness of what private security can bring to the tableand of its specialized functions.Similarly, some private security -for example, personnel who do not have law enforcement experience - may not be fully aware of law enforcement's capabilities and resources.

Trust. The federal governmenthas routinely asked industries and companies to provide information about security in the country - such as the existence of suspected criminal gangs, suspected and/or identified threat to security, etc -but they have often refused to reciprocate by providing helpful information in exchange. For a variety of reasons, including lack of trust, data had a tendency toflow to the government from private industry, but not vice versa. In Nigeria, public security operatives have been accused of leaking information to criminals as well as informing criminals about the sources of their information about them (Abubaker, 2017). In addition, government-suppliedinformation had a tendency to get so "watered down" enroute to the private sectorthat, in many cases, civic groups and businesses could learn more by watching network news.

Information sharing and privacy: Law enforcement, private security and the public have legitimate concerns about the sharing of personal, sensitive and classified information. Some of the concerns include fears that business competitors will gain access to proprietary information. There are also issues surrounding security clearances and the potential for information glut (too much irrelevant information collected and/or disseminated).

Technology: Some technologies are complex or controversial with respect to management, oversight, or public acceptance. Many are costly and require time for selection of system features, acquisition, setup, training and maintenance.

Personnel issues: Some segments of the security industry (e.g., guard services) experience high employee turnover. Related concerns include the quality of security officer compensation, background screening, training and inconsistency in state licensing and training standards.

Decision making: Risk aversion in government can slow the positive changes that might come from public-private security collaborations. Typically, private security is better positioned to seize opportunities, but security directors must still convince their employers that time spent on partnership activities is worthwhile.

Taxpayer support for police and private security services: Private security often delivers certain services that traditionally were provided by law enforcement, such as security patrols in a business improvement district (BID). This trend is not universally embraced by police, and some businesses are reluctant to be taxed twice for crime-prevention services they believe a public (taxpayer-supported) law enforcement agency should provide.

The private sector's desire to protect proprietary data: There is also theconcern about theanti-trust ramifications of sharing certain information with competitors. Many private security firms may not like to share information for fear of other firms using such information to compete with them.

Efforts to overcome the challenges can start by boosting trust and enhance cooperation between private and public security organizations. It will involve intimate collaborations using activities such as:

a), Joint drill and exercises

b). Hosting a private sector liaison at the National Police Headquarters to coordinate and share information on security.

c). Emergency classified briefings and

d). Real-time sector threat-level reporting.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 3

(a). Within the context of private and public partnerships for security (PPPS), discuss how the short-comings of public security will be compensated by the strengths of private security.

(b). Discuss the major facilitating factors that fast track the paradigm shift in security collaborations in the world.

c). What do you think is the major goal of security?

d). Discuss the opinion of scholars that "only public-private security partnerships can enhance the realization of security goals in Nigeria".

e). Outline and discuss the challenges that may constrain the realization of security goals through public-private security collaborations. How can such challenges be overcome?

5.0 CONCLUSION

Public-Private partnerships on security has the overall objective of enhancing the realization of security goals. It is better explained by the concept of "force multiplier". The force multiplier is a term that originates in the Military science. It refers to a condition or capacity that makes a force more effective than it wouldotherwise be. In its application to public-private security partnerships, force multipliers refer to harnessing the security apparatuses by combining the resources, expertiseand talents of private security firms, businesses, community groups and law enforcement.Private security companies are now trying to support local law enforcement in a variety of ways. The multiplier effect is likely to be a result of education, information sharing and helping to build resiliencein public security delivery due to inputs from the private sector security experiences.

6.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, the emphasis was on examining the goals of public security, as well as private security, with a view of harmonizing them for the purpose of effective security delivery. Opinion of several scholars, and empirical evidences,indicate that marrying public and private security goals is possible if the identified obstacle (lack of trust) is removed and that public and private partnerships is likely to engender force multiplier effect that could be very useful for security sector delivery in the country.

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Unit 4 THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The need to effectively protect the citizens from "all threats and all hazards" demands all hands to be on deck. Modern security policy is calling not only for the establishment of public security but also a strong and effective synergy between private and public security. An enormous amount of initiatives and attention are,therefore, being put in place to foster "public-private-partnership for security" (PPPS) in order to achieve sustainable security. The hope is that the development of public-private partnerships between law enforcement, the Intelligence Community and the private sector will effectively checkmate crime; and that crime detection, prevention, and control can become achievable goals. As security partnership enhances information sharingand emergency preparedness and response efforts, threats to lives and hazards can be prevented and /or mitigated. However, very little attention has been given to how PPPS should be structured and how they can function – both formally and informally. In such circumstances, misunderstanding of PPPS expectations - when associated with poor structures for cooperation - will create barriers to success from the very beginning of the partnerships thus predisposing it to ineffectiveness and failure.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this unit, therefore, you are the student is expected to:

1. understand the different structures of public-private security partnerships,
2. comprehend the different operational dimensions,

3. explain the different levels of coordination in security partnerships, and
4. appreciate what drives the motivating force of PPPS.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1The Structure of Public-Private Partnerships

An aspect of Public Private Partnership for Security (PPPS) that deserves discussion is the often-over-looked nature of PPPS as having multiple levels of involvement. The concept of a partnership involves an inherent level of commitment on the part of each member. However, the level of commitment, and therefore benefits of the partnership, varies. Stakeholders' expectations of outcomes vary in proportion to the investment in the partnership. While PPPS are recommended and desired by public agencies and viewed in positive light by the private sector, they are not required by law to engage with one another. As such, a key component in the equation of successful PPPS is voluntary commitment. A prerequisite for the development of voluntary cooperative partnerships is that all participants expect an increase in positive outcomes as a result of the partnership as compared to the outcomes that would result from a failure to cooperate.

As security scholars pointed out, successful partnership efforts should have both a policy and operational dimensions. The policy dimension encompasses a process that produces consensus on security goals, agreement on the roles to be played by each security organization, and sustained support for action (Barry, Ole&Jaap de,1988). The operational dimension, on the other hand, consists of three general structures: Private security initiative for public benefit;Public security initiative to facilitate or encourage private activity in the public interest; and Joint ventures by the public and private security (Carter, 2008).

Private security initiative for public benefit involves instances in which the private sector determines a method or practice that will aid the public sector – typically with respect to operations or management of tasks. An example isa private sector company that specializes in information technology and manages logistics for tracking of phone thefts for the Nigerian Police. In this context, the private security company has demonstrated that it can provide a quality service that helps to enhance police operation and performance. Such initiation of partnership also benefits the citizens who are victims of phone theft and armed robbery. In this era of information and communication technology, this kind of security partnerships is at

times difficult to delineate from outsourcing because of the advantage they provide to the public in the form of reduced prices for commercial products.

Public security to facilitate **or encourage private activity** in the public interest encompasses emergency management. These are instances where government has initiated a collaborative effort between the public and private security in the best interest of public safety. A good example of this in Nigeria is the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in Borno State that work with the Nigerian Police and the Military in the fight against Boko Haram. In this context, the private security organization does not work for the monetary gain but for the interest of public security. They, perhaps, more appropriately serve as a crutch for the public sector in times of need (Carter, 2008). The observation here is that the collaboration is based on "need be" basis. When disasters occur, the private sector comes to aid the public sector's attempt to respond effectively to the disaster. This form of partnership can possibly be attributed to corporate citizenship – or corporate philanthropy (Porter & Kramer, 2002) – which is the obligation of a private or community security organization operating in the best interest of the community within the situation it finds itself. It is normally deemed as something good for the organization or groups to do as long as it is of benefit to the community and/or the entire citizens (McIntosh, 1998).

Joint ventures by public and security partnerships involves an arrangement which all parties stand to benefit from the partnership. This form is most evident with respect to information sharing. Information sharing isa constant two-way relationship where both the public and private security outfits stand to gain valuable information that directly influences their operations. In Nigeria, this kind of partnership is yet to develop in large scale, but elsewhere in Europe and America, many private security firms are working with public security Departments (federal, state and local law enforcements) to aid the prevention of threats to lives and property.

Each form of the partnerships requires a different level of interdependence among its partners. The partnerships put participants in more desirable situations if (a) by pooling their resources, they obtain efficiencies; and/or (b) by combining complementary strengths, they can increase the scope of their activities. Coordination of resources and information is necessary for interdependence to be established (Blau & Schoenhern, 1971). Thompson (1967) has identified three types of coordinations needed for successful interdependencies in

the activities of public-private security partnerships. These include coordination through standardization, plans and by mutual adjustment.

a). **Coordination through standardization** is necessary in situations where rules and routines constrain the actions of each security partner in order to observe consistency (Thompson, 1967). This form of coordination is utilized in instances of pooled interdependence where the agencies involved are asked to provide their own discrete contributions, but do not necessarily have to work directly with one another during operation.An example of this would be the sharing of information between a private security organization and the Police Department. In order to effectively do so, rules and regulations must be provided for accurate and legal information sharing, not only to avoid leakages but also sabotage by moles within the organization.

b). **Coordination by plan** is most beneficial in circumstances where the environment is unstable and dynamic. Here the planned actions of partnerships are governed with respect to environmental tasks. This form of interdependence often involves the outcomes of one partner serving as the inputs of another. This is often referred to as sequential interdependence, which suggests that the level of interdependence increases as the dependence on inputs increases. A good example of "coordination by plan" is the "Operation Rainbow" in Plateau State. At the height of their glory, the outfit had operated by getting information from the local vigilantes, and then processed these information into "intelligence" for action, via their fusion center. In this context, the "fusion center", which collects these information, disseminates them to operatives that the Command is sure can use them effectively. The fusion center has the highest dependence since it depends on information from the different vigilante groups.Such interdependency suggests that when the outcomes of law enforcement agencies and the private sector begin to diminish, so do the inputs, and ultimately, outcomes of the fusion center.

c). **Coordination by mutual adjustment** involves the transmission of new information and resources during the process of action (Thompson, 1967). As the security situations become more unpredictable, reliance on coordination by mutual adjustment increases. Mutual adjustment relies on a reciprocal interdependence structure because the constantly evolving environment requires each partner to produce outputs that are simultaneously used as outputs of another partner. This form of coordination and interdependence applies to the emergency security situation. As the security situation unfolds and the environment becomes more

uncertain, partners will rely on one another for emerging information and resources to cope with changing environmental demands. This type of coordination is required in many joint task force operations

otherwise the success rate may be adversely affected.

Table 1 summarizes the types of partnerships, interdependence, and coordination discussed in the foregoing paragraphs.

Table 1: Structuring of public-private partnerships

	Private Security Initiative	**Public security Initiative**	**Joint Venture Initiative**
Type of Interdependence	Pooled	Reciprocal	Sequential
Type of Coordination	Standardization	Mutual adjustment	Standardization / By Plan
Example partnership	Private information management companies providing logistics for the Police Department • Increase in efficiency and effectiveness • Decrease in cost	Emergency management plans where public security is aided by private security companies • Increase in efficiency and effectiveness of emergency response delivery • Increased preparedness	Information sharing partnerships among federal, state, and local law enforcement and the private sector • Both parties gain access to information that was previously unavailable • This information guides operations for a more effective response to threats

Sources: Carter, J. G. (2008). The structure and function of public-private partnerships for homeland security. *Homeland Security Review*, 2(3), 235-251

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4

"Successful public-private security partnership has both policy and operational dimension" (Barry, Ole & Jaap de,1988).

Required: Discuss your understanding of this statement with respect to the role of security partnership in the realization of security goals in any theatre of conflict in Nigeria.

5.0 CONCLUSION

For law enforcement, public-private partnerships are critical for preventing and responding to threats to lives and property. For this purpose, different types of partnerships have been designed, ranging from "private security initiative for public benefit, public security initiative to facilitate or encourage private activity in the public interest and joint ventures by the public and private security. Each form of the partnerships requires a different level of

interdependence among its partners. The outcome is deemed successful if by pooling their resources, public-private partnerships obtain efficiencies; and/or by combining complementary strengths, theyincrease the scope of their activities. Coordination, therefore, remains a matter of choice since success is determined by the levels of interdependence among the partnering organizations.

6.0 SUMMARY

This unit had focused on the structure and functions of public and private security partnerships with emphasis on policy and operational dimensions. While the policy dimension encompasses a process that produces consensus on security goals, operational dimension consists of three general structures, viz: a) Private security initiative for public benefit, b) Public security initiative to facilitate or encourage private activity in the public interest, and c) Joint ventures by the public and private security. Both dimensions are possible to achieve through the coordination of resources and information.As the security situations become more unpredictable, reliance on coordination by mutual adjustment increases and it becomes very essential for successes of security collaborations.

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MODULE 2:LIBERALIZATION OF SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

In the 1960s, while scholars and policymakers were operating within a framework that recognized only public policing, the structure of private policing was experiencing a quiet revolution. The provision of private protection was expanding exponentially from security gateman to organized pool of private security as a business outfit where as either individually or collectively, one can approach with a request for security personnel in agreement for monthly payment. In the developed world, the proliferation of mass private property needed the services of private security companies that can provide guard services, and sense of security by means of safeguarded perimeters and theready presence of security staff. The more private property and infrastructure developed, the more the need for private security was enhanced.

In the course of time, the development of cities resulted in the building of more shopping centres and modern business premises, multi-entertainment complexes, often located on the edge of towns, housing a range of leisurevenues such as multiplex cinemas, restaurants, nightclubs and bars. Theexpansion of business parks in mega cities served corporate demand for tailor-made business settings inspacious, out-of-town environments. And in the residential sector, the rapid expansion of large housing estates with enclosed residential blocks and estates in cities like Lagos, Abuja, and Kano need the services of private security companies. Elsewhere too, Shearing andStenning (1982), attributed the growth of private security in both size and profile to the recognition of their value by property owners, and the employment benefits the companies provide to their employees.

Based on the recognition of privacy, private security companies are not only able to specify the functions performed by the security staff, but to also empower their security guards to uphold conditions of access to the property, and to exclude anyvisitor who may wish to breach these conditions, since in common law countries, the law bestows onproperty owners the right to decide who may enter and remain on their land. For the massprivate property owner, efficient use of private security services resulted in economiesof scale (Shapiro, 1987). By resorting to private methods of order maintenance rather than relying on assistance from thepolice, property owners are better placed to ensure that policing strategies within their territoriescomplement their profit-maximisation objectives. As Stenning (1989) argued, for the commercialuser of private security, any policing strategy must be proven cost-effective, since a business willnot adopt a security solution more costly than the problem. In general, therefore, corporationswill seek to prevent a loss rather than try to recover the loss after it has occurred, and to changethe situation in which any problem may occur rather than to draw on the slow and costly criminaljustice process in pursuit of sanctions. Thus, private security personnel, and the securityhardware that they have at their disposal (such as radio communication and closed-circuittelevision (CCTV) technology), have become fundamental to the successful governance of suchterritories; enabling a pre-emptive approach to security in contrast with the reactive style of statepolice agencies.

Inspite of the increased relevance of private security, they were still limited in some aspects of security delivery due to their limitation by law. The need for security collaboration began to emerge from the analysis of their short-comings. In Garland's (1990) observation, government needed to show some levels of 'responsibilization', with a strategy whereby the centralgovernment seeks to promote action by non-state agencies and organisations, with crime controlno longer regarded as the sole duty of the public police officer or other criminal justiceagents but as shared responsibility of private security organizations. For Ericson (1994), this was a shift towards responsibilizationstrategies, and away from a punishment-based criminal justice system. It is reflective of the widergrowth of risk management. The concern is less with the labelling of deviants asoutsiders, and more on developing a knowledge of everyone to ascertain and manage their placein society.This move towards public-private security collaboration heralded in what Jones and Newburn (1998), observed to be a growing orientationwithin the police towards 'information gathering, anticipatory engagement, proactive intervention,systematic surveillance and rational calculation of results', demonstrating 'an ethos comparableto that found in the commercial security sector.

Thus, the activities of securitypersonnel have become increasingly compatible with police objectives. Many empiricalresearches have recorded the benefits of security inter-agency collaboration which are very promising in security delivery (Jones&Newburn, 1998; Wakefield, 2003).

In this module, you will be introduced to the theoretical arguments that support the liberalization of the security sector. Subsequently, the theory will focus on the role of globalization. Thereafter,an attempt is made to discuss privatization of security and democratization value. You will also be exposed to the discourse on public-private security partnerships in Nigeria.

The Module is divided into four unitsthus:

Unit 1: Theories and Approaches
Unit 2: Private Security, Democratic Values, and the Public Good
Unit 3: Globalization
Unit 4:Public-Private Partnerships for Security (PPPS) in Nigeria

Each of the units is further elaborated below.

UNIT 1 THEORIES AND APPROACHES

CONTENTS

5.0 Conclusion

6.0 Summary

7.0 References/Further Reading

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The theoretical discourse on public and private partnership for security (PPPS) will be better understood if the value of security is given attention. Everyone (individuals, families, states, and other actors) value security, not only for the valuesake but also because it gives increasing pursuit towhich security necessitates. Scholars have identified three types of values that bring the importance of security to the fore. These include (1) the prime value approach, (2) the core value approach, and (3) the marginal value approach (Jones& Newburn, 1998; Wakefield,2003). It will be argued that the marginal value approach is preferable to the other two. Other theories that explain the values of security and the necessity for public and private security partnerships are also explained in this unit.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

1. identify the three types of values that underline the importance of security;
2. understand the key tenets of theories that can be used to discuss the practice of public and private security partnerships.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1The Prime Value Approach

One way of determining the value of security is to ask what life would be like without it. The most famous answer to this question is that by Thomas Hobbes to the effect that life would be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'. Such reasoning has led many scholars to assert the 'primacy' of the goal of security (Sklansky, 2006; The Ammerdown Group, 2016). The logic underlying this assertion is that security is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other values such as prosperity, freedom, or whatever. The fallacy in this line of argument is exposed by asking the Hobbesian question with respect to breathable air, potable water, salt, food, shelter or clothing. The answer is roughly the same for each of these as it is for security; and a plausible case for the 'primacy' of each can be made. This exercise, of course, merely underscores a truth King Midas learned long ago, i.e., that the value of something - gold, security, water, or whatever - is not an inherent quality of the good itself but rather a result of

external social conditions, demonstrated in supply and demand (Rogers,2010). The more gold one has, the less value one is likely to place on an additional ounce; and the more security one has, the less one is likely to value an increment of security.

The prime value approach is not without some shortcomings. The main tenet of the approach is that security outranks other values for all actors in all situations. This is both logically and empirically indefensible. Logically, it is flawed because it provides no justification for limiting the allocation of resources to security in a world where absolute security is unattainable. Empirically it is flawed because it fails to comport with the way people actually behave.Prehistoric people may have lived in caves for security, but they did not remain there all the time. Each time they ventured forth in pursuit of food, water or adventure; they indicated a willingness to sacrifice the security of the cave for something they presumably valued more. And in choosing places to live, settlers often forgo the security of high mountain-tops in favourof less secure locations with more food or water. Likewise, modern states do not allocate all of their resources to the pursuit of security, even in wartime. Even the most beleaguered society allocates some of its resources to providing food, clothing, and shelter for its population. Even if 'absolute' security were a possibility, it is not obvious that people would seek it. As Robert Dahl and Charles Lindblom (cited in Sarre& Prenzler, 2011) observed long ago, 'probably most people do not really want "absolute" security, if such a state is imaginable; "optimum" security would probably still leave an area of challenge, risk, doubt, danger, hazard, and anxiety. Men are not lotus-eaters' (McIntosh, 1998).

3.2The Core Value Approach

The core value approach allows for other values by asserting that security is one of several important values. Although this approach mitigates the logical and empirical difficulties associated with the prime value approach, it does not eliminate them. One is still confronted with the need to justify the classification of some values as core values and other values as non-core values. And if core values are always more important than other values, this approach cannot justify allocating any resources whatsoever to the pursuit of non-core values.

3.3 The Marginal Value Approach

The marginal value approach is the only one that provides a solution to the security allocation problem. This approach is not based on any assertion about the value of security to all actors in all situations. Instead, it is rooted in the assumption that the law of diminishing marginal utility is as applicable to security as it is to other values (Sarre& Prenzler, 2011). Asserting

the primacy of security is like asserting the primacy of water, food, or air. A certain minimum amount of each is needed to sustain life, but this does not mean that the value of a glass of water is the same for a person stranded in a desert and a person drowning in a lake. The value of an increment of something depends on how much of it one has (Lawrence,1977). According to the marginal value approach, security is only one of many policy objectives competing for scarce resources and subject to the law of diminishing returns. Thus, the value of an increment of national security to a country will vary from one country to another and from one historical context to another, depending not only on how much security is needed but also on how much security the country already has. Rational policy-makers will allocate resources to security only as long as the marginal return is greater for security than for other uses of the resources. There is nothing new about treating national security as one of many public policy objectives competing for scarce resources and subject to diminishing returns (Cassidy, Brandes&LaVegila, 1993).

3.4The Laissez-Faire Theory

At the Center of ClassicalLiberal Theory is the idea of laissez-faire. By definition, Laissez faire is the belief that economies and businesses function best when there is no interference by the government. It comes from the French word, laissez faire, meaning to “leave alone” or “to allow to do”. Laissez-faire capitalism started being practiced in the mid-18th century and was further popularized by Adam Smith's book, The Wealth of Nations.During the period of Enlightenment, laissez-faire was conceived as the way to unleash human potential through the restoration of a natural system, a system unhindered by the restrictions of government (Nolan, 2008). In a similar vein, Adam Smith had viewed the economy as a natural system and the market as an organic part of that system. Adam Smith, therefore, saw laissez-faire as a moral program and the market its instrument to ensure men the rights of natural law (Rogers, (2000).By extension, free markets become a reflection of the natural system of liberty; and a program for the abolition of laws constraining the market, and restoration of order and for the activation of potential growth (Orchard&Stretton, 2016).

As a system of thought, laissez-faire rests on the following axioms:

a) The individual is the basic unit in society.
b) The individual has a natural right to freedom.
c) The physical order of nature is a harmonious and self-regulating system.

Another basic principle is that markets should be competitive, with aims of maximizing freedom and of allowing markets to self-regulate.

The basic purpose of the laissez-faire economy is to promote a free and competitive market that demands the restoration of the order and natural state of liberty that humans emerged from. A laissez-faire economy is thus characterized by the free movement of forces of supply and demand, free from any form of intervention by a government, a price-setting monopoly, or any other authority.

Contemporary version of the Marxist has argued that public-private partnerships, as currently practiced, is under the umbrella of state control. They therefore view this as evidence of the continuing evolution of an exploitative state-corporate alliance that promote selective policing, that is biased in favour of wealth and power (Porter&Kramer, 2001). However, while this position echoes the concerns of state-centered theorists, it does not share their belief in the possibility of a just and fair state within a capitalist society. The privatization of policing, like that of other aspects of criminal justice, is expressed in metaphorical terms as a "widening of the net" of state control in the interests of capital (Buzan,1991). In this context, privatization has had the effect of bringing more and more of daily life under the control of an oppressive capitalist state. Scholars within this persuasion, therefore, argued for democratic forms of policing controlled by local communities (Cassidy, Brandes & LaVegila,1993; Bruce, 2012). In promoting this agenda, these scholars have sought to replace the argument advanced for the emergence of public-private cooperation in the public interest with revisionist histories asserting that the laissez-faire strategy of privatization is just another stage in the ongoing process of mystification that characterizes capitalist social control (Richard, Roy& Ted, 1993).

In the analysis of Orchard and Stretton(2016), both the state-centered and laissez-faire conceptions are founded on an understanding of the social world as divided into public and privatespheres, whose boundaries and significance assume the existence of a nation-state that either does, or should, monopolize governance. They both assume a history of conflicts over the sources of governance; but maintain that this either is, or should be, a thing of the past. The willingness of the laissez-faire framework to accept and countenance privatization as a coordinated system of public and private security that integrate the activities of state and private security companies can result in the emergence of a "police-industrial complex", that guarantees peace and order as well as peaceful coexistence, and a strong nation-states

3.5**The Pluralist Perspective**

Pluralism is the theory that share in the tenets that a multitude of groups, not the people as a whole, govern the citizens. These multitude of groups include among others, unions, trade and professional associations, environmentalists, civil rights activists, business and financial lobbies, and formal and informal coalitions of like-minded citizens. They influence the making and administration of laws and policy. Since the participants in this process constitute only a tiny fraction of the populace, the public acts mainly as bystanders. Viewing from this context, pluralism is an interpretation of social diversity (Galston, 2002).It can be rendered as a cultural, political,or philosophical stance. In any of theseversions, pluralism offers an account of socialinteraction understood as an interplay ofconflicting and competing positions thatcannot be seamlessly reduced to one another,ranked in one single order permanently, orreduced to a single institutional arrangement.Any kind of pluralism (cultural, political, orphilosophical) presupposes at the very least anempirical thesis about irreducible diversity (Eisfeld, 2006).Inside the pluralist family, different types ofpluralism coexist and various thinkers haveoffered alternative classifications of pluralistst rands. This is beyond our concern here.For further information refer to John Kekes (2000).

Three of the major tenets of the pluralist school are:

(1)Resources, and hence potential power, are widely scattered throughout society;

(2) At least some resources are available to nearly everyone; and

(3) At any time, the amount of potential power exceeds the amount of actual power.

Proponents and defendants of the associationbetween pluralism and liberalism, and pluralism and democracy have argued widely on the character and connectionat stake between them. In the argument of Bellamy(1999), an individual or group that is influential in one realm may be weak in another. For instance, a public security outfit may certainly throw their weight around on defense matters, such as arms and ammunitions, but how much sway do they have on information, knowledge of the rural localities as well as some technological know-how?A measure of power, therefore, is its scope, or the range of areas where it is successfully applied. The Pluralists,thus,believe that with few exceptions, power holders in the society usually have a relatively limited scope of influence. In this context therefore, collaboration and synergy between corporate entities remain the key to good governance. Certain characteristic influence their operation and performance of security providers.

3.5.1.The multiplicity of providers: The first characteristic of security providers,as acknowledged by the Pluralists, is that security is dominated not by Government Security Departments but by a multiplicity of private security companies, Community Vigilantes, and

Neighbourhood Crime Watch Groups (NCWGs);some of which are well organized and funded while some are, however, not well funded. Although a few are larger and more influential than the others, the scope of their power - far from being universal- is restricted to relatively narrow areas such as security guards, escort duties, spy and security information.

3.5.2 Autonomy and independence: The second characteristic is that security groups are independent and autonomous. They have the rights and freedom to do business in the marketplace. How well they fare depends on their expertise and patronage by society members. This is because in a diverse society like ours contains so many potential factions, and customers with different tastes and demands and so a spirited competition among these organizations.

3.5.3 Intergroup competitions: The third characteristic is the existence of intergroup competition which leads to countervailing influence. In this context, the power of one group tends to cancel out that of another so that a rough equilibrium results. Group memberships overlap as well due to associational memberships and existing rules that regulate their operations and activities. Belonging to similar associations tends to reduce the intensity of conflicts because loyalties are often spread among many organizations. In the process, groups mine untapped resources.

3.5.4 Recruitment policy: A fourth characteristic is the openness of the security organizations to recruitment, and so they are seldom, if ever completely, shut off from the outside world. They continuously recruit new members from all walks of life. The development in the society and the demand for security seems to encourage the formation of new groups. This characteristic confirms the existence of different expertise among the private security organizations, because of the different demands from the teeming population of businesses men and women. Harnessing this different expertise to complement the expertise of the public security can be of immense benefit to the security of the nation. In this context, Shearing and Stenning (1991)have argued that public-private partnerships for security has prompted a fundamental shift in responsibility for policing, from state to corporate hands, that is, challenging state power and redefining state-corporate relationships. They argued that what appears as a widening of the net of state control is revealed as a change in the location of power. The shift is not only being accompanied by a thinning of the net of control, but has brought with it importantchanges in the nature of policing as the objectives and capacities of corporate entities have begun to shape the ordering process.

Not surprisingly, the order being promoted by private security companies through their security activities is directly related to their interests as competing entities within a capitalist economy, with profit motives. It is,infact, confirming what Garland (1990) called, "policing for profit". The strategies that result are controlled more by the profit motive, than patriotism.

3.6Routine Activity Theory

The routine activity theory ofcrime is credited to Cohen andFelson (1979). The theory points to theinteraction between three salientvariables that explain the routineoccurrence of crime in society: the availability of suitable targets, theabsence of capable guidance, andpresence of motivated or potentialoffenders. The theory states that an individual will commit a crime given three factors. Thefirst is a motivated offender, a person who is prepared and willing to commit a criminal act. The second factor is a suitable target such as an unlocked car in a dark alley, and or a house or business premises in an isolated place without security guards.The last factor is the absence of a capable guardian (Bennett, 1991). A capable guardian is aperson or persons willing and able to prevent such a crime; a trained and well-equipped security man or woman. Security partnership within the context of Routine Activity theory view availability of security personnel inthe community as necessary facilities for the warding off of criminals.

Other than these, Security partnership will make security personnel available, and thus act as capable guardian. The availability of security guards and those on surveillance can stop the motivated offender bytaking away the means and will of the offender. For example, in security partnership, the public and the private police work together to stop illegal activities, including gun sales and drug use, among other illegal behaviours. This is one way of stopping motivatedoffenders.

The creating of a capable guardian is implemented in many ways. The first is the joint patrol that public and private security can form:the apprehension of offenders by the private security, and subsequent handing over to the public police for further investigation and prosecution. Since private security may include people from the locality, it is likely that their involvement in crime fighting will elicit the cooperation of society members as opposed to crime fighting by public security alone. For instance, if a community member, witnessed someone breaking into somebody's car, he is likely to call the Vigilante members in the community, than the Police, since they may be favourably disposed to them than the Police.

Considering the synergy involved in public and private security partnerships, they constitute capable guardiansthat can ward off criminals.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 1

1.). How does the shift toward responsibilization strategy justify the adoption of public and private security partnerships in Nigeria?

2)(a**).** Differentiate between core value and prime value approach. (b). Justify the argument that the "prime value approach is flawed" in security delivery.

3). What are the main tenets of the routine activity theory? (b). In what way(s) do(es) it (they) justify the adoption of public-security partnerships for crime control in Nigeria?

5. CONCLUSION

The argument that security is a prerequisite for the enjoyment of other socio-economic values such as prosperity, freedom, or whatever, is the anchor of the value approaches. The theoretical lenses seek to explain the emergence of pluralized security and why collaboration becomes necessary in contemporary world. The belief is that security can be effective through collaboration.

6. SUMMARY

The unit helps to explain the importance of security and the paradigm shift from security as a public service to private service and a collaborative one. It exposes scholars to justifiable theoretical reasons, and the benefits that the citizens stand to gain in a collaborative security provision.

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UNIT 2 PRIVATE SECURITY, DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND THE PUBLIC GOOD

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

An ongoing challenge for police services in a democratic society is to protect both public order and individual rights. There are natural tensions between the power and authority of the

police and their legal mandate to maintain order, on the one hand, and the values and processes that exist in a democraticsociety on the other (Griffiths, 2014). This issue becomes more complex when considering the role of private security.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

The objectives of this unit are in four folds, viz:

1. Expose the discourse on the imperatives of private security in a democracy;
2. Comprehend the tenets of democratic values;
3. The necessity of security as a public good; and
4. Understand the contributions of public private security partnerships to public good.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Private Security and Public Safety

A key theme in the discussion of private security and of privatization is the extent to which the outsourcing of traditional police tasks involved "a shift from the logic of the public good to the logic of the market in the delivery of security" (White, 2014, p.1002). This position is given credence by the expansion of private security in the spaces previously occupied by the public police. Examples are uniformed patrols in neighbourhoods, private security guards in government premises, including maintaining traffics, and doing guard works. Government organizations and infrastructures are making extensive use of private security to maintain order, and reassure members of the public that their premises and surroundings are safe and secure. The concern is that the expansion of private security will diminish the public dialogue that surrounds the role and activities of the public security, like the police (Krahmann, 2008). In presentations, private policing firms often highlight that utilizing the private sector ensures that companies are accountable for results and are motivated to be customer-service oriented. Beside this, there also concerns about the exclusionary role of private security officers: that they protect only those who can afford to pay them. Observers have cautioned that it is important to avoid a situation where "the rich get effective policing and the poor do not (Pearson-Goff & Herrington, 2013, p.3).In this scenario, the privileged ones will be able to purchase security, while the less affluent and marginalized communities will not. Paid private security tends to sweep marginalized segments of the community out of privileged spaces occupied by the wealthy", especially in the developing world. In the developed world, like Canada, Kempa, Stenning and Wood (2004) found that public police are being assigned to lower socio-economic areas, while more private security officers are being employed in

cities. In communities with high ratesof violent crimes, private security officers tend to be more on guard than public security officers.

In the United Kingdom, studies by Rowland and Coupe (2014) revealed that, although crime rates in that country have been falling, there is a "reassurance gap" among the public. The gap is between fears about personal security and the realities of being victimized. The key question has been whether private security can assist in closing this gap or whether there are limits to the role that the private sector can play in delivering what was previously a public service. Uniformed public (police) officers project "control signals" that contribute to feelings of reassurance of safety and security amongst the general public, although these same images may spark fear and distrust among certain segments of the community.

3.2 The Public Good

The public is more likely to have more contact with private security officers than with public police officers. Private security officers are found in retail stores, supermarkets, security posts of higher institutions, residential estates and private houses. They conduct airport screenings, are present in sporting venues, and at other community events. Sometimes, the similarities in uniforms may make it difficult for the public to distinguish between a public police officer and a private security officer. In Nigeria, there is little or no published studies of where the Nigerian public would draw the line between the activities of public and private security. The uniforms are remarkably different; more so the Nigerian private security officers do not carry arms andpublic input into the discussions of private security in Nigeria has been minimal.

A study credited to Uzuegbu-Wilson (2016) found that Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Nigeria have helped to reduce the security deficit in the face of police incapacities, by performing roles that would either not have been performed by the police- such as guarding residential and private habitations - or, if the police were to perform such tasks, for example guarding critical national infrastructure like airports, it would have further overstretched their already limited capacity. Private security, therefore, complement the police by relieving them of the need to perform some routine tasks so that they can concentrate on core policing duties such as intelligence gathering and investigations.

As opposed to the pattern observed in the developed world (Kempa, Stenning&Wood, 2004), private security tends to be urban focused. This is aside from similarity in being profit-motivated. Since it is only the wealthy that is able to afford their services, crime is invariably

displaced from wealthy neighbourhood to poorer communities, thus, further reinforcing existing socioeconomic inequalities.

In his argument on the contributions of public-private security partnerships to public good,Uzuegbu-Wilson (2016) observed that private security guards are everywhere both in public and private sectors. The big challenge, however, is to determine the effectiveness or efficacy of the private security outfits in discharging their primary duties to their clients. According to Shearing and Stenning(1991), private security companies have played important roles in detecting crimes at different levels. Their effectiveness could be seen in the roles they play as undercover agents outside the formal authorities. In Nigerian tertiary institutions, such effectiveness is seen in the suppression of cult activities by the students, as well as report concerning the plan on students' unrests and violent protests. Similarly, Dambazau (2006) argued that the presence of a security man is effective to the extent that it is capable of retarding criminal activities. Therefore, a secure or guarded target may not always be a victim of crime.Private security guards also serve as witnesses when criminals are arrested and arraigned before the court of law for prosecution.

A key feature of policing in the early 21st century is the use of evidence-based best practices. Police strategies and operations are increasingly informed by sophisticated analyses that are interfaced with the qualitative dimensions of the delivery of police services. In this context, Police services have strengthened research and planning units, increased the number of civilians with specialized expertise and worked to close the gap between the administrative and operational levels of police work. In Nigeria, these are seen in the Police yearly crime reports and some detailed analyses provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) and the Public Service Commission Bulletins.

In contrast, the development of best practices and evidence-based policy and practice in private security has been far more elusive. This is due to a variety of factors, including a lack of analytical capacity and expertise, the contract-focused nature of much private security work and the transient nature of many private security contracts. With the exception of companies providing specialized services, such as forensic accounting and cyber-security, private security firms are less likely to invest resources in assessing the effectiveness of specific strategies in various environments when the work is being provided on a fixed-term basis. There is, therefore, a need to understand the factors that contribute to, and limit, the effectiveness of private security. A number of public goods, recognized as benefits of public-

private security partnerships have been articulated by the Law Enforcement-Private Security Consortium (LEPSC, 2009, pp: 2-3) to include:

a) Reducing the costs of public police operations;

b) Providing private security officers with access to training and development;

c) Providing the public police with access to resources and technologies held in the private sector; and,

d) Bolstering emergency planning capacities and preparedness.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 2

List and discuss the many ways that Private Security Companies (PSCs) in Nigeria have helped to reduce the security deficit in the country.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Private security was originally conceived for profit making. Though still a business venture, they provide security for their clients on specific charges. This is against the purpose of public security that is strictly free of charge and for the benefits of the entire citizenry. In this context, private security is said to deliver private goods while public security deliver public goods. However, the advent of democracy opened up choices, not only on the choice of security, but also on the quality of the goods (public and private) that are being provided. The argument is that in the face of public security deficit (which is a doubt of the quality of security as a public good), public and private security partnershipscan help to boost the quality and even reduce costs of public security delivery to the citizens. It can also provide private security officers with access to training and development; provide the public police with access to resources and technologies held in the private sector; and, enhance emergency planning capacities and preparedness of the police. In all these, security can be delivered as an improved public good.

6.0 SUMMARY

The entire unit concentrated on the benefits that public and private security partnerships can bring to security delivery. Although private security as business venture provides security to members of the public who can afford it, their operation is, however, restricted by law. Many private security personnel may not be adequately trained, but they are exposed to modern technological equipment in security monitoring and surveillance. Thus, a collaboration

between public and private security organizations is expected to enhance security service delivery in the country.

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UNIT 3: GLOBALIZATION IN PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Globalization is regarded as the transformation of the world into a globalsociety, characterized by interconnectivity and interdependenceof people and nations (Okoli & Atelhe, 2018). It is characterized by the dynamics anddialectics of spatial and temporal integration onworldwide and regional scales. The dynamic is complexwith multifaceted expressions in the realms ofpolitics, economy, environment, and culture; and so it is in the realm of security. What the complexity of the dynamism suggests remains uncertain as to what the emerging globalized world will look like in the next two decades. This uncertainty is reflected in the current celebrated use of prefix "post" to refer to the "post-modern" era. We are a lot clearer about the past, where we have come from,because of the benefits of historical background, than where we are going. Security lies at the heart of any order, and so its presence determines, to a large extent, freedom from fear, and peaceful co-existence. If the future of security is uncertain, then the world is just trying to tumble forward. What available public-private security partnerships is suggesting is the emergenceof social world where security is not going to be monopolized by the state. Perhaps as Rogers(2000)suggested, security will rest more directly in the hands of local communities. The reason for this line of argument can be made clearer.

Following the terrorist attacks on New York on the 11thof September, 2001 and London on July 7, 2005, the world rose, as never before, with a consensus opinion demonstrating solidarity of global response with shared fear of security vulnerability. It created, for the first time in recent decades,a "world risk society" (Branović, 2010), which broughtEmile Durkheim alive, with his argument, that crime evokes the collective conscience of the society. The notion of a 'world risk society' revealed a society that was united by shared awareness of risk and fear (Beck 2002). The experience of 9/11, therefore, revealed a post 9/11 world, where threats are defined moreby the fault lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them. From terrorism, toglobal disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational rather thaninternational. Theproblem relates to the migration (permanent) and movement (temporary) of people to other countriesand the societal norms and cultural differences that they take with them and transpose into thatcountry of destination. The societal problems that this identifies include, but not limited to, staticnotions of social order (Urry, 2002), or that trans-border interconnectedness inevitably leads tohomogenization (Chan, 2005).

How society is now perceived is important because with the mass movement of ethnic groups

and refugees fleeing war zones and their society, the questions raised are: what do they view as theirsociety? Is it in the best interest of their society before its demise due to civil war, or will it be embracing a newsocietal model in their destination country? The problem is that if there is to be a criminological enquirythat encapsulates the concept of globalization, what societal values are there that are common acrosspolitical, religious, cultural and ethnic boundaries? In modern society, the criminological inquiry intosociety is based upon the understanding that "society is ordered througha nation-state, with clear territorial and citizenship boundaries and a system of governance over itsparticular citizens" (Brian& Jan, 2016, 18). Globalization does not automatically lead to anintegrated world system, and one needs to keep in mind not only the intensity of the transnationalconnections, but also the disconnections, the paradoxes, concrete modalities and resistance. In a global world full of insecurity, what role do public-private security collaborations play in security delivery? Answering this question is the main concern of this unit.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this unit,you are expected to be able to:

1. understand the role of international private security companies on security delivery;
2. appreciateInternational Legal Obligationsrelating to security collaborations;
3. recognise good practices relating to public and private security partnerships; and
4. explain the global context of policing.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 International Scenario

The international private security industry has attracted increasing attention since theUS-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. For the US Army alone, the US Government Accountability Officereported in 2006 that 60,000 contracted personnel supported its operations in Southwest Asia (Spearin,2006). The various roles and expectations relating to private actors and security governance identified problems that were related to Fragile Statehood, Armed Non-State Actors and Security Governance. There were lapses in information sharing and interpretation, and reconstruction of Public Monopoly ofLegitimate Force (Brian& Jan, 2016). In addition, there were discussions on Assessing the Relationshipbetween Humanitarian Actors and Private Security Companies (Spearin, 2006).

The complexity of the roles and expectations of the private security industry identified the needfor regulation and oversight if they were to achieve their stated objectives. As previously

observed, private security companies are rapidly expanding both in the developed and developing world. Their scope is becoming broad to cover emerging private threats impacting thesecurity sector. Such operations are seen in areas of protection of facilities, goods and persons. In the course of these operations, private security tends to face enormous challenges. In Iraq, for instance, Brian and Jan (2016) listed the challenges faced by the private military and security companies (PMSCs) as human rights violations. These were possible because their diverse roles were not strictly regulated through an effective legal and policyframework. These challenges, however, did not preclude the identification of their positive contributions to security delivery.

Elsewhere, Wilson (2006) also identified challenges of the governance of private security and international organizations. According to him, although the UN has paid private military and security companies(PMSCs) for a range of services in the areas of humanitarian affairs, peacebuilding and development; their practice has rarely translated into coherent policies that could guide the UN in definingacceptable standards or ensuring transparent and responsible contracting procedures. The author argued that companies providing these services had the potential to act in a manner that failed to respectinternational human rights and humanitarian law, and highlighted their flawed accountability, particularlywhere private actors operate in situations of armed conflict or in other contexts of state fragility.

Due to such empirical discovery, an international initiative to promote compliance with international human rights andhumanitarian law by PMSCs operating in armed conflicts waslaunched by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). That initiative resulted in twomajor developments: The Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct (ICoC). TheMontreux Document was developed jointly with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)and adopted in 2008. The Document focused on legal obligations and best practices for states related tooperations of private military and security companies during armed conflict. The ICoC focused primarilyon the responsibilities of private security companies operating in complex environments, and wasdeveloped in 2010 through a multi-stakeholder initiative involving governments, private security andcivil society representatives. Both of these documents are complimentary to each other and are supportive of other international and national regulatory measures.

The Montreux Document (ICRC, 2009, pp. 11 – 27) is divided into two distinct parts- Part One and Part Two. Each of them is discussed below.

3.11 The Montreux Document: Part One

Pertinent International Legal Obligationsrelating to Private Military and Security Companies

The first part of the document, (PartOne), identifies pertinent obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law for states.The responsibilities of PMSCs, their personnel, and the liability of management oversight are alsoaddressed. It has six sub themesnamely:

a) Contracting States
b) Territorial States
c) Home States
d) All other States
e) PMSCs and their personnel and
f) Superior responsibility

The second part of the document, (Part Two), titled:Good Practices relating toPrivate Military and Security Companiesidentifies good practices for state regulationof PMSCs. This includes the establishment of transparent regulatory regimes, terms for grantinglicenses and measures to improve national oversight and accountability. To ensure that only PMSCscapable of complying with international human rights and humanitarian law provide services, goodpractices in the areas of training, appropriate internal procedures and oversight are proposed. Generally, the part contains a description of good practices that aims to provide guidance and assistanceto States in ensuring respect for international humanitarian and human rights laws andpromoting responsible conduct in their relationships with PMSCs operating in areas ofarmed conflict. They also provide guidance for States in their relationships with PMSCsoperating outside of areas of armed conflict.

Although the Document does not have legal binding effect and is not exhaustive, It isunderstood that a State may not have the capacity to implement all the good practices, and thatno State has the legal obligation to implement any particular good practice, whether that State isa Contracting State, a Territorial State, or a Home State. States are invited to consider these goodpractices in defining their relationships with PMSCs, recognizing that a particular good practicemay not be appropriate in all circumstances and emphasizing that this part is not meant to implythat States should necessarily follow all these practices as a whole.

The intention of the good practices includes assisting States to implement their obligations underinternational humanitarian and human rights laws. However, in considering regulation, Statesmay also need to take into account obligations they have under other branches of internationallaw, including as members of international organizationssuch as the United

Nations, and underinternational law relating to trade and government procurement. They may also need to take intoaccount bilateral agreements between Contracting and Territorial States. Moreover, Statesare encouraged to fully implement relevant provisions of international instruments to which theyare parties. These include anti-corruption, anti-organized crimes and firearms conventions. Furthermore,any of these good practices will need to be adapted in practice to the specific situation and theState's legal system and capacity.The summary of part two of the document contains 18 sub themes,organised in three sections - focusing on good practices for contracting states, territorial states and home states – thus:

The Montreux Document: Part Two
Good Practices relating toPrivate Military and Security Companies
A. Good practices for Contracting States

a) Determination of services
b) Procedure for contracting PMSCs
c) Criteria for the selection of PMSCs
d) Terms of contract with PMSCs
e) Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability

B. Good practices for Territorial States

a) Determination of services
b) Authorization to provide military and security services
c) Procedure with regard to authorizations
d) Criteria for granting an authorization
e) Terms of authorization
f) Rules on the provision of services by PMSCs and their personnel
g) Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability

C. Good practices for Home States

a) Determination of services
b) Establishment of an authorization system
c) Procedure with regard to authorization
d) Criteria for granting an authorization
e) Terms of authorization granted to PMSCs
f) Monitoring compliance and ensuring accountability

3.2 The Global Context of Policing

The global context of policing relates not only to the nation state but also to social problems thatmay exist within that nation state. This may include, but not limited to: crime, political instability,ethnic conflicts and human rights violations. These issues may have to be addressed by the nationstate but their impact and consequences may go beyond the state border and impact, not only neighbouring states but distant countries. Included in the

problems facing effective democratic policingare social problems that may be categorized under the broad heading of crime, political instability,ethnic conflicts and human rights abuses, global migration and refugee problems broughtabout by nation states involved in political and sectarian civil wars that involve, and impact, othernations in an effort to seek a peaceful resolution.

In general terms, policing may be defined as all individuals who are authorized to maintainthe peace, safety, and order of a community through democratic regulations and laws. Itincludes, therefore, both formal and informal policing, whose activities aim at the maintenance of societal order. In this context, policing suggests that no single entity,namely the police, as a group of people trained in methods of law enforcement, crime preventionand detection can provide policing. The concept of policing here can be understood in the context of community involvement (assort of community policing), where a collaboration between the police and the community ensure the identification and provision of solution to community crime and antic-social problems. With the police no longer the sole guardians of lawand order, "all members of the community become active allies in the effort to enhance the safetyand quality of neighbourhoods" (Brian&Jan, 2016, p. 9). This philosophy acknowledges that the public security cannot effectively perform without the support of the private security.

The global context of law enforcement, therefore, can only be successfully delivered with a policythat upholds fair and just criminal justice acting in an ethical manner that acknowledges andupholds Human Rights. The law enforcement management must be fair and equitable and therewill be personal and organizational transparency and accountability. To achieve this, theremust be agreed protocols to share data to deal with the sociological problems that are not thesole responsibility of one agency. The training must instill professionalism and integrity as wellas provide for retention and career development for all personnel based on ability withoutbias and prejudice towards ethnicity, gender, sex, culture, and religion.

As Sarre and Prenzler(2011, p. 15) would argue, even if the public security provided by the police agencies become "superbly professional, technically proficient and with sparklingintegrity, they would still lack legitimacy without negotiating their mission, strategies and tactics withlocal and national communities". The fragility of democracy is exposed by the bias, prejudice and ethnic divisions andmobilization of ethnic movements,

especially in multi-ethnic countries. This predisposed many countries to violence. In discussing theglobal context of security, therefore, it has been identified that there has to be public-private partnerships in security delivery for effective maintenance of peace and order.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3

(i). List and explain the provision of the Montreux Document with respect to the use of PMSCs by the state during crisis situations.

(ii). According to Emile Durkheim "crime evokes the collective conscience of the society". Explain your understanding of this statement with respect to the world's reactions to the terrorist attack of 9/11 in the United States.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The usefulness of public and private partnerships in security delivery has a universal application. The United Nations has severally paid PMSCs for a range of services in the areas of humanitarian affairs. However, the global context of law enforcementcan only be successfully delivered with a policythat upholds a fair and just criminal justice acting in an ethical manner. In this context therefore, international initiative to promote compliance with international human rights andhumanitarian law by PMSCs operating in armed conflicts wasinitiated in what is known as the Montreux Document. It seeks to guide public and private security partnerships at the international level.

6.0 SUMMARY

The unit dealt with the globalization of public and private security partnership. The employment of private security personnel, including PMSCs in peace keeping operations was discussed. The lack of proper policy on security governance at that level resulted in the introduction of the Montreux Document (parts one and two), which provides a guideline for the operation of security collaborations at the international level.

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UNIT 4:PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR SECURITY (PPPS) IN NIGERIA

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Public-private partnerships in security involve a collaboration between government security agencies and private security organizations. The whole essence is to achieve desired outcomes in security delivery. There are at least four types of engagements with non-governmental actors for the purposes of enhancing security service delivery. These include, outsourcing, privatization, competitive sourcing and public-private partnerships. In Nigeria, three of these types of engagements (Outsourcing, privatization, and public-private partnerships) seem to be gaining grounds in security delivery.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

This unit, therefore, is expected to expose you to:

1. the different types of security partnership in practice in Nigeria and elsewhere;
2. examine these partnerships in the context of national security;
3. understand the shortcomings associated with each and the one most suitable for your a community.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Types of Security Partnership Engagements

3.1.1Outsourcing:

The first type of engagement -outsourcing - can be defined as, the practice of turning over entire business functions to an outside vendor that ostensibly can perform the specialized tasks in question better and less expensively than the organization choosing to outsource.Outsourcing is different from privatization in that in outsourcing, only the workload has shifted from public to private actors, but no transfer or sale of assets—including the management, workforce, equipment, and facilities—to a private actor. Although an outside non-governmental actor now handles the performance of the task, government entities continue to remain responsible for management decisions and ultimate provision of

the service. The re-introduction of the privatisation and commercialisation policesin 1999 by the Federal Government brought the practice of outsourcing to the fore. The policy made it clear that all Grade-1 jobs in the Federal Public Service should beoutsourced (Ikeije & Nwaoma, 2015). These included cleaning jobs,messenger job, attendants, and security jobs within the organisation. It was clear from the Policy Document that government was no longer willing to fund them directly.

Since security is one issue that must be taken very seriously, many governmental organizations as well as institutions of higher learning began instantly to outsource security services. Private security companies were invited to take over the function of providing security to the institutions including guard services. Currently, it has become an established practice that many government institutions and organizations in the country are provided security by private organizations.

3.1.2 Privatization:

This is a process of transferring an existing public entity or enterprise to private ownership.The difference between privatization and outsourcing is that privatization requires that the management, workforce, and often the equipment/facilities are transferred or sold to private owners. Privatization can be in form of "full privatization" - where a government entity is fully sold to a private owner - or "partial privatization" - where the equipment/facilities remain government-owned but workforce is privatised. In the observation of Eteyibo (2011, p. 24), privatization connotes "any shift of the production of goods and services frompublic to private" or a "shifting into non-governmental hands, goods and services that are being produced by thegovernment". In this context, the government is divested of the control andownership, thereby making the investors to assume control and management of such enterprises. Historically, privatization appears to have emerged as a counter action or movement against the development ofgovernment in the Western world on the one hand, and dissatisfaction with public service delivery strategies on theother.

In Nigeria the committeefor the implementation of the privatization process was inaugurated on 27th August, 1988 and was vested withpowers to supervise and monitor the implementation of the privatization and commercialization programme. Thiscommittee was mandated to privatize 111 public enterprises while 34 were to be commercialized. Although theactivities of the committee were later truncated, it had succeeded in privatizing 88 government enterprises as at 2011. The privatization of security services in Nigeria is mostly

demonstrated in the maritime sector. The threatsposed to global order by international terrorism, piracy, oil theft and bunkering, to mention but a few, have given riseto overriding and all important national security concerns, especially at the sea ports and the high sea. In response to these challenges,some states have increased their strategy with the establishment of maritime security enforcement forces. Countries like the United States of America and Malaysia have aCoast Guardand aMalaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) respectively.

In Nigeria, the Nigerian MaritimeAdministration and Safety Agency (NIMASA) was set up to address the problem of insecurity at the port and the high sea. The NIMASA Act empowers the agency to carry out surveillance andenforcement of law in regard to activities at their respective maritime domains with the assistance of other securityforces. Based on this provision, Maritime surveillance andenforcement was privatized and given out to the Global West Vessel Specialist Agency (GWVSA), a private security companyowned and controlled by Chief Government Ekpemukpolo (a.k.a Tompolo). The services often rendered by private securitycompanies to shippers include safeguarding the ships and crew, tracking of ships, recovery of hijacked ships,negotiation for shippers in case of hostage, among others.

There are several reactions to the privatization of security, with speculation about its consequences for states'sovereignty andglobal governance. Optimists have argued that privatization is likely to yieldbenefits for states, as the private security companies will deliver new security services cheaply and flexibly inways that will enhance state security, with multiplier effect on global governance (The Ammerdown Group, (2016; Uzuegbu-Wilson, (2016)).However, the pessimists have argued that privatization will be costly to states, and will erode accountability and thus enhance conflicts (Rogers, 2010; Sarre& Prenzler, 2011).There is evidence supporting and opposing both positions.

For instance, Avant (2004) observed that privatization of security doestend to offer new tools for security. According to the scholar, in 1994, the United Statesinfluenced the balance of power in the Balkans without U.S. troops or U.S. funds bylicensing a PSC to provide training to the Croatian military. Shortly thereafter, theCroatians took back the Krajina region from the Serbs. It was that military success thatchanged events on the ground such that strategic bombing by NATO could pushthe Serbs to the negotiating table. The results of which were the Dayton Accords.The United States was able to quickly field international civilian police in the 1990sthrough a PSC. Similarly when the condition in Iraq becomes tumultuous, PSCs

were moved in to provide site and personal security for thoseworking in the country and to train the Iraqi Army and police force. The action of the PSCs helped to free up the regular forces to combat the insurgency.

3.1.3 Competitive Sourcing:

This is the facilitation of competition for work contracts between government and private entities. Depending on the strength of their bid, either a government or private sector actor could win. Unlike outsourcing and privatization, competitive sourcing makes no immediate assumption that private actors will be able to deliver services at a lower cost and/or higher quality than government actors.

3.1.4 Public-private partnerships:

This is the final type of engagement. The partnership is possible when the public sector - federal, state, or local government security agencies - join with the private sector security to pursue a common goal, which is security delivery. The major objective of public-private partnership for security delivery is "governmental responsibilization strategies". It involves the cooperation of private security personnel with government security personnel to deliver security services to the public.

Security activities like the one between the Civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) and the soldiers in the fight against Boko Haram insurgents in North East Nigeria, is an example of public-private security partnerships in Nigeria. It is being replicated in many parts of the country where Neighbourhood Crime Watch Groups (NCWGs) and vigilante groups work hand in hand with the police and army to ward of criminals in their areas. Since the area of specialization differs, when vigilante groups arrest suspected criminals, they have to hand them over to the Police for interrogation and prosecution. Members of the vigilantes also act as witnesses when the case is finally charged to court.

Law enforcement in Nigeria is provided by the Police. Apart from the Police, several other national agencies carry out law enforcement functions and have the power to arrest and detain suspects at their own detention facilities. These include the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), the Customs and Immigration Service and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), a body established in 2002 to investigate a range of financial crimes such as money transfer fraud and laundering. In addition, there are two principal intelligence agencies - the State Security Service (SSS) and the Directorate of Military

Intelligence (DMI) - dealing with criminal matters affecting the security of the state and who have powers to arrest and detain suspects.

In many countries where privatization of security has beenfully integrated into the national security policy, the policeand the private security companies (PSCs) are expected to work together to ensure a crimefreesociety. There is expected rewarding reciprocity in security partnerships. While the public security outfits will be better able to execute theirtraditional functions of crime control by using the skills andexperiences of PSCs in community policing strategies, the PSCs will be better in carrying out their dutiesof protecting their clients if they cooperate with the police.

Several evidences abound especially in the use of firearms, which privatesecurity personnel are forbidden from carrying. As a result,they seek the assistance of the police when performingduties that may require the use of firearms. In the samevein, PSCs provide the police with bullet-proof vans forconveying money between banks as well aswith technical equipment and skills. Such expectations provided the drivingforce behind the establishment of the American Society forIndustrial Security (ASIS) in 1955.

In a study conducted by Eke (2018) in Lagos, he discoveredthat operational collaborations and networkingbetween PSCs and the police in crime controlstrategies in Lagos Metropolis were imperative for achievinga crime-free society. The police acknowledged that theycannot fight crime alone and that there was need for strong collaborationwith private security firms. However, collaborationbetween PSCs and the police was weakened by lack of trust. Although the PSCshold the police in high esteem, the police look down onPSCs and regard them as uneducated, untrained, unprofessionaland ill-equipped for security duties. Neverthelss, thereare areas in which PSCs and the police perform their dutiestogether, the most regular of which were escort duties, arrests and handing over of suspects to the police by PSCs, investigations,crowd control at public gatherings, patrol duties,executive protection duties, emergency responses and staticguards. Thestudy concluded that the collaborative efforts of PSCs andthe police have had a positive impact on crime reduction.

On the other hand, Uzuegbu-Wilson (2016)found thatPublicPrivate Partnership in Policing for Crime Prevention in Nigeria is weak;the existence of collaboration skeletal; to a large extent uncoordinated and poorly harnessed to the benefit ofthe citizens in the country. Although PSCs provide intelligenceto the police, the police do not share intelligence withPSCs. This suggests poor interagency collaboration and networking. There is, therefore,

much to be done to close the gap in theoperational relationship between private and public security. The recommendations offered by experts (Bala&Ouédraogo, 2018; Eteyibo,2011)to close the observed gaps include: training, information sharing, investigation andprosecution, patrol and surveillance.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 4

(i). Differentiate between outsourcing and privatization of security in Nigeria.

(ii).Provide an argument "for and against" the observation that the privatization of Port Security in Nigerian by NIMASA can interfere with Nigerian sovereignty.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The private sector is a key player in the fight against crime, including at critical infrastructure sites. Despite different operating principles, it does appear to be possible to develop public-private partnerships that address crime problems in ways that benefit a variety of stakeholders, including the general public.However, considerable caution should be exercised in the involvement of private security in policing, especially with regards to ensuring that the universal mission of the police is not compromised. Nonetheless, available evidence indicates that a variety of very productive relationships can be established and maintained that are capable of showing success across a range of criteria, including significant reductions in crime and crime-victimization.

6.0 SUMMARY

The Unit examined four different types of public and private security collaborations. These include outsourcing, privatization, competitive sourcing and public-private partnerships. The three types (outsourcing, privatization and public-private partnerships) commonly practised in Nigeria are elaborately discussed.

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MODULE 3:COLLABORATIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

The advent of the twenty first century has witnessed ever increasing government attention in private sector partnership. This has been demonstrated in the area of economicdevelopment

and competitiveness through improved basic infrastructures. Increasingly,governments are turning to the private sector for the financing, design, construction andoperation of infrastructural projects. Once rare and limited, these public-private partnerships(PPP) have emerged as an important tool for improving not only economic competitiveness andinfrastructural services, but also security. Public-private partnershipsfor security (PPPS) is increasingly being considered as a mechanism to fill security 'deficit' in many countries.

Many citizens around the world, and especially in developing countries, are facing security 'deficit', as evidenced by increase in the sophistication of organised crimes, poorly trained and equipped security forces, decrease in the funding of Law Enforcement Department and low ratio of law enforcement manpower to the citizens. These problems have, in turn, made some developing countries favourable environment for organized crimes and hence their exploits. On this realization, many governments have come to appreciatethat public security outfits alone cannot provide the needed security for the citizens. Many private security organizations are skilled in modern technologies that are useful for security mapping; many more others have expertise in forensic analysis than that are available in the Public Security Departments. Creating a synergy between the public and private security sector, thus, remains one good option that can help to meet the challenges in security delivery.

One of the challenges that all governments face in promoting PPPS is the ability to instigate the proceduresand the processes involved in delivering successful PPPS and sustaining it as a workable security partnership. This is because PPPS will require a new type of security expertise that facilitates training, cooperation and operation monitoring of their performance on security delivery. Consequently, in this module, you will understand:

1. what PPPS mean?
2. what public-and private security nexus holds for security governance?
3. how PPPS can be enhanced and strengthened; and
4. what issues and challenges of cooperation must be overcome to build PPPS capacity?

The Module is organised into four units:

Unit 1: Cooperation in Security Delivery.

Unit 2: Public - Private Security Partnershipsand Trust Building.

Unit 3: Enhancing private security and strengthening public security.

Unit 4: Issues and challenges of Security cooperation.

UNIT 1:COOPERATION IN SECURITY DELIVERY

CONTENTS

1.0:INTRODUCTION

A co-operative arrangement between the State Law Enforcement Department (public sector) and Private Security Companies (Organizations) forthe implementation of government security scheme, operation or programmes is popularly known as PPPS. In other words, PPPS may be described as anexceptional public–private cooperation framework model which has its ownstructures, contractual relations, clearly labelled implementations and expected security delivery benefits. It may be a legal binding document involving public and private sectors for the provision ofassets and the delivery of security services that allocates responsibilities and risks among the various partners (public security organizations and private security organizations). In this context, the private security organizations invest their own funds, equipment, experiences andinitiatives while implementing the delivery of security to the public, or improvingsecurity services in the public domain.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

The major concern of this unit is to expose you to:

1. understand the meaning of public-private security partnerships
2. comprehend the different duties (or mixes) that public and private security partnerships may undertake;
3. distinguish the different types of public and private security partnerships;
4. discern how to initiate public and private security partnerships; and
5. identify the growth stages of PPPS

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 What is PPPS?

In addition to the definition given in the introduction, the PPPS may be regarded as a model of publicprocurement based on long term relationships between the government or otherpublic bodies and the private sector for the delivery of security services. It is viewed as a contractual arrangement whereby the resources, risks and rewards ofboth the public sector and private organizations are combined to provide greaterefficiency, better access to capital and improved compliance with a range ofgovernment regulations regarding security delivery to the citizens. In the words of Hodge and Grieve (2005), PPPS may be regarded as tool of governance, which provides a novelapproach to the delivery of security.

Corroborating the position of Hodge and Grieve(2005), Soltar (2009, p. 16) referred to PPPS as an 'innovative methods used by the government to collaborate with the private security organizations", who bring their capital (skills, expertise, technologies know-how and abilities)onsecurity planning and delivery to complement that of government. It is incumbent upon government to retain such partnership to ease security delivery in a way that will benefit the public and enhance economic development and safety of lives and property of the citizens. The distinctive feature here is the transfer of risk of public security sector to the private security sector.

Private Security Companies (PSCs) help to reduce the security deficit in the face of police incapacities by performing roles that would either not have been performed by the police, such as guarding residential and private habitation or, if the police were to perform such tasks, for example guarding critical national infrastructure like airports, that would have further overstretched their already limited capacity. The PSCs thus complement the police by relieving them of the need to perform some routine tasks so that they can concentrate on core policing duties such as intelligence gathering and investigations.

Private security organizations, however,have some downsides: they are urban focused and profit-motivated. The rich and wealthy, who can pay for security, afford their services. When that happens, crime invariably disappears from wealthy neighbourhood to poorer communities, which further reinforce existing socioeconomic inequalities (Karimu,2014). It is now obvious that private security guards are everywhere both in public and private sectors. The big challenge, however, is to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of these PSCs in discharging their primary duties to their clients. As Karimu (2014) observed, private security companies have played important roles in detecting crimes at different levels. Their effectiveness could be seen in the roles they play as undercover agents outside the formal authorities especially among industrialized countries.

3.2 The Mix in Private Security Market

The presence of private companies providing military services is not entirely new. Inthe period before the rise of the modern state, military contractors were common.Even in the modern period some states, such as the United States, have outsourcedmany services. What is new is the number of contractors working for states. In theUnited States, for instance, many private security companies (PSCs) were engaged in Bosnia, and are currently being engaged in Iraq. Privatesecurity companies (engaged by governments) now provide services,including some that have been considered core military capabilities in the modernera. Theseoperations have brought PSCs closer to the battlefield. For instance in the "Operation Iraqi Freedom", Avant (2004) reported that PSCs contractors provided operational support for systems such as "Patriotic Missiles", and are heavily involved in postconflict reconstruction, including raising andtraining the Iraqi army and police forces. A small number of PSCs providedarmed personnel that operate with troops on the battlefield. Much more common,however, are PSCs that support weapons systems, provide logistics, adviceand training, site security and policing services to states and non-state actors.

A new dimension in the security market is the transnational nature of the market. Private security has become a globalphenomenon. In the 1990s, every multilateral peace operation conducted by theUN was accomplished with the presence of private military or security companies (Buzatu& Buckland, 2015).States that contracted for military services ranged from highly developed states, like theUnited States, to developing states like Sierra Leone. Global corporations contracted withPSCs for site security and planning and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)working in conflict zones or unstable territories in Eastern Europe, the Middle East,Africa, Asia, and Latin America did the same.Changes in the nature of conflicts

have played a role in this phenomenon,leading to some tasks less central to the core of modern militaries (such as policing andtechnical support) to be more and more at the front and centre of maintainingsecurity, and private security companies providing these services readily. For instance,advances in technology have led unmanned aircraft, such as the Predator, to be atool with which the United States can fight terrorism. This system is not onlysupported by PSCs, but contractor personnel fly the plane until it is in the positionto launch its missile.

Another key tool in the conflicts of the 1990s and into thetwenty-first century is international civilian police. Many states do not have international police force. In 1990, the United States, used PSCs (DynCorp security Company) to recruit and deploy international civilian police, which was sent to Bosnia, Kosovo, and EastTimor (Bayley, 1999). From all indications, states are not the only organizations that finance security. Increasingly,nonstate actors (NGOs, multinational corporations, and others) pay for securityservices. For instance, in Nigeria, both Shell and Chevron have financed portions of the Nigerian military andpolice to secure their facilities. Since the 1970s,conservation NGOs have routinely financed portions of states' security apparatusesto help protect endangered species, and relief NGOs have hired PSCs to providearmed escort, site security for their facilities, and security planning.

3.3 Type of Public Private Partnership for Security (PPPS)

There are different types of PPPS established for different reasons by different governments. Each type seems to reflect the different needs of governments for security delivery. Partnerships also vary with respect to organizational structure, purpose, leadership, funding, and membership.Inspite of the differences, two broad categories of PPPS can be identified: the contractual type with concession and the private finance initiative.

3.3.1 Contractual Type with Concession Model

The contractual type with concession model is the longest in the historyof public-private partnership. In this type of partnership, the user is asked to pay. The model allows private sector management, private funding and private sector knowhow with public security operatives teaming up with them. A clear example of this type of PPPS is seen in the security provided for the Oil Conglomerates in Nigeria. Section 18 (d) of the Police Act provides for the creation of Supernumerary Police Officers. The Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC) have

their own Spy Police (with Supernumerary Number given by the Nigeria Police). They work hand in hand with the Nigerian Police in their daily operations.

Such contractual arrangements - whereby a facility is given by the public to theprivate sector, which then operates the PPPS for a given time period - is regarded as “contractual with concession”. The normal terminology for these contractsdescribes, more or less, the functions they cover. Contracts that concern the largest number offunctions are "Concession" and "Design, Build, Finance and Operate" contracts, since theycover all the above-mentioned elements: namely finance, design, construction, managementand maintenance.

3.3.2 Private Finance Initiative (PFI) Model

The private finance initiative (PFI) model is traced to the United Kingdom, where government had to stop the employment and training of security guards by government Ministries and Department, but rather outsource it to private security organizations for a fee. Currently, the PFI is becoming popular in countries like Nigeria, Canada, France, the Netherlands,Portugal, Ireland, Norway, Finland, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, the United States andSingapore, among others.

As opposed to the concession model, security management and financing schemes are structured differently. Under PFI schemes, the private security renders their services to the public organization for a specific fee paid by the public authority. This arrangement is increasingly seen in Hospitals, Federal Ministries, Universities, and Colleges, etc, where government outsources security services. The yearly budget is given a subhead for security; and the element of the funding in the budget enables the different government Ministries, and Departments to pay the private security companies for their services. On the short run, the cost of payment may be higher, but lower in the long run as the different security organizations will bear the gratuity and pension payments of their staff.

3.4:Starting Public -Private Partnerships for Security(PPPS)

According to the policy paper on private security and public policing developed jointly by the ASIS, Industrial Association of Chief of Police, International Security Management, and the National Association of Security Policing (2004, pp. 5 - 17), the process of starting PPPS can be divided into three different levels viz: methodology, shared values, and prerequisites. The first level, the level of methodology, is considered first by all potential partners. After all partners have agreed onthe methodology, shared values matters are considered. When there is mutualagreement on the shared values, the prerequisites level for

the project are thendiscussed. For a more detail analysis of these stages, read the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI)(2010) Handbook on the establishment of PPPS to protect vulnerable targets (2010).

3.4.1The level of Methodology

When the development of a PPPS project is to protect vulnerable targets, the agreement on the methodology should be adopted. Thefollowing subjects could be of value to help stakeholders reach a shared level ofunderstanding on methodology:

i). **Identifying stake holders**: Potential stakeholders (private security companies) should be contacted and askedif they are willing to join the project. It will also have to be defined who willact as the PPPS project's facilitator/coordinator.

ii). **Identifying Objects**: It has to be clear which sites, objects and places fall withinthe scope of the project. This is a sensitive matter and should,therefore, be classified as a confidential matter by all parties involved.

iii) **DevelopingCommon lexicon**: Based around stakeholders' backgrounds and experience, thedevelopment of a common lexicon, that all partners understand, is desirable.Within governmental systems for instance, the use of different terms for thesame item, or one term for different items, is not unusual.

iv). **Identifying the Goal(s)of the project**: Project partners should, carefully and realistically, define thegoal(s) of the PPPS project.

v). **Process-based**: Cooperation and coordination arrangements within theframework of the PPPS should preferably be based on pre-defined and agreedstructures.

vi). **Information exchange**: Arrangements and timeframe(s) should be defined forthe exchange of information between partners. The sharing of information about potential threats against vulnerable targets isclearly beneficial to governments, other public sector entities and to industry. If amechanism exists through which one entity can learn from the knowledge, experience,mistakes and successes of another, without fear of revealing sensitiveinformation to criminals or the media for instance, then everyone is likely to benefit.The government is obviously a vital partner in any such mechanism, given itsintelligence gathering capacity and other security related resources that it can offer. Information exchange can be classified according to a "traffic light colours"confidentiality code, from white for information that is publicly available, to red forthe most confidential matters. Whoever contributes information can decide on thedegree of confidentiality.

vii). **Exercising andTraining**: The development of a schedule for exercising and training is necessary. While training and exercises help in achieving fitness, it also has the important role of making members in the partnership to know themselves better, and work as a team.

viii). **Clarifying roles and identifying tasks**: It should be very clearly defined whatspecific roles and tasks each individual and organization will perform and anylimitations that can be envisaged in that regard.

xix). **State of the art**: Seek to optimize the use of resources, maximise effectivenessand avoid duplication of effort.

3.4.2. The Level of Shared Values

Within a PPPS project, all partners should agree to identify shared values and theirmeaning in advance. The following values are proposed by Prenzier and Sarrer (2012) as examples in this regard, butobviously depending on the culture, capacity and constraints prevailing, other valuescan be introduced if thought desirable:

i). **Equality**: PPPS partners should hold equal status.

ii).**Win-win approach**: For all partners, there should be something to "win" fromparticipation in the project, including a range of business benefits for instance.

iii). **Pro-activeness**: Any PPPS project should seek a pro-active approach from boththe public and the private partners, with all partners agreeing to work, think andexchange information on a pro-active basis.

iv). **Long term commitment**: A PPPS project is very likely to involve long termcommitment. Even when the partnership has a short span, the likelihood is that understanding and working together will engender a team spirit that can be used in future. The trust and relationships that have been built will be enhanced ifmembership of the team is kept as consistent as possible.

v). **Shared responsibility**: Since a PPPS project has to be built on mutual trust andresponsibility, all partners involved are responsible for maximizing theircontributions and enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of the project.

vi). **Flexibility:** All partners have to be flexible due to the fact that criminals are always changing their strategies. Similarly, terrorism and criminal environments are changing constantly. PPPS partners should be willing to redefine their positions if required and productivelydiscuss changes.

vii). **Confidence building**: Within the framework of a PPPS project, Pastor (2003), have observed that partners do haveto trust and confide in each other, especially as the effective

exchangeof sensitive information may be of great importance to the success of the security project.

3.4.3. The Level of Prerequisites

In terms of shared prerequisites, Golsbyand O'Brien (1996) offered the Australian experience, and advised that all partners must have subscribed to agreed shared values of the nature of the security partnership before the prerequisites are shared. In line with that advice, the UNICRI (2010) suggested the followingprerequisite examples that may be considered:

i). **Business case**: For the private security companies, in particular, the PPPS project details couldbe defined in a business case format. Cost efficiency is very important butsecurity should also be seen as an investment, not only as an extra cost.

ii). **Information exchange**: All partners, both private and public, must be preparedto exchange, without breaking the law, operational and/or threat-basedinformation about security and risk levels that the PPPS project requires to beeffective.

iii). **Trust**: All partners should trust each other. If there are private sector partnersfrom the same and/or competing industry involved, clear arrangements shouldbe made in advance to avoid conflict of interest.

iv). **Political will**: In certain cases, governmental partners may benefit from thehighest possible level of political support and endorsement for the project'saims and objectives.

v). **Coordination**: As aforesaid, a PPPS project needs effective coordination.

vi). **Application of expert knowledge**: Develop expert knowledge, share experience,support new participants and promote the PPPS concept.

vii). **Accountability**: Partners are accountable and should perhaps be asked toacknowledge their commitment and accountability to the project in a contractor some other form of written agreement.

viii). **Voluntary**: Stakeholders should join the partnership voluntarily - but notwithout obligations.

vix). **Legal context**: The project and everyone involved must, at all times, act withinthe provisions of local, national and international laws. This is to avoid being accused of human rights violations and/or the laws of the country which they initially sought to uphold.

3.5 The growth Stages of PPPS

The relevance of public-private security partnership for security requires a process that take cognizance of the stages of building solid foundation for collaboration. It is for this purpose that the United Nations (2008) suggested a number of distinct phases that countries need to go through in the development of PPPS to become fully operational. Based on these phases, some countries are regarded as non-starters, while some are at the first stage, where thedevelopment of actual projects is still numerically small. The requirements in each of the phases are summarised in table 3.5.

Stage One: Defining Policy Framework: The first stage involves the development of policy framework through defining, and identifying core services that need collaboration; identifying where private security services can fit in within the strategic plan and objectives, and the likely potential and limitations, of private security services with respect to their activities. At this stage, the identification of the areas that the public police are currently involved, which could be more effectively and efficiently covered by private security service, is also given preference. It is the identification of strategic areas of operation that would enhance the preparation of the legal frame work for collaborations, and the area of partnerships. Thereafter, interested companies with expertise for collaboration are identified and notified by the Department of law enforcement preparatory for full partnership engagement.

Stage Two: Introduction of Legislative Reform: At the second stage, the need for legislative involvement is required. This is because, like all reforms, public-private partnership for security must be backed up by law. It is in such laws that the nature and extent of the contact/interaction with private security companies as well as the regulations of the operation are explained; and the policy guidelines streamlined to determine what each partner stands to benefit. It is also important at this stage for the legislation to cover training needs as well as the oversight of private security companies.

Stage Three: Establishment of Fully Defined, Comprehensive System: At stage three, the full PPPS has taken off with each partner knowing what is expected from its organization within the short and long terms of the partnership. It is at the third phase that countries could be said to have reached the mature stage in PPPS collaboration.

Table 3.5: Stages of PPPS Development

Stage One	**Stage Two**	**Stage Three**
Define policy framework *Test legal viability	**Introduce legislativereform** • Publish policy and	**Establishment of fully defined,comprehensivesystem**.

*Identify model of partnerships *Develop foundation concepts (PPPS) *Apply lessons from elsewhere and /or other sectors *Outline core services of the private security	practice guidelines • Establish dedicated PPPS units • Refine PPPS delivery models •Develop service areas * Identify sources of fund • Leverage new sources of funds	• Legal impediments removed • PPPS models refined and reproduced • Sophisticated risk allocation • Committed deal flow • Long-term benefits identified • Provision of infrastructure • Training • Area of partnerships

Source: The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, (2008, p. 7)

In the findings of the UN (2008), many countries are still at the early stage of PPPS. This is because PPPS have proved difficult to implement in many countries. The main reasonfor the delay is lack of legislative reforms, which could enable the development of institutions, processes, and procedures to deliver PPPS projects.The lack of well performing PPPS in many countries is reflected in several other things suchas inability to share information, and lack of trust among the collaborative partners. The challenge,therefore, is not just to create new institutions but also to develop the expertise that can manage security collaborations. The PPPS demand a strong public security sector, which is able to adopt a new rolewith new abilities. In particular, strong PPPS systems require security managers who are not onlyskilled in making partnerships and managing networks of different partners, but also skilled innegotiation, contract management and risk analysis. Indeed, asking private security partners to delivergovernment services places moreresponsibility on public officials.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 1

(i). What do you understand by "security deficit"?

(ii). What role does public-private security partnership play in solving security deficit?

(iii). If you were asked to plan the commencement of public-private security partnership in your state, name and explain the stages you would take to realize the stability of the partnership.

5.0 CONCLUSION

A Public-Private Partnership for Security (PPPS) can be regarded as a co-operative arrangement between the State Law Enforcement Department (public sector) and Private Security Companies (Organizations) forthe implementation of government security schemes, operationsor programmes. There are different types of PPPS, established for different reasons

by different governments, as well as international organizations. The process of starting a PPPS can be divided into three different levels, viz; levels of methodology, shared values, and prerequisites. While each of these levels is important, the growth stages must be closely monitored till it reached maturity where the legal impediments are removed.

6.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, the focus was on security service delivery. It has shown that public-private security partnership are formed for the purpose of strengthening security, which suggests that each of the security outfits offer something that the other one can complement. It is the strength in collaboration that makes security delivery through public-private security partnership very attractive to even international organizations like the UN. In this Unit also, the engagement of PPPS in peace-making in countries that are affected by insecurity and civil wars is explained. The usefulness of the PPPS informed the need to introduce you to strategies that should be adopted in the formation of PPPS and how to monitor the growth stages of the PPPS to maturity.

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Unit 2:PUBLIC - PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS AND TRUST BUILDING

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Building trust in security collaboration is not only a problem between public-private security but also a serious problem between private-private security and public-public security collaborations. For instance, trust between the army and the police (public-public collaboration) is rated as one of the biggest challenges that hinders intelligence sharing between them (Ikoh, 2015); and maintaining it could be even more challenging (The Ammerdown Group (2016). Many scholars have defined trust as an ongoing process that involves personal relations that consumes a lot of time (Soltar,2009; Zedner, 2003). In the maintenance of PPPS, trust must not be lost in the case of either new member joining, or members being inactive or taking advantage of the services that a PPPS offers without contributing to any of the defined duties and operations.

In security collaborations, it is advisable, therefore that the process of trust should start from the very beginning; and should not be allowed to decline even when members tend to change workplaces or are being assigned to new tasks, so they no longer attend meetings of the PPPS. The advice is necessary because trust is not always continuous and most of the times not stable. As many scholars have pointed out, trust is built mainly through common working experiences and long lasting cooperation (Operation Cooperation, 2000; Porter&Kramer, (2001).The United States' Department of Community Oriented Policing services (COPS, 2004) outlined several mechanisms which support trust building and are used in countries

where public-private partnership for security is yielding maximum results. These discourses are therefore important to expose you to the mechanics of creating and ensuring strong partnership in private and public security collaboration.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOS)

At the end of this unit you are expected to:

1. understand the element of trust in public and private security partnerships;
2. comprehend and employ activities that are needed to strengthen the membership and operation of public and private security partnerships; and
3. appreciate types of partnership activities and programmes involved in public-private security collaborations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Trust Building

According to the United States' Department of Community Oriented Policing services (COPS 2004), trust building helps in enhancing the operations of public and private security partnership. Many countries where public and private partnership for security delivery are found to yield positive maximum results take the following steps to enhance and support trust building:

a). Face-to-Face Meetings: These meetings are defined as vital because trust between partners is built through co-ordination and exchanging of information on face to face basis. Face-to-face meeting, therefore, provide one of the strongest interactions for effective information exchange.

b). Regular Meetings: Regular meeting is another form of building trust as all members are obliged to get involved in systematic and scheduled meetings. The more frequent the meetings, the more the parties involved get to know themselves, and have shared confidence.

c). Social Events: The participation in social events is becoming a necessity for the enhancement of security partnership. The more security organizations who have collaboration in the achievement of target goals and / or objectives participate in social even they more they come to appreciate their strength and weakness, and to do to compensate each other to be able to achieve the assigned goal. It thus helps to a strong relationship between them.

d). Thematic Conferences: The focus in a thematic area will help all experts to exchange their ideas and share information. Thematic conferences take place when members are all centred towards one definite topic.

e). Thematic Trainings: One of the instructional methods of bringing together experts from different backgrounds and expertise is to get them trained on a specific theme. It enhances trust building as it gives participants opportunities to build trust, and become creative around the new areas of information. It also enables members to see themselves as inter-related through common goals although with different expertise areas.

f). Joint Exercises: These include patrol, conferences, training and workshops.

Face-to-face meetings, regular meetings and social events are considered as the most effective tools of trust building as they contribute to build long term partnerships. Personal qualitative interaction between the members of the PPPS is considered as a key point for successful security collaboration. In the process of building trust, the need for a "manager" would be considered catalytic as he/she would be someone who believes in the cause of, is devoted to the assigned duties and operations, and by such attitude, inspires others to get involved and to collaborate. Security collaborations with high level of trust are obviously more efficient.

3.2 Types of Partnership Activities and Programmes

As the gap between the population's need for security and the ability of state institutions to provide it widens, wealthier citizens have turned to the private security companies for security services. These services include:

a). Security Hiring: The requirement for security service has also increased the number of private security companies in operation.In Nigeria some 1,500 to 2,000 security firms employ about 100,000 people. Kenya has about 2,000 companies, one of which is the KK Guards, that operates not only in Kenya but also in Tanzania, Uganda, Southern Sudan, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Bedard& Guenette, 2015). Ironically, except in a few countries like South Africa, Uganda and Angola, private security officers are not allowed to bear arms in many African countries. So when a private security firm wants police at its clients' homes or offices with arms, the firms have to make arrangement with the Police.

Researchers have found that security firms in many African countries like Nigeria, the DRC, Ghana, and Kenya informally "hire" police officers to accompany their patrol vehicles, when the need arises (Abrahamsen&Williams, 2005; Eteyibo, 2011; Eke, 2018). At first glance,

such cooperation may appear to help both the police and security firms to bridge the gaps in capacity. However, in actual fact, such partnerships may actually reduce public security, given the weaknesses in Africa's police institutions. This is because the monetary payment that the police received in the process may not go into the police account but, in most cases, to the private pockets of the Divisional police officers, with whom the contracts are signed.

In Nigeria, Abrahamsen and Williams (2005)have observed that privatization of public policing is most extensive in the oil sector, where insurgency and illegal oil siphoning cost the country and oil companies billions of dollars. To address the problem the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) have trained and deployed unarmed security men and women to guard the oil facilities. These officers are paid and controlled by the Oil Companies. For instance, Shell Development Petroleum Company (SPDC) employedabout 1,200 of such officers, while ExxonMobil and Chevron employed approximatelyover 700 and 250 respectively. In addition, oil companies routinely rely on the heavily armed state paramilitary police (MOPOL) to secure their operations. Shell also uses over 600 armed police and MOPOL officers. By this practice, it is becoming often difficult to determine where public policing ends and private security begins; as virtually all levels of public force, including the military, have been integrated into the day-to-day security arrangements of the oil industry.

The use of public police forces to provide private security for the oil companies could be interpreted as government effort to secure national income, since oil is the major revenue-earner for the economy. However, the problem remains as to how security delivery is being carried out under PPPS given the involvement of public officials in private security dealings. Earlier, Abrahamsen and Williams (2005) had observed that the involvement of public officials in private security dealing created wide income differences within the police force, thus generating cut-throat competitions for the more profitable jobs, as security is perceived as a commodity that are being traded upon.

b). Information Sharing: This is a key factor for many public-private security partnerships and collaboration. Scholars have found that two factors seem to exert significant influenced on the nature of information sharing: Trust and availability of reliability medium (Wakefield,2003; Soltar, 2009).For emphasis, two examples of information sharing in public-private security partnerships in the United States - The Nassau County Security Police Information Network (SPIN) and Minneapolis Safe Zone- are presented below:

(i). The Nassau County SPIN was established in 2004 by the Nassau County (New York) Police Department (NCPD). The SPIN programme is an e-mail based information-sharing partnership with over 700 security entities as members. The NCPD provides SPIN with a dedicated staff of two officers and a sergeant.

(ii). Minneapolis Safe Zone operates a public-private security partnership that rely on security radio system and e-mail, cell phones, pagers, and other means to share crime alerts, crime tips, photos, video, incident reports, and online victim impact statements. Advances in technologies has now permitted the sharing of information on crime threat immediately via e-mail, text messaging, joint radio systems, secure websites, and other means.

c). Training: This is another aspect of partnership activity. Theapproach to training varies with respect to the objective of the partnership. The training may range from brief presentations to intensive courses culminating in professional certifications; format (lectures, demonstrations, etc.)to be adopted will be based on the subject matter. Examples of training topic areas may include, but not limited, to the following:

- Terrorism, e.g., responding to critical incidents, identifying suspicious packages, impact of terrorism on special events.
- Professional development, e.g., ethics, leadership development for law enforcement, conducting background investigations, search and seizure laws.
- Industry-specific crime investigations, including officer safety measures (e.g., at road block)
- Community policing, e.g., working with vigilante groups; patterns of gang activity, private security role in responding to nuisance crimes

d). Resource Sharing: In addition to sharing information and training, many partnerships share investigative resources or technical expertise. Private security support for law enforcement may also include donations or loans of equipment and funding to provide training or to support other partnership goals.

e). Crime Control and Loss Prevention: Many public-private security partnerships have significantly,in field operation with respect to patrol and access controlfor instance, joint operation in crowd control during public, national and public ceremonies. Other occasions may include:

- Special events: Law enforcement and private security have a long history of collaborating to reduce risks to lives and property at special events, including, national political conventions, major sports and cultural events, and others.

- Community policing approaches:This includes collaborations that focuses on crime and quality of life in specific geographic areas, like rural areas, touristscentres, and residential neighbourhoods.

f). Investigations. Public-private security partnerships is also useful in investigations, especially in cases like fraud perpetuated through the computer, financial, and intellectual property crimes, as well as many other types of crimes affecting numerous industries. In addition, various partnerships have facilitated installations of closed-circuit television (CCTV) products and systems as an investigative aid at special-event venues, shopping malls, and other strategic sites.

g). All-Hazards Preparation and Response. In this kind of partnership, members extend beyond law enforcement officers and the private security companies to include fire and emergency medical services, hospitals, public works, and representatives of other private-and public-sector organizations. In this context, public-private security collaboration seeks to include both natural and manmade disasters as well as crime and terrorism.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 2

(i). Explain the importance of trust in public-private security partnership

(ii). Explain the steps you will use to build trust among members of public and private security partnerships in your community.

5.0 Conclusion

Trust in security collaboration is very important. Many scholars and security practitioners believe that without trust, the partnership for security delivery cannot be effective achieved. In initiating security partnerships, therefore, emphasis is placed on trust building.

6.0 Summary

In this unit, the key focus was on what makes public and private security partnerships successful. The converging opinion of scholars on the importance of trust in security collaboration was elaborated upon with explanation on the various ways that trust can be enhanced. The unit also explained the various types of partnership activities and

programmes, and observed that instances exist where security partnership could extend beyond security delivery to hazard protection, thus extending the frontier of security discourse to hazard preparation and responses, due to natural disaster.

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Unit 3 ENHANCING PRIVATE SECURITY AND STRENGTHENING PUBLIC SECURITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Private security refers to various lawful forms of organized,for-profit personnel services whose primary objectives include the controlof crime, the protection ofproperty and life, and the maintenance of order.It is represented by registered private security companies (PSCs). As defined here, PSCs are distinct from other socialgroups and activities, outside of public law enforcement, (like vigilante groups and Neighbourhood Crime Watch Groups) that also playsome roles in controlling crime and maintaining order. In many rural and urban areas of Nigeria, private citizens have organized themselves into vigilante groups, which are distinct from private security companies. Membership include volunteers from the residents of the neighbourhood who take turn to keep watch over the neighbourhood especially at night hours. Other Neighbourhood Watch groups and vigilantes consists of paid watchmen, which landlord and the residents recruit and contribute money monthly to pay them for rendering security services. In many literatureson public-private security partnership, scholars have referred to private security officers as private police. In the United States of America, some private security personnel are licensed to carry arms (Parfomak,2004). Some of these private

policemen have been deployed during international peacekeepingmissions and conflicts, which can be more accurately described as quasi-military work (White, 2010).

In terms of public security, the officers are the law enforcement officers (the public police). For many, the "police" are armed, uniformedpublic servants charged with enforcing the criminal law. To this wemight add that they are members of a "bureaucracy created by political andlegislative processes," and are also expected to "maintain public order," and to keep the peace.In democratic societies, police are accountable to thecourts, and to the elected legislatures and executives.The employment of theterm “private security officer” or "private police" necessarily implies a definition in contrast to the “public security officer” or “publicpolice”. Each carries out the function of security delivery to the limit provided by the law. In contemporary security literature, it is believed that collaboration between the two serve to strengthen them in their different endeavours (Hess, 2009).

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this unit, you are expected to know:

1. differentiate between public and private security;
2. understand what each stand to gain in security collaboration, and the reciprocity involved;
3. know the benefits of security partnership to the public sector; and
4. recognise the benefits of security partnership to the private sector.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Distinction between Public and Private Security

In order to draw a comparison, you have to be acquainted with the sociological and legal literature pertaining to the publicpolice,consider the interplay between the formal rules regulating publicpolice behaviour and observations made of public police organizations in action.The public police are formally charged with the enforcement ofcriminal laws and the prevention and detection of crime. The State defines, bystatute, who may be classified as a public police officer, or in the parlance ofsome statutes, a "law officer”. This designation identifies who maystop, detain, search, and arrest persons under the special legal powers thatthe state confers upon the public security officer (the public police).

The formal obligation to enforce the law fully is not borne out in practice. For instance, the police officers possess considerable discretion in decidingboth when and whether to enforce

the law (as well as in the exercise of theirpeacekeeping functions).This is because no police department exists with enoughtime or personnel to meet formal enforcement goals; police officers rely insteadupon "priorities of enforcement". As for the goal of preventingcrime, an objective of the very first public police, the police remainslargely reactive: attending to crimes after the fact, on the basis of citizencomplaints (Gill& Hart, 1999, p. 35).

Although the public, and even officers themselves, perceive crimefightingas the most important task of the public police, the average patrolofficer devotes only a small portion of his or her working day to solving orpreventing crime. Instead, police officers spend the greatest portion oftheir time engaging in maintaining order, or peacekeeping; they "interruptand pacify situations of potential or angry conflict" Parfomak,2004, p.11).. The order that thepolice keep, is the result ofvarious factors: police officer attitudes, public expectations, and the "situationalexigencies" of individual encounters between officers and the citizens.The public criminal law is a resource for determining police behaviour. This is especially true at the level of the individual officer. Being sociallyand physically isolated in his work, the police officer is informed asmuch by his "working personality"-a combination of danger, authority,and accountability to superiors-as he is by the law (The Ammerdown Group, 2016).

In addition to crimecontrol and order maintenance, the public police are also responsible forregulatory duties such as towing away illegally parked cars and issuingpermits for parades, protests and public campaign rally. In sum, sociological studies of the public police have shown that theirpopular characterization as "law enforcers" is only partially correct. Policing,even for the public police, encompasses a much greater variety of action(and inaction) than might be first assumed.These general observations, however, go only pathways towards characterizingthe attitudes, functions, and operation of any particular police department.

The Nigerian Police is a centralized one, even when they have both zonal and state headquarters as well as Divisional headquarters. There is only one overall central Command in Abuja. The priorities and mission of any one police officer, depend on the directives of the Central Command. The public police, therefore, is not controlled from the State, but the central police command. Overlaying the complex world of ordinary police work, therefore, is a high degreeof legal regulation, much of which has been "constitutionalized" (Alemika&Chukwuma, 2005).

Private Police

In contrast, the boundaries of private policing are much less clear, inpart because there is very little scholarly attention, and moreso,no equivalent to criminal procedural laws governing them. There is a growing lack of consensus as to what exactly the 'private policing' constructentails. What is defined as "private policing" here is notwithout contest. Some of the disagreements are traced to the fact that police are employed in a variety of different contexts: acting asbodyguards, patrolling property, investigating fraud, and maintaining order.

Another source of confusion is the range of organizational form. Some private police or private security are employees of large, publicly-held multinational corporations,while others are solo practitioners. All, however, share a commonpurpose: to pursue their clients' objectives.

A client-driven mandate is perhaps the most central characteristic ofprivate policing. Clients' particular substantive needs-the kinds oflosses and injuries for which they seek policing services-shape the characterof the private policing employed. Thus, what counts as deviant, disorderly,or simply unwanted behaviour for private security organizations is definednot in moral terms but instrumentally, by a client's particular aims,such as a pleasant shopping experience or an orderly work environment. In order to pursue these substantive ends, private security organizations oftenturn to four methods of policing, as discussed by Shearing and Stenning(1991) andthese are :

a). Focus on Loss and not Crime: First,private police agencies focus on loss instead of crime. Loss is distinctivebecause it is concerned with a wider scope of activity than crime, such asaccidents and errors. The emphasis on loss also means that private policeare disengaged from the moral underpinnings of the criminal law; they focusinstead on property and asset protection.

b). Prevention over Detection: Second, private police stresspreventive means over detection and apprehension to control crime and disorder.Because private police clients are concerned not so much with thepunishment of individual wrongdoers but the disruption of routine activity

(e.g., a smoothly functioning workplace), policing efforts focus heavily onsurveillance.

c). Private Justice System: When prevention fails, private security often turn to a thirdmeans: private justice systems. These are functional alternatives to thepublic police and

the criminal justice system. Multiple incentives exist totreat matters privately-warning, banning, firing, and fining-instead of pursuing prosecution.

d).**Client Satisfaction beyond Fault Finding**: In this context, private security organizations focus more on the satisfaction of their clients for the purpose of keeping the job and to make profit. It uses clients-retention to measure the satisfaction of the clients. The quality of the service rendered becomes the measure that determines the continuous stay in business and the growing-concern of the PSCs as an organization.

3.2The Benefit of Public-Private Security Collaboration

For a public-private partnership for security (PPPS) project to be effective and sustainable, it should provide benefits for allthe stakeholders involved. These benefits will support the involvement and enhancethe enthusiasm of all participants. The partnership must realize that private security companies are incorporated by the law of the country as profit making organizations. The private security companies that are taking part in the PPPS must also acknowledge the fact that the country gives them the chance and opportunity to practice their profession, and that security means more than money making. It is about the people, peace and order in the country. The concept of security, therefore, should be treated not as a cost but rather as aninvestment as well as a contribution to the protection of the community in particular, and the country in general.

According to the Sarre and Prenzler(2011, pp. 17 - 21), the PPPS initiatives can be applied at a number of different levels –internationally/regionally, nationally and locally.When PPPS initiatives have an international or regional focus, they are typicallycoordinated by a central governmental authority, such as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs,with a remit to promote the protection of national interests abroad.When a PPPS seeks to protect potential targets from terrorist attacks nationally, thecoordination also often involves a central authority in a pivotal role.

In the case of a local PPPS initiative, a city council or a local government authority responsible for security is often delegated to manage the PPPS.However, active private security participation in every case is always essential torealise any project's potential. The involvement of other private sector stakeholders,such as vigilantes, neighbourhood crime watch groups, can also add significant value (White, 2010).

3.3 The Benefits of Security Collaboration to the Public sector

The Public and private partnership for security (PPPS) is important to the country for many reasons. Several empirical findings (Meerts, 2013; Bamidele,Akintola& Nuhu, 2016, Eke, 2018) have documented the benefits of security collaborations, including the following:

- Helps get the commitment of the private sector to become a part of the overallcommunity threats' prevention and emergency response planning process.
- Cooperation and the joint utilisation of "soft" target resources can significantlyenhance security and create a single, much "harder", target.
- Provides an understanding of private sector requirements and its capacity andresource availability.
- Proactively enhances communication with the private sector prior to anincident.
- Gives the opportunity to discuss and plan joint response and recoverystrategies.

The Benefits of Security Collaboration for Private sector

Similarly, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2004) enumerated the benefits of PPPSto the private sector to include the following:

- Provides the private security companies (PSCs) and other private sector units with public sector contacts and develops anunderstanding of the support that may be available from the public law enforcement officers.
- Offers the chance to explain and describe to the public law enforcement officers the threats to peace and order experienced in the country and what the private security organizations have been doing to curtail and or curb them.
- Makeavailable incentives for the business community to invest in preventivemeasures to reduce threats and risks.
- Could afford the opportunity to receive information, additional support andcrime prevention advice.

Other research (Porter&Kramer,2001; Abubaker, 2017)findings have added to these lists, including:

- Might help reduce liability and insurance costs.
- Creates an opportunity to discuss and develop business continuity and recoveryplans.
- Develops an accurate understanding of public sector capacity and resources.
- Encourages involvement in the establishment of public sector security prioritiesand objectives.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE 3

(i). Public-private partnership for security (PPPS) holds benefits for both the public and private sector. Explain what each partner stands to benefit in the collaboration.

(ii). Name and explain the substantive ends of private policing. Discuss how these ends can be changed to enhance their participation in public-private security partnership in Nigeria.

5.0 Conclusion

The public Police have duties that are defined by the Constitution. In contrast to the public Police, the private Police (private security) are members of registered private security companies who provide security protection to their clients. In whatever capacity the police (public and private) found themselves, their duties include acting asbodyguards, patrolling property, investigating fraud, and maintaining order, etc. In the context of these duties, therefore, engaging in security collaboration has significant reciprocal benefits to both the public and private security sector.

6.0 SUMMARY

The emphasis of this unit was on the reciprocal benefits of security partnership between public and private security organizations. From all indications, the public security may be empowered by the National Constitution to carry out specific duties. The Police uses discretions in executing their mandate, due largely to limited staff strength and availability of reliable information. Security collaboration with private security personnel can serve to strengthen security delivery capacity of both public and private security and, in so doing, enhances protection of lives and property of the citizens. The writer of this section needs to support the claims made here with sources as the section lacked sources and the only one cited outdated.

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Unit 4: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES OF SECURITY COOPERATION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Contemporary discourse on security partnership has brought to the fore some argument as to what constitute "policing" and who may legitimately callthemselves "police". Following these arguments have been the contentions of what policing and police work consist of. Furthermore, the contemporary proposition thatprivate police (private security officers) ought to serve as *partners* with public police in a commonenterprise of crime prevention must be met with caution, for these partnershipscarry unresolved questions as to the proper balance of burdens, benefitsand controls that are distributed between the public and private sectors.Adequate training of private company security officers (private police) is necessary to ensure that they have theessential skills for the performance of their work.

Historically, a number of obstacles have hindered cooperation between law enforcement agenciesand private security firms, as well as the larger community. Perhaps the biggest obstacle is a profoundlack of understanding of, and familiarity with, the capabilities of

private security companies, as well as lack of trust between public and private security officers. In addition, public security agencies have been slower to adopt new security andlaw enforcement technologies than private security agencies. From electronic monitoring and surveillanceto Internet security, the private sector has more of the type of IT experts needed forlaw enforcement than public security agencies.

2.0 Intended Learning Outcomes (ILOs)

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

1. understand the obstacles militating againstpublic and private security partnership;
2. compare security collaborations in Nigeria with that of other countries;
3. make suggestions towards solving problems that prevent effective security collaborations

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Obstacles to Public and Private Security Collaborations

Obstacles to public and private security collaboration have been identified by Montgomery and Griffiths (2015) to include:

3.1.1 Law Enforcement Officers' reticence about sharing information:

Public Security Department (Law Enforcement Officers) has routinely asked industries and private security companies to provide information about their operations, but has often been loathto provide helpful information in exchange. For a variety of reasons, data had a tendency toflow to the government from private industry, but not vice versa. Where government security officers provide information, if at all, it is sometimes so "watered down" that it makes very little meaning or provide very little hint for operation planning. In many instances, private security officers learn more by watching network news.

3.1.2 The Private Sector's Desire to Protect Proprietary Data:

In many instances, private security companies are concerned about sharing certain information with competitors. For example, the Shell Police, the Security organ of Shell Petroleum Company in Nigeria, have information about shell oil and gas installations in the country and the security loopholes that must be secured at all times. Sharing such information with the security outfit of Agip Company, for instance, on how to secure Oil and Gas installations may be alright, however, in the process of sharing the information, it may leak to

criminals and oil vandal groups. Besides , there is the concernabout sharing information with competitors on topics ranging fromproduct pricing to hydraulic fracturing technologies.

3.1.3. Accountability, Transparency and Principles of Democratic Policing:

A key set of concerns surrounding the role of private security and security privatization are how to ensure accountability, transparency and the principles of democratic policing (Kimani, 2009). Concerns have been expressed that the increased "marketization of crime control" requires a discussion of the governance of private security (Soltar, 2009). Furthermore, the United Nations' Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE, 2008) noted that the law and regulatory frameworks have not kept pace with the expansion of private security. The suggestion here is that there is currently minimal public oversight of the private security industry. Many citizens whose rights are violated by private security officers, have not been heard.

3.2 Obstacles to the Development of Public-Private Security Partnerships

A dominant theme in the literature is the conflict that exists between public and private security organizations. These conflicts focused on lack of trust and confidence, and the absence of facilitative procedures to establish and sustain collaboration. In many empirical work documented by scholars, observers tended to see private security officers as incompetent, who need supervision, organization and training (Garland, 1990; Shearing, 1992).

Beyond the misconception about private security competence, is the superiority complex. Historically, private security firms were viewed as a threat by police services, their leadership and unions, and still are in many jurisdictions. A fundamental difference is that the public police have a legislatively mandated duty to serve all segments of the community, while private security is contractually responsible to their employers. The potentially inherently contradictory principles upon which the public police and private security firms operate - differences in levels of training; a lack of mutual respect between the parties and the different powers that are vested in the public police and private security - have also impeded the development of partnerships. Additional obstacles include fear and anxiety amongst the public that the police are giving over their responsibilities to the private sector, resistance among senior police leaders and their management teams and inexperience in working with private security company personnel.

In the United States of America, a study by Buzatu and Buckland(2015), found a positive relationship between public and private security that was characterized by cooperation, competition, or co-existence.The study identified three types of police leadership that work with the private security industry to include: a) Skeptics; b) Pragmatists; and, c) Embracers. The "skeptics" viewed private security as having only a minor role to play in the policing realm, while the officers categorized as "pragmatists" viewed the role of private security as a necessity rather than as desirable. "Embracers," on the other hand, viewed private security as value-added and supported collaborative partnerships wherein private security personnel worked with public police officers.

A report prepared by Soltar (2009) on the relationship between private and public security sector in the US identified a number of benefits from the collaboration of public police and private security, including: 1) creative problem solving; 2) information, data, and intelligence sharing; and, 3) "force multiplier" opportunities. Similarly, in Canada, the security industry is identified as having a significant role to play in risk reduction and private security companies in deterrence and prevention. The area of cybercrime, in particular, has been identified as one that requires partnerships between the public police and private security, given the pervasiveness of technology and its use in both the private and public sectors (Rogers,2010).

Contrary to the above, Sarre and Prenzler, (2012) found that in Australia, private security has traditionally been viewed as unreliable and incompetent and, perhaps, criminal and as not providing the required services. A number of issues were identified with the findings. These include the potential for criminal activity and the infiltration of private security by organized crime groups, exploitation of security officers through low wages and corruption in security guard training schemes. The authors observed that frauds, corrupt practices, insider crime, trading in illicit goods and money laundering were of particular concern. In an earlier study, the authors had cited instances in which private security companies were prosecuted for misrepresentation of patrol and alarm monitoring services, abuse of citizen's rights and other violations of the law (Prenzler &Sarre, 2011).

Generally, the issues raised by scholars in the literature include:

i). The profit-driven nature of private security which might lead to two-tier policing: one tier for those who could pay for additional security and another tier for those unable to pay;

ii). The ethical issues and the concern that private security companies may promise more than they can deliver;

iii). The concern that private security companies might compromise quality in favour of the business bottom line;
iv). The question as to whether private security companies, working under a fixed contract, would be flexible enough to respond to the unpredictable nature of demands for security service delivery;
v). The concern that in security partnership, too broad powers might be transferred to private security companies, placing both private security personnel and citizens at risk;
vi). The opposition to using private security personnel in core policing tasks; and
vii). The concern that public security officers, as police leaders, may not have the expertise, or time, to manage private security personnel as part of a collaborative partnership.

In Nigeria, government policies may be contributing to the challenges faced by private security companies. For instance, the Private Security Guard Act (1986) has made the stand of government clear on non-permission of private security companies to use firearms in Nigeria. This may likely pose a serious challenge on the security guard since they cannot confront miscreants with arms. In such circumstances, private security officers would not only be seen by the public as being weak, but also incompetent in fighting crime. Other challenges facing private security in Nigeria are lack of adequate training, poor wages, risk of violent attacks and lack of clear legislation on the activities of the organization.

Globally, the relationship between the public police and private security has advanced considerably over the past three decades. A number of developments have facilitated the move toward cooperation and collaboration. These include: 1) the reforms in service delivery and the creation of new management information systems (MIS). In many countries MIS is linking private security firms with the police; 2) In some countries, there is private sector funding of specialized public policing units and databases; and, 3) the increasing mobility of public police into the private sector, through retirements.All these have yielded additional advantages to security collaboration.

The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has made efforts to promote public police-private security partnerships, stating that “Private security needs to be considered in national and local government plans and partnership consultation for a number of reasons, but especially to ensure the inclusiveness of prevention strategies and the equality of security provision” (UNODC, 2010, p.103).

Public police and private security collaborate in a number of areas, including responding to crimes in progress, investigating crime and sharing intelligence and knowledge. Private security is therefore complimenting public police in a "value added," way, by providing "extra eyes and ears" role, or, in other circumstances, may assume a primary role, including being hired to patrol neighbourhoods. This has accelerated with the increasing concerns over terrorist threats (Prenzler&Sarre, 2012). The sheer number of private security personnel that can be deployed can be useful both in reassuring the community and in providing an additional set of "eyes and ears" for public police. The potential benefits of outsourcing to private security included 1) freeing the public police to focus on core functions; 2) benefits provided to the police by the expertise of private security personnel; and, 3) cost savings tasks, i.e. guarding crime scenes.

3.3 Solutionsto Issues and Challenges of Security Collaborations

Many scholars have offered suggestions towards solving the issues and challenges raised about security collaborations. These suggestions include:

i). Training: This is a key component of the effort to raise the standard of private security. With the continued expansion of private security into areas formerly the domain of the public police, training is becoming a matter of greater importance. Training will determine the extent to which private security personnel are effectively able to take active part in security partnership, and utilize the full legal tools at their disposal. Such training will include private security personnel being involved in "risky situations" (Buzatu& Buckland, 2015).

It has been noted that in most instances, private security personnel are less carefully screened and receive less training than public police officers. Given such situation, training, including refresher trainings, becomes very necessary for private security officers.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 4

(i). Discuss the likely challenges to public-private security partnerships in Nigeria.

(ii). In what ways can these challenges be addressed for the realization of effective public-private security partnerships in Nigeria?

5.0 CONCLUSION

The concern of this module was to examine the collaboration between public and private security. In doing this, what the collaboration entails, and explanation for the necessity of public-private partnership for security (PPPS) delivery were elucidated. Explanation was

provided for the emergence of private security market and the several types of PPPS that exist. Students are introduced to the methods and techniques involved in the commencement of PPPS and the importance of trust building in security partnerships.

In the unit just concluded, emphasis is placed on the obstacles that prevent effective collaborations in security partnerships. Several factors have been explained and comparison drawn to what happened in Nigeria and elsewhere. The implication of the discourse is that it will enable you to make suggestions to effective solutions that can enhance public and private security partnerships in Nigeria.

6.0 SUMMARY

The unit examined the issues and challenges affecting public and private security collaborations and explicated several suggestions provided by scholars on how to overcome them. Comparisonswere drawn from a wide range of security literature both within and outside the country.

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MODULE 4 INCLUSIVE SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

INTRODUCTION

Two key provisions in the Africa Union (AU) Agenda 2063 deal exclusively with security issues. These are "silencing the guns" and "inclusive growth". Inclusive growth is related directly to "silencing the guns" because it takes security matter above the conventional law enforcement duty to the concern of the entire citizens. The critical success factors in the realization of security include participation by the citizens, inclusion and empowerment of the citizens and all stakeholders in the conception, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This provision in Agenda 2063 of the AU aligns with goal 16 of the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Goal for promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development.

As it is currently observed, the dynamics of violent conflicts are changing across the world. The number of violent conflictsis increasing, just as the level of social violence is increasing than ever before. In the observation of the Crisis Monitoring Group (2019), the levels of violence are nowhigher in a number of non-conflict countries than in countries at war. For instance, Nigeria is not at war, but the number of violence and violent associated crimes keep multiplying by the day. Communities are facing increasing threats to their security and social cohesion from bandit attacks, herdsmen, kidnappers, insurgents and terrorists from the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP), and Boko Haram. These changing trends in

insecurity reflectthe complex and volatile nature of the root causes, and underscores the importanceof adopting a dynamic and multi-faceted approach to addressing it.

Contemporary literature has revealed that the challenges of security can no longer be met with separate, sectoral interventions. In module three, emphasis was placedon public-private partnership for security (PPPS) with particular focus on public law enforcement outfits and private security companies. In this module (Module 4), consideration is on community security organizations which, unlike the private security companies, are not established for pecuniary benefits (profit purposes) and so do not recruit personnel for the purpose of using them to provide security services to clients for monetary payment. Security organizations, in this context, include the neighbourhood crime watch formed voluntarily by community members, as well as vigilante groups, for the purpose of rendering security services with or without partnership with the law enforcement officers (public security). It is concerned with community security developed through social cohesion and using it to strengthen conventional institutional support for community security.In some of the literature, inclusive security is regarded as a community based policing with enhanced relationship with the citizens.

In this module the student will also be introduced to the concept of inclusive security as an aspect of community response to security challenges, and how community network with the formal security institutions cooperate for the purpose of having peace and a secured community. The module explains the imperative of strengthening community security and social cohesionin a multi-sectoral and cross-cutting manner and outlines the drivers and causes of violence. It also highlights the importance of collaboration in community security and the importance of inclusive security for national security. By way of emphasis, the drivers of violence and/ or insecurity are stated and explained, followed by the values of security. The Module is organized into four units, viz:

Unit 1: Inclusive Security
Unit 2: National Security
Unit 3: The Value of Security
Unit 4: Community Security and Social Cohesion

UNIT 1 INCLUSIVE SECURITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The concept of "inclusive security" can be traced to some divergence views of feminist theorists, but mostly credited to the work of Hunt and Lute (2016) who argued that security issues have been greatly "gendered," that is, controlled by men to serve theirinterests and interpreted by other men, consciously and unconsciously, according tomasculinised perspectives. Theabsence of women is coupled with the belief that women are not well-suited to thedemands, pressures and responsibilities associated with peace and security issues. The theory, therefore, called for greater female participationin all aspects of security. The argument seeks to locate security as a community matter that should canvass for the opinion of every member. In the argument of Thomas(2007), gender neutral interpretations of what constitutessecurity and power must be brought into the field in order to achieve a non-gendered,inclusively human way of thinking about achieving security in the future. The author argued that women treat conflict differently and place a premium on achievingconsensus and reconciliation.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

1. understand and explain the concept of inclusiveness and inclusive security;
2. explain the role of inclusive security for community security;
3. expound the benefits of community security in national security;

4. comprehend the policy framework for inclusive security.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Concept of Inclusive Security

Inclusive Security (IS) as a concept began to gain scholarly attention in security theorizing in 2008 when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), developed the Community Security and Social Cohesion (CSSC) model as a multisectoralprogramming aimed at ensuring coherent interventions that can enhance security and socialcohesion at the community and national levels, especially in crisis contexts. Enhancing community security andcohesion was identified as one of nine outcomes under the UNDP Crisis Prevention and Recovery(CPR) outcome in the 2008-2013 intervention strategy. The 2008 – 2013 strategy had proposed that security challenges can no longer be met with separate, sectoral interventions alone (e.g. disarmament, demobilization and reintegration,justice and security sector reform, small arms control, and conflict prevention). It requires diverse citizen-driven approach to achieve security. Security must therefore be community driven.

Security becomes inclusive in the sense that not only are diverse individuals involved but, more importantly, the people are learning-centered, and value the perspectives and contributions of all people. In so doing, the needs and perspectives of every community member, irrespective of gender, tribe, religion, etc, are incorporatedinto the design and implementation of the security programme. An inclusive security seeks to make sure that everyone in the community (the entire ethnic composition) participate in the decision to create the security outfit and are therefore served in terms of security service delivery. A practice of inclusive security, closer to one embarked through community endeavour, is the proposal for the establishment of *Omitokun* security organization contemplated by the South West geo-political zone. The plan to establish it is given wider consideration by all the states in the south West Zone, including receiving inputs from both business and political elites.

In the pioneer definition given by Hunt and Lute (2016),inclusive security seeks to include all community members, particularly women, in peace processes. Apart from suggesting the disproportionate impact the insecurity could have on women, it also encouraged an increase in women's participation in security operations. The summary is that if the community work together, a more secure world is possible; more so if policymakers, security sectors, and conflict-affected populations work together. In this context, inclusive security can be seen as an aspect of human security because it advocates for full and equalparticipation of everyone,

including women, in state security apparatus and for their protection againstany possible threats to their security and beyond emanating from both within andoutside the state. This is opposed to the argument of the traditional approach to security, which regards territorial integrityand continued survival of the state as most sacred. Inclusive security tends to put human and community members' safety first, among others. At the heart of it, inclusive security calls for community, regional, and international integrated approach to security challenges.

3.2Community Security as Inclusive Security

In the definition given by the UNDP (2016), Community Security approachis a programmatic approach that seeks to *operationalize* human security, human development andstate-building paradigms at the local level. It focuses on ensuring that communities and their membersare 'free from fear' whilst also taking action on a wider range of social and economic issues that mayimpact on physical security to ensure 'freedom from want'. It brings together a wide range of state andcivil society actors to identify the causes of insecurity and develop a coordinated response to them atthe community level and, an enabling environment, at the national level. It emphasizes participatoryassessments, planning and accountability and seeks to improve service delivery, reduce social exclusion,enhance relations between social groups and strengthen democratic governance (UN, 2010). The emphasis here is that inclusive security will require building and strengthening relationships and partnershipsamong and within communities and with other civil society groups and government institutions. How community members engage and work with allies in the neighbourhood can take many different patterns. The partnerships can range frommore formal coalitions to informal networks. The advantage is that working collectively can broaden the support base,diversify the perspectives and opinions of concerned community members, and bring new skills and experiences to security issues. As more community members are mobilized, the security base will begin to grow with committed members who will continue to strengthen the security and bring positive innovations to it.

The goal of an inclusive community security is grounded on the wellbeing of the people in their social andecological context, rather than the interests of a nation state as determined by its elite. This,therefore, requires collective effort of the people to build the conditions of security over a long-term. In this context, security becomes a shared responsibility, and its practice, negotiated democratically. In his analysis of inclusive security, Kibui (2010) recognised cognized four cardinal principles:

a). **Security as a freedom.** Security is understood as a shared freedom from fear and want, andthe freedom to live in dignity. It implies social and ecological health rather than the absence of risk.

b). **Security as a common right.** A commitment to commonality is imperative; security should not,and usually cannot, be gained for one group of people at others' expense. Accordingly, securityrests on solidarity rather than dominance – in standing with others, not over them.

c). **Security as a patient practice.** Security grows or withers according to how inclusive and justsociety is, and how socially and ecologically responsible they are. It cannot be coerced into being.

d). **Security as a shared responsibility.** Security is a common responsibility; its challenges belong toall. The continuing deterioration of security worldwide testifies against entrusting the common wellbeing of people to a selected group of law enforcement officers.

3.3. Benefits of Community Security (CS) as a Programmatic Approach

In countries facing crises of governance, criminality or violence, CSis a valuable approach for bothprevention and control of crime (O'Neil&Nanako, 2017).The target communities particularly benefit from community security due to the following advantages:

a). **Ensures coherent interventions:** The CS approach provides a framework to harness the expertise and resources of community members and partners that can address security and development issues in a moreintegrated manner. It enables collective input of community members to security issuesand since members live in the community, there is the likelihood of knowing security loopholes and of course suspected criminals in the community, as well as their hide outs. When CS planning include women and people of diverse gender identities at every level, it is possible that they can make inputs that help to address and provide end to the occurrence of sexual and gender-based violence. Maleand female security actors can contribute in improving monitoring and reporting of gender-based violence, providing support services for victims, facilitating access to justice for victims,ensuring appropriate penal procedures for perpetrators and raising awareness of gender-based violence among the population at large.

b). **Tackles root causes of insecurity:** The CS approach combines action to provide immediatephysical protection with efforts to address the wider political, economic and social drivers of violence,such as exclusion.

c). **Empowers local communities:** The CS approach makes it possible to work with community members,identify their ownneeds and ensures that interventions are demand-led.

It is a participatory process that involves localcommunities in planning and decision-making on the targeting of resources.

d). **Makes states more responsive to the needs of citizens:** When the communityis able to identify her security needs, it is possible to build capacity that can attract participation by public security. In this context, the community is able to come together for the purpose of security service delivery and, in the same instance, hold themselves together for the purpose of security delivery.

e). Links action at the local and national levels– The CS approach focuses on effecting change in aspecific geographical area but recognizes that many of the issues that threaten community securityrequire action at the national level. Local issues are addressed through CS plans, whilst action isdeveloped with the national government to help create an enabling environment.

f). Builds social capital and trust between different social groups – The CS approach seeks tostrengthen the common values and identity, interpersonal and inter-group ties that bind societiestogether and make them more resilient to violence. In this context, social capital is enhanced due to community-firmed believe in one another's problem. The cohesiveness helps to build bridges of recognition and create consciousness of being brothers' keepers.

3.4Policy Framework for the Inclusion of Women in Inclusive Security

There is a number of international provisions, including the Beijing, Beijing +5 and 1325, that have set international policy frameworks for the full and equal participationof women in all aspects of public life, including peace and security. The 1995Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) that emerged from the fourth World Conferenceon Women in Beijing, China, marked an important milestone in the internationalcommunity's involvement in recognition of women's rights and roles in peace andsecurity. The BPFA states, in pertinent part, that "full participation [of women] indecision-making, conflict prevention and resolution and all other peace initiatives[is] essential to the realisation of lasting peace" (Kibui, 2010)). Besides, the BPFA recommendsmember states, inter alia, to increase the participation of women in conflict resolutionat decision-making levels and to promote women's contributions to fostering aculture of peace. Moreover, the 2000 Beijing +5 Political Declaration and "Outcomes"document also reaffirmed member states' commitments to the BPFA.

In October 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted unanimouslyresolution 1325 that recognized gender equality as an integral component of peace andsecurity. The UNSC 1325 became the first solemn recognition of the role of women

in thehitherto male dominated 'high politics of peace and security" (DCAF, 2011).Thisresolution is the most important commitment made by the international communitywith regard to women's participation in the maintenance of national and internationalpeace and security. The resolution spells out actions needed by all actors, includinggovernments and the UN, to ensure the participation of women in peace processes andimprove the protection of women in conflict zones. It calls upon the Security Council,the UN Secretary General, member states and all other parties to take action in four interrelatedareas, including the participation of women in decision making and peace processes;integration of gender perspectives and training in peacekeeping; the protection ofwomen; and gender mainstreaming in UN reporting systems and programmes.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 1

(i)**.** Explain the concept of inclusive security.

(ii). What are the benefits of inclusive security?

(iii) (a). What is inclusive security? (b). In what ways do the 1995Beijing Platform for Action (BPFA) provide policy framework for inclusion of women in inclusive security?

5.0 CONCLUSION

As the discourse on public and private security partnership gained popularity in the twenty first Century, the need to make security the concern of all also gained the support of many scholars especially those on the board of international and non-profit organizations. The concern on the participation of women brought inclusive security to the front burner and, in no time, inclusive security become equated with community security; and the need to have the opinion of all when it comes to security decision-making. In this way, security becomes "the concern of all society members". Inclusive security, therefore, expands the understanding of security as common right, shared responsibility of all and a practice towards the freedom of all community members.

6.0 SUMMARY

The focused of the unit was on inclusive security. It, therefore, placed emphasis on the definition of inclusiveness and inclusive security. Efforts were made to explain the role of

inclusiveness in the attainment of community security, understanding the policy framework for inclusive security, and the benefits of community security as a pragmatic approach.

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UNIT 2: NATIONAL SECURITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

What is security? Inspired by the Latin's word, *se + cura*, meaning free from fear or anxiety, security may be understood as a shared freedom from fear and want, and thefreedom to live well (UN General Assembly, 2005, p. 31). It implies a measure of physicalsafety but is not defined by it. Rather, true security means communities and societies inwhich people may meet their fundamental needs without jeopardy.Within this understanding, security is better understood not as the absence of risk, but asthe presence of healthy social and ecological relationships. Conversely, policies that serve astate's interests to the detriment of the social and ecological fabric will generate insecurity. Take a cue from oil exploration and exploitation in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria. Inspite of the amnesty programme, the remain of oil spillage on the Ogoni land and environmental degradation still bear evidence of insecurity.

The argument in the security literature is that common security is a commonresponsibility; its challenges belong to everyone and should be democratised accordingly (Garland,1996; Bayley&Shearing2001).Citizens, communities, local authorities and people's movements all share theresponsibility. So do national governments and regional and global institutions, providedthat they be made accountable internationally and democratically. Power must bechallenged to serve, rather than dominate, and be actively resisted when those who wield itcrave more of it for their own ends.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of the unit, you are expected to:

1. understand why security should be the responsibility of all citizens;
2. comprehend the drivers of violence in a country; and
3. recognise why the drivers of violence should be treated as challenges to national security;

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Drivers of Violence and Challenges to National Security

In many countries, citizens do not trust the state to ensure their safety and providejustice. In some contexts, this may be because the state lacks the capacity to control its borders orsignificant parts of its territory. In others, it may be because one or more social groups are systematicallysubjected to violence or deliberately not provided with security by the state. While the breakdown ofthe rule of law may be a direct consequence of conflict or criminal violence, it also creates and amplifiesexisting security dilemmas within the country. The

absence of the rule of law is a security threat in its ownright. Without physical and legal protection, or mechanisms to manage conflicts, grievances are more likelyto be resolved by violent meansand in contexts of insecurity, state responses often become increasinglyrepressive. Research shows that in many fragile states, non-state systems are the main providers ofjustice and security for up to 80-90 percent of the population (Kessler,2014). In some cases, non-state systems may bemore effective, accessible and cheaper for citizens. However, in others, they may be corrupt, abusive anddiscriminatory.

Other factors that multiply violence and constitutes serious challenges to National security are discussed below:

3.1.1. Organized crimes, corruption and war economies

The presence of armed groups and an increase in economic motivations for crime, make peace andconflict mediation efforts more complex and undermines traditional dispute resolution and localgovernance mechanisms. The emergence of a criminalized infrastructure of violence can serve toinstitutionalizeinsecurity within a society by capturing the traditional and local governance mechanismsor replacing them. In Sierra Leone, for instance, conflict over resources, including diamonds, timber, water and land were serious sources of conflict that fuel militancy and civil war that killed several people for many years. In Nigeria, and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroun, Boko Haram insurgency has created the culture of sub-violence, with attendant consequences on trans-national crimes such as drug and trafficking on children, men and women. As it is found elsewhere, societies where the economy is highlycriminalized, efforts to formalize the economy and establish the rule of law always pose a threat to actorsthat benefit from the insecurity, and may meet opposition from citizens who have become engaged inthe criminal economy.

3.1.2. Breakdown of governance

The increased penetration of society by organized crime and corruption has a serious impact ongovernance. When state agencies become linked to illicit economic activities, it can undermine thecapacity of the state to deliver services and protect communities. Where criminal elites emerge tochallenge state power it breaks the state's monopoly on the use of force (Ikoh, 2013). In some contexts, the stateis not present in many communities where organized criminal leaders run an alternative system oflocal governance. Nigeria is experiencing such condition in some local communities in the north eastern part of the country. Such situation increase the insecurity of communities and, in extreme forms, can lead tothe collapse of the state. Libya and some parts of northern Mali are having new forms

of civil strife that indicate no control from the central government. Non-state actors have taken over governance, and are greatly profiting from it. When processes to manage the relationsbetween state and society break down or become exclusionary, then community security and socialcohesion are threatened.

3.1.3. Lack of opportunities for youth

Young men aged 15-24 are both the main victims and the main perpetrators of armed violence in mostcountries. A critical trend impacting on the security of communities is the growth in size and proportionof the youth population. According to UNDP (2019), some 48 percent of the world population is under the age of 24 and86percent of 10-24 year olds live in less developed countries. A bulge in the youth population in a contextof high unemployment and lack of social and economic opportunities presents a significant risk factor.Research has shown that crime and violence are often strongly associated with the growth and proportionof youthful populations, especially young males (The Ammerdown Group, 2016).A large youth population does not automatically leadto increased violence,but this is a group particularly affected by socio-political troubles, especiallywhen other risk factors are present. In many countries, conservative and hierarchical social structuresexclude youth from participating in decision-making, both in the family and in the public sphere.When faced with few options for legitimate empowerment, there is an increased risk that youth can fallprey to criminal gangs, warlords, fundamentalist associations and identity politics and be mobilizedfor destructive ends. Although more at-risk, it is important to ensure that youth are not inadvertentlycriminalized or stigmatized.

3.1.4. Population movement

Population movement is another trend that is increasing the insecurity of communities andundermining social cohesion. This is true of both internally displaced people in conflict contexts andthe influx of rural populations to cities in non-conflict contexts. The characteristics of rapid urbanizationplace in sharp contrast certain challenges and grievances, including gaps between extreme poverty andwealth. Since 2008, and for the first time in history, the majority of the world's population lives in urbanareas. All of the population growth expected over the next four decades is predicted to happen inurban areas, which at the same time will continue to attract migrants from rural areas. The UN-Habitat'sresearch (Huerto& Virgilio, 2016) has shown a relationship between city size, density and crime incidence.Population growth and rural-urban migration frequently results in the growth of slum cities on thefringes of urban centres where diverse social groups, each with their own

social norms and traditionalgovernance mechanisms, coexist. The lack of basic public infrastructure in these settlements and thecompetition for scarce resources can increase the risk factors for armed violence. Poor urban planning,design and management play a role in shaping urban environments that put citizens and property atrisk. The physical fabric and layout of cities have a bearing on the routine movements of offenders andvictims and on opportunities for crime and violence.

3.1.5. **Economic inequality**

Under-development is often associated with crime and violence but research shows that there is a moresignificant correlation with economic inequality, rather than absolute poverty. A World Bank studythat reviewed data from 24 years of UN World Crime Surveys found that increases in income inequalityraise crime rates (Fajnzylber, Lederman&Loayza (1998). Income inequality is a strong predictor of homicides and major assaults, both in andbetween countries. For example, non-state violence is higher in countries where a high proportion ofpeople are economically deprived (UNODC, 2007).

3.1.6. Cultural issues

Aggressive cultures of masculinity can play a significant role in driving violence and insecurity. Forexample, the growth of gangs and violent masculine identities in Jamaica has led to high rates ofgender-based violence against women, notably rape and domestic assault. A Caribbean studyfound that 48 percent of adolescent girls' first sexual encounter was 'forced' or 'somewhat forced' (UNODC, 2007). In some cultures, high levels of gender-based violence are accepted. For example, in El Salvador thehomicide rate against women doubled between 1999 and 2006 to 12/100,000 people. Yet, despite35 women a month on average being murdered, a UNDP survey found that 64 percent of the populationviewed violence against women as normal (UNODC, 2008).

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 2

1.Name and explain the factors that consistently thwart national security in Nigeria.

2. Explain how cultural issues can constitute the drivers of violence in your community, and how inclusive security can help to solve the problem.

5.0 CONCLUSION

True security exist in communities and societies where the citizens meet their fundamental needs without jeopardy. It may, therefore, be difficult to attain because of human greed and the inclination to crime by many. However, insecurity becomes a national concern when security is seen as a public good for a few. In this context, therefore, drivers of insecurity tend to exacerbate the situation and elevate normlessness in the society. At this level, national security becomes a matter of great concern.

6.0 SUMMARY

The focus of this unit was to expose you to causes (drivers) of insecurity and how they constitute challenges to national security. Several examples were presented both in Nigeria, Africa and elsewhere in Asia. The discourse revealed that factors like culture, hitherto taken as granted, can constitute a serious driver of national insecurity; so also are factors such as population movement, and conspicuous inequality.

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UNIT 3: THE VALUE OF SECURITY

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Does security really have value? Several scholars seems to answer the question in the affirmative. Among such scholars are Barry, Ole, and Jaap de (1988) and Baldwin (1997) who listed security values to include prime value, core value, and marginal value (see module

2). In this context, the concept of security is easily connected with a variety of values that can be secured by a variety of means. Also, the use of adjectives permits reference to many different kinds of security such as economic , environmental , military , social , physical , identity and national security.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

This unit seeks to expose you to:

1. the understanding of what "force multiplier" mean, and how it can be achieved in the context of public and private security partnerships in Nigeria;
2. how law enforcement can prepare private citizens for security response; and
3. the benefits and risks involved in public and private security partnerships.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 The Value of "Force Multiplier"

The value of security can also be found in the discussion of the concept of "force multiplier". Although this term belongs to the military, it is used to refer to a condition or capacity that makes a force more effective than it wouldbe otherwise. Force multipliers aresomething that must be harnessed on the domestic front by combining the resources, expertiseand talents together. It is a kind of joining forces. In this context, the private security companies, firms, businesses, community groups and law enforcement join forces together to solve emerging security problems.In the context of delivering security services to the nation, private security companies are required to support public law enforcement in a variety of ways.Much of this takes the form of education, information sharing and helping to build resilience in policedepartments based on private sector experiences (Golsby&O'Brien, 1996).

The argument that strengthens "force multipliers" is that the law enforcement and private security have strengthsand weaknesses that must be considered to formrealistic expectations of what each can bring tocollaborative partnerships. Partnerships offer a numberof benefits to both sides, including creative problemsolving; increased training opportunities; information,data, and intelligence sharing; access to the community through privatesector communications technology; and reducedrecovery time following disasters.

Security partnerships are,however, not without their obstacles. The primaryones are barriers to information sharing, mistrust, andmisinformation.Even though a reported lack of trust and mutualknowledge has inhibited the formation of lawenforcement-private security

partnerships in the past,gains have, however, been made. The goal of partnerships iscollaboration,in which partners recognize that theirmissions overlap and work to share resources andachieve common goals. Successful collaborativepartnerships include common tasks, clearly identifiedleaders, operational planning and a mutualcommitment to provide necessary resources (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011).

The value of security especially with the benefits of "force multipliers", can be cited with the mobilization of security after the coordinated terrorists attacks by the Islamic terrorist group, al-Qaeda, at the World Trade Centre on Tuesday, September 11, 2001, at Manhattan, New York. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) had to issue directives for jurisdictions to improve collaboration with their private sectoragency counterparts. To prevent terrorism, the DHSrecommends that public and private agencies should do the following:

(a).Prepare memoranda of understanding andformal coordination agreements describingmechanisms for exchanging information regardingvulnerabilities and risks;

(b).Use community policinginitiatives, strategies and tactics to identify suspiciousactivities related to terrorism;

(c). Establish a regionalprevention information command centre; and

(d). Coordinate the flow of information regardinginfrastructure.

Police chiefs were told to consider formalizingrelationships with their private security counterparts. The formalization should show both the law enforcement and privatesecurity employees that the partnership is anorganizational priority. Law enforcement-privatesecurity partnerships tend to revolve aroundnetworking, information sharing, crime prevention,resource sharing, training, legislation, operations, research and guidelines.

3.2 Outcome of Enforcement: Security Partnerships for National Security

The advent of radical terrorism in the world has placed great pressure on the law enforcementcommunity. Specifically, the law enforcement agencies have been searchingfor a way to crime detection, prevention, and control with the responsibility of protecting the breach of territorial sovereignty. Limited andsometimes scarce resources must be allocated basedon need, leading some law enforcement executives toacknowledge the problem of curbing insecurity and terrorists' advances. Privatesecurity officials are experiencing a similarphenomenon, including neighbourhood watch groups and vigilantes. While their traditional responsibility toprotect people, property and information hascontinued, they are

now also expected to be activeparticipants in the national effort to protect thecountry's infrastructure.Clearly, law enforcement and private security havemuch to gain from each other.

It is evidenced from empirical work that the law enforcement can prepare private security to assist in emergencies; coordinate efforts to safeguard the nation's criticalinfrastructure; obtain free training and services; gain additional personnel and expertise; use the private sector's specialized knowledge andadvanced technology; obtain evidence in criminal investigations; gather better information about incidents (throughreporting by security staff); and reduce the number of calls for service (Buzan, 1991; Bruce, 2012).

On the other hand, private security can coordinate plans with the public sector regardingevacuation, transportation and food services duringemergencies. In so doing, it can gain information from law enforcement regardingthreats and crime trends, develop relationships so that private practitionersknow whom to contact when they need help orwant to report information; and thus build up law enforcement understanding of corporateneeds (e.g., confidentiality).

By working together, both private security and public lawenforcement can realize impressive benefits, including creative problem solving, increasedtraining opportunities, information, data, and intelligence sharing; "force multiplier" opportunities; as well as access to the community through private sectorcommunications technology, and can help to reduce recovery time following disasters.

Inspite of these benefits, several other scholars, including Garland(1996), Bayley&Shearing, (2001), and Sparrow (2014) have identified both benefits and risks involved in public and private security partnerships as presented in table 3.2.

Table 3.2: Potential Benefits and Risks of Public/Private Police Partnerships

Grounds for support and engagement (the Benefits)	**Grounds for skepticism and Concern (the Risks)**
1. Increased Effectiveness Through Public/PrivatePartnerships. Collaboration between the public and privatesectors enhances performance by sharing complementary skills,knowledge and resources. Partnerships facilitate informationexchange and provide access to	**1. Lack of Accountability.** Private police are not subject to thesame formal and legal systems of accountability that governpublic police agencies. Nevertheless, they may carry weapons,use force, detain suspects and intrude on the privacy and rightsof individuals. They may discover crimes and

broader networks. All parties canbenefit from properly functioning partnership arrangements	choose not toinform public authorities. The exercise of policing powers withoutcommensurate accountability is inherently dangerous to society.
2. Alignment with the ideals of Community Policing. Community policing is essentially collaborative and involvessacrificing a purely "professional agenda" in favour of onenegotiated with the community. The community, which includesbusinesses, should be able to participate in setting the crimecontrolagenda and should be encouraged to participate in carryingit out.	**2. Threats to Civil Liberties.** Many restrictions on the conductof public police do not apply to private police (unless formallydeputized by public agencies). For example, confessions extractedby private police without Miranda warnings and evidence obtainedthrough unlawful searches conducted by private agents are notsubject to exclusionary rules.
3. Greater Equality in Protection. The ability of the better offto protect themselves by purchasing private protection at theirown expense allows the public police to concentrate their effortson poorer and more vulnerable segments of the community. Theoverall effect, therefore, is to raise the floor in terms of levels ofprotection for the most vulnerable.	**3. Loss of "Stateness."** Policing services and security operationsrequire judicious balancing of the multiple and often conflictingrights of different groups or individuals. Therefore, only state("civic") institutions can be trusted to reflect the broad societalvalues required to carry out such functions. The particular interests of private clients and the for-profit motivations of commercialproviders will inevitably distort the public agenda to some extent.
.**4. Access to Specialized Skills and Technical Resources.** Theprivate sector can provide the public police with highly skilledand technical specialists that the public sector could not routinelyemploy. Collaboration with the private sector thus makes highlyskilled and specialist resources available for public purposes.	**4. Threats to Public Safety.** Private police, who are not as welltrainedas public police, may display poor judgment or overreactto situations, thus endangering public safety. Citizens may beconfused about the status or rights of uniformed security personneland may therefore act in ways that create danger for themselvesor others.
5. Efficiencies Through Contracting Out. Government operationsshould seek to exploit the efficiencies of private-sectorcompetitive markets by contracting out any components of theiroperations that	**5. Greater Inequality in Protection.** The growth of private securityexacerbates inequality regarding citizens' access to protection.Citizens will get the level of protection they can pay for. Those

can be clearly specified and carved out, and forwhich competitive markets exist.	who are better off, and are able to purchase or enhance their ownsecurity, will reduce their commitment to public policing. Fundingand support for public policing will suffer, which will ultimatelyresult in lower levels of protection for the poorer and morevulnerable segments of society
	6. Reputational Concerns. Inadequate performance or improperconduct by private security personnel may produce reputationalor litigation risk for public police if the public police have formallyrecognized, qualified, trained, contracted or, in some other way,recognized or validated the operations of private operators. Suchoperators should therefore be kept at an arm's length.
	7. Threats to Police Jobs. Increased availability of lower skilledand lower paid security jobs, coupled with the contracting out ofsome police tasks to the private sector, may undermine job securityand limit career prospects for public police. Competition from theprivate sector is inherently unfair because of their tolerance forlower training standards and access to cheaper labour.

Source: Sparrow, M. K. (2014). Managing the boundary between publicand private policing, p. 9

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 3

(i). Explain the concept of "force multiplier".

(ii). How is "force multiplier" enhanced under public-private security partnerships?

(iii). Name and discuss the perceived advantages and disadvantages that may influence public-private partnerships in your country.

5.0 CONCLUSION

Security has values. In the context of public and private security partnerships, the values are seen not only in strength but also in shared ideas, synergy in terms of intelligence sharing and strategies. The concept of "force multiplier" explained the expected values from emerging

security collaborations. However, as empirical evidences have shown, public and private security partnerships have both benefits and risks.

6.0 SUMMARY

The unit discussed the expected values of security especially values that will accrue to public/private institutions from security collaborations. It, therefore, exposes you to the concept of "force multiplier" and the expected values of security partnerships for national security. In explaining the benefits associated with public and private security partnerships, scholars drew attention to greater security effectiveness, efficiency in security delivery, alignment with the objectives of community policing, and access to specialized skills. However, other scholars articulated the risks involved to include lack of accountability, threat to civil liberty, loss of stateness, threat to public safety, inequality, reputational concern, and threat to police jobs.

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UNIT 4: COMMUNITY SECURITY AND SOCIAL COHESION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Communities can be defined at different levels – from the national to the local – and this implies that actionis needed at each of these levels to effectively enhance security. Community can also be defined by the shared interests, values and needs of citizens (e.g. youth, women,the working-class community, the disabled community, or a religious community), which can extendacross borders.Experience has shown that issues ofsocial cohesion are vital to enhance the safety and security of communities.Community does not just refer to individual community members, but also to all actors, groups andinstitutions within the specific geographic space. It, therefore, includes civil society organizations,the police and the local authorities that are responsible for delivering security and other services in the area (Thomas, 2007).

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

The objective of this unit is to expose you to:

1. the concept of community security and draw concurrence with public and private security partnerships;
2. understand and explain the meaning of social cohesion; and
3. comprehend and clarify the role of social cohesion in the formation of community security.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Community Security

Community securityis a programmatic approach that seeks to integrate security and development interventions. It bringstogether a wide range of state and civil society actors to identify the causes of insecurity and developa coordinated response to them at the community level and, thus, create an enabling environment at the nationallevel. It emphasizes participatory assessments, planning and accountability and seeks to improveservice delivery, reduce social exclusion, enhance relations between social groups and strengthendemocratic governance.

As a concept, community security seeks to operationalize human security, human developmentand state-building paradigmsat the local level. This is in line with the Outcome Document of the 2005World Summit in which global leaders recognized that “development, peace and security and humanrights are interlinked and mutually reinforcing” (World Banks,

2003). A number of approaches have been developed to helpimplement these concepts in different contexts, including citizen security, community safety and armedviolence prevention/reduction. These approaches are quite similar and thereare no clear conceptual boundaries between them. In fact, in many contexts, different terminologies areused interchangeably or in tandem (e.g. community safety and security) (Sampson, 2004).

The use of the term 'community security' is not new. It is one of the seven dimensionsof human security highlighted in the 1994 Human Development Report (HDR), which the UNDP (2009) offered an indepth analysis. The report definescommunity security as primarily addressing protection against the breakdown of communities(such as clubs, tribes or extended families) that provide members with a reassuring sense of identityand a shared value system. The HDR saw the protection of ethnic minorities and indigenous groupsas a central focus. Personal security was considered as another dimension of human security andincluded threats from:

a). the state (physical torture).
b). other states (war).
c). other groups of people (ethnic tension).
d). individuals or gangs against other individuals or gangs (crime, street violence).

It also includes threats directed against women, such as rape and domestic violence; threats directed at children based on their vulnerability and dependence (child abuse); threats to self, such as suicide and drug use. The contemporary concept of community security, narrowly defined, includes both group and personalsecurity. The approach focuses at ensuring that communities and their members are 'free from fear'. Yet, abroader contemporary definition also includes action on a wider range of social issues to ensure 'freedomfrom want'.

Community safety and citizen security seek to promote a multi-stakeholder approach that isdriven by an analysis of local needs (Thomas, 2007). In this context, community concept seeks to bridge the gap between the focus on thestate and on the individual. At its core, is the objective of developing effectivestates that are accountable to citizens for the effective delivery of services. A key focus, therefore, is on developinginclusive security that can manage state-society relations by emphasizing 'community'context, community safety and /or citizen security in security delivery. It, therefore, seeks to embrace both cultures and 'individual-oriented' contextsthat are 'group-oriented'.

3.2 Social Cohesion

Social cohesion is an elusive concept - easier to recognize by its absence than by any definition (UNDP, 2009). A lackof social cohesion results in increased social tension, violent crime, targeting of minorities, humanrights violations and, ultimately, violent conflict. Social cohesion is about tolerance of, and respect for,diversity (in terms of religion, ethnicity, economic situation, political preferences, sexuality, gender andage) - both institutionally and individually.While the meaning of social cohesion is contested, the World Banks (2003, p. 43), provides there are two principal dimensions to it:

a). The reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion, and

b). The strengthening of social relations, interactions and ties.

It is important to consider both dimensions in order to get a comprehensive picture of the social

cohesion of a society. For example, a homogenous and cohesive community with strong ties coulddiscriminate against and exclude people from other social backgrounds.The first dimension, therefore, requires developing strategies for engaging excluded groups. Exclusion can takedifferent forms – political, economic, social and cultural. Promoting social inclusion involves tacklingpower relations and confronting the social groups or institutions responsible for the exclusion. Itsobjective is to ensure that people from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities.

There is a strong link between social exclusion and insecurity. Minorities will become more insecure ifthey are being victimized because of their ethnicity, gender, culture or religion. This group's insecuritycan then lead to wider societal insecurity if a marginalized group decides to use violent means to claimtheir rights and redress inequalities. Group differences are not enough in themselves to cause conflict,but social exclusion and horizontal inequalities provide fertile ground for insecurity including violent mobilization. Peoplewho have been excluded often feel they have little to lose by taking violent action. Examples of wheresocial exclusion has been a key factor in group violence include Southern Sudan, Somalia, Northern Uganda, Mali, Northern Ireland, etc (UNDP, 2009).

The second dimension of social cohesion requires developing social capital in all its forms. This is theinvisible glue that keeps a society together even in difficult, stressful times. According to Berger-Schmitt(2000, p.5), strengthening social capitalcan include:

a). Supporting social networks that connect groups together.

b). Developing a common sense of belonging, a shared future vision and a focus on what different socialgroups have in common.
c). Encouraging participation and active engagement by people from different backgrounds.
d). Building trust – people trusting one another and trusting local institutions to act fairly.
e). Fostering respect – developing an understanding of others and recognition of the value of diversity, and
f). Increasing the responsiveness of a state to its citizenry.

Building community cohesion is, therefore, about building better relationships between people from differentbackgrounds including those from new and settled communities. An important area of communitycohesion work is assisting individuals and groups to find consensual strategies or common ground aroundwhich they can work together (World Bank, 2011).The more social networks that exist between diverse communal groups, and the more responsive a stateis to its citizenry, the more likely a society will be cohesive and possess the inclusive mechanisms necessaryfor mediating and managing a conflict before it turns violent.

Improving social cohesion is about both targeted actions and taking account of cohesion in the designand implementation of other interventions.In addition to initiatives specifically designed to enhancesocial cohesion and achieve community security, it is important to view social cohesion as a lens for all programming in crisiscontexts, in a similar way to conflict sensitivity (World bank, 2003). For example, the provision of community security will have a significant impact on cohesion, if it is all embracive and non-discriminatory. It, therefore, strikes semblance with inclusive security. However, community leaders have to know that enhancing security in their community can inadvertentlyincrease insecurity in the neighbouring community, as criminals may decide to relocate from their community to the neighbouring community. In this context, linking neighbouring communities and seeking to build network of citizens security becomes necessary. It provides a forum for security members from the different communities to meet and share strategies and undertake shared activities in security delivery, which could help bridge previous divisions. This could, in turn, leadto a reduction in violence and an increase in security.

Ofcourse in some contexts, cohesive groups may pose serious risks to the security of others, especially where relationship has been marked by feud and long-term misunderstanding. In Taraba state, for instance, despite the long term relationship between the Jukun and the Tiv, there appears to be repeated and incessant conflicts between them, with serious consequences

on security. A social cohesion approach in this situation would involve educatingneighbouring communities about one another, developing projects that link the communities together,addressing underlying inequalitiesand building contact and trust tobreak down negative images of the other community. The aim here would be to transform bondingforms of social capital that can be exclusionary, and often conflictual, into bridging social capital thatlinks the ethnic groups together in an inclusive approach (Ikoh, 2013).

3.3The Benefits of Community Security and Social Cohesion

Community Security and Social Cohesion (CSSC) is grounded in the UNDP concepts ofhuman development and human security (UNDP, 2001). Community security emphasizes theneeds of the community and the importance of bringing together different groups to design commonapproaches to common problems. In this context, "security" rather than "safety"is given importance as a broad concept that also takes into consideration issuessuch as dignity, fear of crime and psychological well-being. 'Social cohesion' is an integral part of theconcept because it highlights the need for a peacebuilding approach based on participation, inclusionand dialogue as well as addressing underlying inequalities.

The CSSC approachprovides a framework for a more integrated programmatic response. It embraces the aspects of the 'freedom from want' agenda that may impact on physicalsecurity. For example, the targeted provision of livelihoods to youth at risk of becoming gang members. The concepts of community security and social cohesion are mutually reinforcing. If communities feelphysically secure, then they are likely to act in more cohesive ways and vice versa. The two concepts can,therefore, be seen as interacting in a virtuous or vicious circle depending on the context.

A key aspect that the social cohesion component brings out is the development of dialogue processesand collective mechanisms to manage disputes and develop solutions to security problems. Tensions anddisagreements are a regular occurrence in crisis communities. The CSSC approach seeks to strengthenthe collective ability to manage these and ensure that they are resolved peacefully without recourse toviolence. This may involve promoting positive societal relationships between different social groups,tackling the barriers that prevent interactions and developing social spaces for the management ofconflict.Integrating social cohesion into community security programmes will also help to ensure that they addressissues of social exclusion that are often the root causes of insecurity. This can involve economic andsocial action to address horizontal inequalities.

Research has shown that communities where residentsfeel engaged and share a belief in the community's capability to act (e.g. to prevent burglary, kidnapping, and collective response to armed robbery attacks and banditry) tend to have lower rates of violence and crime (UNODC, 2007; Bruce,2012). In such communities, strengthening socialnetworks and institutionalizing forums for community input into decision-making can, therefore, leadto enhanced community security.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 4

(i).What is community security?

(ii). How does community security differ from private security?

(iii). What is social cohesion?

(iii). How would social cohesion help in the realization of social capital in your community?

5. CONCLUSION

Security collaboration holds a wide range of benefits for the nation. The maintenance of law and order suggests national stability. In this context, the definition of national security includes what used to be conceived as the protection of the nation against military attacks. However, in contemporary times, national security is widely understood to include non-military dimensions including the security of the nation from terrorism, minimization of crime, economic security, energy security, environmental security, food security, and cyber security. Similarly, national security risks include in addition to the violent activities within the country, action by violent non-state actors (like Boko Haram and ISWAP in Nigeria), narcotic cartels and multinational corporations. Government, therefore, rely on a range of measures including political, economic, and military powers as well as diplomacy to safeguard the security of the nation. Emerging approach on national security has emphasized regional security, and reducing transnational causes of insecurity. This is why this module is devoted to assessing the importance of inclusive security on National security.

An inclusive security seeks to make sure that everyone in the community (the entire ethnic composition) participate in the decision to create security and are, therefore, served in terms of security service delivery. It locates security as a community matter that everyone should be interested. After the explanation of the key concepts, therefore, the benefits of security are explained, with emphasis on what the nations stand to gain when every citizen decide not to take security matter for granted. The module lists the challenges confronting national security

and explained the values of inclusive security. It also explained the outcome of law enforcement partnership for national security, with emphasis on the role of national cohesion for community security.

6.0 SUMMARY

In this unit, emphasis was focused on community security and social cohesion. Although the meaning of social cohesion is contested, two principal dimensions seem to make the meaning clear – the reduction of disparities, inequalities and social exclusion and the strengthening of social relations, interactions and ties. These attributes suggest the building blocks of social capital. When a community has these attributes, the formation of community security becomes easy. A community that is secured suggest a reduction in violence; which is the goal of public and private security partnerships.

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MODULE 5GLOBAL STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES IN SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

INTRODUCTION

Partnerships between the public and private security sectors are frequently being acknowledged as providing synergetic effect on crime prevention. This module considers both the potential benefits and risks of partnerships, by reporting empirical evidences on diverse partnership projects across the world, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia, most of which have demonstrated large reductions in target crimes.

Despite the fact that private and public security operate on quite different principles (public versus private interests), a collaboration between them seem to provide an enhanced scope for wide security delivery with significant benefits to diverse stakeholders. The expectation of this module is to enable you to:

1. appreciatethe various types of public and private security partnerships as practiced around the world;
2. understand and recognise the benefits derived from public and private security partnerships;
3. initiate public and private security partnerships for a community when the need arises.

The module is structured into four units, viz:

Unit 1: Security partnerships in practice,

Unit 2: Security collaborations around the world,

Unit 3: Public – private security partnerships for cyber and financial crimes, and

Unit 4: Public-private security partnerships for terrorism preventions,

Unit 1: SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS IN PRACTICE

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The growth of private security has been attributed to a large number of factors, including increased litigation and workplace safety legislation, both of which place increased obligations on property and business owners to protect customers and visitors. Improvements in security technology have been another factor(Pastor, 2003). However, the main driver of

growth in private security is arguably the steep increases in crime experienced in many countries beginning from the 1960s. It is being worsened today with the addition of terrorism. Other scholars have also blamed risingprosperity and freedom (van Dijk 2008). The much lower costs of security guards, vis-à-vis police, and the launching of technologies such as intruder alarms and CCTV are also major attractors.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

The objective of this unit is to let the student understand the:

1. factors that encourage the formation of private security outfits;
2. cultural differences between public and private security organizations; and
3. issues that make public and private security partnerships attractive.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Factors That Encourage Private Security Formation

Increasing crime rates and the failure of traditional policing is said to have influenced local communities and urban neighbourhood to get organised for crime prevention. In some countries like Britain, United States, and Australia, where security provisions used to be exclusively the business of government, increase in crime rates and general insecurity forced government to change its stand on security strategy from reliance on public security exclusively, to invitation of private involvement, including joint operations. The local response frequently involves the outsourcing of security to private contractors as well as outright collaborations (Wilson & Sutton 2003).

In the argument of van Dijk (2008), the emergence of the culture of ‘securitisation’ or ‘self-protection’ (Sarre & Prenzler 2011) signalled the recognition of the limits of public policing and the need for tailor-made security. Securitisation and self-protection are not intrinsically private sector phenomena. Any government department or project – such as public housing – can self-manage their security, including employing security officers and installing security equipment. ‘Pluralisation’ of policing,thus, becomesa more appropriate description of changes in policing, including growth in the number of public sector specialist policing and regulatory agencies. In all these, private security has become a key player in security delivery, largely because of its size and its specialisations. In some countries, especially the emerging economies and new democracies with significant crime problems, private security personnel substantially outnumber public police. Despite some convergence of roles, it appears currently that private security is still largely focused on providing a preventive

presence, while police have a more dominant role in arrests, investigations and prosecutions, including interdictions in crisis situations (Pastor 2003).

The growth of private security has led to calls for greater co-operation with police and for formal public-private partnerships (Golsby & O'Brien 1996). This is inspite of the numerous obstacles to a closer working relationship that scholars have acknowledged. For instance, public and private security officers operate on fundamentally opposing interests. While the public police officers have a duty to serve the public equally on the basis of needs, the private security providers are, for the most part, obliged only to their employers or principals. The public security officer can be a government law enforcement officer, like the police, Civil Defence , Traffic warden, etc, while the private security officer, may be an employee of a private security organization. Where security collaborations require them to work together on a kind of contractual arrangements, that require police-like duties to the public, their basis of engagement may remain selective.

3.2The Cultural Differences Between public and Private Security

Shearing, Stenning &Addario (1985) identified some significant cultural differences between the public and private security groups . For instance, the Police has, generally, looked down on private guards and investigators as less professionaldespite some high skill levels in private security (some of whom are retired army officers and police officers and men). This situation derives, in part, from the lower training, selection and salary standards that generally apply to private security officers. Despite these problems, the calls for greater cooperation continue, based largely on a shared mission for crime prevention and the idea of a public interest benefits from private security operations. For example, the greater ubiquity of security guards and surveillance technology means that direct lines of communication and sharing of intelligence between police and private security should improve the speed of interdictions and arrest of offenders.

There are some research evidences also, indicating that collaborations between informal and formal security organizations have helped to checkmate insecurity in both urban and rural areas, whether in the developed or developing countries (Kimani,2009; Gainer, 2014). As a Spanish study (Gimenez-Salinas 2004) revealed, the police and private security could productively work together on a routine basis; in this case through a communications coordination room, in relation to procedures such as licence checks on suspect vehicles,

information about suspect persons, recovery of stolen vehicles, back-up assistance to security officers, and intelligence about organised crime.

In the advent of terrorism and wide insecurity around the world, the need for basic labour-intensive front-line measures against criminals and offenders have become more critical than before. Security collaborations have become more intensive and demanding. The remaining part of this module is dedicated to showing some context-specific security operations and usefulness of the different security collaborations in curbing crime.

4.0 **SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 1**

Explain the perceived differences that public and private security officers must overcome if effective security collaborations are to be realized in Nigeria.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The growth of private security has been explained by different scholars with reasons ranging from increased criminality to emerging violence associated with terrorism. In the face of high incident of crime, it has become increasingly difficult for public security to tackle these crimes alone and still pay attention to the maintenance of peace and order as well as daily infraction with moor offences. Many countries that, hitherto, did not consider security delivery as a private concern suddenly changed their security strategies and policies to include partnership with private security organizations. Though security collaborations have proved effective in security delivery, studies have revealed that private security is still largely focused on providing preventive security while public security have more dominant roles in arrests, investigations and prosecutions, as well as interdictions in crisis situations (Pastor 2003).

6.0 SUMMARY

Two related issues were examined in this unit. They include factors that encourage private security formation and cultural differences between public and private security. The rise in security formation is attributed to both negative and positive factors. The positive factors include the rise in wealth and or prosperity of the citizens and the need to protect the wealth from criminals and vandals. The other negative causative factor is associated with the rise in the levels of poverty, greed and criminality as well as mal-governance. The rising levels of crime pose challenges on how to curb it. There is increasing evidence that collaborations

between informal and formal security organizations arehelping to checkmate insecurity in both developed and developing countries.

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UNIT 2: SECURITY COLLABORATIONS AROUND THE WORLD.

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The reasons for collaboration between public and private security organizations for the purpose of security delivery differ around the world. In Europe for instance, the Confederation of European Security Services (CoESS, 2010)released a discussion paper that set guidelines for critical infrastructure security and protection, and urged the commencement of public-private partnership. While the guideline seeks *to* promote security partnership beyond basic counter-terrorism operations, the United States Department of Justice, urged the engagement of private sector security principally for homeland security. From available indications, targeting terrorism was going to require private security operatives' engagement outside American soil, whereas the CoESS seeks to limit their engagement to internal or homeland security. For the Americans, the coordinated Islamic terrorist attack of 9/11 at the World Trade Centre in 2001, was a wake-up call to bring both public and private security experts together to ensure not only protection for Americans, both at home and abroad, but also American friends and regional security.

Although there is no evidence that Nigeria involved private security companies during the military engagement in Liberia, and recently in the Gambia to restore peace, America involved private security companies along with American soldiers during their engagement in

Bosnia, and in the on-going operation to stabilise Iraq after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

The specific objective of this unit is to expose you to:

1. Different security collaborations involving public and private security organizations around the world; and
2. Enables you to understand different security partnerships based on the circumstances.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1Venue and Mass Transit Security (Sydney Olympic 2000)

Venue and Mass Transit Security (VMTS) collaboration was first experimented during the Olympic Games held in Sydney in 2000. The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games, which preceded it, had become something of a watershed after the event was marred by the 'Centennial Olympic Park bombing', with scores of deaths and injuries. The bombing triggered criticisms of the cooperative security arrangements that were put in place, including allegations of poor communications and inadequate personnel standards. It was necessary to avoid a repeat of the Atlanta experience, so Venue and Mass-transit security collaborations were put together for the Sydney Games. It involved collaborations between public and private security companies with distinctive division of labour, and protocols for cooperation between them.

The lessons learnt were evident in the 2000 Sydney Olympics, which proved a high point in the effective deployment of diverse security services. The New South Wales Police Service had overall command, with approximately 4,000 security officers working a combined total of 27,000 shifts along with private security personnel drawn from private security companies and security volunteers over a two-week period free of adverse incidents (Sarre & Prenzler 2011).

As it is evidence elsewhere, many major sporting events have been marred by riots, brawls and assaults, related to poor security and police management. At present, venue security, involving public and private security collaborations, is becoming increasingly effective with police officers adopting a back-up role to security personnel in situations requiring the application of criminal law. Closer planning between police and security is also more evident, with review and feedback procedures, significant use of CCTV and plain clothes 'spotters' to remove troublemakers, better use of point-of-entry bag searches to exclude contraband, and

the useof shared intelligence databases. Equally, venue security has been used to curb many alcohol-related violence at clubs and pubs. Venue and mass-transit security are arguably becoming the the most obvious crime prevention partnerships for most people.

3.2The United Kingdom Case Studies

The United Kingdom has seen considerable innovation and experimentation in crime prevention partnerships, with particular success in burglary reduction. Some examples are given here:

3.2.1 The Safer Merseyside Partnership

In the Safer Merseyside Partnership (SMP), public and private security personnel came together on the request of 105 business firms to provide security delivery. The public law enforcement officers decided to embark on free security audits and advice, while the private security companies offered subsidised security. The audit report made suggestions on what the business firms should do to enhance security. Some businesses improved lighting, while others were told to install 'target hardening' devices, such as window locks and roller shutters. The survey carried out after the intervention revealed that among participating business firms, attempted burglaries had declined from 49% to 25%. Successful burglaries were reduced from 31% to 13%, with an overall 58% reduction in offences. No significant changes were recorded in offences against non-participating business firms (Sarre & Prenzler, 2011).

3.2.2 The Leicester Small Business and Crime Initiative

The Leicester Small Business and Crime Initiative (LSBCPI)was initiated with focus on reducing repeat commercial burglaries in Leicester. The initiative was managed by a committee that included members of the City Council, Police and Chamber of Commerce and was funded by a charity trust.

Like the Safer Merseyside Partnership project, the first plan of action was to carry out security audits by a project officer following a police burglary report. A mix of security measures was recommended, including alarms and CCTV. Portable alarms were shared with other premises once risk periods for repeat offences had expired. Silent alarms were selected with a view to capturing and incapacitating offenders after research found numerous offenders could complete a burglary after the activation of an audible alarm. The project resulted in very few arrests but offences in the target areas were reduced by 41% from the year before the project to the final year of evaluation (Kimani, 2009).

3. 3 The Dutch Case Studies

The Netherlands has also been a leader in the area of formal crime prevention partnerships, with particular success in commercial burglary. The Department of Crime Prevention in the Dutch Ministry of Justice adopted a policy of initiating and supporting partnerships (van den Berg 1995). A three-step process involved:

(1) a feasibility study of potential sites (including profiling the crime problem and gauging business support);

(2) developing site-specific plans, establishing a coordinating committee, selecting a security company and signing a master contract; and

(3) implementing the plan, typically through operationalising on-site security and police alarm responses. Examples of the security collaborations are explained below.

3.3.1 The Enschede-Haven Project (EHP)

In 1980, the Area Entrepreneur Association of the Dutch, Enschede-Haven industrial, had requested the police to provide increased patrolsto counter criminal activity in the industrial area housing more than 410 companies (van den Berg, 1995). The police produced a crime profile for the area and suggested a partnership arrangement in which they supported private security patrols. The Association established a cooperative with membership from the majority of the 410 companies on the site, and police set up a Project Agency to coordinate the work of the Cooperative, the police and the local government. Further assistance was provided by a government employment agency which subsidised the appointment of unemployed people as security guards, with training provided by police. The key element of the project was the stationing of a security guard on the estate outside business hours, who checked alarm activations before contacting the police. The local council also improved lighting and the amenity of the area, while signage about the project was designed to deter would-be offenders.

A formal evaluation of the Enschede-Haven project found that security incidents were reduced by 72%, from 90 per month in the 18 months before the project to 25 per month in the 18 months after it was established. The partnership continued as a self-funded project once the initial subsidy had expired (van den Berg, 1995). A similar project on the Dutch Vianen Industrial Site saw commercial burglary reduced by 52% from 75 incidents in the year before the project to 36 in the year after the project's commencement. All crime incidents were reduced by 41% from 133 to 78 (Van den Berg 1995).

3.4Australian Case Studies

Australia has also been the site of various experiments in public-private partnerships. The following four case studies demonstrate some of the potential diversity of partnerships, and successes and failures that relate, in part, to differing implementation strategies and evaluation methods.

3.4.1 Perth 'Eyes on the Street'

The 'Eyes on the Street' isdesigned as a crime prevention initiative involving working partnerships between the Western Australia Police, local governments, businesses and the security industry. The program primarily involves local businesses and staff in gathering and reporting information to police (Crime Research Centre). Partners receive training in recording and reporting suspicious persons or events. Reports are made to an 'Eyes on the Street' team, who then follow up the report, typically through police action. Regular feedback is provided to the partners to ensure they are kept motivated to continue to report incidents.

The program is widely promoted by displaying the 'Eyes on the Street' logo on vehicles and shop windows. Advertising is designed to encourage participation, deter offenders and stimulate feelings of safety. Security personnel (both public and private) are considered key players. They require less training, are more likely to recognise and report relevant incidents and provide more detailed and useful information in their reports. The private security personnel have the option of either reporting to an "Eyes on the Street"team or directly to the police.

In 2007, the program included over 100 participating organisations, with over 4,000 employees and over 500 vehicles branded with the 'Eyes on the Street' logoattributed to Eyes on the Street intelligence. A formal evaluation of the program found strong support from participants but no objective evidence of a crime reduction effect. The evaluation report concluded that in order for a more comprehensive quantitative evaluation to be conducted, a 'controlled' implementation of the (Eyes on the Street) program would need to be undertaken by selecting an area in which to implement the program, and making a crime rate comparison over a specific time period with a demographically similarly controlled area, while attempting to control as many other factors as possible.

3.4.2 Ipswich Safe City Programme

The Ipswich (Queensland) Safe City Programme was established in 1994 in response to an upsurge in alcohol-related crime and disorder, mainly in the city centre (City of Ipswich,

2010). The program is centred on a CCTV system managed twenty-four hours a day, and seven days a week (24-7) by a contracted security firm. The monitoring facility is linked by radio to security officers and police on the beat, as well as connecting with other security firms, the police operations centre and other services. By 2010 the program had a network of 181 cameras extending beyond the city centre to neighbouring suburbs and potential hotspots for crimes such as bikeways and bus stops.

The programme invests heavily in the latest technology with pan, tilt and zoom camera functions, high picture definition and full digital recording and archiving. Live feeds can be transmitted to the main police radio room. The programme includes a crime prevention through environmental design (CPTED) advisory service for businesses. Apart from law enforcement interdictions, the programme also provides welfare referrals for young people, drug affected persons and missing persons.

The Safe City Program is 'widely recognised as one of the best public-private security partnerships anywhere in Australia (ASIAL, 2010), and as 'the benchmark for a fully integrated crime prevention programme that is not solely reliant on cameras and utilises a co-ordinated approach of all agencies" (Gimenez-Salinas,2004, p. 24). It receives numerous visits from interested parties across Australia and overseas. Over the years, a number of successes have been linked to the programme, including directly leading to 5,475 arrests from 1994 to 2008. Research evidence also revealed a reduction in crime by 78% over the last 15 years (Cowan, 2010).

3.4.3 Strike Force Piccadilly 1

Strike Force Piccadilly was a New South Wales Police initiative designed to address an upsurge in ram raids targeting automatic teller machines (ATMs) in the greater Sydney area beginning in 2005. Participants in the programme included industry stakeholders, security managers from the Australian Bankers' Association, the Shopping Centre Council of Australia, cash-in-transit firms and the ATM Industry Association.

The consultation and development process began with a large forum and was followed by smaller meetings. All stakeholders were engaged in different prevention efforts. The consultation process allowed for a coordinated approach and led to the implementation of six main strategies, including:

a). The introduction of a police 1-800 phone hotline. Alarm monitoring companies would only use the system when two or more alarms in a multiple alarm system would indicate a very high probability of a ram raid in progress. Police made the calls a priority (subject to triage) and despatched patrol cars with sirens and lights. In most cases, this closed off the offenders' window of opportunity.

b. Companies were engaged in development and installation of cut-resistant and ramming-resistant bollards - internal bollards around machines; and other technologies for securing ATMs, such as shock absorbing base plates.

c). Companies relocated machines to areas inaccessible to vehicles wherever possible.

d). Police developed and disseminated a risk assessment and reduction tool, which included information on many of the measures at b and c above.

e). Police also made available Crime Prevention Officers to carry out risk assessments and make recommendations for security upgrades.

f). Regular intelligence reports were circulated by e-mail with detailed data on factors associated with successful and unsuccessful raids, and contributions about prevention measures from all stakeholders.

An evaluation report (Prenzler, 2009) found that the project was highly successful in its core mission. The initial increase in ATM ram raids was halted, and the number was reduced from 69, in the 12 months before the nine-month intervention implementation period, to 19 in the final 12 months of the post-intervention period. This represented a 72% reduction in incidents. For the same periods, successful raids (where cash was obtained) were reduced from 30 down to one, representing a 97% reduction.

3.4.4 Strike Force Piccadilly 2

Following the success of *Strike Force Piccadilly I*, criminals attacking ATM machines changed tactics to a new type of crime threat. Gas attacks, sometimes called 'bam raids', were introduced. It involves pumping accelerant gases into an ATM and then setting the gases alight, resulting in an explosion intended to provide access to the cash canister. This type of trick was probably copied from methods reported in the Netherlands. In July 2008, the Strike Force Piccadilly was restructured as Strike Force Piccadilly 2, primarily in response to the upsurge in gas attacks. The strategies adopted by Strike Force Piccadilly 1 were maintained, including participant meetings, along with the introduction of gas detection devices by ATM operators and the rapid enlargement of police personnel.

A category of ‘gas attack’ was introduced into the Strike Force Piccadilly database after the first incident recorded in March 2008. The attacks peaked from 2008 to 2009, including 19 attacks in November 2008. The detection equipment normally triggered:

(1) a back-to-base alarm that alerted police on the priority response system,

(2) an audible alarm and release of smoke designed to act as deterrents, and

(3) the release of a gas that mixed with the explosive gas making it inoperable.

Strike Force staff were increased from six to 50 during the peak of operations, including detectives, intelligence analysts and forensic specialists. An evaluation report showed that across 14 months, there was a 91% reduction in all gas attacks from a 54 in the first 12 months to 5 in the final 12 months. For the same periods, successful attacks were reduced by 100% from 22 to zero.

Summary of the Case Studies

Although the case studies of the public-private partnership studies in the foregoing paragraphs revealed the successes in security delivery in each of the partnership, at least with respect to the objective of the security collaborations, there exist weaknesses that may have been encountered. What is important, however, is the reduction in crime and hence, the achievement of the objectives attributable to the sharing of resources, knowledge, skills and information across a range of public and private sector participants. The summary of process evaluation data indicates that the following factorswere important for successful partnerships:

a). A common interest in reducing a specific crime or crime set,

b). Effective leadership, with personnel with authority from each partner organisation driving participation,

c). Mutual respect,

d). Information sharing based on high levels of trust in confidentiality,

e). Formal means of consultation and communication; such as committees, forums and e-mail networks,

f). Willingness to experiment and consider all ideas,

g). Formal contractual relationships are not always essential,

h). Additional legal powers are not always necessary on the security side, and

i). Data-rich projects appear more likely to generate effective interventions and demonstrate success.

3.5 Possible Operation Lessons

Given records of successes in public-private security partnerships, the police and other government authorities in Nigeria should seek to reduce crime in their jurisdictions by introducing possible partnerships with the private sector. Once potential sites are identified, a coordinating committee will most likely organize diagnostic research, the development and implementation of strategies and protocols for cooperation, and oversighting contracts. The committee should make an early commitment to systematic process and impact evaluations across all aspects of a project, including a financial cost-benefit assessment. Governments should also consider providing startup funds and subsidizing security upgrades for participating partners, especially in high-risk economically deprived areas.

A number of other strategies can be developed to enhance cooperation with private security, including developing alarm response protocols, educating police about crime prevention and private security partnerships, and improving security industry professionalism. Partnerships can also be facilitated by local governments establishing crime prevention units with specialist staff using the Divisional Police Officers (DPOs), to curb crime in the rural areas of the country.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 2

(i). By looking at the different public-private security partnership practices around the world, what would you say were the strengths brought by private security personnel to the partnership?

(ii), What factors account for the achievement of the overall objective of the security collaborations during the Sydney Olympic of 2000?

5.0 CONCLUSION

As observed in the different security collaborations scenario, none of the collaborations was carried out without prior security scanning of the environment, and consultations with the intending partners. It suggests that, at the onset of the partnership, every partner knows what his or her duties, and what the expectations are. Everyone, therefore, carried out his or her duties in partnership with the other to get the desired result. Public and private security

partnerships, therefore, involves common interest, effective leadership, mutual respect, information sharing as well as the willingness to experiment and consider ideas.

6.0 SUMMARY

This unit uncovers the international best practices in the field of public and private security collaborations. Several types of collaborations were discussed in the unit with the different techniques adopted to implement them, as well as the results achieved. The whole purpose is to enable you to understand what to do at the initial stage of security scanning and who to consult for the purpose of assembling interested security parties and other personnel needed for security collaborations to tackle the identified problems.

For further clarifications, examples of security collaborations were drawn from the US, UK, Australia, and the Netherlands. In the references recommended for further reading , the student will learn more of the practices and the techniques adopted.

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UNIT 3 PUBLIC–PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS FOR CYBER AND FINANCIAL CRIMES

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Cyber security is emerging as one of the most challenging aspects of security for Criminologists, business officials and governments at all levels. Ithas serious implications for national security, the economy, human rights, civil libertiesand international legal frameworks. Although scholars have been aware of thethreats of cyber insecurity since the early years of internet technology, anxietyabout the difficulties in resolving or addressing them has increased rather than being abated. In response, many governments around the world have begun to develop national cyber-securitystrategies to outline the ways in which they intend to address cyber insecurity. Inmany countries -where critical infrastructural systems in areas such as utilities, financeand transport have been privatized -governments have tended to heavily rely on ‘public–private partnership’ as a key mechanism to mitigate

cyber security threats. For instance, in the United States and United Kingdom,public–private partnerships have repeatedly been referred to as the ‘cornerstone’or ‘hub’ of cyber-security strategy. National security threats have now extended from the land to the sea, air and cyber space.

‘Cyber security’ is almost as broad and indistinct a term as ‘security’ itself;and there are a number of reasons for this. First, the implications of internettechnology are highly diverse because they penetrate many critical systems andpractices on multiple levels. Cyber security is used to refer to the integrity of ourpersonal privacy online, the security of our critical infrastructure, electroniccommerce, military threats and the protection of intellectual property. Theseareas range extremely widely and are united only by the technology with whichthey engage. Cybersecurity is,therefore,not just a national requirement, but also of global interest, which has been recognised at the UNand actioned by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) with the deployment of an InternationalMultilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats. The creation of the ITU IMPACT Global SecurityOperations Centre in Cyberjaya provides the ability to monitor and coordinate response globally to cyberthreats and attacks.Cybercrime is a major issue nationally and globally, and therefore, needs security partnership to curb it.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

The objective of this unit is to further expose you to international best practices on public and private security partnerships but with specific focus on security partnerships on cyber security. At the end of this unit you will be able to:

1. familiarise with the strategies adopted by different countries to curb cybercrime;
2. understand US and UK cybercrime security collaborations;
3. identify the New Zealand meta governance strategies on cyber security;
4. compare cybersecurity partnerships and the one most suitable for Nigeria; and
5. comprehend other recommended strategies that can enhance the achievement of cyber security collaborations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Efforts to Curb Cyber Security

Many countries have adopted public–private partnership in their national cybersecurity. However, the approach is multifaceted with diverse relations with internet serviceproviders (ISPs), multinational information corporations (Google, Facebook, etc.),private cyber-

security firms, promoters of human and civil rights, law enforcementagencies and civil society organizations. Within the relevant policy documents,and within the cyber-security discourse generally, the public–private partnershipsis treated as a single entity, thus ignoring the complexity involved. The core focus in the strategies adopted is on the relationshipbetween the government and the owners/operators of critical infrastructure. The rationale is that while many other aspects of cyber security are regardedas linked to the national interest, critical infrastructure protection is unequivocallyand intrinsically linked to national security.

Critical infrastructure isdefined as "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital tothe nation that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact onnational security, national economic security, national public health or safety, orany combination of those matters" (Obama, 2009: p. 4).The protection of critical infrastructure becomes very important because, in many countries, the practice of privatization had shifted key government institutions and parastatals into the hands of private collective ownership, such as sewage management, water, electricity, communication, banking, and transport, etc. These critical infrastructureshave links with cyber security. By the timethe new millennium arrived in 2000, some 85 per cent of critical infrastructureswere already in private hands. With privatization came an increased discretion on the partof those managing the infrastructure in the choice of systems and technology to control these utilities and industries, and many of them had moved from proprietary. In explaining the international best practices observed in the public-private cyber security partnerships, two case studies are presented here: the United States and Britain (which seem to have shared policy), and New Zealand Government.

3.2The US and UK Cyber Security Strategies

The Obamaadministration's first National Security Strategy in 2010 elevated the internet tothe position of 'strategic national asset' and declared that protecting it was now a'national security priority' (Obama, 2010). Similarly, the UK Cyber Security Strategy states that it is the'effective functioning of cyber space' that is of vital importance. It argues that achieving the goal of a safe, secure internet will 'require everybody,the private sector, individuals and government to work together" (Home Office UK (2004, p. 7). It suggests that just as the citizens all benefit from the use of cyberspace, so do they all have a responsibility to helpprotect it. With specific reference to the role of the private sector, it states thatthere is an expectation that private-sector entities will 'work in partnerships witheach other, Government and law enforcement agencies, to share information andresources, that can transform the

response to a common challenge, and actively deterthe threats the citizens face in cyberspace" (White, (2010).

The two strategies (US and Britain) tend to introducesome conflation of ideas about cyber security. In addition to being anobject to be protected, the internet is also seen as the source of threats (from criminals and die-hard terrorists) and the mechanism through which those threats can be addressed. It is therefore clear in these strategies that the network itself is a primaryreference object for conceptions of security. It is the security of the *technology* itself,as well as the security of those who use the technology, that concerns the USand UK governments here; and the two forms of security are linked. The citizens, business and government can enjoy the full benefits of a safe, secure and resilientcyber space if only it is protected. The technology, therefore, becomes an artefact to be protected and an asset essentialto broader state security.

The National cyber-security strategies tend to explicitly identify the actors from whomthreats are expected to emerge: criminals, terrorists and hostile states.Beyond articulating some conceptions of the actors that pose a threat in cyberspace,there are two main areas of concern that dominate the US and UK nationalcyber-security strategies - the economy andcritical infrastructure protection - and these arealso the primary focus of the public–private partnerships.

3.2.1 The Joint Money Laundering IntelligenceTaskforce (JMLIT)

The Joint Money laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) is a public–private partnership dedicated to collaborations in order to enhancethe national response to financial crimes. By October, 2015, the UK National Risk Assessment of MoneyLaundering and Terrorist Financing, had indicated that 'money laundering represented a significant threat to the UK's national security, citing the UN figures to conclude that the best available international estimate of amounts laundered globally would be equivalent to some 2.7% of global GDP or US$1.6 trillion in 2009 (Rosemont, 2016). In order to curb this ugly development, the UK government launched the JMLIT in October, 2015. The general objective of the JMLIT was to improve intelligencesharing arrangements to aid the fight against money laundering. Specifically, the JMLIT has four specific operational priorities, including understanding and disrupting the funding flows linked to:

a). bribery and corruption.

b). trade-based money laundering.

c). organised immigration crimes
and human trafficking, and
d). Understanding key terrorist financing methodologies (led by the National TerroristFinancial Investigation Unit in the Metropolitan Police Service).

Thus, the emphasis of the JMLIT has been to establish an effective *operational* information sharingmechanism. The collaborative manner in which the JMLIT worked to achieve its aim was highly innovative, ifnot unprecedented. Initially planned only as a twelve-month pilot project, it remains striking how,from the beginning, it was conceived as a fully inclusive, multi-stakeholder initiative, comprisingmultiple government agencies, banks and other organisations. The numerous entities involvedin the initiative are listed in table3.2.1.

Table 3.2.1 JMLIT Participants.

Government/Law	**Government/Law**	**Government/Law**
Home Office	20 major UK and international banks, including: Barclays; Santander; Standard Chartered; RBS; HSBC; BNP Paribas; Citigroup; Nationwide; Lloyds	British Bankers' Association
National Crime Agency		Cifas
City of London		
Financial Conduct Authority		
HM Revenue and custom		Post Office

Source:Home Office (2015). Anti-money laundering taskforce&jointmoney laundering intelligence taskforce (JMLIT), p. 13

Drawing on the participation of these multiple contributors, the early evidence suggests thatthe JMLIT has been of considerable benefit to the UK's anti-money laundering efforts. Accordingto evaluation report from government, the JMLIT has directly contributed to law enforcement operations,including eleven arrests and restraints of £558,144 of criminal funds, as well as identifying over 1,700 bank accounts linked to suspected criminal activities.

3.2.2 Cyber-securityInformation Sharing Partnership (CISP).

TheCyber-security Information Sharing Partnership(CISP)is a joint collaborative initiative between industryand government in the United Kingdom to share cyber threats and vulnerability information, in order to increase overall situationalawareness of the cyber threats and, thereby, identify the risks to reduce the impact upon UKbusiness.The CISP was launched in March 2013, with the aim of sharing information between the public and private sectors, and, by so doing, build a community of public and private partners, which can pool information oncyber threats and increase it'svisibility for mutual benefit. In order to

strengthen the CISP initiative, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, held a “tea party” on the 14thof February 2011 at 10 Downing Street with ‘the heads of some of the largest companies from all sectors of the UKeconomy to discuss the cyber threats and shared interests. The need to access and share intelligence information of cyber threats was stressed. For the first time, a new secured, virtual collaborative environment that can allow government, including theSecurity Service, the National Crime Agency and industry partners to exchange informationon threats and vulnerabilities was agreed upon. The meeting, thus, helped to generate stronger situationalawareness of the cyber security threats affecting the UK than had previously been the case.

Evaluation report revealed that the CISP has helped to buildtrust, foster collaborations and encouraged the sharing of information to develop the situationalawareness of cybercrimes in Britain. Numerous benefits were cited by the report. For instance, in 2014, members of CISP were informed each day of ‘215,000 abused IPaddresses, so they [could] be blocked or dealt with’. The CISP was also ‘heavily used’ during a majorexercise on cyber threats conducted by the financial services sector known as ‘Waking SharkII’. The ensuing report highlighted ‘the value of the facility in identifying and responding to acyber-event’. Perhaps, more importantly, CISP has helped to mitigate actual and specific threats.For example, it was directly involved in tackling the ‘Heartbleed’ vulnerability which enabledthe theft of data from devices hosting the open-source software library (OpenSSL), whichwas identified in the first half of 2014. The CISP was able to rapidly warn members of the threats, providingsignatures that could be used to detect abuse (Rosemont, 2016).

3.3New ZealandMeta-Governance

The New Zealand Government took an important step in 2008 to ensure a competitive telecommunications that is well regulated through a set of Standard TermsDeterminations (STD). The STD states the required level of performance for regulated services,through a highly effective form of public-private partnerships, in which regulatory instruments are used toachieve the required government outcomes, known as meta-government.

Meta-government can be defined as an “indirect form of top-down governance that is exercised by influencingprocesses of self-governance through various modes of coordination such as framing, facilitation andnegotiation" (Shore, 2011, p. 3). This concept provides a flexible and coherent way to establish a collaboration between public andprivate actors. It requires minimum degree of regulation from government but brings enough rigour

forgovernment to be assured of industry self-regulation. The meta-government provides three approaches for public and private actors tocollaborate. These are Meta-governance of identities, Hands-off meta-governance and Hands-on meta-governance. Each is further elaborated below.

3.3.1**Meta-governance of identities:**Meta-governance of identities requires definition of the tasks andresponsibilities to provide a clear statement as to why assistance is required from the private sector,what tasks need to be done and which organisation is responsible for delivering the outcome. Then, thegoals and expectations of the private sector owners are defined, and the government must gaincommitment from the private sector through the development of a clear link between the well-being ofsociety and the private sector's success – a close match to the *common good* form of public-privatepartnerships. This link will then cultivate a more collaborative criticalinfrastructure partnership between government and industry.

3.3.2Hands-off meta-governance: In this type of partnership, governments indirectly influence the partnership by changing the environment. There are threeways in which hands-off meta governance can be achieved: coordination, facilitation, and stimulation.

Coordination can be done by establishing cross-sectoral advisory boards for Critical InfrastructureProtection partnerships that serves as platforms for coordination between different partnerships.

Facilitation is used to support existing partnerships and enables them to work efficiently by creating apartnership-friendly environment. Governments can promote them, advise them (e.g., by creatinggeneral frameworks for interaction or by developing model agreements) and, sometimes, grantexemptions from laws that impede private collaborations.

Finally, **stimulation** is the way governmentsprovide economic or social incentive plans to increase private sector participation. This spans thevoluntary and incentivised adoption (where government gives advantage to suppliers who havesatisfied some partnership obligations) points.

3.3.3Hands-on meta-governance: This approach is similar to the traditionalconcept of direct public-private partnerships and focuses on public sector participation in highlyspecialised partnerships by facilitating and administering the collaborative work themselves. The resultis that government is able to monitor and influence private sector activity, lower participation costs,neutralise conflicts among private partners and stabilise the overall arrangement. It is

regarded as the most effective way for governments toensure that the private sector acts in the public interest.

While hand-on meta governance canbe an effective approach, there are shortcomings. One is the role that government playsboth as participant andregulatory body, which can lead to a lack of trust. A second shortcoming arises from the need to haveall players involved in an area represented in the individual partnerships, where the resultant size ofpartnership groups can compromise their effectiveness and efficiency.

Each of these three meta-governance approaches has its advantages and disadvantages. While they areindependent, they can sometimes overlap with each other, but generally they bring enough policy coherencewithout losing flexibility in the partnership models for critical infrastructures. Government, therefore, adopts the flexibility to allow harmonious industrial policy by ensuring that businesses deploying electronic services do soresponsibly and not to undermine the Government 's advocate role. A coherent critical infrastructurepolicy requires a clear strategy and communication (meta-governance of identities) and a direct engagement ofpublic actors in partnerships with the private sector where it is necessary and possible (hands-on meta-governance).In the case where the latter is not possible, governments throw in theirinfluence by providing adequate environment to ensure that all involved organizations act in concert (hands-off meta-governance).

3.4Model of National Cybersecurity Partnership

The achievement of cybersecurity at the national level needs to be more robust and be based on a more formalmodel of public-private partnerships than has been the case with past critical infrastructure programmes. Shore (2011) have suggested an enhanced model of public-private partnershipsof cyber security that provides a rich governance taxonomy against which therequirements for national cybersecurity can be mapped. By reviewing each area of the cybersecurity requirementwith this taxonomy, the most appropriate form of governance for each can be derived to provide a structuredpartnership model.

One of the key factors for making sure that the outcome of this mapping will be effective is toensure a clear focus on the drivers for the private sector where necessary, which can enhance delivery outcomes.This is because each option for a public-private partnership activity has its pros and cons. These are shown in table 3.4 togetherwith a description of the kind of activities that are appropriate for each approach.

Table 3.4: Enhanced public-private partnerships model for Cyber security

Option	Pros	Cons	Usage
Market Forces	Reduced lifecycle cost • More efficient allocation of risk • Faster implementation • Revenue driven • Balances demand and supply	Requires effective competition • Hard for government tosteer privatepartners • Maximizing company profitsmay result inreduced focus onsecurity • No transparency	Where there is a need fortechnological development tomeet market driven needs
Common good	May improve Companyreputation	Acting in thepublic good is anoverhead cost • Outcomes arehard to define	Where the company has agood record of providingpublic interest services, and can gain benefit from thatposture
Voluntary regulation	Flexible collaboration • Avoids potentially higher cost of regulation	May result in insufficient commitment • Voluntary regulation is an overhead cost • Outcomes are hard to define	Where there is a reasonable expectation that the companywill honour its commitmentto a credible level of adoption
Incentivised Adoption (Focus Groups)	Could avoid costs • Could identify new business opportunities • Could improve service quality	May involve none Coreactivity and divert attention from corebusiness • May not drive sufficient revenue to cover cost	Useful where there is anopportunity to improveinnovation and/or competitiveness, and wheregovernment can contributeintellectual value.
Incentivised Adoption (Cost Reduction)	Reduce cost • Could improve service quality	May involve none coreactivity and divert attention from corebusiness • May not drive sufficient revenue to cover costs	Useful where the activity is inline with strategy
Incentivised Adoption (Revenue Retention/Increase)	May drive new business • Could improve service quality	May involve none coreactivity and divert attentionfrom corebusiness • May not drive sufficient revenue to cover costs	Useful where the activity is inline with strategy and willdeliver improved marketshare in a strategic targetarea
Direct Influence	Ability to drive the rightoutcome	Not a cultural fit	May be used where regulationis the alternative and

			privateindustry is prepared tosacrifice some decisionmaking for costavoidance
Regulated (Licensing)	Competitiveness enhancement	Additional costand effort toestablish andretain license	Useful where there iscompetition sufficient formarket forces to drive theinterest, but where there is aneed for additional controlover quality of service
Regulated (Standards)	Guaranteed to deliver therequired outcome	Usually high compliance, monitoring andaudit costs	A final resort when negotiation fails to deliver acollaborative partnershipoption
State Ownership	Full controlpossible sooutcomes can be set	Inefficient and burdened with excessivebureaucracy • Fails to allocate Resourceefficiently	Used where the function isclearly one belonging to thestate, whether or notoutsourcing options are used.

Source: Shore, M. (2011). A public-private partnership model for national cyber security, p.6

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 3

1. Explain the importance of public-private security partnerships in the prevention of cybercrime.

2. If you were asked to choose from the New Zealand cyber strategies, which one would you adopt? Justify your reason(s) based on the need for a technological development to meet Nigeria's market driven needs.

5. CONCLUSION

Cyber security has serious implications for national security, the economy, human rights, civil libertiesand international legal frameworks. Where cyber security is not given serious attention, it has facilitated many criminal attacks on the economy and critical infrastructures. In order to curb cyber threats, most governments have come up with cyber security; and this is perfected through public and private security partnerships. Different strategies have been adopted with diverse justifications. For instance, the Joint Money laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT) in the United Kingdom is dedicated to financial crimes, while the Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership(CISP) seeks for security information that can prevent, track and apprehend offenders including terrorists that target critical infrastructures.

6.0 SUMMARY

The unit was devoted to security partnership for cyber security, and presented some examples of public- private security partnerships on cyber security and how they operate. The example included the JMLIT and the CISPof the United Kingdom as well as the New Zealand meta-governance. In all, the expectations of the governments guide the choice of targets and stake holders. In order to achieve an effective public and private security partnerships for cyber security, government is encouraged to first consider the key factors that drives the private sector, and where the threat lies to be able to design an IT policy to checkmate it. Table 3.4 presented a summary of the pros and cons options that can help in making choices that can enhance delivery outcomes in cyber security partnerships.

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UNIT 4: PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS FOR TERRORISM PREVENTION

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In recent times, security partnership has also been focusing on the prevention of terrorism. Public-private security partnerships aimed at preventing terrorism, therefore, refers to programmes, policies and activities sourced and/or implemented by government and non-governmental actors that are intended both to prevent individuals and groups from radicalizing to facilitating or committing violence as well as disengaging individuals and

groups who are planning to commit or facilitate, or who have already engaged in, extremist violence (Countering Violent Extremism [CVE], 2010).

Security partnerships that seek to counter violent extremism, therefore, must address the underlying drivers and environmental factors that facilitate radicalization into violence and not only the violent symptoms of larger problems. Factors associated with individual-level involvement in violent extremism include, but are not limited to, histories of substance and sexual abuses, rebellion, desire for meaning in one's life being manipulated by recruiters,failure to think about issues beyond racial, ethnic, and religious differences, issues of personal identity attached to feelings of exclusion and alienation,and mental health issues (Pete, Bryan, Bubolz, McNeel and &Steven (2015).

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

1. ascertain the objectives of public and private security partnerships aimed at controlling terrorism;
2. identify and explain actions that can be taken to counter violent terrorism; and
3. understand the limitations of using force in the control of violent terrorism.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 **Elements of Security Partnershipsto Counter Violent Terrorism**

In order to build security partnerships that can counter violent terrorism effectively, the convergence of scholarly opinions is provided in the summary below:

3.1.1. **Engagement**. This refers to building relationships between local communities and government agencies, to build trust and local capacity and to counter recruitment and radicalization into violent groups. Activities such as, meetings and structured conversations like "roundtable discussions" between community members and local government agencies are one such example. The purpose of these engagements is to create people-to-people connections and facilitate access to critical resources.

3.1.2. **Prevention**. Community-wide implementation of programs, policies, and activities to mitigate the risk of individuals' movement into violence by creating healthy environments that reduce the appeal of extremism. Examples range from classes on civics and religious education to creating "safe spaces" for conversations where people have healthy outlets on sensitive topics (such as identity, social relations or political grievances) without the fear of

stigma or shame. These activities are collectively analogous to "inoculating" individuals and entire communities against the allure of extremism.

3.1.3. **Intervention**. Similar to "crisis counselling," this is about helping individuals whom community members and others—peers, friends, family, law enforcement, mental health, education, or social work professionals—identify as being at risk of engaging in violence, but who have not yet taken any significant steps to fulfill that intent.

3.1.4. **Interdiction**. For those who are taking significant steps towards violent action, are already engaged in violence, or facilitating other illicit actions in support of violence, the use of force may be necessary. These are "hard" counterterrorism measures, including surveillance and intelligence gathering, arrests, and/or military action.

3.1.5. **Rehabilitation and reintegration**. These activities are intended for those who are:

a) "walking back" from the edge of unlawful violence or activities in support of unlawful violence because of intervention activities;

b) currently serving time in prison or on parole after an interdiction; or

c) returning from a combat zone/exiting from a violent extremist organization. These individuals often find it difficult to return to normalcy due to challenges that range from mental trauma to social stigma and community ostracizing. As the name of these activities suggests, they are intended to help specific individuals get back on a healthier path towards being law-abiding and productive members of society.

3.2 The Limitationsof "Force" in Public and Private Partnershipsfor Terrorism Control

The activities of public-private security partnerships aimed at countering terrorism should be inclusive, and not limited to use of force options like surveillance/intelligence gathering, arrests, or military strikes. Recognizing the limitations to the use of force, policymakers and law enforcement officials are increasingly advised to focus on public-private partnership, because it is difficult to use force alone to "arrest our way out of any crime of terrorism" (Pete, Bryan et al, 2015).

A partnership for terrorism prevention requires an expanded set of actors with the requisite subject matter expertise and skillsets to address the broadened problem set. This is somewhat analogous to preventing gang violence. In this context, therefore,law enforcement alone cannot be expected to take on additional social work, education and mental health functions of those involved in terrorism. More realistic (and effective) approaches involve cross-departmental and cross-sectorial partnerships, where each group of actors can contribute to a collective goal without compromising their respective core missions and functions. In this

context, inclusion of some non-governmental actors—such as former extremists and ex-terrorists—are probably the most credible voices to encourage disengagement and exit from hate and violence as well as psychologists.

3.3 Value Tension

Inspite of the usefulness that public-private partnerships has in terrorism prevention, there are identifiablehindrances that may thwart optimal balance between transparency and confidentiality. Scholars refer to these hindrances as value tensions (Diane, 2014; Alejandro, 2014). These value tensions include legal obligations, personal safety of partners, efficacy and program evaluation. Each of this is clarified below.

3.3.1. **Legal obligations**: Several countries, including the United States, Canada, and European states have "sunshine" laws that obligate government agencies to disclose information, when requested by members of the public. However, there are typically certain national security exceptions to these laws. On the one hand, transparency can uncover serious cases of waste, fraud and abuse, motivating citizens and lawmakers to ensure those engaged in unlawful and unethical breaches of conduct are held accountable. On the other hand, excessive openness on sensitive issues could also identify vulnerabilities that can be exploited by malicious actors.

3.3.2. **Personal safety of partners:**Terrorists will often involve some sort of engagement with violent actors, or those who may openly and aggressively advocate on their behalf. Often times, the personal safety of individuals rests on the personal or institutional credibility they may hold with their target audiences. However, potential disclosure of their collaborations with government entities, including any tangential support received, such as seed funding for a project, could harm the reputations (and pose threats to the physical well-being) of implementing partners.

3.3.3. **Efficacy:** As noted earlier, in certain socio-political contexts, governments are not only proscribed from engaging in certain terrorist activities for legal reasons, but also for strategic reasons. Simply put, they are not considered to be credible actors by their target audiences. Disclosure of any perceived government involvement in a given terrorist negotiation programme may, at best, turn people away from it. On the other hand, one can also argue that transparency in prevention programmesis necessary to dispel skepticism from target audiences, particularly from those who raise concerns about whether terrorist activities are simply "a cover" for intelligence gathering functions.

3.3.4. **Program Evaluation:** One of the bedrocks to any successful public-private partnershipsis success metrics that measure implementation and/or effectiveness of a program. Often the party conducting the evaluation may be academic researchers and/or research agencies. Scientific and programmatic advancements are contingent upon their ability to be scrutinized by peers so that they can be replicated and improved upon. However, choosing to keep certain types of information confidential potentially limits that process. In some cases, confidentiality may require protecting the privacy of programme participants to encourage their involvement and mitigate discouraging factors, such as stigma, harassments, and potential threats to individuals' (and their friends', families', and peers') physical safety. The downside is that the potential need for confidentiality may limit the effectiveness of evaluation effortsyet, information from terrorists may require top level confidentiality.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 4

(i). What strategies are best suited for public-private security partnerships whosetarget objective is to curb terrorism?

(ii). Name and explain four value tensions that may hinder public-private security collaborations with the objective of curbing terrorism.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The concern of this module was to introduce you to the international best practices in public and private security collaborations. The module drew relevant examples around the world. As it is evidenced, the private sector is acknowledged as a key player in the fight against crimes, including at critical infrastructure sites and through the reach of the private security industry into almost every aspects of people's lives. Despite different operating principles, it does appear to be possible to develop public-private partnerships that address crime problems in ways that benefit a variety of stakeholders, including the general public and taxpayers.

In the United States of America, for example, evaluation reports have recorded several successes associated with public-private security partnerships. For instance, the United Stateshasn't suffered catastrophic terrorist attacks, like those of 9/11 in nearly 15 years, though there isample evidence that a number of such attacks were planned. For example, an attempt to fly model airplanes, loadedwith explosives, into the Capitol building was thwarted in 2010. That same year, a planned terrorist car bomb was thwarted at the Times Square. The planned terrorist car bomb attack was foiled when two street vendors discovered thecar bomb

and alerted the New York Police Department patrolman to the threat. This last case illustrates another (and perhaps the biggest) success of the new partnership betweenthe public and private sectors through increased awareness and vigilance on the part of the average citizen. It has encouraged more people to be proactive inreporting potential threats, however large or small.

After examining the growth of private security, the module looked at public private security collaborations with respect to cyber and financial crimes as well as terrorism. The module also explained the hindrances that often thwart public and private security partnerships for terrorism prevention.

6.0 SUMMARY

In the last unit of the module (Unit 4) emphasis was placed on curbing violent terrorism. Based on this emphasis, strategies that could help in successful public and private security partnership to curb violent extremism were outlined and discussed, including engagement, prevention, intervention, interdiction, rehabilitation, and reintegration. The limitations on the use of forces for the control of violent terrorism were also discussed as well as hindrances that may thwart optimal balance between transparency and confidentiality.

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MODULE 6TRENDS AND PRACTICES IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY COLLABORATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Inspite of how the English Philosopher and Thinker, Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), described the state of nature as being brutish, nasty and short, the twenty first century, with all its civilization and technology, is no much better. Crime and insecurity of all persuasions are not only making life short, nasty and brutish, but also miserable for a greater majority in the world. In Nigeria, criminal acts like kidnappings, armed robbery, terrorism, cybercrimes, banditry, oil pipe vandalism, piracy, to mention but a few, are becoming the order of the day. Many commentators have concluded that Nigeria is no longer a secured society (Bamidele, Akintola & Nuhu, 2016). But it is not only in Nigeria that insecurity walks on four legs; insecurity is reported in other parts of the world too. If it is not terrorism perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists in America and Europe (as in Nigeria), it is violent crimes motivated by either frustration-aggression by deprived citizens or greed by organized criminal gangs, and drug addicted youths are causing havoc in Latin American and Africa. Curbing crimes have, therefore, become the worry of many governments.

In order to curb crimes and ensure safety and security in the society, different measures are being implemented. These include recruiting security men and women to guard access routes, installations of surveillance cameras in public places, guards patrolling, etc, (Dambazau, 2008). Private security companies are also providing alternative measures to complement the measures provided by the public security to prevent crime. Security is perceived as crime

prevention and it encompasses “freedom from fear”, “freedom from want” and “a life of dignity” (Burgess & Tadjbakhsh, 2010).

The provision of security by employing individuals as watchmen or having community members to form vigilante groups to prevent crime in the community is not new. In recent times, neighbourhood crime watch groups have also been formed in the urban areas. These are beside private security companies, the first (Nigerian Investigation and Security Company) of which was registered in Nigeria as far back as 1965 (Abrahmsen, 2005). The beginning of the fourth republic in 1999 witnessed the expansion in the private security sector. Both national and international security companies are registered and operating in Nigeria. This increase in the demand for the services of private security companies may be attributed to the high rate of insecurity in the country and the inability of the Nigeria Police Force, as well as other public security organizations, to effectively curtail the crime situation. Nowadays, private security personnel can be seen guarding businesses, banks, communities, private and public buildings in major cities of the country.

It is difficult to give the accurate size of the private security companies that operate in Nigeria, because some of them are unlicensed and unregistered. However, the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2018) observed that private security companies in Nigeria have employed not less than 828,502 personnel between 2013 and 2018, when the survey was conducted. According to Meerts (2013), private security business is growing and has gone through a silent revolution.

As the fear of crime is being kept alive by the daily occurrence of crime, and wide media coverage, people are no longer contented to leave security issues to public security organizations in Nigeria. This informed the decision taken by hunters and civilians to combat terrorism in the north eastern part of the country. Security responsibilities are,therefore, being shared with different organisations like ethnic militias, vigilante groups and private security companies. It may be an aberration, considering section 214 (1) of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of the Nigeria, which gave power for crime prevention and control, only to the Nigeria police. However, the private security organizations are not taking over the functions of the police, rather, they are trying to complement them in the face of high insecurity. Many highly placed people, including private and public organisations in Nigeria, have become increasingly reliant on private security companies.

In this module, therefore, you are going to be informed of the:

1. trends and practices in public and private security partnerships;
2. different types of private security practices as well as increase in private security marketing;
3. causes of failures and /or successes of many public-private security partnerships;
4. debate in the security literature as to the necessity of public-private security collaborations.

The module is divided into four units comprising:

Unit 1: Key trends in public and private security practices

Unit 2: Markets for private security

Unit 3: The 4-C's of public-private security partnerships and

Unit 4: Managing the boundaries between private and public security

UNIT 1: KEY TRENDS IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECURITY PRACTICES

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The practice of security is indeed going through a silent revolution. Throughout the world, there are a variety of collaborative programs involving public and private security organizations. Among the different collaborative initiatives are: 1) networking; 2) information sharing; 3) crime prevention; 4) resource sharing; 5) training; 6) drafting and supporting legislation on a variety of topics, including training; 7) operations; and, 8) distribution of research findings and protocols.

A review of the private security industry in the literature has revealed a wide variety of partnerships between public and private security firms. In Europe, a number of effective public-private security collaborations has been observed. There is also a considerable literature on the partnerships between public police and private security in Australia (Sarre, 2011). This includes collaborative efforts at sporting events and in providing airport security. Survey research conducted during the 1990s found "good" or "very good" cooperation between police and private security organizations, although there was resistance among the police to outsourcing many functions to the private security organizations (Goldsby & O'Brien, 1996).

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

The intended outcome of this unit is to introduce you to:

1. the different areas of specializations of private security companies;
2. understanding the areas that private security organizations have advantages and/or strengths over public security organizations;
3. the types of collaborations that can be initiated in future in a community.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Types of Private Security Services

Private security organizations are providing a variety of services. The security literature provides several of these services, including guard services, investigations, alarm monitoring, surveillance, armoured transport, and correctional facilities management. Other services include, systems integration and management, security consulting, pre-employment screening, and information security. Other security duties that are outsourced to private security organizations include alarm installation, maintenance and repair, and alarm monitoring services. Many other private security organizations undertake substance abuse testing and background investigations (The ASIS Foundation, 2005).

The general trend in private security provision during these past years revealed specialization in the following services presented below:

3.1.1 Guard Services

Many security companies provide guard services. In the United States, a survey by La Vigne, Hetrick, and Palmer (2008) observed that 35% of the private security companies provide unarmed guards, while 11% provide armed guards. Guards are used in a variety of sectors to protect people and property (e.g., critical infrastructure, commercial, institutional, and residential) and have increasingly been used to support law enforcement and emergency personnel as well as to protect military bases throughout the world. Employing guards to protect company executives is becoming more popular among companies in the United States. As at 2007, top companies like Oracle and Ford Motors, spent more than $1 million annually to provide security services for top executives. Executive protection typically involves screening visitors at gatehouses, guarding the perimeter of executives‘ personal homes, providing 24-hour protection and accompanying them on out-of-town trips (Lerer, 2007). Many of the security companies in Nigeria specialized in guard services (Eke, 2018).

3.1.2 Alarm Monitoring

Alarm services, commonly used in retail, residential, and manufacturing markets, involve the use of sensors to detect intrusion and transmit a signal at the premises or a remote location. Central stations, which operate 24 hours a day, can monitor a variety of alarms and then alert the appropriate parties, including the police, fire, and emergency medical services. Many security companies provide the alarm services, like installation to both residential and commercial customers.

3.1.3 Investigations

The use of private detectives and investigators seems to be common in the United States and Britain. For instance, a report by Dempsey (2008) revealed that, by 2008, around 45,500 private detectives and investigators were employed in the United States by private detective agencies, states and local governments, Departmental stores, financial institutions, insurance agencies and employment security services. Private investigators are hired to collect information through observations and interviews to solve noncriminal cases, including missing persons, medical malpractices, domestic or marital issues, and product liability. Additionally, private corporations or organizations may hire private investigators for criminal cases such as credit card fraud, internal theft, insurance fraud and, in some cases, corporate intelligence and industrial espionage (Dempsey, 2008; Gill & Hart, 1999).

3.2.4 Armoured Transport

Armoured transport security companies traditionally provide armoured vehicles and armed personnel (often interstate) to protect and deliver money, securities, bonds, gold, silver, and other precious metals, credit cards, jewelleries and other items of high intrinsic value. These activities may include counting, sorting, and packaging currencies from automatic teller machines (ATM) or emptying parking meters. The security provided by these firms comes with great risks because of the dangers involved in transporting these materials. In many instances, therefore, the armoured vehicle and drivers are provided by the private security company, while the escort security personnel are proved by the police.

3.1.5 Correctional Facilities Management

Although this pattern is yet to exist in Nigeria, privately run prisons and jails have been expanding since the 1980s, especially in the US. Private correctional companies, typically, take one of two types of agreements:

(1) They are contracted to manage government prisons, or

(2) They provide inmate housing (in-state and out-of-state) in private-run correctional facilities.

In the US, government saves money and relieve overcrowded prison systems, by increasingly outsourcing their correctional services to private companies. In addition to operating correctional facilities, private correctional facilities also operate under performance-based contracts (i.e., rehabilitation programs, healthcare, educational and vocational training, state-of-the-art facilities, and more efficient operations).

The Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which houses approximately 75,000 inmates in more than 60 facilities,is the largest private correctional system in the US (Taub, 2010). The CCA guards are assigned to provide security for housing units, monitor inmates, conduct perimeter checks and reports and documents incidents. In addition to managing prisons, jails and detention facilities, the company also specializes in the design and construction of facilities and inmate transportation. The GEO Group, is another private corrections company, which manages more than 53,000 beds in about 5 states in the US federation. It provides correctional and detention services for federal, states, and local government agencies at the minimum, medium, and maximum security levels (Gilroy et. al, 2010).

3.1.6 Systems Integration and Management

The goal of systems integration is to merge existing systems (e.g., video surveillance, access control, intrusion detection) through a computerized process so that data are captured once and stored in a central location. One integrated system could address multiple functions, such as information security, physical security, fire safety and many others (Dempsey, 2008).

3.1.7 Security Consulting

Security consultants work in diverse fields, including engineering, security management, crisis management, and computer security (Cunningham et al., 1990). The services consulting firms offer may include designing security systems and developing specifications for technological and physical security measures, conducting security training, administering polygraph and psychological stress evaluations as well as providing expert advice on loss prevention and risk management (Hess, 2009).

3.1.8 Pre-Employment Screening

Organizations may feel the need to screen potential employees before making a job offer. The most common screening techniques include testing instruments, such as a polygraph or psychological stress examinations and background investigations. Background checks may be performed to protect an employer from damages arising from negligent hiring lawsuits and résumé fraud or to comply with laws requiring screening for certain positions (e.g., anyone who works with children). Employers may seek an employee's credit history, criminal records and sex offender registration, educational records, personal references and more (Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, 2009).

3.1.9Information Technology Security

Implementing procedures to safeguard corporate information from unauthorized access, modification, destruction or disclosure, whether accidental or intentional,is critical (Peltier, 2005). In fact, a study conducted by the Computer Security Institute revealed that breach of information security has cost some companies more than $2 million in losses (Gordon & Loeb, 2002). Chief security officers, or chief information security officers, are usually responsible for protecting an organization's digital assets. They ensure that the organization's security systems are properly maintained, monitor user access and network security and protect video surveillance equipment and access control systems (CSO Security & Risk, 2008).

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 1

(i). What reason(s) would you give for the emergence of different types of private security systems in Nigeria?

(ii). Differentiate between "Guard services" and Correctional facility management.

5.0 CONCLUSION

The diverse nature of crime can be seen from the sundry nature of security specializations, especially in the private security organizations. It confirms the observation by scholars that private security has indeed gone through a silent revolution; to the extent that every criminal innovation is also followed by an innovation in security engineering to detect and apprehend the perpetrator(s). While guard security may be for protection and surveillance, systems integration management seeks to merge existing systems (e.g., video surveillance, access control, intrusion detection) through a computerized process so that data are captured once and stored in a central location, so that it can be reviewed in future to provide evidence.

6.0 SUMMARY

In this unit the focus was on types of expertise provided by the private security organizations. The services discussed include guard services, armoured transport, investigations, alarm monitoring as well as correctional facilities management. The availability of these diverse patterns of expertise suggests that private security organizations have varied expertise that can complement the proficiency of public security personnel in the quest for security partnerships to curb crime in the country.

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UNIT 2:CRITICAL SECURITY TARGETS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The successes of the patterns of private security explained in Unit 1 (Module 6) is greatly enhanced by collaborations with the public security sector. This is because there are some aspects that need legal backing and cover up with security patrol. For instance, in some of the "Correctional Facility Management", the private companies take charge of training of inmates on skills acquisitions, counselling services and rehabilitations while the correctional officers (Warders) look at the issues of discipline, feeding, and other regimented live issues that the inmates need for correction. Now that Nigerian government has changed the name of

Prison to “Correctional Services”, it is expected that the best international practices will be introduced to the system by way of “public -private” collaborations to boost the outcome.

Increasing security challenges influence the various designs and patterns of private security and it is expanding the private security market. The various security markets include those for critical infrastructures- commercial, institutional and residential. The expansion in the security market has also expanded employment. The trend is expected to continue as growth in thecommercial, institutional and non-residential marketsis expected to continue in the twenty first century. As proprietary security gives way for privatization and, in some cases, outright contracting of the security services of government institutions and parastatals, expansion on expertise in the private security sector is expected to take these challenges.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this unit, you will be able to:

1. identify critical security targets;
2. know the meaning of critical infrastructures and the necessity of security partnerships in its protection;
3. understand the components of commercial security;
4. recognise what constitutes institutional security;
5. appreciate how security collaborationsare suitable for residential and Government Ministries.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Critical Infrastructures

Critical infrastructures include industry and manufacturing, utilities and transportation. The security literatures refer to these critical infrastructures as constituting critical security targets (Hess, 2009; Obama, 2010)In Nigeria, critical infrastructures used to be owned hundred percent by the government. Included are facilities like the national stadium (the different stadia in the states), the airports, railways, industries, refineries, radio stations, power stations (like NEPA) and government owned media houses, etc. However, in the recent economic reforms, some of these facilities were outrightly privatized, and/ or commercialized, while others were jointly owned, popularly known as public- private partnerships (PPP).

In the United States of America and Europe, the vast majority of critical infrastructures is owned and operated by the private sectorand requires private security for protection (Hess,

2009). According to the Congressional Research Service (Parfomak, 2004), approximately 50,000 security guards protect critical infrastructure in the United States. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), established in 2009, built a partnership of government agencies and private sector entities to enhance protection of critical infrastructures and key resources.

Private security is necessary to protect large sectors of critical infrastructures, including industry and manufacturing, airports, seaports, utilities, and transportation. In manufacturing facilities and warehouses, internal theft is a significant threat. Businesses may also need security against crimes such as sabotage and espionage. Certain facilities, such as the refineries, the Central Bank, airports, seaports, radio stations, chemical plants and utilities facilities, are sometimes potential targets of terrorist attacks. As for transportation, a variety of security services are used to protect cargo, seaports, airports and airline transportations.

Private security guards may be commonly hired by air carriers to conduct passenger and baggage checks; however, the federal law enforcement officers usually provide overall airport security. Mass transitoperators also make use of private security, not only as guards, but also for the checking of passengers'freights against suspected explosives. Some private mass transit companies also hire police men for escort duties, especially during night travels.

3.2 Commercial

Commercial security encompasses a range of markets, including offices and office buildings, financial institutions, retails and other businesses (e.g., lodging and hospitality, food service, entertainment). The primary threat to office buildings is burglary and theft (Hess, 2009). Common measures taken to protect against this type of loss include access controls (e.g., identification card or fob readers, coded access, biometric access), closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance and security guards.

Financial institutions, like banks and microfinance houses, also suffer from losses involving theft (e.g., cash and stocks) and regularly use guards and alarm monitoring systems. Larger financial institutions may also hire investigators devoted to investigating identity thefts and frauds. Retail shops, like supermarkets,face a number of security issues, including shoplifting, vandalism and employee thefts.In order to deter shoplifting, many supermarkets and minimarkets employ uniformed security guards while others combine uniformed security guards with close circuit monitoring devices. Other methods include physical controls, such as alarms and surveillance equipment. In other commercial markets, such as hotels and

restaurants, close circuit televisions (CCTV) are used to monitorthe environment against burglary, vandalism and other atrocities that may be committed by criminals in the name of customers.

3.3 Institutional

In the provision of security for institution, focus is given to places like churches, mosques, hospitals, clinics, schools and government infrastructures. In this context, visitors'control is emphasized as well as internal and external thefts, prevention against arsons and sabotage. Security guards are often used to patrol the hallways and control access to detect and ward off criminals. Risks at educational institutions include the safety of students and staff, violence, vandalism, and theft. To address these concerns, access control, lighting and security guards may be used in some facilities. For example, when suicide bombing of churches in Jos, Plateau state was increasing during the settler-indigene crisis, churches had to hire guards,in addition to law enforcement officers (army men), to keep guard at churches during and after worship hours. Colleges and Universities also used both proprietary and contractual security personnel to secure their facilities and ward off suicide bombers.

3.4 Residential

Private security may also be necessary in public and private housing. In the federal capital territory, Abuja, where many residential quarters are organized in estates, private securities are hired to monitor access in and out of the estates. In some of the estates, mini-Police posts are built for police on night duties and patrol, who work in collaboration with the private security. In addition to these, some of the residents installed security alarm systems. Other measures taken by homeowners include special locks and lighting, safes, and guard dogs. Some gated communities, like prefap in Owerri, Imo State capital, also hire security guards to patrol the premises and monitor entrances. Similarly, some public housing authorities use access control and CCTV surveillance services.

3.5 Government

The Federal, States and Local Governmentsalso seek the services of private security companies. This is in line with the economy reformed policy of government that directs that security units in the Ministries be outsourced to private security companies. It is, therefore, not surprising to see private security personnel mounting guards in the headquarters and branches of several federal and State Ministries, other than the Police men and/ or law enforcement officers, that used to be the order of the day in time past. In many local

government headquarters, private security guards are hired to guard government buildings, and public housing.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 2

(i). What do you understand by the term, "critical infrastructures"?

(ii). What factors account for the importance of critical infrastructures in security collaborations around the world?

5.0 CONCLUSION

In many countries of the world, critical infrastructures remain the symbol of identity and economic importance. It is one reason why the Islamic terrorists targeted the World Trade Tower in the United States, during the coordinated attacks of 9/11 in 2001. It is also one reason why the Boko Haram terrorists targeted the UN building in Abuja, on Friday, 26th August 2011, using a car bomb. In many other instances, terrorists have targeted national airlines, as well as mass transit vehicles. These critical infrastructures, therefore, deserve close security monitoring and protection. In the event where these infrastructures have been either outrightly privatized or collectively owned through private- public partnerships (PPP), government must do all that is possible, security wise, to protect them. In the developed economies of the United States and Britain, security literature have revealed how these infrastructures are being protected through the involvement of public and private security collaborations.

6.0 SUMMARY

This unit discussed critical security targets, which have been identified to include critical infrastructures, commercial houses, institutions like schools, ministries, residential areasand Government houses, including headquarters, where government businesses are carried out. Given the importance of these targets, the need for public and private security collaborations was also discussed.

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UNIT 3 THE 4-C'S OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

In Module 3, a whole sub-section (3.2) was devoted to discussing the problems that constrained public-private security collaborations. In that discussion, emphasis was placed on lack of trust. These challenges were further highlighted when "issues and challenges of security cooperation" were explained. At each stage of the discussion, recommendations were made on what can be done to overcome the problem of trust.

In the context of the public-private security partnerships operation, both public and private security providers have increasingly come together, pooling theirstrengths together to offer security protection, prevent as well as apprehend criminals. However, the criminals, especially, organized criminals, who are more professionals, are fighting back. Terrorists and kidnappers are mobilizing daily. In the face of these expanding security threats, security partnerships must not simply preventand solve crimes, they must also prevent terrorist acts.Empirical security literature discussed in previous modules, had shown that significant progress had been made inestablishing partnerships, and that some partnerships aremore comprehensive and effective than others. What, then, accounts for the differences? Answering this question, calls for understanding of the 4 C's (Communication, Cooperation, Coordination and Collaboration) in security partnerships.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

The intended learning outcomes of this unit include:

1. Introducing you to the meaning of communication, collaboration, cooperation, and coordination (the 4Cs);
2. Understanding the components of security partnerships; and
3. Setting the guidelines for security collaborations.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Key Steps in Public and Private Security Partnerships

In the evaluation of the successes and failures of many public and private security partnerships, scholars (Goldsby& O'Brien, 1996; Gill& Hart, 1999) have outlined the key factors that ensure the successes into what is commonly referred to as the 4-Cs, which are explained below:

Communication: The exchangeof information and ideas is the first step inestablishing a relationship between two organizations.

Cooperation: The second step, cooperation, involves partnersundertaking a joint project or operation such as thesharing of personnel.

Coordination: The third step isachieved when the partners adopt a common goal, forinstance, to reduce crime in a certain neighbourhood.The final and most comprehensive step, **Collaboration:** This is the fourth, final and most comprehensive step and itoccurswhen partners understand that their missionsoverlap and adopt policies and projects designed toshare resources, achieve common goals andstrengthen the partners.

3.2The 12Components of Partnerships

Understanding that public-private securitypartnerships are important to the nation's security isonly a first step. Defining and operationalizing apartnership is the critical next step. What are expected of the Chief Security Officers (public sector and private sector) to engage in these partnerships?

First, they must understand what a partnership consist of.Although this may seem too simple a factor toconsider, security officers often overlook the basics. It is important that agencies seeking to achieve collaboration mustunderstand the components that their partnerships willcontain.A successful public-private partnerships has 12essential components:

a) Common goals.
b) Common tasks.
c) Knowledge of participating agencies' capabilitiesand missions.
d) Well-defined projected outcomes.
e) A timetable.
f) Education for all involved.
g) A tangible purpose.
h) Clearly identified leaders.
i) Operational planning.
j) Agreement by all partners as to how thepartnership will proceed.
k) Mutual commitment to providing necessaryresources.
l) Assessment and reporting.

The Security Chief Executives need to agree on these components beforethe partnership moves forward. For the public law enforcement chiefs, this may include not only working with the private security company Directors but also with the community leaders and/ or corporations' executives that are expected to be the prime beneficiaries.

Private security professionals at the meeting should be able to express their interests and/ or reservations in the security collaborations. The public law enforcement executives should also be mindful of adoptingpolicies that only partially contribute to successfulpartnerships. For instance, although the following canbe elements in a partnership, in and of themselves theydo not constitute public-private collaborations:

a) Executives attending partner meetings.
b) Officers attending partner meetings.
c) Individual projects undertaken with private security.

d) Joint grant undertaken with private security.

Attending meetings and working on projects can beintegral partsof a partnership. In fact, meetings areoften used to share information and plan activities.Likewise, working together on projects or grants isoften of value. However, these activities do not addup to the 12 threads that tie groups together incollaborative partnerships.

3.3. Guidelines for Public-Private Security Collaborations

As already explained in 3.1 above, collaboration begins when partners understand that their missionsoverlap and adopt policies and projects designed toshare resources, achieve common goals, and thus strengthen the partners. In their elaborate empirical survey on public- private security partnerships, the United States Department for Homeland (internal) Security (DHS) offered guidelines for effective public-private security collaborations. According to the expert advice, while public-private cooperation can take manyforms, collaborative partnershipsare more defined, in that collaboration requires common goals and tasks as well asclearly identified leaders.Cooperation might simply entail government contracting withprivate security for services traditionally performed bylaw enforcement agencies. However, these activities onlyscratch the surface of what the two sides can do tofoster public safety. In the analysis of the DHS, public-private security partnerships requiremuch more than cooperation.

The recommendations of the United States DHS seeking to improve collaborationwith their private sectorcounterparts are as follows:

a) Recognize the need for prevention.
b) Establish a system, centre or task force to serve asa clearinghouse for all potentially relevantdomestically generated criminal and terrorism information.
c) Ensure timely interpretations and assessments ofinformation.
d) Prepare Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs)and formal coordination agreements betweenpublic and private agencies. The MOUs should describemechanisms for exchanging information aboutvulnerabilities and risks, coordination of responsesand processes to facilitate information sharing andmultijurisdictional pre-emption of terroristsand criminal acts.
e) Use of community policing initiatives and/ or community security strategies andtactics to identify suspicious activities related toterrorism, insurgency and criminal operation.

f) Explicitly develop “social capital” throughcollaborations between the private sector, lawenforcement and other partners so that data,information, assistance and “best practices” maybe shared and collaborative processes developed.
g) Coordinate federal, states, and local informationplans and actions for assessments, preventionprocedures, infrastructure protection and fundingpriorities to address prevention.
h) Establish a regional prevention informationcommand centre and coordinate the flow ofinformation regarding infrastructure.
i) Include prevention and collaboration measures inexercises.

3.3.1 Outreach and Trust

The key to success is implementation. Whenimplemented properly, collaborative partnerships canminimize (and sometimes avoid) duplicative effortsand leverage limited resources. Once a partnership agreement is reached, initial outreach will benecessary. Outreach is easiest when trust levels arehigh. In these instances, the public sector chief security executive will likely have established a relationshipwith his or her private sector counterpart as trust isnormally built over time. For those chief executiveswho have not engaged their private sector counterpartsbefore, an initial gesture of goodwill, respect,commitment and purpose can go a long way.

3.3.2 Formalization and Memoranda ofUnderstanding

Once trust has been established, the partnership can now be formalised by signing an MOU. Formalization shows employees thatthe partnership is a priority. The MOU will contain the preferred tools that are going to be used in tackling security, and other problems agreed to be addressed in the partnerships. As part of the MOU, the partnership chiefs are expected to design measures that will evaluate and reward efforts. In order to achieve the desired goals, partners in collaboration are encouraged to:

a) institutionalisecommunication bysharing personnel directories with each other; tomake collaboration an objective in their strategicplans; and to require monthly and annual reportingof progress.
b) network.
c) share information.
d) share resources.
e) training.

f) legislate.

g) apportion operations.

Networking: An example of networking might bebreakfast and lunch meetings to discuss the commonproblems both groups have in protecting criticalinfrastructure. These meetings could elicit not only aconstructive exchange about the pressures,motivations and constraints on both the public andprivate sides of the equation, but also possiblesolutions.

Information sharing: The lifeblood of any policingagency is information.Thus, information sharing (andits analysed counterpart, intelligence sharing) shouldbe a central component of any public-private security partnerships. Information sharingincludes planning for critical incident response,protecting infrastructures, enhancing communications,minimizing liability and, strategically, deployingresources. Information should flow in both directionsbetween public and private security partners.

Resource sharing: Lending expertise is an excellentexample of resource sharing that can benefit terrorism and crime prevention. As noted earlier, private security companiesoften have considerable technical knowledge that the government law enforcement officers may lack.

Training: Lending expertise has clear connections totraining. Another way to include training in apartnership is to host speakers on topics of jointinterests, which can be extremely beneficial to both lawenforcement and private securitypersonnel by broadening theirknowledge base.

Legislation: Law enforcement and private securitycan work together to track legislation that is importantto both. More importantly, they should help legislatorsat the local, state, and national levels to understand howlegislation can affect, impair or assist collaborative security, especially in the sharing of certain types of sensitive information.

Operations: For line-level officers, investigatorsand command staffs, the greatest opportunities forcollaboration with private security are in the operationalareas. Terrorism-related opportunities for collaborationinclude critical incident planning, the investigation of complex financial fraud or computer crimes (i.e.,cybercrime) and joint sting operations (e.g., thosetargeting cargo theft).

Regardless ofactivity, it is important to keep the 4 C's in mind:communication, cooperation, coordination, andcollaboration. Each "C" represents an increasinglysophisticated component of the partnership. The endgoal always, however, is to collaborate.

3.3.3 Choosing Liaison Officers

Once both sides agree to form a partnership and setcommon goals and objectives through an MOU,selecting the right person as a liaison officer is animportant, and often overlooked, responsibility. Thesuccess of a partnership often depends on the liaison.No substitute exists for a well-informed officer who iscommitted to and passionate about a partnership.These officers become invaluable resources,motivating others to accomplish the goals and tasks of the partnership, improving information sharing andfostering lasting relationships. The Chief Executives should also bear in mind that selecting thewrong law enforcement officer to represent thedepartment, even for a single meeting, can bedevastating. Unfortunately, officers are sometimesthrust into liaison roles without adequate preparation,understanding or commitment. They are not briefedon how or why the partnership was begun or its goals. In the context of this, Security Executives should note the following guidelines in the selection and support of their liaison:

a) Involve supervisors in the selection process: Supervisors are the closest management rank toofficers, who know their strengths and weaknesses. Before the selection is made, supervisors shoulddevelop or be given criteria on the type ofinvolvement and time commitment required for theposition, and its projected outcomes. Supervisorsshould take a lead role in the selection process.
b) Fit the officer to the assignment: "Fit" should bebased on a candidate's personal interests, priorexperience and commitment.
c) Give as much notice as possible before askingofficers to represent the department as liaison. Thisallows them time to prepare.
d) Inform officers of the desired outcomes of thepartnership.
e) Explain expectations clearly at the start of theprocess.
f) Educate officers on the "who, what, when, where,why, and how" of partnerships. Officers shouldknow how to facilitate a partnership and support itsmission. Alsointroduce the officer to the key players.
g) Follow up regularly on participation by officers:Followup demonstrates a commitment by peopleother than the liaison and provides additionalperspective on the partnership's progress.

Additional guidance can be given to the liaison.Just as selecting the personnel to represent the organization in the partnership can lead to failure, selecting the wrong liaison officer can do the same. The problemwith selecting private security personnel is perhapsmore complicated.

As noted above, private securitypre-screening, standards and training are often lacking.Law enforcement and private security executives should bothrecognize these deficiencies.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 3

i). Explain the 4-Cs of security collaboration; b). Why would you consider them important in public-private security partnerships in Nigeria?

ii). What are the essential components of security partnerships?

iii). What criteria would you use in the selection of your liaison officers for public-private security partnerships?

(iv). Discuss the elements that an MOU of public-private security partnerships must contain?

5.0 CONCLUSION

The importance of public and private security partnerships in crime prevention and control has valid evidences. However, initiating a security partnership that can be successful requires several other strategies. Other than the 4-Cs -communication, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration - scholars have identified 12 other components of partnerships and emphasized the need on the choice of a liaison officer that must not only be credible, but also have interest of the assignment at heart. While public-private security partnershipscan take manyforms, collaborative security partnershipsare more defined, in that collaboration requires common goals and tasks, that are clearly identified by the partners (public and private security leaders).

6.0 SUMMARY

The objective of this unit was to expose the reader to the requirements of setting up a successful public and private security partnerships. Beyond the definition of partnership, therefore, emphasis was placed on the key elements that have defined successful security partnerships elsewhere. These included communication, cooperation, coordination, and collaboration. The achievement of collaboration became a major concern of scholars in that even when all other elements are available without collaboration, the success of the partnership may still be questioned. The need for collaboration calls for the initiation of MOU, because the partners must understand the subject matter of their missionsto the extent that they missions' goals could overlap. Given such knowledge, they can adopt policies and projects designed toshare resources; all for the purpose of achieving a common goal andstrengthening the partnership.

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UNIT 4: MANAGING THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECURITY PARTNERSHIPS

CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The boundary between public and private policingis messy and complex. Police executives dealwith some aspects of it almost every day. As investments in private security continue to expand with increase in public and private partnerships, it raises issues as to whether private security companies should not be strengthened legally for the personnel to bear arms and ammunitions, as well as being given effective training so that they can effectively compliment the public security officers in their constitutional assigned goals of crime prevention and control; moreso, in this era of insurgency and terrorism.

This sub-section discusses the emerging debates on public-private security partnerships. The analysis here starts with anumber of assumptions: First, that it is no longerpossible for public police to ignore the extent andpervasiveness of private security arrangements.Second, that being in some general sense "for" or"against" private security is not helpful, as suchviews are inadequately nuanced or sophisticatedgiven the variety of issues at stake. Third, that theinterests of private security will rarely, if ever, befully aligned with public interests. Fourth and finally, that itis not sufficient for public security agencies simplyto deal with the private security arrangementsthat exist today; rather, public security personnel have a roleto play in influencing future arrangements and inmaking sure those arrangements serve publicinterests.

2.0 INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this unit, you should be able to:

1. understand the different types of private security personnel;
2. comprehend the debate and the reasons why public security officers often find it difficult to open up to private security personnel, even in joint partnerships;
3. appreciate the emerging public and private security partnerships in Nigeria;
4. recognise why private security will continue to be relevant in the 21st Century and beyond.

3.0 MAIN CONTENT

3.1 Understanding Private Security

For the purposes of this discussion, privatesecurity is broadly construed and means theprovision of security or policing services, otherthan by public police, in the normal course of

their public duties.The clients for private security may, therefore, bepublic (as with neighbourhood patrols) or private(as when corporations contract with privatesecurity firms or employ their own securityguards).

The providers of private security may include:

a). **Volunteers:** Private individuals acting asunpaid helpers (e.g., neighbourhood watch group, vigilantes).

b). **Commercial Security-Related Enterprises:** For-profit commercial enterprises thatprovide some aspects of security/policingservices (e.g., security companies, hiredguards, hired neighbourhood patrols, privateinvestigators, alarm companies).

c). **Specialist Employees in Private or Not-for-Profit Organizations:** Employees whohave specialist in policing, such as retired police and military officers, retired security and risk managers, etc. These personnel may be employedby private security companies as guards or detectives. They may also be employed by Universities and Colleges as members of the university's own security department, or by the owners of othercommercial premises (e.g., shopping malls)as guards or patrols.

d). **Non-specialist Employees in Private or Not-for-Profit Organizations:** Employees withmore general duties who are, nevertheless,asked to pay attention to security issues(e.g., store clerks watching out for shoplifters,airline flight crews observing passengers forsuspicious behaviours).

e). **Public Police:** There are circumstancesin which publicpolice are paid by private clients for specificservices. In some situations, the officers areoff duty or working overtime for a privatepurchaser (as with paid police details). Inother cases, police officers are on duty butcommitted to a specific policing operationpaid for at the agency level by a private client(e.g., policing a major sporting event, banks, on escorts). In such instances, police functions are being performed but paid by the private company. There are also instances, where public police officers work for private clients under a variety ofdifferent arrangements. Publicpolice also cooperate on a daily basis withsecurity guards and embark on patrols on areas on the request of private security personnel.

In many instances, Police routinely rely on privateindividuals, co-opted as confidential informants,to assist in their investigations.Given these range of different structures, puttingtogether reliable statistics on the overall "size"of private policing seems an almost impossibletask, as any estimate will depend heavily on thedefinition of what is covered.

3.2 Public and Private Police Relationships

Skillful management of the relationships betweenpublic and private security constitutes a core
competency for police executives. Realizing thisand accepting it, however, has taken the policingprofession a good long while, and the route followedto arrive at this point varies by country.

In the United Kingdom, the public police steadfastly resisted any association with privatesecurity for decades. In a detail provided by White (2010) about private security in Britain, private security comprises mostly large firms that provide guards and security patrolsfor commercial premises. Because of the private motive of the companies, government insists on establishing standards for qualificationand conduct that would help to keep irresponsible orincompetent players out of the market; therebyenhancing the credibility and reputation of theestablished firms. Initially, any form of government recognition for the private security was seen as compromising or distorting the publicpolicing mission. The government, evenby playing the role of a regulator, was seenas taking responsibility for the conduct of anindustry whose motivations and competence was regarded as inherently untrustworthy.

However, things began to change significantly during the Thatcherera (1979-1990), when the role of free markets gave room for advocacy of privatization of state functions. A belief inthe merits of privatization required a higherlevel of appreciation for the capabilities of thecommercial sector and a greater degree of trustin the ability of competitive markets to sort outthe good from the bad. The endorsement of marketeconomies, deregulation and privatization, were embraced by public and private security partnerships. Thus ended the British government's reluctanceto engage constructively with the private securityindustry.

In the United States, private security had an early recognition. The United States has never been concerned with "stateness" and alwaysdisplayed a greater appreciation for the role ofcommercial enterprise. Private security companies areable to act as ordinary commercial organizationsselling ordinary commodities; their activities do not seem to be structuredby state-centric expectations abouthow security ought to be delivered. A deeply embedded capitalist free-marketideology, seems to permeate mostaspects of American life, and the private security received early acceptance.

The early acceptance accorded private security practice does not mean that that concerns do notarise. Concerns arise as a result of failures, scandals andabuses in the industry, each instance of whichprovides another opportunity to appreciate therisks associated with private security. Concernsarise also when new technologies in the hands ofprivate actors affect civil liberties or privacy inways that ordinary citizens had not anticipatedor imagined. Concerns arise as private security continues to grow and become ubiquitousand touching the lives of ordinary citizens on adaily basis.There are also concerns due to unnecessary use of force, abuses of power, dishonest businesspractices, unequal access to security provisionand weak accountability mechanisms for privateagents (Shapiro, 1987).

Private security in Americais a big business; from a one-person private investigators and entrepreneurial alarm installers to a multi-national companies. Both large and small firms have been able to successfully carve their own niche out of an ever-expanding marketplace. Continuing technological innovations and product development, crime and fear of crime, and strained public resources will all contribute to sustained the dynamic growth of this important segment of the economy. Private security therefore, plays a major protective role in the life of the Nation (Cunningham&Taylor, 1985). In the argument of Joh (2004), The private police are increasingly being considered as the first line of defence in America's post-September 11^{th} world.

In Nigeria, formal social control was introduced at the inceptionof colonialism. The colonialgovernment,therefore,took over full responsibility for ensuring lawand order in the state. This led to the birth of the colonialpolice, which soon became instruments of force and violencein the hands of colonial authorities.Inspite of this, increase in criminality was observed, especially after the civil war. It was very clear from the proliferation of small arms and violence (Igbo, 2007) that the government was no longer able to provide effective security for the citizens. Itwas the realization of the indications that the statehas failed in its constitutional responsibilities to maintain lawand order and ensure peace that gave impetus to the emergenceof various private security firms, including ethnic vigilantes and neighbourhood crime watch groups. As Arase (2018), a former Inspector General of Police in Nigeria rightly observed, there is no coordinated mechanismsin Nigeria thatseek to apply resources, initiatives, knowledge and energy of the diverse security (public and private)sectorsto promote and sustain security and safety in the country. Many of those who would have done had spent their energy to argue that there is no need for a paradigmshift and adoption of new approaches especially on strategic security partnerships.

However, Ekhomu(2005) has noted that no government has the ability andknow-how to offer adequate security for its citizens, even in developed countries; hence the need for private securityfirms to complement the efforts of the state in crimecontrol and prevention. The comparison of scholarly investigations around the world has shown that there is the existence of a *revolving door*effects in the security industry. The [private security] industry, particularlyat the more professional and leadershiplevels, is composed of thousands of former police, military andretired national security officers, and domesticpolice agents for whom public service wasa revolving door, and who have now retired after the mandatory retirement age at work. Many local police retired at a relativelyearly age after 20 years of service. To these categories of men and women, morelucrative private-sector offers would attract them long before final retirement. These types of officers brought their public security experiences to the private security organizations; and help to create formal and informal networks thatserve to integrate those in public and privateestablishments.

In Nigeria, the collaboration between the Civilian Joint Task Force (Civilian JTF) and the soldiers in the fight against Boko Haram helps to illustrate and emphasize the importance of security collaborations or partnerships. Similarly after the 9/11 in the United States, increased emphasison public/private partnerships revealed the importance of the contributions of private securityguards to the protection of critical national infrastructures in particular, and national security, in general. The present insecurity situation in the world is suggesting that security can only be adequately delivered through a network of public and private security collaborations, whose duties are both overlapping, complimentary as well as mutually supportive.

4.0 SELF-ASSESSMENT EXERCISE (SAE) 4

(i). Explain the delay in the acknowledgement of the roles of private security companies in crime prevention and control in Great Britain.

(ii). Explain your understanding of the “revolving door effects”. What implication has the effect on the future of private security companies in Nigeria?

(iii). Given the expertise and skills available in private security companies, predict the future of public-private security partnerships in Nigeria.

5.0 CONCLUSION

This unit focussed on the discourse on private security and the relationship between public and private security. It allows the student see the growth of what was initially regarded as "private good" (module 2) growing to the realm of "public good", even in the United Kingdom, where private security was not well appreciated. Time and economic advancement, which were discussed under the module on Liberalization of Security seems to have changed the earlier perceptions. In Nigeria, the collaboration between the Civilian JTF, local hunters, and the military in the fight against Boko Haram, illustrates the important role that security partnership holds in the fight against crimes and criminals.

Despite initial objection against private security organization in different countries, the conception of "revolving door effect" points to more experience of retired security officers either establishing their private security firms or joining existing ones. Those experiences are needed in the fight against crime, and the provision of security for national stability. Currently,private security has transformed to cover nearly all the patterns of criminal innovations for the purpose of checkmating the activities of criminals including the advances made by terrorists. The collaboration of these expertise is healthy for national security delivery.

The debate on security collaboration serves to bring to the fore the expertise in skill, experience, and operative strategies that exist in private security personnel, especially among retired military, police, and intelligence officers who have joined private security firms after disengaging from the public organizations. These skills and experiences, in addition to technology expertise are needed to compliment that of the public security officers to protect the country's critical infrastructures, commercial houses, institutions and provide overall national security.

6.0 SUMMARY

Overall, the conceptual clarifications of this course was done in module one. All through the modules that followed, effort was made to build on the clarifications by bringing in theoretical approaches. Thereafter, explanationswere offered on the practices of security collaborations and the importance of public and private security partnerships for national security. In module five examples of international best practices on public and private security collaborations were presented; followed by strategies that can be used to achieve effective security collaborations in module six. This is in addition to providing insights to what security collaborations holds for the protection of critical infrastructures, commercial

institutions, residential and national security, which are regarded as critical security targets. It is hoped that many young policemen and women, who retired early from the security service, will join private security firms and to continue to serve the country especially, in security collaborations involving public and private security organizations. In this way, private security organizations continue to remain a big employer of labour, in addition to providing security for the overall well-being of the citizens, the economy and the country.

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